Aquita & Hikal-Aquita
[2021] FamCA 491
•9 July 2021
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Aquita & Hikal-Aquita [2021] FamCA 491
File number(s): PAC 5664 of 2016 Judgment of: HANNAM J Date of judgment: 9 July 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Dispute as to certain assets and liabilities – Dispute as to contributions – Where the husband contends that it is just and equitable for the parties’ property interests to be adjusted so that each will receive an equal share – Where the wife contends that her contribution-based and adjusted entitlement should see her receive 75 per cent of the parties’ property – Where at final hearing there was insufficient evidence to support most of the parties’ contentions – Where on the limited evidence available the Court assesses the wife’s total financial and non-financial contribution following separation and up until the time of final hearing as slightly greater than that of the husband and on this basis a small adjustment is made in her favour – Where having regard to the s 75(2) factors including each parties’ respective earning capacity and the wife’s greater responsibility for the future care of the children, a further adjustment is made in favour of the wife – Where in all of the circumstances the Court is satisfied that orders that would give effect to the wife receiving a 55 per cent entitlement of the parties’ net assets and the husband receiving 45 per cent are just and equitable, with a small shortfall in the husband’s entitlement by virtue of the parties’ agreement that the wife retain the family home.
FAMILY LAW – CHILD SUPPORT DEPARTURE ORDER – Where the husband seeks a further order that a Child Support Departure Order be made but adduces no evidence in support of his application – Where in the absence of evidence the Court cannot be satisfied that it is just and equitable and otherwise proper to make orders as sought – Husband’s application is dismissed.
Legislation: Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) ss 99, 116, 117
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75, 79
Cases cited: Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116
Black & Kellner (1992) FLC 92-287
Brandt & Brandt (1997) FLC 92-758
Gyselman and Gyselman (1992) FLC 92-279
Pierce & Pierce [1998] FamCA 74
Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108
Teal & Teal [2010] FamCAFC 120
Trevi & Trevi [2018] FamCAFC 173
Weir & Weir (1993) FLC 92-338
Williams & Williams [2007] FamCA 313
Number of paragraphs: 150 Date of receipt of last written submissions: 1 and 3 December 2020 Date of hearing: 5 November 2020 Place: Parramatta Solicitor for Applicant Self-represented Solicitor for Respondent Self-represented ORDERS
PAC5664 of 2016 BETWEEN: MR AQUITA
Applicant
AND: MS HIKAL-AQUITA
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
HANNAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 JULY 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.All previous applications filed by each party are dismissed.
2.Within 60 days of the date of these Orders, the parties shall do all things necessary and sign all documents to simultaneously:
(a)Transfer to the Wife all right, title and interest in the property known as D Street, Suburb E, New South Wales, being the whole of Lot 3 in Deposited Plan … (“the D Street property”) at the Wife’s cost;
(b)Transfer to the Husband all right, title and interest in the property known as F Street, Suburb E, New South Wales, being the property contained in Lot 2 in Deposited Plan … (“the F Street property”) at the Husband’s cost;
(c)Refinance any and all loans secured by way of mortgage over the D Street property into the Wife’s sole name;
(d)Refinance any and all loans secured by way of mortgage over the F Street property into the Husband’s sole name; and
(e)Cause the disbursement of the balance of the joint NAB account being the offset mortgage account (BSB … Account no. …51) to the Husband and thereafter take all necessary steps to close the account.
3.The Wife shall indemnify and keep indemnified the Husband in relation to any and all encumbrances, debts, taxes, imposts, outgoings and/or utilities secured against or in relation to the D Street property.
4.The Husband shall indemnify and keep indemnified the Wife in relation to any and all encumbrances, debts, taxes, imposts, outgoings and/or utilities secured against or in relation to the F Street property.
5.Except as otherwise provided by these Orders, the Husband shall retain as against the Wife all interest in and entitlement to the following:
(a)Any and all shares in his name or in a portfolio in his name, including any shares managed by CommSec;
(b)The proceeds of the Commonwealth Bank CDIA account ending in …06;
(c)All of his interest (howsoever arising) in the apartment in Suburb G, City H, Country J;
(d)All personal property now in his possession or control including any vehicle in his name;
(e)All debentures, units in unit trusts, bank, building society or credit union accounts standing in his sole name; and
(f)All interest in life insurance policies and superannuation funds standing in his sole name.
6.Except as otherwise provided by these Orders, the Wife shall retain as against the Husband all interest in and entitlement to the following:
(a)Any Pension Scheme of the K Association, and any estate in Country J;
(b)All personal property now in her possession or control including any vehicle in her name and the parties’ furniture situated in the D Street property;
(c)All shares, debentures, units in unit trusts, bank, building society or credit union accounts standing her sole name; and
(d)All interest in life insurance policies and superannuation funds standing in her sole name.
7.The Husband shall be solely responsible for all liabilities in which he has an interest, both incurred prior to the date of these Orders and in the future, including but not limited to all credit card debts and taxation liabilities and the Husband hereby indemnifies and shall keep indemnified the Wife in relation to all of these liabilities.
8.The Wife shall be solely responsible for all liabilities in which she has an interest, both incurred prior to the date of these Orders and in the future, including but not limited to all credit card debts, taxation liabilities and personal loans, and the Wife hereby indemnifies and shall keep indemnified the Husband in relation to all of these liabilities.
Child Support Departure
9.The Husband’s application for a Child Support Departure Order is dismissed.
Section 106A
10.In the event either party refuses or neglects to execute any deed, document or instrument necessary to give effect to all or any of these orders, then the Registrar of the Court shall be appointed pursuant to Section 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to execute such deed, document or instrument in the name of the said party and do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to the deed, document or instrument upon the Registrar being provided with verification of such refusal or failure by way of affidavit.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Aquita & Hikal-Aquita has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HANNAM J:
INTRODUCTION
The parties (“the husband” and the “wife”) cannot agree about a fair adjustment of their property interests arising from the breakdown of their marriage lasting over 20 years.
The husband contends that it is just and equitable for the parties’ property interests to be adjusted so that each will receive an equal share. The wife contends that her contribution-based and adjusted entitlement should see her receive 75 per cent of their property, though it is not clear that her proposed orders, if made, will achieve this result.
