AQUILA & MONTE

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AQUILA & MONTE

[2014] FamCA 821

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – with whom a child should live – where interim orders were made approximately twelve months prior – where at the previous hearing the mother alleged the father had sexually abused the child – where the mother does not maintain this position – where the mother asserts that the paternal extended family poses a risk to the child – where the child lives primarily with the mother – where the father seeks that the child live with him.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 61DA, 61DB

Vigano & Desmond (2012) FLC 93-509
APPLICANT:	Ms Aquila

RESPONDENT:

Mr Monte

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Brisbane Family Law Centre

FILE NUMBER:

BRC

3057

2012

DATE DELIVERED:

17 September 2014

PLACE DELIVERED:

Brisbane

PLACE HEARD:

Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF:

Hogan J

HEARING DATE:

15 and 16 September 2014

REPRESENTATION

THE APPLICANT:

In person

THE RESPONDENT:	In person
COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:	Ms McArdle

Orders

All previous orders are discharged.
The child B born … 2008 live with the mother.
The mother have sole parental responsibility in respect of all major long-term issues (as that expression is defined in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (as amended)) for the child with such issues to include but not be limited to:
(a)       the child’s education;
(b)       the child’s religious and cultural upbringing; and
(c)       the child’s health.
That, except in the event of an emergency involving the child, the mother is to consult with the father about decisions to be made in the exercise of her sole parental responsibility as follows:
(a)the mother shall inform the father about the issue about which a decision needs to be made, the decision she would like to make in respect of such issue and the reasons for that proposed decision, in writing;
(b) the mother shall give the father fourteen (14) days to respond;
(c)the mother shall consider the father’s views/response when coming to her decision;
(d)the mother will inform the father of the final decision she has made with respect to that issue as soon as practicable thereafter.
That each party has responsibility for the day to day care, welfare and development of the child while she is in his or her care.
The child shall spend time with the father at all times as may be agreed in writing between the parties and, failing agreement, as follows:
(a)until Thursday, 16 October 2014: each Saturday from 9 AM until 4 PM with changeovers to occur at McDonald’s restaurant Suburb C;
(b)from Friday, 17 October 2014: each week from after school Friday until 5 PM Saturday with the father to collect the child from school at the commencement of the time and return the child to the mother at McDonald’s restaurant Suburb C at the conclusion of time;
(c)from Friday, 14 November 2014: each alternate weekend from 9 AM Saturday until 5 PM Sunday with changeovers to occur at McDonald’s restaurant Suburb C;
(d)during the December 2014/January 2015 school holiday period: on three non-consecutive blocks of two nights and, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing, such time shall occur:
(i)from 9.00 AM on 21 December 2014 to 9.00 AM on 23 December 2014;
(ii)from 9.00 AM on 4 January 2015 to 9.00 AM on 6 January 2015;
(iii)from 9.00 AM on 18 January 2015 to 9.00 AM on 20 January 2015;
(e)from the second weekend after school commences in 2015 until school concludes for Term 1 in 2015: each alternate weekend from after school Friday until 5 PM Sunday with the father to collect the child at school at the commencement of time and change over to occur at McDonald’s restaurant Suburb C at the conclusion of time;
(f)during the 2015 Easter school holiday period: for two non-consecutive blocks of three nights and, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing , such time shall occur:
(i)from 9.00 AM on 3 April 2015 to 9.00AM on 6 April 2015;
(ii)from 9.00AM on 15 April 2015 to 5.00PM on 18 April 2015;
(g) from the commencement of Term two in 2015:
(i)from after school Friday 24 April 2015 until 5 PM Sunday 26 April 2015 and each alternate weekend thereafter with the father to collect the child from school at the commencement of time and changeover to occur at McDonald’s restaurant Suburb C at the conclusion of time; and
(ii)from after school Thursday 30 April 2015 until before school Friday 1 May 2015 and each alternate week thereafter with the father to collect the child from school at the commencement of time and return her to school at the conclusion of time;
(h)during the 2015 June/July school holiday period: for five consecutive nights and, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing, such time shall commence at 9 AM on 30 June 2014 and conclude at 5.00pm on Sunday 5 July 2014 with changeovers to occur at McDonald’s restaurant Suburb C;
(i)for the first half of the 2015 September/October school holiday period with such time to commence at 9 AM on the Saturday immediately after school concludes for the Term and to conclude at 5 PM on the second Saturday after school concludes for the Term with changeovers to occur at McDonald’s restaurant Suburb C;
(j)for the first, third and fifth week of the December 2015/January 2016 school holiday period and, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing:
(i)from 9 AM on the Saturday immediately after school concludes for the Term until 5 PM on the second Saturday after school concludes for the Term with changeovers to occur at McDonald’s restaurant Suburb C; and
(ii)from 9 AM on the third Saturday after school concludes for the Term until 5 PM on the fourth Saturday after school concludes for the Term with changeovers to occur at McDonald’s restaurant Suburb C; and
(iii)from 9 AM on the fifth Saturday after school concludes that Term until 5 PM on the sixth Saturday after school concludes that Term with changeovers to occur at McDonald’s restaurant Suburb C.
(k)commencing with the school holiday period at the conclusion of first Term in 2016 and, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing:
(i)for the first half of the school holiday periods in odd numbered years; and
(ii)for the second half of the school holiday periods in even numbered years.
From the start of Term 1 in 2015 the operation of Clause (6) shall be suspended during any school holiday period and shall resume with weekend time commencing:
(a)on the first weekend of school Term if the child has spent time with the father in the first half of the holiday period; or
(b)on the second weekend of school Term if the child has spent time with the father in the second half of the holiday period.
That the operation of Clause (6) of this order is suspended for the weekend on which Mother’s Day occurs such that the child will remain in the mother’s care for that weekend.
In the event that the child would not otherwise be spending time with the father on the weekend on which Father’s Day occurs, the child shall spend time with the father from after school Friday until 5 PM Sunday on that weekend with the father to collect the child from school at the commencement of time and changeover to occur at McDonald’s restaurant Suburb C at the conclusion of time.
From 31 January 2015, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing the child shall spend time with the father:
(a)from 5.00 PM Christmas Eve until 9.00 AM Boxing Day in odd numbered years;
(b)from 9.00 AM Boxing Day until 5.00 PM 28 December in even numbered years.
From 31 January 2015, unless otherwise agreed between the parties in writing, the child shall spend time with the mother:
(a)from 5.00 PM Christmas Eve until 9.00 AM Boxing Day in even numbered years;
(b)from 9.00 AM Boxing Day until 5.00 PM 28 December in odd numbered years.
Until the commencement of school in 2016, the Father shall personally supervise the child at all times she is in his care.
From the commencement of school in 2016, if either parent is unable to care for the child for more than two consecutive nights in any holiday period, the other parent shall have the first option of caring for the child during such time.
The father shall have telephone communication with the child each Monday, Wednesday and Friday between the hours of 6:30 PM and 7 PM or at such other times as may be agreed in writing between the parents with:
(a)the father to initiate the telephone call to a mobile telephone number to be provided to the father by the mother; and
(b)the mother to ensure the child is available to receive the telephone call; and
