Arnold v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines - [2002] QLC 29

LAND COURT

BRISBANE

18 April 2002

Re: Appeals against annual valuations

Valuation of Land Act 1944
Property ID Nos: 9087488 and 9090233
Local Government: BCC-Sherwood

Elizabeth J and Peter C Arnold (AV2001-0213)

Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines

and

Valmai Arnold (AV2001-0214)

Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines

D E C I S I O N

Background:

These matters deal with lands at 142 Hargreaves Avenue, Chelmer, (AV2001-0213) and 79 Laurel Avenue, Chelmer (AV2001-0214), and described respectively as Lots 59 and 60 on RP 29376, Parish of Oxley (142 Hargreaves Avenue), and Lot 30 on RP 29380, Parish of Oxley (79 Laurel Avenue). The subject lands have areas of 989 m² (142 Hargreaves Avenue) and 506 m² (79 Laurel Avenue). Both are zoned as low density residential under the Brisbane City Council Town Plan effective at the relevant valuation date of 1 October 2000. The key issues are the nature of the land, relativity and comparison of sales. With the agreement of both parties, the two matters were heard concurrently.
On 26 February 2001 the Chief Executive issued valuations of the subject lands at $340,000 (142 Hargreaves Avenue) and $212,500 (19 Laurel Avenue). Following objections the Chief Executive confirmed those figures on 29 May 2001. The appellants have now appealed claiming the unimproved value should more properly be $300,000 (142 Hargreaves Avenue) and $190,000 (79 Laurel Avenue). There were no objection conferences between the parties, and the matters did not proceed to a court supervised preliminary conference.
Peter C Arnold appeared and gave evidence in respect of both matters. Mr K Sowden, counsel of Crown Law, appeared for the respondent, calling evidence from Daniel O’Connor, the departmental registered valuer responsible for determining the valuations.
The nature of the lands -
(A) 142 Hargreaves Avenue
This subject land is located about 8 kilometres from the Central Business District of Brisbane, and about 2.4 kilometres south-east of the Indooroopilly Shopping Town. There are local shops about 1.2 kilometres to the south-west, and it is within close proximity to schools, rail and bus services. There is good access to Hargreaves Avenue which is bitumen sealed with concrete kerbing and channelling.
The subject land has a 20 metre direct access to the Brisbane River. The land falls from street level about 2 to 3 metres to a terraced level, then falls a further 3 to 4 metres to the Brisbane River. The road frontage to Hargreaves Avenue is at elevation about 9 metres (Australian Height Datum). All normal utility services are available.
Mr Arnold advises that the subject dwelling was partly inundated to window sill level during the 1974 major Brisbane River floods.
(B) 79 Laurel Avenue
This subject land is located in one of the most prestigious street addresses in Brisbane, and is a corner parcel with a 10 metre frontage to Laurel Avenue and 50 metre frontage to Chelmer Street West. The subject land is located about 1.2 kilometres west of 142 Hargreaves Avenue, in what is accepted to be the more highly valued part of Chelmer, west of the railway line. Similar services are available to both subject lands.
Access to Laurel Avenue is good, and Laurel Avenue is an attractive tree-lined corridor, bitumen sealed with concrete kerbing and channelling. Chelmer Street West is also bitumen sealed with concrete kerbing and channelling. However Laurel Avenue is subjected to some peak hour traffic congestion due to drivers seeking to circumvent traffic build-up along Honour Avenue to the east, and the approaches to the Indooroopilly Bridge across the Brisbane River.
The subject land falls about 2 metres from Laurel Avenue towards the west, and also towards Chelmer Street to the north. There is an engineered concrete retaining wall along the entire length of the Chelmer Street West frontage. Access to the subject land from Chelmer Street West would be impacted by the fall of the land in that direction. Mr Arnold argues that any benefit accruing to the subject land from its corner location would, in his opinion, be offset by the additional costs in overcoming access to the sloping parcel from that direction.
Mr O’Connor disagrees, arguing that the slope, and the quieter access to Chelmer Street West, may be seen by a prudent purchaser as providing an opportunity for alternative access to the land. The current vehicle access is from Laurel Avenue. Mr O’Connor notes that the cost of retaining walls of height about 2 metres was unlikely to be seen as a significant cost relative to existing developments now evidenced in the market place for residential lands.