The question to be determined is whether it is just and equitable to adjust the parties’ property interests and if so what adjustment should be made to achieve justice and equity between them.
BACKGROUND
The husband who is 56 and the wife who is 52 were both born in an overseas country (“the overseas country”).
In 1987 the husband immigrated to Australia and attained Australian citizenship shortly thereafter.
At some stage prior to the parties’ marriage the wife became a qualified lawyer in the overseas country and as I understand it, worked in that profession for some time in that country.
In 1998 the parties were married in the overseas country, and in the same year the wife immigrated to Australia. The parties began living together in Australia and not long after the wife also received her Australian citizenship.
The wife did not have any property interests of significance at the commencement of the marriage whereas the husband at that time owned a house situated in the ACT (“the ACT property”) which became the parties’ first home. At the time of their marriage the husband also owned an apartment in the overseas country. Issues relating to the parties’ property interests at the commencement of their marriage and how those interests are to be treated in this application are a matter of dispute to which I will return.
In April or May 2000 the husband sold the ACT property and the parties moved to Sydney so that the wife could complete her tertiary education. The husband who is also a professional was able to transfer his position to Sydney.
In about July 2000 the parties purchased a home in a Sydney suburb (“the F Street property”), which was registered in joint names.
In 2006 the wife was registered as a professional in New South Wales.
In 2008 the parties’ first child, a daughter now aged 13, was born.
In June 2008, the parties purchased a second property in Sydney in their joint names which became the family home (“the family home”). The F Street property was then leased and the rental income was put towards the mortgage repayments for the family home.
In 2011 the parties’ second child, another daughter who is now 10 years old, was born.
In February or March 2014 an investment property (“the investment property”) was purchased and registered in the parties’ joint names.
Throughout the parties’ relationship the husband was employed on a full-time basis and in this manner was the “primary breadwinner” while the wife assumed the role of homemaker and primary carer for the children after they were born. There is some dispute between them about the husband’s contribution to domestic tasks and the household and the wife’s employment to which I will return.
Over the years the parties also acquired other assets such as vehicles for each of them and share portfolios which were registered in the husband’s name.
The parties do not agree about the date of final separation though it occurred on both accounts between late 2015 and April 2016. Although little is known about the circumstances at the time of and immediately following separation, there is no dispute that for some time both parties and the children remained living together in the family home.
The husband continued to engage in his profession and trade in shares following separation. It appears that the wife was also in paid employment outside the home by this stage.
The husband initiated proceedings in December 2016 seeking orders in relation to parenting and property.
In her Response filed a short time later the wife sought orders only in relation to the future parenting of the children. The wife later amended her Response slightly with respect to the children’s time with the husband and also sought property settlement orders.
Following a hearing on 16 January 2017, the parties agreed on interim orders (“the 2017 orders”) that the children live with the wife and spend defined time with the husband. They also agreed on orders that the wife have sole use and occupation of the family home and that the husband have sole use and occupation of the F Street property. The husband moved out of the family home and the parties have each lived in these properties since that time.
The 2017 orders made with the parties’ consent also provided for the sale of the investment property and that $150,000 of the proceeds of sale be paid to each party and the balance into an offset mortgage account to service the loans on the family home and the F Street property.
In April 2017 orders were made by a Registrar directing the parties to provide financial disclosure. The husband in particular was ordered to disclose his past and current shareholdings and any car loans, while the wife was required to provide information in relation to any pension entitlement relating to her previous role as a lawyer in the overseas country. Each party was also directed to provide disclosure as to any probate documents they held regarding overseas inheritances.
In July 2018 orders were made for a mechanism to identify and value the parties’ respective alleged property interests in the overseas country. The steps required to be taken pursuant to those orders were not taken and the parties’ respective contentions about the other’s overseas interests have not been resolved, nor the identified property valued.
In March 2019 the parties were divorced.
On 4 September 2019 the parties reached agreement in relation to the future parenting arrangements for their children and orders were made with their consent for the children to live with the wife for nine nights a fortnight and with the husband for five nights and to spend half of each school holiday period with each parent on a “week about” basis.
There was a delay in listing the property dispute for hearing due to the restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the requirement that the hearing proceed in person as the parties were each self-represented. The hearing eventually took place on 5 November 2021.
THE LAW & DISCUSSION
The approach to the determination of an application for property settlement orders is set out in Stanford v Stanford[1] (“Stanford”) which was considered in detail by the Full Court in Bevan & Bevan[2] (“Bevan”).
[1] (2012) 247 CLR 108.
[2] [2013] FamCAFC 116.
The starting point is a consideration of “whether it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order by identifying, according to ordinary common law and equitable principles the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in the property”[3].
[3] Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 at [37].
This involves identifying the existing interests and then considering whether having regard to the particular circumstances before me, it would be just and fair to make orders for the alteration of those interests.
If it is just and equitable to alter the parties’ property interests, I should next consider the matters set out in s 79(4)(a) to (c) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), that is, the financial and non-financial contribution made by each party to the property and to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties.
I must then consider the remainder of the matters in s 79(4) including the matters referred to in sub-section 75(2) so far as they are relevant, and determine on this basis whether there should be a further adjustment to the parties’ contribution-based entitlements.
Finally, I must then consider the justice and equity of the proposed orders. As was said in Bevan (supra) at [86], the just and equitable requirements is “not a threshold issue, but rather one permeating the entire process”.
What are the existing interests of the parties?
The draft joint Balance Sheet prepared by the parties lists some items of property about which there is no dispute. There are disputes concerning other assets and liabilities which require resolution.
Vehicles
First, there is a dispute in relation to the parties’ cars. It is common ground only that there is one vehicle registered in the wife’s name (“the wife’s car”) valued at $7,000. The wife also raises a matter in relation to a debt owed in respect of this car which will be discussed when considering the parties’ liabilities.
Although the parties also agree that the husband owns a particular vehicle (“the husband’s car”), its value is a matter of contention; the husband lists its value at $26,700 in the Balance Sheet while the wife contends its value is $36,000.
The wife also asserts that the husband owns another car (“the disputed car”) of the same model as the husband’s car which she curiously asserts is also valued at $26,700. The husband denies that he owns the disputed car.
