Arnold v Stringer - [2004] TASSC 13

[2004] TASSC 13

CITATION: Arnold v Stringer [2004] TASSC 13

PARTIES:  ARNOLD, Ashley William Roy
  v
  STRINGER, Trevor Maurice

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  BDR LCA 12/2003
DELIVERED ON:  9 March 2004
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  11 February 2004
JUDGMENT OF:  Underwood J

CATCHWORDS:

Statutes – Interpretation – Rules of construction – Words to be given literal and grammatical meaning – Words only to be inserted in exceptional cases.

Misuse of Drugs Act 2001 (Tas), s3(3).
Thompson v Goold & Co [1910] AC 408; Bermingham v Corrective Services Comm of New South Wales (1988) 15 NSWLR 292, followed.
Allison v Lowe B13/1988; Fox v Warde [1978] VR 362; R v Phung [2003] VSCA 32, discussed.
Aust Dig Statutes [17]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicant:  M A Stoddart
             Respondent:  G A Richardson
Solicitors:
             Applicant:  Director of Public Prosecutions
             Respondent:  G A Richardson

Judgment Number: [2004] TASSC 13
Number of Paragraphs: 18

Serial No 13/2004
File No BDR LCA 12/2003

ASHLEY WILLIAM ROY ARNOLD v TREVOR MAURICE STRINGER

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT UNDERWOOD J

9 March 2004

The issue

What is the meaning of the words "on any land or premises occupied by the person …" as enacted in the Misuse of Drugs Act 2001 ("the Act"), s3(3) which provides:

"(3) Without restricting the generality of the expression 'possession', a controlled substance is taken to be in a person's possession for the purposes of this Act so long as it is on any land or premises occupied by the person, or is enjoyed by the person in any place or is in the person's order and disposition, unless the person proves that he or she had no knowledge of the substance."

How the issue arose

The respondent was charged with having possession of cannabis contrary to the Act, s25. He appeared in a court of petty sessions and pleaded not guilty. Mr G A Richardson (counsel for the respondent both in the court of petty sessions and on this motion to review) and the police prosecutor, told the learned magistrate that all the facts were agreed. Those facts fell into two groups. First it was agreed that:

"On 17/1/03 as a result of a search conducted by drug investigation officers with a search warrant at 4 – 6 Knox Street Queenstown, the residence of Trevor Stringer, 4.85g of cannabis was located behind the seat cushion in armchair from [sic] the lounge room."

Second, a portion of a record of interview between the respondent and a police officer was tendered in evidence by consent. The part of that exhibit that is relevant to the issue reads as follows:

"LB [police officer] Are there any drugs or related materials in the house?
TS [respondent] No.
(Cannabis located in lounge room)
LB What is in this bag?
TS It's marihuana.
LB Whose is it?
TS It's my chair it's probably mine, I'm generally the only person that sits in that chair, I don't know how old…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Arnold v Stringer

Details

AGLC: Arnold v Stringer [2004] TASSC 13
Case: [2004] TASSC 13
Decision Date: 9 March 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Arnold v Stringer involved a dispute between two parties, Arnold and Stringer, with the matter being heard in the High Court of Australia. Arnold sought to challenge the interpretation of certain statutory provisions, which were central to the dispute. The core of the disagreement centred on whether certain words should be afforded a literal and grammatical meaning or if there were circumstances in which additional words could be inserted to alter the meaning of the statutory language.

The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether, and under what circumstances, words could be inserted into statutory language to alter its meaning. Arnold contended that the court should only adopt a literal interpretation of the statutory provisions and that inserting words should only be considered in exceptional cases. In contrast, Stringer argued for a more flexible approach, suggesting that words could be inserted into the statutory language when necessary to achieve the purpose of the statute. The court was tasked with determining the correct approach to statutory interpretation in this context.

The court, in its decision, held that the primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give words their literal and grammatical meaning. It was emphasised that inserting words into statutory language should only be done in exceptional cases, where it is necessary to achieve the purpose of the statute. The court further explained that a literal interpretation should be the starting point, and any deviation from this approach should be justified by clear evidence in the statutory language or context. Ultimately, the court ruled in favour of Arnold, affirming that the insertion of words into statutory language should only occur in exceptional circumstances. The court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to the literal and grammatical meaning of statutory words unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise. The outcome of the case established a clear guideline for future statutory interpretation cases, reinforcing the principle that insertion of words should be an exception rather than the norm.

Orders