Relativity -
(A) The method of comparison
Before pursuing the matter of relativity it is noted that Mr Arnold does not seek direct comparisons between residential parcels on a rate per square metre basis, as a consequence of any belief that such an approach reflects how the market place assesses residential parcels of land. Mr Arnold concedes that prudent purchasers in the market place seek such lands on the basis of various factors, including area, shape, elevation, location and other features.
However he argues that, all else being equal, the manifestation of the market’s will may be assessed by reference to a rate per square metre basis. Mr Arnold sees such a rate as something that is “added to the other observable traits of the block” (transcript page 10). Mr Arnold uses such a comparative rate more as an analytical measure of understanding the overall market level of the lands. It may be reasonable to refer to his comparative approach as a measure of the outcome of a site value comparison.
Mr O’Connor makes no comparisons on a rate per square metre basis, basing his comparisons on a site value approach. However, he does not discount that sometimes in the market place it may appear to people that a rate per square metre approach may have some selective applicability. He notes that may occur for example with prime direct river frontage lands, where the balance between supply and demand may lead to an overheated market. However Mr O’Connor cautions against such a method.
(B) 142 Hargreaves Avenue -
In seeking relativity, Mr Arnold has compared another river-front parcel of approximately similar area at 77 Longman Terrace, Chelmer. That parcel has an area of 999 m², and is on the corner of Longman Terrace and unformed Hanlon Street. Mr Arnold argues that part of the adjoining unformed Hanlon Street has been landscape to effectively enhance the amenity of 77 Longman Terrace. Mr Arnold further argues that 77 Longman Terrace is superior to 142 Hargreaves Avenue, because it is in a superior location, is less impacted by flooding, and has a more accessible access to the river bank.
Mr Arnold compares the rate of $310.31 per square metre at 77 Longman Terrace, concluding that the subject land should have a rate of $300 per square metre or $296,700 (say $300,000). He argues that he has consistently over a number of previous objections against valuations sought relativity with 77 Longman Terrace. He advises that on each of those former objections he was unable to have had a personal meeting with the respondent, and on each occasion his objection had been refused.
Mr Arnold has sought such a relativity comparison because he accepts the paucity of sales of similar lands in the area, and he believes that relativity with a parcel of comparable quality, location, size and river frontage provides a reasonable approach to equity and fairness under the Act. He also acknowledges the difficulties confronting the Chief Executive in ensuring every parcel in the area is in correct relativity.
Mr O’Connor was unaware that there had been previous objections, and acknowledges that there may have been some communication problem in respect of seeking dialogue on this issue. He indicates that perhaps the 77 Longman Terrace valuation may need some readjustment, which would not now occur until the next valuation, should any be seen to be necessary. Mr O’Connor advises that is generally the departmental policy where errors in valuation are found to exist. He advises that there have been several thousand manual adjustments to valuations in that area during the last valuation.
Mr O’Connor further advises that valuations on the western or higher side of Chelmer had generally been increased overall by about 10%, except where the manual adjustments had been necessary. However he notes that recent sales evidence in the eastern or lower areas of Chelmer had supported increases of 15% to 20%. In some areas, where the impact of the 1974 floods have lost some significance in the market place, some increases of between 30% and 40% had been evident.
(C) 79 Laurel Avenue -
Mr Arnold draws comparisons with similar size parcels at 70 Laurel Avenue (544 m² - $215,000) and 81 Laurel Avenue (506 m² - $200,000). Adopting his overarching approach of a rate per square metre, he concludes the following relativities:

Parcel	Rate per square metre	Unimproved value
70 Laurel Avenue	$395.22	$215,000
81 Laurel Avenue	$395.26	$200,000
79 Laurel Avenue	$375.00	$190,000

