Arnold v Beech-Jones - [2004] TASSC 27

[2004] TASSC 27

CITATION: Arnold v Beech-Jones [2004] TASSC 27

PARTIES:  ARNOLD, Ashley William Roy
  v
  BEECH-JONES, John Mark

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  LCA 1/2004
DELIVERED ON:  25 March 2004
DELIVERED AT:  Burnie
HEARING DATE:  16 March 2004
JUDGMENT OF:  Cox CJ

CATCHWORDS:

Magistrates – Appeals from and control over magistrates – Tasmania – Motion to review – The hearing – Generally – Sufficiency of evidence – Whether proof of non-repair of radar device after testing necessary – Whether absence of such proof can create reasonable doubt of guilt.

Vehicle and Traffic (Offence Detection Devices) Regulations 2002.
Aust Dig Magistrates [272]

Magistrates – Jurisdiction and procedure generally – Procedure – The hearing – Matters of procedural fairness and propriety – Defendant not legally represented – Statements by defendant while cross-examining prosecution witness – Whether admissions – Whether of evidentiary value.

Aust Dig Magistrates [79]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
           Prosecutor:  P Jones
           Respondent:  No appearance
Solicitors:
           Prosecutor:  Director of Public Prosecutions
           Respondent:  No appearance

Judgment Number: [2004] TASSC 27
Number of paragraphs: 9

Serial No 27/2004
File No LCA 1/2004

ASHLEY WILLIAM ROY ARNOLD v JOHN MARK BEECH-JONES

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COX CJ

25 March 2004

The respondent was charged with driving a motor vehicle on 8 March 2003 at a speed exceeding 100 kilometres per hour, namely 126 kilometres per hour, on Bass Highway in the Municipality of Circular Head, being a length of road to which the provisions of the Traffic (Road Rules) Regulations 1999, regs20 and 25(3)(b), applied.

Evidence was given for the prosecution by Constable Herbert, who deposed that he completed a course in the use of the Custom Falcon Radar on 9 September 2002. He said that on Saturday, 8 March 2003, he was on mobile radar patrol on the Bass Highway near Smithton. The highway at that point had a sign posted speed limit of 100 kilometres per hour. He observed a vehicle travelling towards him at a speed which he estimated at 130 kilometres per hour. He used his radar device, which showed a constant reading of 126 kilometres per hour which he locked on to the device. He turned and intercepted the vehicle, which was driven by the respondent, and which contained passengers. The respondent accompanied him to the police vehicle where he was shown the reading locked on the device and was issued with a traffic infringement notice. Constable Herbert produced a test certificate in Form 3 of the Vehicle and Traffic (Offence Detection Devices) Regulations 2002 ("the Regulations") to the effect that the radar device he had used had been tested on 10 September 2002 by a tester at the School of Engineering, University of Tasmania, and was found capable of accurately determining the speed at which a vehicle travels within a limit of error not exceeding 2 kilometres per hour in excess or deficiency in respect of speeds up to 200 kilometres per hour.

At the conclusion of Constable Herbert's evidence-in-chief, the respondent, who was…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Arnold v Beech-Jones

Details

AGLC: Arnold v Beech-Jones [2004] TASSC 27
Case: [2004] TASSC 27
Decision Date: 25 March 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Arnold v Beech-Jones involved an appeal against a conviction for driving while disqualified. The case was heard by the Magistrates Court of Tasmania, which the appellant, Arnold, sought to review. Arnold argued that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the conviction as the prosecution had not proved that the radar device had not been repaired after testing. Arnold contended that without such proof, there was reasonable doubt as to whether the radar device had accurately detected the speed of the vehicle, thereby undermining the conviction.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the prosecution needed to provide evidence that the radar device had not been repaired after testing to support a conviction for driving while disqualified. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the absence of such evidence could create reasonable doubt regarding the accuracy of the radar detection, thereby justifying an acquittal. These issues were pivotal in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence and the validity of the conviction.

The court examined the principles of proof and the burden of proof in criminal cases, noting that while it is the prosecution's responsibility to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the defence does not need to prove innocence. The court concluded that the prosecution's evidence, which included the radar device reading and the driver's disqualification status, was sufficient to support the conviction. The court held that the absence of evidence regarding the radar device's post-testing condition did not create reasonable doubt as it was not the appellant's responsibility to disprove the accuracy of the radar device. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.

No further orders were made by the court beyond dismissing the appeal and upholding the conviction.

Orders