It became clear in the course of the proceedings that the various cars used by the parties in question were owned by a company of which the parties were equal shareholders and joint directors (“the company”). The husband resigned as a director of the company in December 2017 and it was subsequently deregistered by the wife. Documents attached to the wife’s affidavit indicate that in September 2017 prior to resigning his directorship the husband purchased his car. Under cross-examination the husband said that at the time of this purchase he traded in the disputed car and has not owned the disputed car since this time.
Although the wife argues that the disputed car is owned by the husband, and for this reason should be included in the Balance Sheet as an asset in his hands, her own affidavit evidence is that the husband either sold it or gave it to a friend in 2017. Although she also seems to suggest that the husband’s account as to the disposal of the disputed car is unreliable, ultimately it is common ground that the husband has not owned it since 2017. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the disputed car is not an asset of either party.
So far as the husband’s car is concerned, there is varying evidence of its current value. In his Financial Statement the husband deposes to a value of $23,500 while a RedBook valuation certificate (issued on the day of the final hearing: Exhibit 9) values a car of the age, model and condition in question as $26,450 for a private sale or $22,100 as a trade-in. The husband’s asserted value in the joint Balance Sheet is $26,700. There is no evidence of the wife’s contended value of $36,000. In my view, the most reliable valuation of the husband’s car is contained in Exhibit 9 and for the purposes of the Balance Sheet it will be valued at $26,450.
Shares
There appears to be no dispute that the husband traded in shares throughout the relationship and continued to do so following separation through a CommSec account in his sole name.
As I understand it, the wife contends that the husband’s CommSec share portfolio is currently valued at $83,042 (rounded up) though she ascribes a value of $88,075 (rounded up) to it in the Balance Sheet, albeit with the words added “as at 7 August 2017.” In her affidavit, as evidence of this value the wife annexes a document titled Financial Year Summary for the financial year ending 30 June 2015, which ascribes a value to the portfolio of $83,042 (rounded up) as at that date. The wife also contends that after that date the husband continued to trade on his share account (a matter which the husband does not dispute and to which I will return).
In the draft joint Balance Sheet the husband nominates a value of $806 (rounded up) to his CommSec share portfolio. In his affidavit he deposes to the portfolio having a total value of “approximately $540” as at February 2020 and in his Financial Statement of 16 December 2019 he deposes to his share portfolio being valued at $494.
There is no evidence adduced in the proceedings other than the party’s respective assertions in relation to the current value of the share portfolio and the husband was not questioned under cross-examination about this matter.
There is also no dispute that the husband holds “shares” described as “L Company Shares” in the draft joint Balance Sheet, which the wife contends have a current value of $28,149 while the husband contends are valued at $3,250.
In his affidavit the husband does not refer to his L Company shares at all and under cross-examination the only questions asked of him about these shares related to their sale after the proceedings had commenced. The husband appeared to agree under cross-examination that at some stage he and the wife agreed about the value of these shares that he had sold which is a matter to which I will return, but no questions were asked about the current value of these shares.
In his Financial Statement the husband does not include these “shares” as assets.
It is apparent from the wife’s affidavit that the L Company “shares” are in fact “credits” in the husband’s name in a vacation resort scheme which appear to entitle the husband to benefits within that scheme. The document annexed to the wife’s affidavit being a levy notice in respect of that credit holding issued in November 2014 has no relevance to the current value of the L Company shares. Cross-examination of both parties did not shed any more light upon the question of the valuation of these shares.
The husband annexes documents to his written submissions that he appears to contend relate to the CommSec share portfolio and the L Company shares. These documents were not admitted in evidence, nor did the husband seek to reopen the proceedings to enable their admission so they are disregarded for the purposes of this judgment.
Ultimately, as there is no reliable evidence in relation to the current value of either of the husband’s shareholdings they should be excluded from the joint Balance Sheet, though the evidence concerning his disposal of these shares may be relied on for other purposes to which I will return.
Property interests in the overseas country
Another item of property in dispute between the parties is an apartment owned by the husband in the overseas country. Although the husband contends that this property is owned jointly with his sisters who are not parties to the proceedings, he deposes to purchasing it himself utilising some money borrowed from his sisters and subsequently conceded that the property is registered in his name. He adduces no evidence of the value of this apartment.
Ultimately, there appeared to be no dispute between the parties that orders were made by a Registrar on 3 July 2018 with the parties’ consent (“the July 2018 orders”) which provided for steps to be taken in relation to the valuation of the husband’s apartment in the overseas country and identification of other contended property interests of both parties in the overseas country and valuation of same.
It also appears to be common ground that the parties who were at that stage represented but subsequently each came to represent themselves did not take the steps required by the July 2018 orders for the contended property interests in the overseas country to be identified or valued, though each party provides differing reasons for these steps having not been undertaken.
The effect of the parties not having complied with the July 2018 orders is that no value can be ascribed to the husband’s apartment in the overseas country and for this reason it will not be included in the Balance Sheet. However, given that the husband does not deny owning the property, his evidence in relation to it is a matter to which I will return when considering each party’s financial resources.
Foreign bank accounts
The parties agree that they previously had a joint bank account in a second overseas country. The husband contends that at some stage this bank account had an estimated balance of $20,000 which he also appeared to suggest is the current balance. The wife contends that this account is dormant and has no current balance.
Although the husband included $20,000 in this account in the draft joint Balance Sheet, he does not depose to the existence of this account in his affidavit and in an interchange with the bench at the commencement of the final hearing conceded that he had made no further enquiries about this account since about 2010.
The husband annexes a document to his written submissions which he says relates to this bank account in an effort, it appears, to have this document taken into account in the proceedings. For the reasons given previously when discussing other documents that the husband annexes to his submissions, this document will not be considered as it does not form part of the evidence in the proceedings.
The wife also asserts that the husband operates an account together with his sisters in the overseas country but she had no evidence to support any contention in relation to that account.
As there was no evidence adduced in the proceedings in relation to the joint bank account in a second overseas country, or the bank accounts said to be operated by the husband together with his sisters, neither of these assets will be included in the Balance Sheet.
Liabilities
The parties are in agreement in respect to the loans secured by mortgages over the two pieces of real estate.
In addition, the wife also asserts that she has an outstanding debt which she alone incurred in relation to her car and which she contends should be treated as a joint liability for the purposes of these proceedings.
