NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT
CITATION:
Armitage v HXE Limited [2010] NSWSC 1109
JURISDICTION:
Equity
FILE NUMBER(S):
2010/259773
HEARING DATE(S):
20 September 2010
JUDGMENT DATE:
20 September 2010
EX TEMPORE DATE:
20 September 2010
PARTIES:
Plaintiff: Cyril Armitage
Defendant: HXE Limited
JUDGMENT OF:
White J
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Not Applicable
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
Not Applicable
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Not Applicable
COUNSEL:
Plaintiff: A W Smith
Defendant: n/a
SOLICITORS:
Plaintiff: Turner Freeman
Defendant: n/a
CATCHWORDS:
CORPORATIONS – application for orders under Companies Act 1961 (NSW), s 307 declaring dissolution of defendant void and s 366 for enlargement of time to bring proceedings – where plaintiff commenced proceedings against defendant for workers’ compensation for mesothelioma said to arise from asbestos exposure when defendant’s employee – where substantial effluxion of time since winding up of defendant and distribution of assets – where defendant required to be reinstated in respect of workers’ compensation proceedings – dissolution of defendant declared void on terms – appropriate in circumstances to wind up defendant on just and equitable ground and dispense with procedural requirements for winding up
LEGISLATION CITED:
Workers' Compensation Act Amendment Act 1982 (SA)
Companies Act 1961 (NSW)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Corporations (New South Wales) Act 1990 (NSW)
Companies (Application of Laws) Act 1981 (NSW)
CASES CITED:
Baird v WJT Howes Investments Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1232; (2008) 68 ACSR 485
City West Water Ltd v Mr D Investments Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 553; (2002) 43 ACSR 622
TEXTS CITED:
DECISION:
1. Order that pursuant to subsection 366(4) of the Companies Act 1961 (NSW) the period for the making by the plaintiff of the application under s 307(1) of the Companies Act 1961 be enlarged to 5/8/10 being the date of the filing of the originating process.
2. Subject to order 3 declare the dissolution of the defendant to have been void.
3. Order that order 2 not affect the validity or operation of any step in the voluntary winding-up of the defendant including any distribution to members.
4. Order that service of the application for an order for the winding-up of the defendant and the appointment of a liquidator to the defendant, the advertising of the application and the lodging of notice of the application pursuant to s 465A be dispensed with.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
CORPORATIONS LIST
WHITE J
Monday, 20 September 2010
2010/259773 Armitage v HXE Limited
JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR: Between 1965 and 1972 the plaintiff was employed by a company then called Hawker Siddeley Electronics Limited (“the company”) in its engineering division. The plaintiff is suffering from mesothelioma and has a life expectancy measured in months. He contends that in his employment with the company he was exposed to asbestos dust and fibres. He has commenced proceedings in the District Court of South Australia seeking damages in respect of his condition.
The plaintiff has made a claim against the Statutory Reserve Fund in South Australia pursuant to s 118d…
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- Case
- [2010] NSWSC 1109
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to decide whether the dissolution of the defendant company was valid, and if so, whether it was appropriate to declare the dissolution void and reinstate the company for the purposes of the workers’ compensation claim. The plaintiff argued that the dissolution was unjust and that the substantial time elapsed since the winding up and distribution of assets did not bar the proceedings. The defendant contended that the dissolution was proper and that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the passage of time and the distribution of assets.
The court found that the dissolution of the defendant was appropriate on just and equitable grounds, but acknowledged the necessity to reinstate the company for the workers’ compensation claim. The court declared the dissolution void on specific terms, allowing the company to be treated as if it had not been dissolved for the purpose of the workers’ compensation claim. The court emphasised that the dissolution was justified under the circumstances and that the procedural requirements for winding up were appropriately dispensed with. The plaintiff was granted the necessary orders to proceed with the compensation claim.
The court ordered the dissolution of the defendant company to be declared void on the terms specified, allowing the company to be treated as if it had not been dissolved for the purpose of the workers’ compensation claim. The court also granted an enlargement of time for the plaintiff to bring the proceedings.
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