Mr Arnold bases those comparisons on the premise that the corner subject land has a disadvantage impacting its corner location by the fall in topography towards the north-eastern corner. He argues that the need for a retaining wall along the Chelmer Street West frontage would be taken into account by any prudent purchaser of 79 Laurel Avenue. He argues that such topographic constraints would outweigh any potential advantage to the subject land as a consequence of its corner location. Mr Arnold notes that all three parcels have similar advantages in respect of location on Laurel Avenue, have similar areas, similar elevations, and all lack any views of the river. Mr Arnold further notes that 81 Laurel Avenue is in fact immediately adjacent to the subject land to the south.
In selecting comparisons with 70 Laurel Avenue, Mr Arnold advises that it is an inside level parcel of similar area to the subject land, and is located about 100 metres removed on the eastern side of Laurel Avenue. He believes that all three parcels have similar building areas, reflecting similar frontages. He understands that the extra area of 70 Laurel Avenue (544 m²) reflects a slightly greater depth from Laurel Avenue. However the map provided by Mr O’Connor (Exhibit 3), suggests that 70 Laurel Avenue may in fact have a slightly shallower depth than the subject land, reflecting a wider frontage for the 544 m² parcel.
Mr O’Connor advises that historically the evidence from sales of new residential estates indicated that corner parcels tended to reflect a premium of about 10% over the values of inside parcels. He suggests that reflected the advantages of increased privacy and access for vehicles. However he agrees that building areas were more constrained for building purposes on corner parcels because of setback requirements, although that was usually balanced by a tendency for corner parcels to have a slightly larger area. He concedes that such market evidence has waned to some degree over time, although he believes some allowance should continue to be provided to allow for the potential of alternative development proposals on a corner site.
Mr O’Connor advises that former relativities had been maintained between the three selected parcels in Laurel Avenue, and that each had been increased by the overall rate of 10% for that locality, free of any manual adjustment in the current valuation. On the evidence supplied Mr O’Connor argues that the unimproved values of $215,000 (70 Laurel Avenue) $200,000 (81 Laurel Avenue) and $212,500 (79 Laurel Avenue) reflect the appropriate relativities as site values. He argues that the increased value of 6.25% for the corner influence of 79 Laurel Avenue is consistent with market evidence.
Comparison of sales -
Mr Arnold provides no direct comparison of sales of comparable residential lands, although he has knowledge of the current sales provided by Mr O’Connor. Mr Arnold advises that his reason for not relying upon sales evidence is the paucity of directly comparable sales of vacant parcels to each of the subject lands.
Mr O’Connor provides the following sales of vacant lands compared to the subject lands:
(A) 142 Hargreaves Avenue -

Sale 1 – (99 Nadine Street, Graceville – Lot 106 on RP 106619). This is a 630 m² level inside parcel with river views located about 1.1 kilometre south-east of the subject land. The sale has no direct access to the river, and is separated from the river by Nadine Street and a Brisbane City Council maintained parkland. The parcel is at about 8 metres AHD in elevation, and has recently been developed with a quality dwelling. The sale is seen to be in an inferior locality to the subject land, and the building area is slightly lower than the subject land. However the level topography and street frontage of the sale are superior. Overall the sale is seen as inferior to the subject land, due mainly to its lack of direct river frontage.
The sale sold in August 1999 for $250,000, was analysed at $251,500 after removing an old dwelling, and has been applied at $220,000.

Sale 2 – (164 Leybourne Street, Chelmer – Lot 164 on SP 114641). This is a 493 m² riverfront parcel located about 375 metres south-east of the subject land. The sale has a 13.5 metre river frontage and has a slightly lower building area than the subject land. The sale is smaller, seen as superior in topography, although slightly lower building area, and overall is seen as inferior to the subject land.

The sale sold in May 2000 for $274,000, was analysed at $273,000, and applied at $250,000.

