Arnold v Dalton

Case [2002] SASC 429

ARNOLD v DALTON

[2002] SASC 429

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Bleby and Besanko JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ:          I agree with the orders proposed by Bleby J and with the reasons that he gives.  There is nothing that I wish to add to those reasons.

    BLEBY J:  Background

  2. The respondent (Mr Dalton) brought a claim in the District Court pursuant to the De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (“the Act”).  He sought orders for the transfer to him of certain house properties at Smithfield and Goolwa presently in the name of the appellant (Ms Arnold), an order for payment of money to him by Ms Arnold and the return to him or compensation for the loss of numerous items of personal property.

  3. On 6 September 2001 a District Court Judge ordered the return to Mr Dalton of in excess of 200 miniature cars and the return of a lesser number to a solicitor for return to a Mr James, a dealer to whom all the miniature cars in question had been sold.  The Judge declined to make any order in respect of the Smithfield property, directed that Ms Arnold pay to Mr Dalton $35,000 which was estimated to represent one half share in the value of the Goolwa property, and adjourned further consideration as to possible sale of the Goolwa property if the latter order were not complied with.

  4. Ms Arnold appealed against those orders, claiming that no de facto relationship ever existed, seeking orders that she is beneficially entitled to both house properties, an order that all relevant personal property remain vested in her and an order for payment to her of $31,000 “being an amount of three years of back child support that the Judge ruled in her orders as a conservative estimate for their care”.

  5. Mr Dalton cross-appealed, claiming the payment of additional money by Ms Arnold, compensation for loss of personal property and “equitable” division of the real property and of the personal property contained within the two houses.

  6. The order for payment by Ms Arnold was not complied with.  By further order made on 28 November 2001 the Judge ordered the sale of the Goolwa property on certain terms, with 50 per cent of the net proceeds, after expenses of sale, to be paid to Mr Dalton and the balance, after payment of outstanding rates and taxes and the discharge of mortgages and encumbrances, to be paid to Ms Arnold.

  7. Mr Dalton also appealed against that order, seeking the same orders as claimed in his cross-appeal and on grounds which are identical to those stated in his original cross-appeal. 

  8. Ms Arnold did not appeal against the second order.  In fact, her appeal against the first order lapsed by virtue of Rule 95.11 of the Supreme Court Rules.  Accordingly, it is not necessary to concern ourselves with that appeal.  We therefore have before us only Mr Dalton’s two appeals, both in identical terms.

  9. Neither party was represented by a legal practitioner at the trial in the District Court.  Mr…

Continue reading Arnold v Dalton

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Arnold v Dalton [2002] SASC 429
Case
[2002] SASC 429
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Arnold v Dalton, the appellant, Mr Dalton, sought to appeal the orders made by the District Court regarding the division of property between him and the respondent, Ms Arnold, following their de facto relationship. The primary issue was whether the trial judge correctly considered the contributions of both parties in the acquisition of their properties and the maintenance of their children. Additionally, Mr Dalton challenged the lack of valuation evidence for the properties in question.

The court had to determine whether the trial judge correctly applied the law in considering the contributions made by both parties, including homemaking and parenting contributions, under section 11 of the relevant Act, despite the court's lack of jurisdiction to order maintenance payments. The court also had to assess whether the trial judge properly handled the absence of independent valuations for the properties and if this omission affected the fairness of the property division.