As touched upon earlier in these Reasons, the two cars used by the parties and treated as their property for all purposes including these proceedings were purchased by the company of which both parties were directors and shareholders which has since been deregistered.
So far as the purchase of the wife’s car is concerned, there appears to be no dispute that this was financed through a loan from a finance company of $20,000 and that the loan instalments were paid prior to separation from one of the parties’ joint bank accounts.
The January 2017 orders made at an early stage in the proceedings provided for the balance of proceeds of sale of the investment property to be deposited into a joint account to service the mortgage loans and also restrained the parties from drawing from that account without the written consent of the other party or order of the Court. Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that the husband did not agree for the ongoing loan repayments for the wife’s car to be made from this account. In any event, there is no dispute that when the term of the loan for the wife’s car came to an end, a sum of $6,000 was outstanding and the finance company threatened to repossess the wife’s car unless that sum was paid.
The wife was not challenged on her evidence that she made the final loan repayment for the car herself (and documents annexed to her affidavit indicate that this was done some time prior to February 2019) or that the $6,000 required for this repayment was borrowed from a friend and that loan has not been repaid. As it relates to an asset which is included in the Balance Sheet for distribution, the wife contends that the debt of $6,000 to her friend should be treated as a joint liability.
The husband in the course of an interchange between himself and the bench takes issue with the contention that he should bear some responsibility in relation to that debt, asserting that the wife is “double-counting”. He provided no further explanation for this submission.
In my view, as a matter of principle, the husband ought to bear some responsibility for the loan obtained to make the payment on the outstanding balance of the wife’s car loan, as this sum was borrowed by the company of which he was a joint director and shareholder at the time of purchase and he resigned from that directorship and left the wife to bear total responsibility for that liability. However, as the wife adduces no evidence about the current situation relating to this debt and in particular whether steps have been taken to require repayment, in my view, it should not be included as a liability on the Balance Sheet. Rather, it will be a matter taken into account later in these Reasons.
Superannuation interests
There is no dispute between the parties about the wife’s superannuation interest but there is significant dispute concerning the value of the husband’s superannuation interest as at the date of the final hearing. The wife asserts that the husband’s superannuation interest is valued at $228,273 and relies upon his Financial Statement sworn 16 December 2019 (upon which the husband relies at final hearing) in which the husband deposes to this value. The husband ascribes a value of $184,940 (rounded up) to this superannuation interest in the draft Balance Sheet.
According to the husband’s affidavit sworn 24 February 2020 he had superannuation entitlements “worth approximately $220,000” at that time.
In the course of an interchange between myself and the husband at the commencement of the final hearing when I was attempting to understand the parties’ respective contentions, the husband undertook to obtain a current balance for his superannuation. Although the husband did not ever produce such a document at the final hearing it is apparent from the transcript that he claimed to have electronically accessed his superannuation records that same day and determined that his superannuation account had a current value of $188,960 (rounded down). The transcript also reveals that the husband was asked to show the wife the document to which he had electronic access upon which he relied if the wife required proof of that assertion and if she did accept it then the agreed figure could be placed in the Balance Sheet. If she did not accept it, he would need to adduce documentary evidence of that balance.
There was some cross-examination concerning the husband’s superannuation. He agreed that he had withdrawn $20,000 from his superannuation account under the scheme permitting this due to the COVID-19 pandemic and he clarified that he had done that as soon as he was able to do so (presumably in the first quarter of 2020).
The wife’s cross-examination of the husband was extremely confusing, in part because she raised for the first time objections to various paragraphs of his affidavit in the course of her questions. The issue of the husband’s superannuation was touched upon tangentially at this stage when the wife said in the course of a question “we sort it out about the superannuation about the 20” but the meaning of these words is unclear. By the end of the hearing, the husband had not produced any document setting out the value of his then current superannuation interest and the wife had not indicated whether she accepted the husband’s oral assertion about that value.
In written submissions at the conclusion of the proceedings the husband asserted an alternate value for his superannuation as at the date of that submission being 1 December 2020. This assertion of itself cannot be evidence of that matter and will not be treated as such.
The wife does not address the issue of the valuation of the husband’s superannuation interest in her final submissions.
The evidence in relation to the husband’s superannuation interest is highly unsatisfactory. Doing the best I can in these circumstances, I consider the most reliable evidence in relation to that interest is the husband’s valuation in his Financial Statement of $228,273 when that document was sworn. Accordingly, for the purposes of these proceedings that value will be ascribed to the husband’s superannuation interest in the Balance Sheet.
Even though I have no reason to reject the husband’s sworn evidence under cross-examination that he subsequently withdrew $20,000 from that account, such a withdrawal was made for his own purposes so he is not disadvantaged in these proceedings if the December 2019 value is used for the purposes of adjustment.
Furniture
There is no dispute between the parties that their jointly owned furniture is in the possession of the wife as she continued to reside with the children in the former family home after the January 2017 orders were made where that furniture was located. The husband estimates that this furniture is valued at $10,000 in the draft Balance Sheet while the wife estimates it is worth around $5,000. Neither party adduces any evidence in support of these assertions. In these circumstances, I consider it appropriate to take the approach foreshadowed in interchanges with the parties about the matter and place a midpoint value between the parties’ values on the household furniture of $7,500 in the Balance Sheet.
On the basis of the parties’ agreement as to assets and liabilities in the Balance Sheet and in accordance with my foregoing findings about matters in dispute, their current interests are set out in the following table:
LIST OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
ASSET HUSBAND WIFE JOINT Former family home $1,250,000 The F Street property $875,000 Wife’s car $7,000 Husband’s car $26,450 Furniture $7,500 Balance in Joint Offset Account $69,313 Total Assets $26,450 $7,000 $2,201,813 LIABILITIES HUSBAND WIFE JOINT Loan outstanding on mortgage over family home $410,691 Loan outstanding on mortgage secured against the F Street property $511,694 Total Liabilities $922,385 Total Net assets $26,450 $7,000 $1,279,428 SUPERANNUATION HUSBAND WIFE JOINT Husband’s superannuation $228,273 Wife’s superannuation $52,728 NET INTERESTS HUSBAND WIFE JOINT Half share of joint assets $639,714 $639,714 Total Net Assets $894,437 $699,442 TOTAL POOL $1,593,879 Is it just and equitable to alter the parties’ property interests?
