HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ,
CRENNAN, KIEFEL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJMatter No S168/2012
ARISTOCRAT TECHNOLOGIES AUSTRALIA PTY
LTD & ORS APPLICANTSAND
GLOBAL GAMING SUPPLIES PTY LTD & ORS RESPONDENTS
Matter No S169/2012
ARISTOCRAT TECHNOLOGIES AUSTRALIA PTY
LTD & ORS APPLICANTSAND
RIAD ALLAM & ORS RESPONDENTS
Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Global Gaming Supplies Pty Ltd
Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Allam
[2013] HCA 21
Date of Order: 2 May 2013
Date of Publication of Reasons: 10 May 2013S168/2012 & S169/2012
ORDER
In each matter, special leave refused with costs.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
A J L Bannon SC with J M Hennessy SC for the applicants in both matters (instructed by Gilbert + Tobin Lawyers)
M L D Einfeld QC with A C Harding for the respondents in S168/2012 and the second to fifth respondents in S169/2012 (instructed by Paul Bard Lawyers)
M Green for the first and sixth respondents in S169/2012 (instructed by Bruce & Stewart Lawyers)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
By orders made on 25 May 2012 the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia allowed appeals by the respondents against a judgment of a single judge awarding damages against them for infringement of the applicants' copyright. The copyright related to literary and artistic works in and on components of electronic gaming machines manufactured by the applicants. The applicants sought special leave to appeal to this Court against the decisions of the Full Court. Their applications for special leave were referred to an enlarged Bench by orders of French CJ and Heydon J made on 16 November 2012.
After hearing argument on 2 May 2013 this Court made orders dismissing the applications for special leave with costs and stated that reasons for its decision would be published subsequently. The question upon which special leave was sought was whether the Full Court had erred in characterising the primary judge's reasoning about evidence of email communications as inferring a "tendency" on the part of the respondents to engage in infringing conduct. Section 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ("the Evidence Act") provides that, absent compliance with conditions including reasonable notice, evidence of a tendency that a person has or had is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a tendency to act in a particular way. The applicants argued that the Full Court was wrong to say that the primary judge used the email evidence to infer tendency and that the appeal to that Court should not have been allowed on that basis. As appears from the reasons that follow, this Court was of the opinion that the Full Court's characterisation of the primary judge's reasoning was open to it and not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of special leave.
The case was one of some complexity factually and procedurally. It…
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- Case
- [2013] HCA 21
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Full Court was entitled to conclude that the primary judge had relied on email communications as tendency evidence, notwithstanding that the primary judge had not explicitly used the term "tendency" or referred to section 97 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (Cth). The applicants contended that the primary judge's reasoning did not demonstrate a reliance on the emails to establish a tendency to infringe copyright.
The High Court considered that, despite the absence of explicit language, the inferences drawn by the primary judge regarding the respondents' sanctioning, approval, or countenance of copyright infringements by others were not directly linked to the specific infringing transactions. This suggested that the reasoning process, in part, involved discerning a pattern of behaviour or a disposition on the part of the respondents to deal with articles whose creation infringed the applicants' copyright. Consequently, the High Court found that it was open to the Full Court to characterise the primary judge's approach to the email evidence as based on the discernment of a tendency.
Special leave to appeal was refused in each matter, with costs awarded to the respondents. The High Court concluded that the Full Court's view of the primary judge's use of the email evidence was reasonably open and that the applications did not involve a question of law of public importance.
Orders
Orders of the court
In each matter, special leave refused with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FRENCH CJ, CRENNAN, KIEFEL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