The court found that the trial judge appropriately considered the contributions of both parties, including their financial and non-financial inputs, as required by the Act. The court emphasised that while the court cannot order maintenance payments, it must still consider these contributions when dividing property. In this case, the trial judge's consideration of the contributions made by both parties was deemed appropriate and in line with the statutory requirements. Furthermore, the court concluded that the absence of independent valuations did not result in a miscarriage of justice, as the trial judge had reasonable alternative methods to estimate the properties' values. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the orders were varied to reflect the correct distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the Goolwa property, with additional payments to Mr Dalton to account for his outstanding obligations and appeal costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Dalton may feel aggrieved that he did not have the documents earlier. He may feel aggrieved that he believed that he was a victim of Ms Arnold’s concealment. However, in the end, the trial Judge accepted his evidence on the crucial issue of who contributed what to the acquisition of the houses. He could not ask for more than that.Maintenance and other contributions – s 11 and the facts The final ground of appeal in the notice of appeal complains about the fact that, in making the division of property, the trial Judge took into account the relative contributions of each party to the maintenance of the children of the relationship, thereby in effect giving practical expression to a notional order for past maintenance of the children in a situation where the Court has no jurisdiction to order maintenance payments. The trial Judge accepted that the Court has no jurisdiction to make orders for maintenance of children of a de facto relationship. Section 11(1) of the Act provides:“11(1)In deciding whether to make an order for the division of property under this Part, and if so the terms of the order, the court -(a)must consider the financial and non-financial contributions made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of the de facto partners to -(i)the acquisition, conservation or improvement of property of either or both partners; or(ii)the financial resources of either or both partners; and(b)must consider the contributions (including homemaking or parenting contributions) made by either of the de facto partners to the other partner or to children of the partners or either of them; and(c) must have regard to the terms of any relevant cohabitation agreement; and(d)may have regard to other relevant matters.” Although there is no jurisdiction to order maintenance payments, in considering whether to make orders for the division of property, it is nevertheless necessary to bring into account the relevant contributions made by both partners to each other or to the children of either or both of them. This includes homemaking or parenting contributions, a matter to which I will return. In relation to the acquisition of the two house properties, the trial Judge found that, in respect of the purchase price of the Smithfield house ($60,000) Mr Dalton had contributed $40,000 in cash at settlement in February 1989. The balance of the purchase price and expenses of purchase were financed by a loan of $22,000 from the State Bank of South Australia. That loan was paid off in May 1995 at the time of acquisition of the Goolwa house, the balance then being a little over $13,000. In respect of the Goolwa house, purchased in May 1995 for $47,500, the trial Judge found that Mr Dalton had contributed $20,000 in cash at settlement. That purchase was financed by a loan of $50,000 from the Westpac Bank, some of which was used to pay off the State Bank loan in respect of the Smithfield house. Thus, it seems that in respect of both transactions Mr Dalton was the only one to provide cash at settlement.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I deal first with the grounds of appeal contained in Mr Dalton’s notice of appeal. Some of these were argued by Mr Dalton on the appeal. Others were not specifically referred to. There were yet other matters raised by Mr Dalton during the course of his oral argument not specifically mentioned in the grounds of appeal. It was those matters particularly that the Court had in mind in giving Ms Arnold the opportunity to make written submissions after the conclusion of the hearing.Lack of valuation evidence The first ground of Mr Dalton’s appeal is that there was no satisfactory attempt at, or discovery of independent valuations of the two items of real property, being the Smithfield and Goolwa properties. Mr Dalton complains that there was no established principle of valuation used by the trial Judge. In his statement of claim, Mr Dalton sought the transfer to him of the Goolwa house (but not the Smithfield house), delivery to him of many items of personal property and payment to him by Ms Arnold of the sum of $10,500 or “such other sum as shall seem appropriate to this Honourable Court”. Mr Dalton knew that any division of property between the parties would only be “in a way that is just and equitable” (s 10 of the Act). Adjustments were being claimed in respect of two house properties, many items of personal property and the payment of money. If a just and equitable division were to be made, short of selling all the identifiable property and dividing the proceeds, it was necessary for the trial Judge to make some assessment of the value of the various items of property, including the houses. Mr Dalton did not provide any evidence of value of the houses, yet he was seeking a just and equitable adjustment by the transfer of one of the houses to himself. He complains that his attempts to obtain valuations from Ms Arnold were ignored or frustrated and that he could not gain access to the properties to obtain a valuation. As was pointed out to him on the hearing of the appeal, he could have obtained appropriate orders from the Court to facilitate the obtaining of valuations. He did not. By not leading evidence of value of the houses he placed the Court in a difficult position. The trial Judge said:“No expert evidence of value was placed before me by either party. It might have been difficult for the plaintiff to have gained access to the properties to obtain such evidence in any event. Whilst Ms Arnold said she had no formal evidence of value she did, at my request, place before me documents showing the values ascribed by the Valuer General for the purposes of rates and taxes, and also a real estate agent’s appraisal in relation to each property.The Valuer General currently gives a capital value of $63,000 for the Smithfield property and $58,000 for the Goolwa property. The appraisal in relation to Smithfield suggests an asking price of $84,500 to $87,500, and that relating to the Goolwa property suggests a value in the $70,000s. On the basis of this material I consider it fair to both parties to assume for the purpose of calculations that the Smithfield property is worth about $78,000 and the Goolwa property about $70,000.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

In all the circumstances I am satisfied that there was no miscarriage of justice, and that Mr Dalton was not prevented from leading what evidence he wished in support of his claim.Conclusion The orders made by the District Court on 6 September 2001 and 28 November 2001 were both stayed by order of this Court on 1 March 2002. The effect of the orders, if the stay were lifted, is that the Goolwa property would be sold and that half the net proceeds of sale would be paid to Mr Dalton. No other order was made by the trial Judge in relation to the Smithfield property or any other personal property because, in the circumstances, any entitlement that Mr Dalton had to an interest in that property was absorbed by his outstanding obligations to Ms Arnold. In the view I have taken of the matter, Mr Dalton is entitled to a further $9,000. I would therefore allow the appeal. I would revoke the stay of the orders of the District Court made by a Judge of this Court on 1 March 2002. I would vary paragraph 1(d) of the order of the District Court made on 28 November 2001 (relating to the disbursement of the proceeds of sale of the Goolwa property) by deleting sub-paragraph (iv) and by inserting in lieu thereof the following:“(iv)50% of the gross sale price less the costs, commissions and expenses of sale referred to in paragraph 1(d)(i) hereof plus the sum of $9,000 be paid to the plaintiff.” There should also be an order that Ms Arnold pay to Mr Dalton his disbursements in connection with this appeal, and that those disbursements be paid also from Ms Dalton’s share of the proceeds of sale referred to in paragraph 1(d) of the District Court order. BESANKO J: I agree with the orders proposed by Bleby J and with the reasons that he gives. There is nothing that I wish to add.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.