(c)the mother to ensure the mobile telephone is charged and in a mobile telephone reception area; and
(d)the mother to ensure the telephone calls take place in private, are not interrupted and are not recorded.
In any school holiday period during which the child is spending holiday time with the father, the mother shall have telephone communication with the child each Monday, Wednesday and Friday between the hours of 6:30 PM and 7 PM or at such times as may be agreed in writing between the parents with:
(a)the mother to initiate the telephone call to a mobile telephone number to be provided to the mother by the father; and
(b)the father to ensure the child is available to receive the telephone call; and
(c)the father to ensure the mobile telephone is charged and in a mobile telephone reception area; and
(d)the father to ensure the telephone calls take place in private, are not interrupted and are not recorded.
Unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing or specified in this order, changeovers shall occur at the McDonald’s restaurant at Suburb C.
During the time the child is with either parent, that parent shall:
(a)respect the privacy of the other parent and not question the child about the personal life of the other parent;
(b) speak of the other parent respectfully;
(c)not denigrate or insult the other parent in the presence or hearing of the child; and
(d)use their best endeavours to ensure that others do not denigrate or insult the other parent in the hearing or presence of the child.
Neither parent denigrate the other or their family to, or in front of, or within the hearing of, the child and shall direct third parties to refrain from denigrating either party or their family to, or in front of, or within hearing of, the child and failing their compliance with such a direction shall remove the child from that environment immediately.
Each party shall, in writing, advise the other and keep the other advised of:
(a) the contact address; and
(b) telephone numbers at which they and the child can be contacted.
Each party shall notify the other of any proposed changes to their contact address or the telephone numbers at which they or the child can be contacted no less than seven days prior to any such change and shall advise the other of the changed contact address and telephone numbers within 24 hours of obtaining such details.
Each party shall:
(a)keep the other informed, by email or text message, of the names and addresses of any treating medical or other health practitioner, psychologist, social worker or counsellor upon whom the child attends;
(b)inform the other, as soon as reasonably practicable, of any significant medical condition, illness or significant health issue suffered by the child;
(c)keep the other informed of the contact details of any before or after school or vacation care facility at which the child attends.
By this order, any treating medical or other health practitioner, psychologist, social worker or counsellor upon whom the child attends is hereby authorised to provide to either parent, at that parent’s request and cost, all information lawfully able to be provided to a parent about the child’s attendance and treatment.
By this order, any school at which the child attends is hereby authorised to provide to each parent, at that parent’s request and cost, all information lawfully able to be provided to a parent about the child’s attendance, progress and participation including copies of any school reports, newsletters, applications for class photographs and the like and any information in relation to the child’s educational and social progress.
By this order, any before or after school or vacation care facility at which the child attends is hereby authorised to provide to each parent, at that parent’s request and cost, all information lawfully able to be provided to a parent about the child’s attendance, progress and participation.
By this order, the director of any extracurricular or other activity in which the child participates is authorised to provide to each parent, at that parent’s request and cost, all such information lawfully able to be provided to a parent about the child’s attendance, progress and participation in that activity, together with any report, assessment or other document usually provided to a parent in relation to the child.
Neither parent enrol the child in any activity which occurs during time the child is with the other parent without first obtaining the written agreement of that parent.
Both parties will engage Ms D, psychologist, or such other psychologist as reasonably recommended by Ms D, for the purpose of assisting the child to progress in the time with the father and, for this purpose, the parties will:
(a)follow reasonable directions provided by the psychologist as to the frequency at which the child should attend upon the psychologist; and
(b)ensure that the child continues to attend as reasonably directed by the psychologist from time to time; and
(c)be equally responsible for the costs associated with the child’s attendance upon the psychologist; and
(d)attend at all such reasonable times as the psychologist may request with the attending party to be solely responsible for the costs of their own attendance upon the psychologist.
That the child’s time with the Father not progress beyond that provided for in Clause 6(a) unless he contributes to the costs of Ms D’s involvement with the child as outlined in Clause 27(c).
The Independent Children’s Lawyer has leave to provide the following documents to Ms D:
(a)a copy of the Reasons for Judgment delivered by the Honourable Justice Bell on 5 September 2013; and
(b)the affidavit of Dr F filed 25 August 2014; and
(c)the Family Reports prepared by Mr G dated 31 January 2014 and 26 August 2014; and
(d)a copy of this Order and the Reasons for Judgment delivered 17 September 2014.
The mother or father have leave to provide any therapist or counsellor upon whom the child attends with a copy of the following:
(a)the affidavit of Dr F filed 25 August 2014; and
(b)the Family Reports prepared by Mr G dated 31 January 2014 and 26 August 2014; and
(c)a copy of the Reasons for Judgment delivered by the Honourable Justice Bell on 5 September 2013; and
(d)a copy of this Order and Reasons for Judgment delivered 17 September 2014.
That both parents are authorised to attend at all sporting, extracurricula, recreational, school performances or events in which the child is involved or at which she attends and to which parents are customarily invited and permitted to attend.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer provide the child’s passport to the mother within 28 days of the making of this order.
The mother, Ms Aquila born … 1971 and the father, Mr Monte born … 1974 and their servants and agents be and are restrained from removing or attempting to remove or causing or permitting the removal of the child B (a female) born … 2008 from the Commonwealth of Australia before 17 June 2016.
It is requested that the Australian Federal Police give effect to the preceding order by placing the name of the said child on the Family Law Watch List in force at all points of arrival and departure in the Commonwealth of Australia and maintain the child’s name on the Watch List until 17 June 2016.
Upon expiration of the period referred to in Order 34 and subject to any further order of a court of competent jurisdiction, the Australian Federal Police will cause the removal of the child or children’s names from the Watch List.
Either parent is permitted to remove the child from the Commonwealth of Australia for the purpose of holiday travel after the 17 June 2016.
In the event that any parent wishes to remove the child from the Commonwealth of Australia pursuant to Clause 36, that parent shall provide the other with no less than sixty (60) days notice of the intention to travel overseas and shall provide details of the proposed departure and arrival dates, destination and contact details whilst overseas.
No less than thirty (30) days before date of departure from the Commonwealth of Australia, the travelling parent shall provide to the other a copy of a return ticket for the child, evidencing the date of departure and date of return to the Commonwealth of Australia, a copy of an itinerary which contains sufficient contact details to enable telephone communication between the non-travelling parent and the child to occur in the manner provided for in this order.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer is discharged after the information referred to in Clause 29 is provided to Ms D and the child’s passport is provided to the mother pursuant to Clause 32.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT

All outstanding applications are otherwise dismissed and removed from the list of cases requiring finalisation.
After the expiration of the appeal period, all subpoenaed documents be returned to the persons or institutions from which they emanated and all exhibits are returned to the person or persons who tendered the same.
Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties to adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached and these particulars are included in these Orders.

IT IS NOTED

If after the expiration of the period set out in Order 33 above any parent seeks that the child’s name remains on the Watch List for a period beyond the period specified that party must file and serve an application and an affidavit setting out the evidence which supports that application in the Family Court of Australia or the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Aquila & Monte has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 3057 of 2012

Ms Aquila

Applicant

And

Mr Monte

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

These proceedings concern B (“the child”), born in 2008. She has always lived with her mother and there can be no doubt that the mother has provided her primary care to date. There can be no conclusion other than that her primary attachment is to her mother.
The parties appeared before his Honour Justice Bell for four days in August 2013. On 5 September 2013, his Honour delivered Reasons for Judgment and made interim parenting orders which I will refer to as the September 2013 order. The effect of the September 2013 order was that the child continue to live with the mother, who was afforded sole parental responsibility for her. The order also provided that, after six weeks of supervised time, on two occasions per week for two hours at a time, the child commence spending unsupervised time with the father each Saturday from 9 am until 4 pm. His Honour also ordered that she spend time with the father from 10 am to 4 pm on Christmas day.