The question to be determined is whether it would be just and equitable to leave the property rights intact having regard to there currently being total assets to the value of $1,593,879 with the husband’s interests totalling $894,437 and the wife’s interests totalling $699,442.
As was indicated in Stanford (supra) at [42], the requirement that it would be just and equitable to make an order is in many cases readily satisfied by observing that:
… as the result of a choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living in a marital relationship. … any express or implicit assumption that the parties may have made to the effect that existing arrangements of marital property interests were sufficient or appropriate during the continuance of their marriage relationship is brought to an end with the ending of the marital relationship. And the assumption that any adjustment to those interests could be effected consensually as needed or desired is also brought to an end. Hence it will be just and equitable that the Court make a property settlement order. …
In this case, the parties were married for over 20 years before separating. They have been separated for a number of years and accept that there will not be common use of their property by both of them in the future. They both seek adjustment orders but are unable to agree to the adjustment and leaving the property rights intact does not accord with either of their contentions about their respective entitlements. In these circumstances, I am easily satisfied that it is just and equitable to make orders under s 79 of the Act.
Other matters related to the Balance Sheet
Add backs
Each of the parties contend that the other has had the advantage of receiving various items of joint matrimonial property which it is contended should be “added back” to the parties’ property interests for distribution and credited to that other party.
In this regard, first it is the wife’s contention that the husband withdrew $115,000 from the parties’ joint bank account and utilised it as if it were his sole property. In the notes that form part of the Balance Sheet she does not identify when this withdrawal was made. In her affidavit as to this matter the wife deposes that the husband withdrew $140,000 “to his own account during refinance” and documents annexed to her affidavit appear to relate to various transfers made from an account in the parties’ joint names in March 2015, prior to separation when the relationship was intact. The husband denies that at any stage he withdrew funds from any joint account with his former wife and used that amount as if it were his own.
The tenor of both parties’ evidence is that when the relationship was intact their finances were mingled and the husband, the main income earner, was responsible for the management of their joint financial affairs. In these circumstances, there is no basis to “add-back” any amount withdrawn by the husband prior to separation (even if there were sufficient evidence to find that that had occurred) having regard to the principles relating to “add-backs”[4].
[4] See for example Trevi & Trevi [2018] FamCAFC 173.
The wife also contends that the husband sold shares to the value of $92,165 (rounded up) and that such a sale amounts to disposal of matrimonial property for which the husband alone received the proceeds. It is her contention that the proceeds of the sale of these shares should be added back to the property of the parties for distribution and credited to the husband. Once again, she does not identify in the notes attached to the Balance Sheet when it is contended that these shares were sold.
In her affidavit the wife deposes only to the sale of the L Company “shares” but she does not annex any document relating to that sale. Instead, she makes a hearsay assertion about the matter from the contents of documents produced on subpoena that the sale took place “during court proceedings in 2018/19” but did not tender the documents said to be relied upon. There is no evidence at all in relation to her contention that the husband sold shares to the value as asserted.
So far as the sale of shares generally is concerned, the husband conceded during an interchange with the bench that he did sell a share portfolio registered in his name and dealt with “around $30,000” as if it were his own. He did not identify when this was said to have occurred and also agreed that he provided no evidence of this matter in his affidavit.
At the commencement of the final hearing, through an entry in the joint Balance Sheet the wife also contended that jewellery to the value of $70,000 (being the property of herself and the parties’ children) was retained or dealt with by the husband it as if it were his own. I understand that the husband refutes this contention but there was ultimately no evidence in relation to that matter other than the wife’s mere assertion which is insufficient to satisfy me to the relevant standard as to that matter.
Although it is clear from the tenor of the husband’s case outline and affidavit that he had also contended that $25,000 withdrawn by the wife should also be added back to the property pool for distribution and credited to her, it became clear in an initial interchange between the husband and myself that this withdrawal was made when the relationship was intact and he did not press it being added back.
In summary, there is insufficient evidence to support any of the parties’ contentions as to sums of money that should be added back or these matters were not pressed.
The only item that should be added back and credited to each of the parties is the $150,000 that each received pursuant to the January 2017 orders as these payments were in the nature of interim property orders for money to be paid from the proceeds of a jointly owned asset. Accordingly, the revised Balance Sheet for the purposes of distribution is as follows:
93 LIST OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
ASSET HUSBAND WIFE JOINT Add back: Payment under January 2017 Orders $150,000 $150,000 Former family home $1,250,000 The F Street property $875,000 Wife’s car $7,000 Husband’s car $26,450 Furniture $7,500 Balance in Joint Offset Account $69,313 Total Assets $176,450 $157,000 $2,201,813 LIABILITIES HUSBAND WIFE JOINT Loan outstanding on mortgage over family home $410,691 Loan outstanding or mortgage secured against the F Street property $511,694 Total Liabilities $922,385 Total Net assets $176,450 $157,000 $1,279,428 SUPERANNUATION HUSBAND WIFE JOINT Husband’s superannuation $228,273 Wife’s superannuation $52,728 Half share of joint assets $639,714 $639,714 Total Net Assets $1,044,437 $849,442 = $1,893,879 Contributions
Under s 79(4) of the Act, in considering what order should be made in property settlement proceedings, I must take into account the financial and non-financial contributions directly or indirectly made to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties and the contributions made to the welfare of the family and the children, including contributions as a homemaker or parent.
So far as financial contributions are concerned, the parties agree that the wife did not have any property interests of significance at the commencement of the marriage and the husband owned the ACT property and his apartment in the overseas country which he had acquired prior to the marriage. Although he does not depose to the extent of his equity in the ACT property, it is common ground that the proceeds from the sale of the ACT property were used by the parties to purchase the F Street property in Sydney two years after their marriage in which they then lived.
Although the husband deposes that the equity in the ACT property and the growth of that equity in the early years of the parties’ relationship “formed the financial springboard from which [the parties] were able to acquire [their] other real estate interests”, he adduced no evidence in his affidavit about the extent of his equity in the ACT property or otherwise in support of this contention.
