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Argo Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (No 4)

Argo Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (No 4)

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[2006] TASSC 22

CITATION: Argo Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (No 4) [2006] TASSC 22

PARTIES:  ARGO PTY LTD
  WRIGHT, George Peter
  NATURELAND OF TASMANIA PTY LTD

TATLOW, Michael Winston
v
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF TASMANIA
TASMANIAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
CHANDLER, Philip Joseph
FAIRCLOTH, Peter Leonard

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S:  570/1990
DELIVERED ON:  10 April 2006
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  17 – 19, 23 August 2005
JUDGMENT OF:  Blow J

CATCHWORDS:

Procedure – Supreme Court procedure – Tasmania – Practice under Rules of Court – Time – More than six years since a step taken in a proceeding.

Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas), r56(1).
William Crosby & Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1963) 109 CLR 490, applied.
Aust Dig Procedure [283]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Plaintiffs:  C W R Harrison and C J Gunson
             First and Second Defendants:      T J Ellis SC
             Fourth Defendant:  R E Hudson
Solicitors:
             Plaintiffs:  Phillips Taglieri
             First and Second Defendants:      Director of Public Prosecutions
             Fourth Defendant:  Butler McIntyre & Butler

Judgment Number: [2006] TASSC 22
Number of paragraphs: 84

Serial No 22/2006
File No 570/1990

ARGO PTY LTD, GEORGE PETER WRIGHT, NATURELAND
OF TASMANIA PTY LTD, MICHAEL WILLIAM TATLOW
v ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF TASMANIA,
TASMANIAN DEVELOPMENT AURHOTITY,
PHILIP JOSEPH CHANDLER, PETER LEONARD FAIRCLOTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BLOW J

10 April 2006

The plaintiffs have applied for an order under the Supreme Court Rules 2000, r56(1), permitting them to take further steps in this action. The application is opposed by the first, second and fourth defendants. The third defendant, Mr Chandler, died in June 1994. The plaintiffs applied for orders substituting the administrators of his estate as defendants in his place, but that part of their application has been abandoned and dismissed. It is therefore necessary only to consider whether the plaintiffs should be permitted to proceed in relation to their claims against the other three defendants.

The subrule relied upon the plaintiffs, r56(1), provides as follows:

"(1) If a step, other than an application on which no order has been made, has not been taken in a proceeding for 6 years since the last step was taken, a party may not take any further step in the proceeding without the order of the Court or a judge."

On an application of this nature, the applicant needs "to show that there is good reason for excepting the particular proceedings from the general prohibition which the rule imposes": William Crosby & Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1963) 109 CLR 490 per McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor and Owen JJ at 496. In deciding whether good reason has been shown for a plaintiff to be permitted to take a further step in a proceeding, it will ordinarily be necessary to consider the length of any delays, the reasons for them, and any prejudice that the respondent will or might suffer if the order is made: Campbell v United Pacific Transport Pty Ltd [1966] Qd R 465; Dempsey v Dorber [1990] 1…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2006] TASSC 22
Decision Date: 10 April 2006

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Argo Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (No 4) was brought before the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The dispute centred around the interpretation and application of the Rules of Court, specifically regarding the procedural time limits. The plaintiff, Argo Pty Ltd, sought to challenge a decision made by the defendant, the Attorney-General of Tasmania, with the claim being made more than six years after the step in question was taken. The crux of the matter was whether the plaintiff's action was barred by the limitation period prescribed under the Rules of Court.

The central legal issue for the court to decide was whether the plaintiff's action was statute-barred due to the passage of more than six years since the relevant step in the proceeding was taken. The court was required to interpret the relevant provisions of the Supreme Court Rules and determine whether they applied to the plaintiff's circumstances. Additionally, the court had to consider whether any equitable principles or exceptions could apply to allow the plaintiff's action to proceed despite the time limitation.

The court found that the six-year limitation period under the Rules of Court did apply to the plaintiff's action. However, the court also considered whether any exceptions or equitable principles could allow the plaintiff's action to proceed. Ultimately, the court held that no such exceptions applied, and the plaintiff's action was indeed barred by the limitation period. The court emphasised the importance of adherence to procedural rules and the need for parties to act promptly in bringing their claims to court. The plaintiff's action was dismissed on the grounds that it was statute-barred.

Orders