Sale 3 – (44 Rosebery Terrace, Chelmer – Lots 2 and 3 on RP 99666). This is a 2,749 m² parcel with direct river frontage and a central flood-free building parcel, sloping towards Rosebery Terrace, and also towards the river to the north. The sale is in a prestigious residential area surrounding by multi-million dollar homes. The sale is significantly superior being larger, in a better location, with a flood-free building area.

The sale sold in September 2000 for $1,350,000, was analysed at $1,358,000, and applied at $1,050,000.

(B) 79 Laurel Avenue –

Sale 1 – (168 Laurel Avenue, Graceville – Lots 166 and 167 on RP 29388). This is a 809 m² corner parcel located about 500 metres south of the subject land, in a locality with similar dwellings as the subject land. Traffic at the sale is somewhat lesser than at the subject land, and there is an old neglected asbestos dwelling adjoining the sale which tends to detract from the ambience of the sale. The sale is larger and has a superior location and shape, and is in a similar locality. The sale is seen as much superior to the subject land.

The sale sold in October 1999 for $390,000, was analysed at $390,000 after clearing and demolition of an old dwelling, and has been applied at $325,000.

Sale 2 – (65 Richmond Street, Chelmer – Lot 102 on RP 29385). This is a 409 m² elevated inside parcel located about 370 metres south-east of the subject land between Laurel Avenue and Honour Avenue. The sale is smaller, in an inferior location, but has superior topography. Overall the sale is seen as inferior to the subject land.

The sale sold in March 2000 for $192,000, was analysed at $190,500, and applied at $157,500.

Sale 3 – (4 Kianga Street, Graceville – Lot 1 on RP 901961). This is a 450 m² elevated inside parcel located about 1 kilometre south-east of the subject land. Kianga Street is a cul-de-sac, and the sale had an inferior topography due to a sandstone outcrop along the eastern side. The sale falls about 2 to 3 metres in height from east to west. The sale is slightly smaller in size, located in an inferior location, and is seen overall inferior to the subject land.

The sale sold in May 2000 for $210,000, was analysed at $208,500, and applied at $182,500.

Both Mr Arnold and Mr O’Connor agree that the 44 Rosebery Terrace sale is far superior to 142 Hargreaves Avenue, and provides little direct comparability, although it demonstrates the high level of value that is paid for very good river frontage land in that locality. Mr O’Connor agrees that his most comparable sale for 142 Hargreaves Avenue is 164 Leybourne Street.
Mr Arnold agrees that 164 Leybourne Street has similar characteristics as 142 Hargreaves Avenue, but is smaller in area and has less frontage to the river (13.5 metres). Mr Arnold agrees that 142 Hargreaves Avenue is superior to 164 Leybourne Street, but he argues by a lesser amount than applied by Mr O’Connor. He concedes that if his over-arching approach on a per square metre basis was applied, adopting the rate for 164 Leybourne Terrace ($507 per square metre), then an unimproved value greater than $340,000 could be applied to 142 Hargreaves Avenue. However he argues that, all else being equal, the rates per square metre for smaller parcels tend to be larger than for larger parcels. He argues that is consistent with his appraisals.
In respect of comparisons between 79 Laurel Avenue and 4 Kianga Street, Mr O’Connor concedes that there may now be river views available from the subsequently developed new dwelling. He notes that at 18 metres AHD the sale is at a higher elevation than 79 Laurel Avenue (about 16 metres AHD). However he maintains that there were no river views from street level when the sale occurred. He speculates that perhaps the subsequent quick resale of the developed dwelling may reflect the realisation of such higher potential for that land.
Decision:

The methods of valuation -

In seeking guidance as to the most appropriate method of determining unimproved values, I note directions in the decision of WM and TJ Fischer v Valuer-General (1983) 9 QLCR 44, where the Land Appeal Court said at page 46:
“It is indeed a fundamental principle of valuation that the best basis for assessment of unimproved value is the use of sales of vacant or lightly improved parcels.”