The parties who were both self-represented seemed to consider that statements contained in various unsworn documents should be treated as evidence. In particular, the husband sought to rely upon written statements in a chronology he had prepared as evidence of the matters asserted especially in relation to the purchase price of various items of property. The wife did agree that certain of the matters asserted in this document (which became Exhibit 8 in the proceedings) could be agreed facts for the purposes of the proceedings. However, Exhibit 8 does little to assist in relation to the question of the equity the husband had in the ACT property or his contention that this equity was a “springboard” upon which the parties were able to accumulate property.
In accordance with the authorities[5], the Court must not simply have reference to the value of an item as at the date of the commencement of co-habitation without reference to its value to the parties at the time of the hearing as this may not give adequate recognition of the importance of the contribution to the pool of assets ultimately available for distribution. However, as discussed, there is insufficient evidence for any finding to be made about the importance of the husband’s initial contribution to the assets now available for distribution.
[5] See Williams & Williams [2007] FamCA 313 and Pierce & Pierce [1998] FamCA 74.
In any event, despite contentions by the husband in this regard, he also generally concedes elsewhere in his affidavit, in oral interchanges with the bench at the commencement of the final hearing and in his case as a whole, that the party’s respective contributions up until the time of separation were “different but equal”.
Having just acknowledged that the husband generally contended throughout the final hearing that each party’s contributions up until the time of separation were “different but equal”, in his final written submissions the husband then significantly altered his position about this matter, submitting that his financial and non-financial contribution to the matrimonial asset pool “far outweighs” those contributions of the wife. In written submissions as to this matter, the husband refers specifically to the value to the parties of the property he owned in the ACT at the commencement of the marriage, his financial support of the wife when she was studying and to his assertion that after the children were born he took on “most duties of looking after their wellbeing” while maintaining full-time employment. He also appears to contend that his accumulated superannuation is a matter to which he alone contributed.
The wife for her part in final submissions contends that her contribution towards the family and children is “far greater” than the husband’s contribution both “financially and non-financially”.
I reject both parties’ contentions made in their final submissions and assess, as conceded by the husband during the hearing, that each party made an equal contribution when their relationship was intact to the acquisition of their property and the welfare of the family and children on the basis that these contributions were “different but equal”. In my view, the husband may be assessed as having made the greater direct financial contribution and the wife as having made indirect financial contributions and greater contributions to the welfare of the family for the following reasons.
It is common ground that prior to the birth of the children both parties were employed and each applied their income to the accumulation of property for their common benefit. The husband as noted brought equity to an unknown extent in a property in the ACT to the marriage.
In both their affidavits the parties also each depose that the wife continued in paid employment for about two years after the birth of their first child. The wife was not challenged on her evidence that together the parties made a decision that she should then leave the workforce as it was agreed that she would primarily care for the children and the household while the husband continued to work outside the home. Although the husband claims that he attended to household tasks when we was at home, a single assertion in his affidavit to this effect cannot support his submission that he took on “most duties of looking after [the children]’s wellbeing” as it is contrary to the balance of his evidence and the wife’s unchallenged evidence about her role in the family and home.
In addition to his income from employment in his profession, the husband also traded in shares and appears to have applied any profit from this activity to the benefit of the family, though the extent to which such share trading was profitable is unknown. He also deposes to earning a rental income from the apartment he purchased in the overseas country four years before the parties were married as that property was leased between 2000 and 2014. According to his affidavit the parties (and presumably the children after they were born) travelled to the overseas country every couple of years and spent the rental income from the husband’s apartment when they were there.
In his final submissions, the husband appears to attach some weight to the fact that it is he who has accumulated a more significant superannuation interest than the wife and that this is due to the length of time he has been in the workforce compared to the wife. If I understand his submission correctly, he contends that this is one of the matters upon which relies in submitting that his financial contributions “far outweigh” those of the wife.
When assessing contributions to the husband’s superannuation account, it is to be remembered that the husband was able to maintain his income earning capacity after the birth of the children in part due to the wife taking on the principal role as homemaker and caring for the children during the relationship and forgoing the advancement of her own career. Following separation, the husband was also able to maintain his pattern of employment and income earning capacity and superannuation contributions for some time as the wife continued in her role as principal carer for the children and the time the children have spent in his care has not impinged upon his capacity in this regard. In these circumstances, I do not consider that the accumulation of the husband’s superannuation interest can be regarded as his contribution alone.
Some findings relevant to a determination of the dispute, particularly in relation to the period after separation, are difficult to make as each party’s affidavit provides limited evidence. Doing the best I can, it appears that following separation in late 2015 or early 2016 (during the period that the parties continued to live together with the children in the former family home up until January 2017), the parties’ financial arrangements continued along the same lines as when their personal relationship was intact. For example, the husband continued to be the main breadwinner working full time in his chosen profession. According to a letter from his former employer annexed to the wife’s affidavit, the husband earned an annual salary of $120,000 from January 2016 and that salary was current as at 30 May 2016, when the letter was written.
The husband adduces little evidence of his income at any relevant time except he deposes that as at the date of swearing his affidavit (February 2020) he was employed in the same profession on a casual basis earning approximately $20,000 gross per annum. In his Financial Statement dated December 2019, he curiously deposes to having an average weekly income of nil.
According to the husband’s affidavit, the wife returned to paid employment in around July 2015 (shortly after he deposes that the parties separated under the same roof) and although he gives no evidence of her income, he must be taken to accept that from this time the wife made some financial contribution to the family and accumulation of the parties’ property. She also continued to be the principal homemaker and carer for the children.
There is very little other evidence of the parties’ financial circumstances after they physically separated in January 2017 and each came to live separately in one of the properties that they jointly own. The husband did, however, agree under cross-examination that he continued to trade in shares (at this time), though any income he earnt from this share trading is unknown. There is also no dispute about the payment of the parties’ main ongoing liabilities after this time. Pursuant to the January 2017 orders, the proceeds of the sale of the parties’ investment property were to be used to pay off the mortgages on both properties and other joint outgoings such as the children’s school fees. The husband concedes in his final written submissions that the mortgage payments have been made equally from this joint saving account over the past four years.
The wife was also not challenged on her evidence that the husband has not paid child support since August 2018.
Neither party gives any detail about any other matter relating to their financial circumstances following separation. So far as income earnt by each of them is concerned, the only finding I can make on the evidence is that at the time of final hearing the wife was not in any form of paid employment and was relying entirely on government welfare payments, while the husband was working on a casual basis in his profession, earning a very limited annual income of about $20,000.