The Reasons for Judgment delivered by the Honourable Justice Bell contain the following findings:
a)He was not convinced in any way that the father had, in any way, sexually abused the child;
b)He was not convinced in any way that the father had, in any way, exhibited sexual conduct which could upset the child;
c)That the mother had been led to such a view which he – Justice Bell – concluded was genuine as a consequence of her attendance upon a Ms E, a psychologist whose evidence was completely discredited.
d)That the mother had come to the view that, if there was not any sexual abuse of the child by the father, it was important for her, the child, to redevelop a relationship with the father.
The parties have implemented the September 2013 order. In addition, at least until about April of this year, the child spent time with her father each Wednesday when he collected her from school and took her to dance classes. Whilst this time ceased as at the end of Term one, the father has continued to attend the majority of her dance classes and has had the opportunity to at least see her on that occasion also. Otherwise, her time with her father has occurred every Saturday from 9 AM until 4 PM.
The mother currently seeks alternative orders. That is, those based on findings either that the child is at an unacceptable risk of physical or psychological harm if she spends overnight, unsupervised time with her father or other proposals if the Court does not reach that determination.
The proposals put forward by the mother on the basis that the Court does not find unacceptable risk include that, after a three week moratorium, the child spend time with the father, whilst she is under the age of 10, each alternate Saturday from 9 AM to 4 PM and on two weekday evenings and, when she is older than 12 years of age, each alternate weekend from Friday until Sunday. She also proposes certain holiday time with no period longer than four nights when the child is less than 12 years of age and, when she is older than 12 years of age, for four weeks of school holiday time with no period exceeding a week at a time. The mother also seeks the opportunity for telephone communication with the child during holiday periods with the father and that the father not remove the child from Australia.
Other aspects of the orders sought by the mother are clearly apparent from documents filed on her behalf. Included within those are that she retain the child’s passport or, given the terms of Justice Bell’s order, have it returned to her and be at liberty to take the child out of Australia for holidays with the father’s written permission or further order of the Court.
The mother’s case may be boiled down to the following: in essence, she asserts that, such is the dysfunction of the father’s extended family, the child would be at an unacceptable risk of physical or psychological harm so that her time with him should be constrained to daytime only; and that, even if the Court is not persuaded the child is at unacceptable risk of suffering such harm, the father’s family’s dysfunction and deficiencies are so significant the Court would not consider overnight time beneficial for the child until she is 10 years old.
The mother accepts the current regime of unsupervised daytime time has gone well and she supports it remaining as it is with no consecutive days. She does not suggest that the father has physically harmed the child or – as I understand her case – allowed her to be physically harmed. Dr F records the mother did not appear to have ongoing concerns about the child being in the care of the father during the day. I note, also, that Ms J, who has been raised by the mother as her daughter, told Mr G on 30 December 2013 that she does not have any concerns about the father in her father’s care. Mr G himself supported such a conclusion.
The mother told Mr G, during the course of the preparation of the report exhibited to his affidavit filed 31 January 2014, that the current regime appeared to be working reasonably well for the child. She expressed the view that the child was too little for her time with the father to move into an overnight arrangement at this time. She also expressed a preference for the child’s time with the father to occur each alternate Saturday (rather than every Saturday) to ensure she is able to consistently participate in extracurricular activities such as birthday parties. She emphasised to Mr G, at that time, that the child had never spent a night away from her. She also told him that she felt overnight time would pose a risk to the child because of her (i.e. the mother’s) view of violence in the father’s home.
Consistently, in a sense, the mother told Dr F that, if the Court ordered overnight visits, she thought she would find that very difficult.
When she spoke with Mr G in July 2014, the mother maintained her opposition to the child spending overnight time with the father. She said she wanted their time together to occur in a public place so as to minimise or mitigate any risks for the child. Mr G records the mother’s belief that the child was more likely to be exposed to violence from the father or his family if the time she spent with him occurred in private or at his home. She recounted to Mr G the wish that the child spend regular time with her father but not on consecutive days, not overnight and preferably not at his home.
The father’s position before Justice Bell was that he sought an order that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility, that the child live with him and spend time with her mother each alternate weekend from Friday after school until Monday before school and for one half of the school holiday periods. The balance of his orders as sought are also apparent from the documentation filed on his behalf.
The father’s case really may be summarised as follows: he asserts that the prospects of the child having a meaningful relationship with both of her parents will be enhanced if she lives with him. He asserts this because her mother continues to raise concerns, which he says are without basis, about the risk to which the child is alleged to be exposed in his care. Further, given her proposal that the child not spend overnight time with him until she is 10 years of age, the only way the child will be able to have a meaningful relationship with him, and thus with both of her parents, is for her to live with him. He further asserts, as is perhaps apparent from this summary, that the mother is not supportive of the child in her relationship with him.
In these proceedings, being proceedings for a parenting order in relation to the child, I may, subject to section 61DA and section 65DAB and Division 6 of Part VII of the Family Law Act make such parenting order as I think proper. I must have regard to the Objects of Part VII of the Act and the Principles which underpin those Objects. In deciding whether to make a parenting order, I must regard the child’s best interests as the paramount consideration.
As is permitted, I consider, under Division 12A of the Act, I determined on my own initiative yesterday to make findings and determine matters after having the benefit of hearing some cross-examination of each party, having received the Exhibits into evidence and having heard the author of the Family Reports cross-examined.
At the time I did so, I gave short reasons for the findings and decisions. I adopt those reasons and incorporate them here. By way of summary, the reasons I expressed to the parties yesterday and the findings I made included that:
a)I accept the evidence given by Mr G.
b)having regard to the evidence, including the contents of the Exhibits and noting that the mother’s own proposal is for a continuation of unsupervised daytime time between the child and the father, I am not persuaded she would be at an unacceptable risk of harm if she were to spend time with him overnight.
c)I considered the mother had provided the child with the opportunity to spend more time with the father than was required by the September 2013 order, a matter which persuaded me she was encouraging and supportive, at least to a degree, of the child’s relationship with the father.
d)both parents have the capacity to reflect on their own behaviours and, with effort and assistance, incorporate new methods of interpersonal interaction.
e)consequent upon her anxiety about the child’s time with the father, the mother has, at best, misinterpreted the contents of material produced pursuant to subpoena.
f)whilst it may well have been open to suggest that the mother’s representation to others of the contents of such documents was evidence of a deliberate intention to prevent the child from having a relationship with the father, her actions in providing the additional time on Wednesdays and offering daytime time to the father during the January school holiday period mitigates against reaching such a conclusion.
g)the evidence clearly establishes significant miscommunication between the parents, whose parenting style and personal inherent characteristics are so vastly different as to contribute to the conflict which has preceded these proceedings.
h)each parent needs to work on appreciating and understanding those aspects of the other’s personality and functioning that are unlikely to change in the future.
i)each party has the capacity – or at least the kernel of capacity – to do this and to work toward recognising that there are certain things about the other’s parenting style and approach that are beyond each’s control.
j)both parents love the child immensely and want the best for her.
k)if both parents fail to work on their own significant personal capacities, the child will not have the opportunity to benefit from these as she grows older.
l)given the significant consequences which are highly likely to be that of detriment, upset, distress, confusion and anxiety for the child, it is not in her best interests for her to undergo the significant change to her parenting regime as would be caused by requiring her to live with her father rather than with her mother.
m)it certainly is in the child’s best interests to spend more time with the father in a manner consistent with the recommendations made by Mr G, who has had the opportunity to be involved longitudinally - not only with the parents but with the child - and through this to observe her and her interactions with each of them over time.
It is clearly inherent in the reasons I expressed yesterday that I consider that there is benefit to the child of a meaningful relationship with both of her parents. I arrive at this conclusion cognisant of the fact that an affirmative finding in this respect does not, of course, depend simply on there being a lack of danger of physical or psychological harm to her arising from time and or communication with that parent: see the discussion by the Full Court in Vigano & Desmond (2012) FLC 93-509.
The child has previously enjoyed spending time with her father. As noted, the mother has reported – including to Dr F – that she has had a nice time with him. There is nothing to suggest he has interacted with her in anything other than a caring, attentive and loving manner. Given this, I have no doubt in concluding she will benefit from the ongoing opportunity to continue to develop and maintain a meaningful relationship with him.
I accept the evidence of Ms D, a psychologist upon whom the child has attended, that the child has made no negative comments about unsupervised time with the father. However, I also note her comments to the effect that the child has expressed an extremely negative attitude about males in her life and will comment that only her mother and sister love her; she will refuse to have conversations about positive traits in boys or men or male characters.
That such a view is held and expressed by the child provides a further basis for ensuring that she has appropriate opportunity to interact with males in her life in order to ensure she has the opportunity to form a balanced view of both her mother and her father and their respective parenting capacities.
Whilst Ms D recommended, at the time of her report, that the child see her on a monthly basis because there were no concerns raised about unsupervised time, it is obvious she remains a source of support, capable, no doubt, of assisting the child to deal with any further changes to her parenting regime. There is nothing to suggest, given Ms D’s previous interaction with the child, that she would not be more than capable of assisting the child to deal with any initial anxieties or reluctance to move toward overnight time with the father.
I did not understand the father to suggest that the child would not benefit from the opportunity to continue to develop and maintain a meaningful relationship with her mother. So much is apparent from his own proposal. It is clear, therefore, that the child will benefit from the opportunity to develop and have an ongoing, meaningful relationship with both of her parents.
I record that since the matter was before Justice Bell in August and September of last year, there have been two further updated Magellan reports, dated 23 April 2014 and 3 September 2014 respectively.
The documents referred to note that the child has not made any disclosures of sexual abuse, has not presented with any injuries and has not made any direct disclosures of abuse since unsupervised time with her father has resumed. In the first updated Magellan report, the Department concluded that her disclosure (as reported to the Department) that she had a day sleep with the father whilst having contact with him was not considered by the Department to be a disclosure of sexual abuse. I agree and note that it was not suggested to be so during the hearing before me.
The second updated Magellan report of September 2014 records certain information provided by a notifier. That may be summarised as encompassing assertions and expressions of concerns that the child may be exposed to ongoing violence within the father’s household and that an awareness of such matters has come about as a consequence of access to subpoenaed documents. The Department recorded that the notifier reported an incident where the father and his brother had “gang raped” a female at the house. I note immediately this assertion is not consistent with the contents of the police documents which form Exhibit 1.
The Department concluded, after being provided with the information recorded in the Magellan report, that there was insufficient information to suggest any violence within the father’s household was of such a nature that it placed the child at an unacceptable risk of harm. The Department further noted that, as she attends school, she is therefore able to be monitored on a regular basis and, given her age, is able to advise in relation to matters to which she is exposed.
I record my concerns that the mother appears only too willing to interpret material in a manner adverse to the father. A clear example of this is the manner in which she interpreted the Solicitor’s Office Report Details document, dated 30 April 2014, which is page 17 of Exhibit 1. The mother clearly concluded, because 30 April 2014 was a Wednesday and the child was with the father on Wednesdays, she was possibly at the home or the address dealt with in that report during the event described at pages 17 and 18 of Exhibit 1.
She apparently failed to appreciate, from a perusal of the contents of those pages, that it was a member of the father’s extended family who called the police and reported that a threat had been made. She apparently interpreted the contents of page 18 as suggesting that the child’s uncle engaged in gestures which suggested a threat of throat-slitting. However, the document makes it clear the child’s uncle was the recipient of such a threat. There is nothing in the material to suggest that he reciprocated and made any comment or threat similar to that to which he was exposed.
Further, page 17 of Exhibit 1 also makes it clear that the behaviours said to constitute a potential offence, as outlined in that document, were reported to police at 14:45 (2.45 pm) - at a time before the child finished school according to the mother’s own evidence. The mother accepted from the bar table that the reported time meant the child could not have been present during the events outlined on page 18 of Exhibit 1. Her account of this event to Dr F – see page 7 of the report exhibited to his affidavit, filed 25 August 2014 – is inaccurate insofar as it relates to “threats to cut each others throats”.
In a similar fashion, the mother told Dr F that the father’s brother had been charged with manslaughter and that there are other records “they” sexually abused young women. Insofar as the latter is concerned, the subpoenaed material makes it clear that an allegation was previously made against two of the father’s brothers of some form of sexual assault against a female person, who, it appears from a reading of the documents, was a girlfriend or former girlfriend of one of them. Police investigated, spoke with them and after inquiries, no charges were proffered.
The mother told Mr G in July 2014 – see paragraph 30 of his report exhibited to the affidavit filed 26 August 2014 – that the father’s brother had been charged and convicted of attempted manslaughter, that a brother had been charged with sexual assault and that the family have a preoccupation with weaponry. The evidence before me does not support the assertion that one of the father’s brothers has been charged and convicted of attempted manslaughter, nor that another brother has been charged with a sexual assault. I am not persuaded it establishes that the family have a preoccupation with weaponry.
Contained within Exhibit 1 is a reference to a charge brought against the father for possessing an unauthorised firearm. This occurred in 2001, some 13 years ago. A perusal of the supporting material in relation to that charge reveals that the father was found by police to be in possession of an unloaded air rifle, which he recounted had come into his possession some two years earlier from a friend. Save for this, there are no other suggestions that the father has any other criminal history.
The mother expressed concern to Mr G – see paragraph 32 of the report exhibited to the affidavit filed 26 August 2014 – about members of the paternal family facing lots of charges for violent offences, including sexual assault. Again, the evidence before me does not support this contention.
At best for the mother, these are misrepresentations and exaggerations borne out of anxiety. At worst, they are deliberate misrepresentations designed to undermine and influence the view of the father held by third parties.
As noted yesterday, without her actions in providing the child with the opportunity of more time with the father than was provided for by the terms of the September 2013 order, the Court might have been persuaded to reach such a conclusion. However, I accept Dr F’s evidence to the effect that it appears likely that the mother’s views with respect to the father’s family have arisen in the context of her intense anxiety. I am in no way persuaded that such beliefs as she expresses are delusional, but I do accept Dr F’s opinion to the effect that they may well have “the characteristic of an overvalued idea”.
Whilst I may have some reservations about the entirety of the father’s evidence and record my view that, on occasion, he appeared to understate or perhaps misstate events, I am confident in concluding that he would not knowingly or deliberately place the child at risk. There is nothing in the material before me to suggest that she has suffered any injury whilst in his care, nor does the mother suggest the same. Further, I note that, whilst the mother’s cross-examination of him clearly took issue with behaviours by members of his family, she did not suggest to him that he had in any way acted in a threatening manner towards the child, or that he had failed to protect her other than, perhaps, in relation to an event in January 2012, during which she says – and he does not accept – that the child was present.

There is nothing in the evidence before me to suggest, even if the child was present on that occasion and exposed to what can only be described as a melee between members of the extended family, that she has been subjected to a repeat performance of this unacceptable behaviour.
As outlined yesterday, I do not accept that the child is at an unacceptable risk of harm if she spends unsupervised overnight time with the father. While she may well be exposed to a parenting style that is significantly different to that she experiences in the primary care of her mother, there is nothing in the evidence before me to suggest that such exposure places her at an unacceptable risk of suffering either physical or psychological harm.
Dr F expressed the opinion that the mother’s anxieties and concerns appear somewhat out of proportion to the allegations and concerns raised. I accept this opinion and join in it. As opined by Dr F, I think it highly likely that there are unconscious or subconscious motivations working upon and influencing the mother’s interpretation of events. This provides a logical explanation for the mother’s misinterpretation of the contents of the police documents detailing the events on 30 April 2014, to which I have already referred.
However, as stated yesterday, I also do not accept that the advantages to the child of a move to live primarily with the father are significant enough to warrant the likely impact on her functioning - both short and long term - of such a significant change to her primary living arrangements at this time. The mother clearly has been the parent who has undertaken the primary care of the child to date. She has been primarily responsible for making decisions about her education and dealing with medical matters. She has been responsible primarily for the manner in which the child presents at school and to Mr G and this should be seen as a credit to her parenting skills and capacities and as a reflection of the priority she has accorded to meeting the child’s needs.
I am persuaded the mother has taken on board, initially at least and to some extent at least, the tenor of the comments made by Justice Bell in the reasons his Honour delivered in September last year. This is well established by the fact she arranged for the child to spend more time with the father than was prescribed by the terms of the September 2013 order. Whilst that arrangement came to an end, it remains that the mother acted positively to ensure the child had an additional opportunity to spend time with the father. I am hopeful that, in a similar manner, she will take on board the comments made to her during the course of the hearing and those recorded in these Reasons.
I consider there is no coincidence that the mother’s support of this additional time ended, perhaps, not long after or at or about the same time she received an email from the father on 30 April 2014.
The father told Mr G he corresponded with the mother as he did in his email to demonstrate to her that which she had done to him, namely – and I summarise – to give her an example of what it felt like to be the recipient of information critical of her in some manner in a similar manner to which he had been the recipient of critical allegations which alleged that he had been abusive of the child. The sentiment expressed to Mr G is a factor which may have contributed to a potential conclusion that the source of information provided to Ms J’s employers was located somewhere in the extended paternal family. The contents and the congruity of the information is too significant for it to be, simply, an unrelated coincidence.
That the father chose to send the email in April 2014, after the mother had extended to him the opportunity to spend more time with the child than was provided for in the September 2013 orders, was very unfortunate. Whilst the contents and tone of the email suggest frustration, they could also, I consider, be seen as encompassing communication of a threatening nature. This type of communication, even if expressed via frustration, is, again, unlikely to have assisted the parties on their path - already rocky and fraught with difficulty - toward a more cooperative co-parenting relationship.
Additionally, such behaviour, taken, as I understand the father’s evidence, after reflection, also casts some doubt upon his assertion to Mr G in July 2014 that he is the parent with whom the child’s ability to maintain good relationships with each parent is likely to be maximised.
As outlined in abbreviated form to the parties yesterday, it is clear that the father’s primary case, in which the child would move to live with him and spend alternate weekends, half of the school holidays with the mother, would involve significant upheaval and change for her. The implementation of such a proposal would obviously remove her from the primary care of the parent who has primarily cared for her since birth. It would diminish her ability to spend time with Ms J to whom she is close.
I reiterate that, given Mr G’s most recent assessment of the child’s bond with the mother, and his evidence as to the likely impact on her of no longer primarily living with her, I am not persuaded that any benefit for the child of a move to live primarily with the father outweighs the significant detrimental impacts of such an event.
In addition, I consider that the father may well have been only too willing simply to sit back and look to the mother to address issues which have arisen between them as they attempt to embark upon a long journey of co-parenting the child. He has not, for example, taken the time to arrange a parent teacher interview during 2014. He appears to have been somewhat lax in his attempts to obtain information from the school. Further, he did not take up the mother’s offer that he spend Monday to Friday during the daytime, consecutively, during the January 2014 school holidays, taking advantage only of some of that proffered time.
Such is the level of mistrust and miscommunication between the parties that neither appears to have taken the time properly to read correspondence, nor, if left in any doubt, to attempt to speak with the other personally to resolve any misunderstanding. This is a clear example of the difficulties in their communication, which persuades me that it is extremely unlikely they could now discharge the obligation, which would be cast upon them if an order for equal shared parental responsibility is made, to make decisions jointly.
I accept Mr G’s evidence, as expressed in the report exhibited to his affidavit filed 31 January 2014, that, despite the issues of mistrust, which are clearly apparent in the parents’ interactions and communication (albeit interspersed with moments of good communication and good cooperation, the existence of which suggests both have the capacity to engage in such a manner) the mother has taken considerable steps to communicate with the father about the child, to put her immediate concerns to him and to seek assurance from him.
I consider it likely the father has minimised the importance of providing the mother with such assurance. He will benefit in his relationship with the child by ensuring he does everything he can to support the child during her time with him, - this includes him supporting the child’s mother by providing the required assurance that, at times, is sought by her, even if he thinks it unnecessary or intrusive.
Clearly, both parents will benefit from the opportunity to consider these actions, their behaviours and my comments about them with a counsellor such as Ms D.
I accept Dr F’s evidence as to the absence of any major mental illness in the mother. As he did, I note that her views about the previous allegations relating to the child appear to have shifted considerably. The reality of this shift, significant as it is, persuades me that the mother has the capacity, with assistance, to reflect upon matters and to implement changes to her behaviour. In saying this, I also accept Dr F’s evidence to the effect that, as the mother remains very anxious about the child, there is a risk and there remains a risk of the child being exposed to this anxiety.
I accept Dr F’s opinion to the effect that it is likely that, on occasions, the mother struggles to separate her own feelings and anxieties from those of the child. I further accept and consider it highly likely that the consequences for the mother of her anxieties about the child’s time with the father may well cause her to seek to control and determine his conduct during such time. Again, this is an aspect of the mother’s parenting of the child which will benefit from further therapeutic involvement and interaction in the same way as occurred after Justice Bell delivered Reasons and made Orders in September 2013.
I accept Dr F’s opinion that it is detrimental to the child to experience her mother as an overwhelming and over-involved parent. As will be apparent from a consideration of the comments I made yesterday, additional time with the father will provide the child with the opportunity to experience his parenting style - no doubt, resplendent with both strengths and weaknesses, as is the mother’s resplendent with her own, albeit different strengths and weaknesses - and to learn that he, her father, is another person from whom she can accept care and upon whom she can rely for support and love as she matures towards adulthood.
I accept that it is concerning that, on occasion, the child appears to be exposed to ongoing conflict between her parents during changeover. This exposure, however, is not causally related to the parent with whom she primarily lives. The child will only be shielded from exposure to such conflict if each parent demonstrates, through his or her actions, an appreciation of the significant responsibility of demonstrating to their daughter an appropriate manner of respectful parental interaction. I am confident that each possesses the capacity to do so. The question for each is their determination in their daughter’s best interests to act upon and activate such capacity.
As I outlined yesterday, I am not persuaded it is in the child’s best interests for there to be a change to her primary care arrangements. I am not persuaded that an order which would see her live primarily with the father and spend time with the mother is one which is more beneficial to her than an order which provides for her time with the father to increase. I consider the likely impact upon the child of such a change to her primary care arrangements is so significant and so likely to be highly disruptive, detrimental and harmful that it could not be seen to be in her best interests.
I consider that the mother has demonstrated a capacity to comply with orders of the court, and also, as I have already said, a capacity to encourage the child’s relationship with the father, albeit that, on occasions, she has clearly struggled to manage her anxiety about this. I am persuaded that, with the professional support and assistance of the kind suggested by Dr F, she will be able to manage and deal with a progression of the child’s time with the father.
I accept Mr G’s evidence, as outlined in paragraph 63 of the report exhibited to his affidavit filed 31 January 2014, that, developmentally, there is no reason why the child should not commence to spend overnight time with the father. I also accept that an order which permitted her to do so would allow her to experience “more broad ranging care from her father, encompassing school and non-school time”. I accept Mr G’s assessment, based upon both observation of the child with the father, and comments made by both parents to him during the course of the December 2013 interview, that the child’s relationship with the father was developing quite well.
Mr G spoke with the child in July 2014. She told him she does not have sleepovers at the father’s home because she doesn’t want to sleep without her mother sleeping with her. When Mr G asked her what it might be like for her if her parents decided she could have sleepovers at the father’s home, she said she didn’t know, that she would cry in the middle of the night for her mother and that she would miss her mother.
I accept the father’s evidence given during the course of his cross-examination as to the manner in which he would deal with any upset the child may exhibit during overnight time with him. I found his evidence to be child focused and appreciative of the distress she may, at least initially, demonstrate. I consider that the manner in which he proposed to deal with this was appropriate and designed to ensure that he would do all that was available to him to comfort her and provide her with appropriate support if such distress occurs.
I accept Mr G’s evidence, following his interaction with the child, that she is very close to her mother and that she has expressed some anxiety about the idea of overnight time with her father. I also accept that her comments pointed to her feeling somewhat insecure about a move into overnight time. In saying that, I also concur with Mr G’s opinion that there is nothing in the subpoenaed material to provide a basis for the imposition of negative orders or undertakings in relation to the child’s time with the father.
I accept Mr G’s evidence to the effect that the child’s time with the father, in a structure proposed by the mother, would, in all likelihood, inhibit the extent to which she will be able to develop and maintain a relationship of substance with him: see paragraph 67 of Mr G’s report exhibited to the affidavit filed 26 August 2014. I accept and consider that the mother’s proposal for the time the child spend with the father reduces the scope for him to act as a parent, and, to use Mr G’s term, to be a seamless caregiver to the child in a natural setting.
I accept Mr G’s evidence and opinion that there should be a graduated increase in time between the child and her father. Clearly, it is necessary that such graduation be developmentally appropriate and take into account the reality of the child’s parenting.
The mother seeks that there is a period of four to six months before the child starts sleepovers with the father. There is no evidentiary basis for such a submission, other than, perhaps, an acceptance of the mother’s evidence that she is the person best able to determine such matters for the child - it is, in fact, completely contrary to Mr G’s evidence.
At paragraph 70 and 71 of the most recent Family Report, Mr G reiterated his support for his earlier view. He suggests a lead-in time of a month, before moving to overnight time, to allow the mother some opportunity to encourage the child to sleep in her own bed at her mother’s home: sleeping independently will assist the child in the short-term, if she is to start overnight time with the father.
I accept Mr G’s evidence and consider that the proposals contained within the Family Reports, or something of a similar nature, provide a structure by which the child’s time with her father can increase in a graduated manner so she can have the opportunity to receive parenting from him and to learn to know him as a person from whom she can receive care and upon whom she can rely for the provision of the same.
I accept Mr G’s evidence as to the suggested manner in which the child’s time with the father should increase. I accept his rationale for the same and join in his opinion that it is more likely than not that the mother will be anxious, irrespective of how fast or slow the progression and increase of time between the child and the father is.
I acknowledge that Mr G considers that the child does not herself feel ready for overnight time with the father at this stage from the comments she made to him. However, I also accept his evidence to the effect that, if she is to continue to develop a meaningful relationship with the father, it is necessary and part of a usual developmental process for her to, perhaps, confront, at least initially, the distress that change may bring.
I accept Mr G’s evidence that it is likely that the child’s comments to him were linked to the concept that she would miss her mother. I am confident that the mother possesses the capacity to act so as to make it easier for the child to spend time with her father overnight. For example, I am confident that the mother has the capacity to encourage the child to sleep independently of her so as to prepare her for overnight time and to minimise any stress and anxiety she may experience initially as a consequence of moving into the next phase of her opportunity to spend time with the father.
I also accept wholeheartedly Mr G’s evidence to the effect that the longer a transition to overnight time takes, or is left for the child, the harder this transition may well become. I accept and am persuaded that it is beneficial for the child to move forward into overnight time with the father in a graduated manner, as Mr G suggests – this will allow her to incorporate such overnight time with the father into her life seamlessly. It will also enable her to experience the father looking after her and as a caregiver to her. I accept Mr G’s evidence that, ideally, such a process occurs for children during their preschool years and that, as this has not happened for the child, there may initially be some difficulties for her in terms of her adaption.
However, I am also well persuaded by Mr G’s evidence that, with the mother’s support, the child has the capacity to incorporate this change and adapt to it. Life requires children to learn the skills of adaption - I have no doubt that both parents have the capacity to pass such a skill on to the child.
I also accept Mr G’s evidence that it is important for the child’s long term development that she have the opportunity to spend overnight, graduated time with the father. I accept that, initially, there may well be some discomfort and distress for the child as she learns and adapts to this new parenting regime which will include overnight time with her father.
Again, I reiterate: I accept that the mother has a clearly demonstrated capacity to be able to encourage the child to enjoin this structure. I also accept Mr G’s evidence and opinion that the concerns expressed by the child’s mother will not be extinguished by prolonging the move or transition into the child spending overnight time with the father.
The parties are in dispute in relation to whether there should be an opportunity provided to the father to collect the child from school at the commencement of time. He accepts that on occasion he has been late.
The mother is concerned that he will fail to attend and such failure will result in the child experiencing understandable anxiety and distress. The benefit of providing for the father to have the opportunity to collect the child from school is that it permits her to transition from the end of the educational day into his care without the necessity of an additional transition into the mother’s care and then from her mother to her father. It also provides the father with the opportunity to be involved in the child’s schooling, to take the opportunity to meet and talk with her teacher and to be seen by the child as being interested and involved with her and her involvement at school.
I am persuaded, having heard the father’s evidence, he will ensure that he is available to collect the child at school at the appropriate time. He could be left with no doubt whatsoever that any tardiness in attendance will be highly likely to contribute to the child’s anxiety. If he is late, or fails to attend, he will - by such action - contribute to her anxiety. There could be no doubt such action would also contribute to the mother’s anxiety. I am conscious and confident that he is aware of that and I am also confident that, save for an emergency situation which prevented him from attending, he will ensure he is available at the appropriate time to meet the child and collect her from school.

The parties also took issue with a number of the orders proposed by the Independent Children’s Lawyer. In particular, the mother sought an order that each party be present and available personally to care for the child during time she is with them. The father gave evidence that it was his intention to do so and that he considered it counterproductive and harmful to the child if, in essence, he sought time with her and then was not available. I accept his evidence in this respect. It seems to me to be appropriate and in the child’s best interest that, for a period of time, orders be made which require the father personally to provide care to the child during any time she is with him.
After the expiration of a period of time, however, I also consider it beneficial and appropriate that each parent be at liberty to make appropriate arrangements for the child’s care.
Another order sought by the mother was, in essence, that the parties have the first opportunity to care for the child in the event that the parent with whom she is to spend time pursuant to the orders is unable to care for her. At the expiration of the period of time to which I have already referred, this seems to me to be an appropriate order and one which is in the child’s best interests. Thus, after that time, that if during school holiday periods either parent is unable to care for the child for two consecutive nights, the other parent shall be afforded the first opportunity to step in and provide that care.
By then, I am hopeful that, with the assistance of Ms D or such other psychologist or therapist as she may recommend, the parties will have improved their co-parenting relationship. I consider that each, as I have said, has the capacity to do so. Every now and then there are flickers of each of them putting that capacity into effect.
For example, I refer to the occasion when the father suggested he enable the child to attend at a particular event that took place at his work environment. As I said to the parties during the trial, it seemed to me that, on that occasion, each parent focused upon their daughter’s best interests: the father looking to provide her with an opportunity to take advantage of being able to see a theatrical event and the mother graciously acknowledging his efforts and thanking him for them. Such event, albeit small, satisfies me, as I have said, that these parents have the capacity to act in such a manner. I think that with assistance provided by a professional they will hopefully learn various mechanisms by which they can bring that capacity to the fore.
The mother seeks an opportunity to take the child out of Australia for a celebratory event which is said to occur some time after she turns eight. At this stage the father opposes an order which permits the child to leave Australia. I am persuaded that it is in the child’s best interests she not undertake overseas travel before June 2016. The time between now and then should properly be focused upon her developing and enjoying her relationship with both of her parents and, in particular, with her father.
However, it seems to me that after that period of time, given the orders I intend to make in this matter, the child’s relationship with her father should be further advanced. She will, by that stage, be spending alternate weekend time and block holiday time with him. It seems to me that, after June 2016, either parent may wish to afford to the child the opportunity of overseas travel for holiday purposes - it seems to me that such overseas travel for holiday purposes is likely to be in her best interests.
The concern in making an order which prohibits the child from leaving the Commonwealth of Australia indefinitely is that it forces the parties to return to Court to seek the release of such order.
Another option and one which I have ultimately decided as being the appropriate one is to permit a child to leave the Commonwealth of Australia after a particular period, in this case after June 2016, with either parent but to impose a requirement on the travelling parent to provide the other with information and details in sufficient time to enable the non-travelling parent - if they do not agree to the child leaving Australia or hold concerns about such a course - to bring an application in the Court to prevent that from happening.
That way, if all is going well and the details are sufficient and neither parent has any anxiety or reasonable and appropriately based concern about the child leaving the country she will be able to do so without the parents being put to the expense and trouble of returning to Court. It will also, of course, ensure that if all is not going well and the non-travelling parent has reasonable and legitimate concerns about the child leaving the Commonwealth of Australia, that parent will have an opportunity to seek to be heard in relation to that.
An order in such terms will also mean that the focus between now and June 2016 can be on developing the child’s relationship with both of her parents, free from any pressure about whether permission for overseas travel will or will not be forthcoming.
If there is an order that the child’s parents are to share parental responsibility for her and the exercise of that parental responsibility involves making a decision about a major long term issue in relation to her, such order requires the decision to be made jointly by her parents.
When making a parenting order I am bound to apply a presumption that it is the child’s best interests that her parents have equal shared parental responsibility for her. This presumption is rendered inapplicable by matters proscribed in section 61DA(2) of the Act or may be rebutted by evidence that satisfies the Court it would not be in the child’s best interest for her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for her. Whilst the presumption does not apply if the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that either of the child’s parents have engaged in abuse of the child or another child or family violence - and it may have been open to suggest on the evidence that I should reach this conclusion - I consider that the level of miscommunication and mistrust between the parents is such that, even if the presumption applied, it would be rebutted in this case. Any thought that the child’s parents can communicate sufficiently to be able to make decisions about a major long-term issue in relation to her jointly, as required by the Act is, I consider, aspirational.
So much can be seen from the father’s information to Mr G – see paragraph 27 of the report exhibited to the affidavit filed in January of this year – that he expected that having equal shared parental responsibility with the mother for the child may lead to increased conflict with her. I also accept the evidence of Mr G that the co-parenting relationship between the parents – and this is after his interviews in July of this year – remains exceptionally poor.
I am satisfied, therefore, that it is not in the child’s best interests that her parents have equal shared parental responsibility for her. Rather, I consider that an order which accords to the mother sole parental responsibility for her with the obligation to inquire of the father and seek his views about decisions relating to any major long term issues and to take his response into account when making such decisions is an order which is in the child’s best interests.
I note the Independent Children’s Lawyer provided the Court and the parties with a minute of proposed order during the course of the submissions made by counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer.
I have had regard to that proposed minute of order and the parties’ submissions in relation to it. Having reflected overnight, I have considered that it is, in this case, likely to be of more assistance and thus beneficial to the child if the orders made are made with some particularity to minimise the prospect of misunderstanding, miscommunication and further dispute.
For that reason, the orders I intend to make prescribe certain timeframes for the child’s time with the father and with each parent, but of course accord to the parents the opportunity to agree in writing to depart from those times.

I certify that the preceding ninety-six (96) paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hogan delivered on 17 September 2014.

Associate:

Date: 19 September 2014

[2014] FamCA 821

17 September 2014

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