That principle was also clearly defined by the Land Appeal Court in PH Clough v Valuer-General (1981-82) 8 QLCR 70 at page 76:

“It has been judicially laid down many times and in many jurisdictions that in ascertaining unimproved value, sales of unimproved land of comparable quality, situation, etc, to the subject land, if they are available, are to be preferred as the best guide for arriving at unimproved value. The reason is obvious. In applying such sales there is no room for error in analysing the value of improvements.
Because there is less room for difference of opinion as to value of the various items of improvement and comparison is thus simpler, it has been held that highly improved sales should be avoided in preference to sales comprising a lesser degree of improvement.”

That principle was also followed in R and MM Barnwell v Valuer-General (1989) 13 QLCR 13, at page 17; and also in NR and PG Tow v Valuer-General (1978) 5 QLCR 378, at page 381.
However where there is a paucity, or lack of sales, of comparable vacant lands, then the Courts have upheld that comparisons of relativity between comparable parcels provide a legitimate means of determining unimproved values. That principle was followed among others in Barnwell v Valuer-General (supra), where the Land Appeal Court said at page 16:
“We are conscious that it is desirable that valuations made for the purposes of the Valuation of Land Act of comparable lands should bear proper relativity, one to the other, if the valuations are soundly based. It is, however, untenable to adopt a value for one parcel on relativity with another which has no sound basis.”

The principle of appropriate relativities was also followed in TF and SA Shepherdson v Valuer-General (1992-93) 14 QLCR 83, where the learned Member said at page 87:
“Applying to this case the principles of law summarised above, it is desirable that valuations of comparable lands should bear proper relativity. The appellants are entitled to rely on the valuations of properties in the vicinity of the subject land as being correct. … Although the comparable sales support a valuation in the order of that assigned to the subject land, it is appropriate that attention be given to obtaining some relativity to blocks in the same category of land.”

The matter of relativity was also considered in similar circumstances to the current matter in Hans and Else Grahn v Valuer-General (1992-93) 14 QLCR 327, where the appellants had sought relativity with surrounding parcels on a rate per square metre basis, supplying no sales evidence to support their estimate of value. The Land Appeal Court in that matter rejected that approach, and said at p. 330:
“The appellants fail on this point because the appropriate basis for the valuation of a residential lot is not the application of a rate per square metre but an assessment of the unimproved value of each lot as land used for single unit residential purposes. As the Land Appeal Court said in its decision on the appellants’ previous appeal (H and E Grahn v The Valuer-General, AV89-246 and 247, 13 December 1990):

‘for the purpose of valuing residential sites, the preferable method of comparison is on a site to site basis and not on the basis of a unit area valued comparison. Site for site comparison should take into comparison such matters as the size of the lots, the situation of and access to the lots, the shape and topography of the lots etc. and comparisons on a unit area basis do not necessarily reflect valuation considerations for the above features.’”

Another matter of relevance in the current matter is the wisdom of relying upon comparisons with parcels where there may be some inconsistency in the determined valuation. That was emphasised in Shepherdson v Valuer-General (supra) where the learned Member said at p. 86:
“If possible, the Valuer-General should obtain uniformity between different blocks in the same land category or type, but should do so (preferably by reference to sales of comparable lands) by correcting inaccuracies rather than by making inaccurate assessment in order to secure uniform error.”

That decision also relied upon the findings of Ladies Hosiery and Underwear Limited v West Middlesex Assessment Committee (1932) 2 KB 679, (and also All ER 427), where Scrutton LJ said at p. 688:
“That the assessing authority should not sacrifice correctness to ensure uniformity, but, if possible, obtain uniformity by correcting inaccuracies rather than by making an inaccurate assessment in order to secure uniform error. “