Doing the best I can on the limited evidence available, I assess the wife’s total financial and non-financial contribution following separation and up until the time of final hearing as slightly greater than that of the husband. This is mainly due to the fact that she has borne a greater share of the expenses and caring responsibilities for the children but has received no financial support from the husband. The wife was also required to solely bear liabilities that were the responsibility of both parties such as the $6,000 final payment on her car to avoid repossession and expenses and costs associated with the husband’s resignation from the company and deregistering of the same, matters which the husband did not challenge.
During the period following physical separation, the husband’s share of the family’s financial burden has been significantly less than it was when the relationship was intact or when the parties lived together following separation. His income from employment has significantly dropped, he has been able to retain any income earnt from share-trading, the parties’ principal expense (being the mortgage payments on their two properties) has been met through joint funds and the wife alone has financially supported the children for almost three years. The wife also has the greater share of caring responsibilities for the children.
Having regard to the foregoing I reject both of the parties’ contentions about their respective contributions and assess the wife’s contribution to the parties’ accumulation of property and the family as a little greater than that of the husband as at the date of the final hearing. Accordingly, I make a small adjustment in the order of around 2.5% in the wife’s favour based on that assessment.
Section 75(2) Factors
When altering the parties’ interests s 79(4)(e) requires that the Court take into account the matters referred to in s 75(2) so far as they are relevant. I consider the following of those matters to be capable of determination and relevant to this dispute.
Each of the parties is in their fifties and so far as I am aware, both are in a good state of health.
Between them, the parties own two properties and each seeks orders that will see the wife retain the former family home in which she and the children will continue to live. Each proposal will see the husband retain the F Street property in which he will continue to live and where the children will stay when they live with him.
In my view, on the available evidence each of the parties currently have the capacity to earn an income to support themselves and the children.
Each of the parties is tertiary educated and the husband has been working in his chosen profession for over 30 years since he immigrated to Australia. Until a few years ago, prior to physical separation the husband earnt a good income to support the family at a reasonably high standard of living. He was substantially responsible for generating sufficient income to purchase three pieces of real estate and a share portfolio, and the family were able to enjoy activities such as overseas holidays and a private school education for the children. The husband does not provide a real explanation for his dramatic drop in income. In these circumstances, it can be assumed that he has capacity to once again earn an income that will sustain a good standard of living in the future and provide financial support for his children.
I am also satisfied on the available evidence that the husband has some financial resources available to him. In particular, it is not in dispute that he owns an apartment in the overseas country which was leased on his evidence from 2000 to 2014. Although he deposes to there being difficulties with the tenancy after that time and legal proceedings associated with the tenant’s refusal to pay rent and subsequent attempts at eviction, he did not adduce any evidence from which a clear picture could be gained about his property interest in the overseas country and capacity to earn some income from it. Further, the husband conceded under cross-examination that he has traded in shares for many years and continued to do so after separation and it appears that he also accepts that he retained some income from that share trading himself.
While the wife has attained legal qualifications in Australia and gained admission as a legal practitioner, she has never held a practising certificate or practised as a lawyer in this country. In these circumstances, I consider that the wife does have some capacity to earn a living from employment as a lawyer, but it may be assumed that given her age and lack of any past experience there may be some challenges in this regard. The wife has however been employed in other positions in finance and in my view has also not adequately explained why she is not currently engaged in any employment.
I do take into account, however, that the wife’s capacity for full-time employment is not as great as the husband’s, given that she continues to have the majority care of children one of whom is still of primary school age. She wishes to maintain the role of a primary parent while earning some income, an arrangement that the parties deemed appropriate when their relationship was intact. The wife will continue to have the care of the children and the younger child will not be an adult for another eight years.
In the course of an interchange at the final hearing, the husband appeared to have great difficulty understanding that the Court must take into consideration the wife’s greater level of responsibility for the care and control of the children and the necessary commitments entailed in this role. The husband suggested that child support should be sufficient for the maintenance of the children which is curious especially given the unchallenged evidence that he has not made any such payments since August 2018. Given the wife’s experience for almost three years of receiving no child support from the husband, I consider it unlikely that he will provide financial support in the future for the children even though I consider he clearly has the capacity to do so.
The position taken by the husband about the sufficiency of child support to provide fully for the children, even if he does pay it, also overlooks the financial implications for a parent who has the primary role in the care and control of children. As was observed by the Full Court in Brandt & Brandt[6]:
It is proper to take into account the economic ramifications of having responsibility for the children and the quasi-economic contributions involved in raising children which include washing, ironing, cooking and the like. It is appropriate to bear in mind salary and income opportunity forgone because of responsibilities to children. It is appropriate to recognise that such responsibilities involve sacrificing leisure and recreation time.
[6] (1997) FLC 92-758 at p 19.
The husband will also have access to a far more generous superannuation interest than the wife. It had been the husband’s proposal that there be a splitting order in relation to superannuation such that the wife would receive a share, but as he had not taken any steps to notify the Trustee of the superannuation fund, an order in these terms was not pressed. Accordingly, the order for adjustment of the parties’ interests will see the husband receive his full superannuation interest as part of his entitlement. The wife on the other hand has a very modest superannuation interest.
Non-disclosure
Each of the parties contends that the other did not provide full financial disclosure in the proceedings as required and as I understand it, each submits that this is a fact or circumstance that the justice of the case requires to be taken into account.
In these proceedings it is not possible to determine whether each of the parties or either of them did fail to comply with disclosure requirements. First, both parties (although having been previously represented) represented themselves when preparing their cases for trial and at final hearing, and each seemed to misunderstand the nature of these obligations. There was a great deal of confusion about matters that had been disclosed when the parties were represented and ultimately there was little more than assertions that the other had not provided disclosure. There was significant overlap between assertions about non-disclosure and matters in respect of which there was no evidence adduced in the proceedings.
The principles which relate to the consequences in proceedings where a party has not disclosed financial information as required, such as the principles from Black & Kellner[7] and Weir & Weir[8], require that there must be clear evidence of non-disclosure which is simply not available in this case.
[7] (1992) FLC 92-287.
[8] (1993) FLC 92-338.
Having regard to all of the foregoing relevant matters under s 75(2), I propose making a further adjustment in favour of the wife.
Are the orders under consideration just and equitable?
As discussed, I consider that the wife’s overall contribution to the parties’ property and the family is a little greater than that of the husband. On the basis of the 75(2) factors I also consider that a further adjustment should be made in her favour. In total, I consider that an appropriate adjustment for both of the foregoing matters in these circumstances should be around five per cent which will result in a disparity of ten per cent between the parties.
At this stage, I am required to consider whether this percentage entitlement is in reality just and equitable. As the Full Court stated in Teal & Teal[9] at [70] – [71]:
By implication however s 79(2) requires if the Court is to make an order under s 79(1) altering the interests of the parties to the marriage in property, such an order must be just and equitable. This legislative imperative is often described as the requirement that a judicial officer “stand back” and look at the reality of the percentage division at which she or he has arrived. That requirement requires consideration of the actual assets to be retained by each party…
It will often require consideration of whether the percentage adjustment arrived at after assessment of contributions under s 79(4)(a)–(c), and adjustment for relevant factors under s 79(4)(d)–(g) when applied to the actual assets and liabilities requires the making of an order slightly outside the precise percentage arrived at as a result of the statutory imperatives… Considerations such as we have just described applied in Phillips & Phillips (2002) FLC 93-104, where justice and equity required an order which enabled the wife to retain the matrimonial home rather than the home being sold in accordance with a strict percentage adjustment.
[9] [2010] FamCAFC 120.
In dollar terms (rounded), the husband’s 45 percentage interest of the $1,893,879 for distribution is $852,246 and the wife’s 55 percentage interest is $1,041,633.
The wife will retain or has already had the benefit of:
Payment under January 2017 Orders $150,000
Wife’s car $7,000
Furniture of both parties in the wife’s possession $7,500
Superannuation interest $52,728
TOTAL $217,228
In dollar terms, the wife is entitled to also receive assets to the value of $824,405 (her percentage interest of $1,041,633 less $217,228 already received or retained).
Both parties seek orders that will see the wife receive the former family home. After the mortgage is paid, the net value of that property is $839,309. In other words, the net value of the former home is just under $15,000 ($14,904) more than the wife’s entitlement of $824,405 arrived at on a percentage basis.
The husband is to retain or has already had the benefit of:
Payment under January 2017 Orders $150,000
Husband’s car $26,450
Husband’s Superannuation interest $228,273
TOTAL $404,723
In dollar terms, the husband is to receive assets to the value of $ 447,523 (his percentage interest of $852,246 less $404,723 already received.) The parties also seek orders that will see the husband retain the F Street property. The net value of this property is $363,306 and the balance to make up the husband’s entitlement ($84,217) will come from him receiving the entirety of the balance in the joint offset account. He will thus receive a shortfall of $14,904 of his entitlement, if the wife were to receive a benefit in this sum under the circumstances just described.
The sum of $14,904 being the further adjustment in favour of the wife is a very small percentage of the entire estate for distribution (0.78%) but the effect in dollar terms is not insignificant in bringing about justice and equity between the parties as it will enable each of the parties to retain the home in which they are presenting living, as both propose should occur.
In all of the foregoing circumstances, in my view justice and equity will be achieved if orders are made to bring about the financial arrangement between the parties as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. The wife has already received $150,00 under the January 2017 orders, will retain her car, the parties’ furniture and her superannuation interest as well as receiving the former family home. The husband has also received $150,000 under the January 2017 orders and will retain his car and superannuation interest as well as receiving the balance of funds in the offset account and the F Street property.
Child Support Departure
In his application the husband seeks a Child Support Departure Order.
In the course of the interchange at the commencement of the trial the husband contended that he had exhausted all the avenues for administrative relief provided for under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (“the Child Support Act”) prior to bringing this application for such orders, though subsequently conceded, as with many other matters, that he had not adduced any evidence in relation to this contention.
Section 116 of the Child Support Act relevantly provides:
(1)A liable parent or a carer entitled to child support may, in respect of an administrative assessment of child support for a child, apply to a court having jurisdiction under this Act for an order under this Division in relation to the child in the special circumstances of the case if:
(b) both of the following apply:
(i)the liable parent or carer entitled to child support is a party to an application pending in a court having jurisdiction under this Act;
(ii)the court is satisfied that it would be in the interest of the liable parent and the carer entitled to child support for the court to consider whether an order should be made under this Division in relation to the child in the special circumstances of the case…
While I consider that I have the appropriate jurisdiction to deal with the husband’s application, in circumstances where he does not provide any evidence in his affidavit or otherwise in support of his proposal that a Child Support Departure Order be made, it is not appropriate in my view to exercise such jurisdiction.
The matters as to which the Court must be satisfied before making the relevant order are contained in s 117 of the Child Support Act. That provision stipulates in summary that the Court must be satisfied that one or more of the grounds for departure contained in s 117(2) exists, and that it is just and equitable as regards the children, the carer entitled to child support and the liable parent and otherwise proper, to make the particular order sought.[10]
[10] See also the “three step process” as explained in Gyselman and Gyselman (1992) FLC ¶92-279 at 79,064.
Other than the wife’s contention that the husband has failed to pay child support since August 2018 (which the husband did not challenge under cross-examination), little is known about any special circumstances relating to the husband or the children which may prevent the husband from meeting any assessment for child support made and which may otherwise ground an application under s 116 of the Child Support Act.
In these circumstances, I cannot be satisfied that it is just and equitable and proper to make a Child Support Departure Order as sought, and thus the husband’s application in this regard is dismissed.
Costs
In their respective applications, each party also sought that the other pay their costs in the proceedings. Although both parties tendered their costs disclosures at final hearing, neither adduced evidence in support of their application nor addressed this matter in final written submissions. Given in these circumstances it is unclear whether either of them press an order for costs, it is appropriate that the issue of costs be addressed in the future upon receipt of further written submissions.
In all of the foregoing circumstances, the orders I make are an amalgam of the orders sought by each of the parties as amended to give effect to the property adjustment as set out in these Reasons.
151 I certify that the preceding one hundred and fifty (150) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hannam.
Associate
Dated: 9 July 2021
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