Comparison of sales -

I adopt first Mr O’Connor’s preferred method of preferring sales of vacant land. I note Mr Arnold’s concern that the comparison should be made only with truly comparable parcels. While it is preferable that comparable sales should be as similar as possible, it is a fact that few parcels are entirely similar. That was clarified in Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (SA) (1973) 32 LGRA 170 where Williams J said at pp. 179-180:
“It is general valuation practice for sales characterised as comparable sales to be used as bases for the valuation of land said to be similar. But allowances must always be made before such sales can be so used. No two parcels of land are identical in all respects: the sale price of any given piece of land is not necessarily the price at which it ought to have been sold, or the same thing as its true value. Before using any allegedly comparable sales, therefore, the valuer must consider whether, having regard to the circumstances (using that word in its broadest sense) appertaining to the parcel of land in question, and to the transaction of sale, there are sufficient similarities to the circumstances appertaining to the subject land and to the notional sale presupposed by the test formulated in Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia and in later cases to warrant a court’s reasoning from the sale price paid under the allegedly comparable sale, with or without other evidence, to a value for the subject land. … There is no hard and fast rule by the application of which a valuer may, whatever the circumstances, draw the line that clearly separates the sales that are comparable from those that are not. It is, in my view, all a matter of degree: some adjustment is always necessary; too much adjustment will render it unsafe to use a sale, subject to such a degree of adjustment, for the purpose of the reasoning process in the comparable sales method. Just where the line is to be drawn is, it seems to me, the very sort of question that is fit for the expert valuer to determine; the assessment of the risks of adjustment is peculiarly within his sphere of skill.”

If I look then at Mr O’Connor’s comparisons for 142 Hargreaves Avenue, I find that he sees that parcel as superior to both 99 Nadine Street (applied at $220,000) and 164 Leybourne Street (applied at $250,000), and significantly inferior to 44 Rosebery Street applied at $1,040,000. Mr Arnold does not disagree with those comparisons.
By similar comparisons on a site value basis, I find Mr O’Connor’s comparisons with his sales for 79 Laurel Avenue reveal that parcel to be far inferior to 168 Laurel Avenue (applied at $325,000) but superior to both 65 Richmond Street (applied at $155,500) and also 4 Kianga Street (applied at $182,500). While I have no direct evidence of any estimate of such comparison by Mr Arnold, his adoption of a figure of $190,000 on a relativity basis does not conflict with Mr O’Connor’s comparisons. The difference between the parties lies only in the degree of difference between those sales that they conclude. On that basis there is nothing to discredit Mr O’Connor’s comparison of sales approach.

Relativity -

I turn then to the relativity comparisons. I note that while Mr Arnold has only applied his overarching rate per square metre approach to lands that he considers are directly similar, he appears to have adopted certain assumptions. The most important feature of his analysis would appear to be his use of similar areas with similar locations. I note for example that he acknowledges that area is only one feature considered in the market place. I note also that in his opinion the rate per square metre will vary upwards or downwards depending upon the size of the parcel.
However any over-dependency upon an area comparison has the potential weakness of ignoring the impact of other features such as street or river frontage, shape etc. That was explained by the Land Appeal Court in Grahn v Valuer-General (supra) at p. 330. The use of a rate per square metre basis for residential lands was also rejected in favour of a site area basis in Ward v Valuer-General (1983) 9 QLCR 48, at 50.
If I consider Mr Arnold’s adoption of comparisons with the property at 77 Longman Terrace, I accept that parcel has an area of 999 m², and has a direct frontage to the Brisbane River. However I have no firm evidence of the actual dimensions of that parcel. I know that it is a corner parcel, and that it’s area has increased from its former size by closure of part of Hanlon Street. From the map supplied by Mr O’Connor (Exhibit 3) I note that some of the streets such as Laurel Avenue have a width of about 20 metres, while other cross streets such as Chelmer Street West only have a width of about 10 metres. By similar observations the original width of the 77 Longman Terrace parcel could have been say about 10 metres, or perhaps up to 20 metres. By the closure of part of Hanlon Street the resulting width of that parcel could vary considerably.
While fluctuations in the actual river frontage of 77 Longman Terrace could differ from the known 20 metres width of 142 Hargreaves Avenue, its impact upon the unimproved value of the land needs to be seen in perspective. It is agreed by both parties that the presence of direct river frontage is a keenly sort after feature in the market place. Indeed the sales evidence provided by Mr O’Connor supports the pre-eminence of direct river frontage as a key feature of those sales. If, for example, I was to adopt a similar approach as Mr Arnold, but utilise the actual width of the river frontage as the common denominator, I could conclude the following relationships:

Sale

River frontage

Applied rate per metre width

Comparison

164 Leybourne Street

142 Hargreaves Avenue

44 Rosebery Terrace

13 metres

20 metres

30 metres

$19,230

$17,000

$35,000

Similar/smaller

Similar/larger

Greatly superior

Such comparisons are of course inconclusive, and demonstrate the principle that the site basis approach, considering all of the features of a residential parcel, is the appropriate means of comparing lots.
I turn then to the relativity comparisons for 79 Laurel Avenue, and note that Mr Arnold suggests that the parcel at 70 Laurel Avenue has a similar width to the subject land at 79 Laurel Avenue. However as noted previously Mr O’Connor’s maps (Exhibit 3) indicate that 70 Laurel Avenue has a depth from Laurel Avenue something less than the 50 metre depth of 79 Laurel Avenue. If that assumption is correct, then the width of 70 Laurel Avenue must be greater than the 10 metres width of the subject land at 79 Laurel Avenue. A similar uncertainty therefore accompanies any assumption by Mr Arnold that “all else being equal” then a direct area comparison rate may be adopted. Clearly all else is not similar for the parcel compared by Mr Arnold.
If I then compare the two adjoining parcels at 79 Laurel Avenue and 81 Laurel Avenue, I find that Mr Arnold sees 79 Laurel Avenue as inferior due to the sloping nature of the topography towards its north-eastern corner. However I also note that there is now increasing traffic along Laurel Avenue during peak hours, and the potential for alternative vehicle access via Chelmer Street West is, in my opinion, an option likely to have some attractiveness for a potential purchaser. Another matter of interest to many purchasers is the level of increased privacy from neighbours which is afforded by a corner location. On balance I believe Mr O’Connor’s determined values fairly represent the relativity between those two parcels.
If I then allow for a greater width of 70 Laurel Avenue, I believe an unimproved site value of $215,000 for that parcel is not inconsistent with the value of $212,500 for 79 Laurel Avenue, and 81 Laurel Avenue at $200,000. On those comparisons there is nothing to discredit Mr O’Connor’s values of either subject land on a relativity basis.
Summary:
In summarising these matters I am reminded that under s.45(4) of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 the onus is upon an appellant to prove his grounds of appeal. That is not to say that the appellant must prove the actual amount appealed for, but rather to prove that the Chief Executive has either acted upon a wrong principle, or made a serious error of fact. That was clarified by the High Court of Australia in Brisbane City Council v Valuer-General (1978) 140 CLR 41, where Gibbs J said at p. 57:
“The effect of these provisions is that an owner on appeal to the Land Appeal Court has the burden of proving the grounds of his appeal, but not the burden of proving that the amount which in his opinion should be the valuation is correct. Obviously the court, if it allows an appeal, may determine the valuation at an amount different from that for which the owner contends.”

In the current matters I have no evidence that Mr O’Connor has used a wrong principle or made a mistake in either of his determinations, and accordingly I must dismiss both appeals.
Conclusions:
(1) In the matter of 142 Hargreaves Avenue (AV2001-213) having considered the whole of the evidence I am not persuaded that the appellants have proved their case. The appeal is dismissed, and the unimproved value of Lots 59 and 60 on RP 29376 as determined by the Chief Executive in the sum of $340,000 is affirmed.
(2)In the matter of 79 Laurel Avenue (AV2001-214) having considered the whole of the evidence I am not persuaded that the appellant has proved her case. The appeal is dismissed, and the unimproved value of Lot 30 on RP 29380 as determined by the Chief Executive in the sum of $212,500 is affirmed.

NG DIVETT
MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT