AQN15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AQN15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 58
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Protection Visa.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958, ss.65, 476, 477

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

WZATH V Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 612
WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2014] FCA 969

Applicant: AQN15
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: BRG 373 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Howard
Hearing date: 20 November 2015
Date of Last Submission: 20 November 2015
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 27 January 2016

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person
Solicitors for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

  1. That the name of the second respondent be amended to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

  2. That the application is dismissed.

  3. That the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent in the amount of $5,800.  

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 373 of 2015

AQN15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant was born on 20 August 1982 in Sri Lanka.  He arrived at Christmas Island on 18 May 2012. 

  2. The applicant applied to the Department of Immigration for a Protection (Class XA) visa under section 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”). 

  3. He made this application on 23 August 2012. 

  4. On 12 September 2013 the Minister’s Delegate refused to grant to the applicant the visa which he sought.

  5. On 18 September 2013 the applicant filed an Application for Review of the decision by the Minister’s delegate.

  6. On 3 December 2014 the applicant was invited to appear before the relevant Tribunal to give evidence and to present arguments.  On 13 February 2015 a hearing took place before the Tribunal and the applicant participated in person together with his representative by telephone.  An interpreter assisted the applicant. 

  7. After the hearing took place on 13 February 2015 – the Tribunal wrote to the applicant stating that the Tribunal wished to conduct a second hearing.  The Tribunal wrote on 24 February 2015.  The purpose of the second hearing was to obtain the applicant’s comments on the relevant part of a new DFAT report dated 16 February 2015.  The Tribunal advised the applicant that it would be able to conduct a short telephone hearing to avoid inconvenience and the Tribunal was available on 2 March 2015.  However, the Tribunal also noted that the applicant would need to consent in writing in order to waive the prescribed period for the hearing to proceed as planned.

  8. However, on 24 February 2015 the applicant’s representative advised that they had been unable to contact the applicant in order to obtain his consent for the hearing that had been referred to in the Tribunal’s letter.  The Tribunal forwarded a copy of the DFAT report dated 16 February 2015 and invited the applicant to provide comments/submissions as soon as possible and certainly by…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 58
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In AQN15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor, the applicant sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The sole ground of review advanced by the applicant was that the Tribunal's decision was affected by legal error. The applicant indicated that this ground had been drafted by a Justice of the Peace and failed to provide any particulars of the alleged legal error, despite opportunities to amend the application and file submissions.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the applicant had properly particularised a ground of review, and more broadly, whether any jurisdictional error had been demonstrated in the Tribunal's decision. The Court was required to determine if the applicant's submissions constituted a valid basis for judicial review or if they amounted to an impermissible attempt to have the merits of the Tribunal's decision reconsidered.

Judge Howard reasoned that the failure to particularise the ground of review was, in itself, a sufficient basis for dismissing the application, referencing precedent from WZATH v Minister for Immigration & Anor. Furthermore, the Court found that the applicant's submissions throughout the hearing were consistently directed towards urging the Court to undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's factual findings and credibility assessments, rather than identifying any jurisdictional error. The Court reiterated the principle, as stated in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang, that judicial review is concerned with the legality of administrative action and not with the reconsideration of its merits.

Consequently, the application was dismissed on the basis that the ground of review was not properly particularised and, in any event, the applicant had failed to identify any jurisdictional error, instead seeking an impermissible merits review of the Tribunal's decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

As noted, on 1 May 2015 the applicant filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia seeking judicial review of the decision of the second respondent. The ground of review stated:-“That the decision of the second respondent, the refugee review tribunal, was affected by legal error”. The applicant only identified this one single ground of review. The applicant told the Court on 20 November 2015 that a Justice of the Peace had written this ground of review for him. The applicant did not at any time provide any particulars of the ground of review. The applicant had an opportunity to file and serve an Amended Application but he did not do so. Further, the applicant had an opportunity to file and serve written submissions before the hearing date. The applicant did not do so. The ground for review stated by the applicant is not properly particularised. I note what was said by His Honour Judge Lucev in WZATH v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 612 at paragraph 60 – where His Honour stated:-“60. Ground 2 is not properly particularised. The failure to particularise a ground of review is sufficient basis for it to be dismissed (Note: SZELX v Minister for Immigration [2007] FMCA 209). The Court has, however, given consideration to the grounds for review as best it can in the absence of particulars.” An appeal against the decision of the primary Judge in WZATH (supra) was dismissed by the Federal Court of Australia (per Siopis J) (WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2014] FCA 969). In the case currently before the Court – despite the fact that the applicant was given many opportunities to provide particulars of the ground of review – he failed to do so. On this basis alone the application is dismissed. But there are other reasons that the application must be dismissed in any event. The applicant – during the course of the hearing on 20 November 2015 continually raised factual matters and was requesting that the Court embark upon an impermissible merits review of the decision of the Tribunal. The applicant’s submissions were aimed at highlighting errors by the Tribunal in relation to factual issues and errors by the Tribunal in relation to findings of credit against the applicant. All of the matters raised by the applicant at the hearing on 20 November 2015 were designed to urge the Court to embark on an impermissible merits review of the Tribunal’s decision. The applicant referred to some recent postings on certain websites in the latter part of 2015. This Court is, however, considering an application for Judicial Review of a decision made by the Tribunal in March 2015. I have come to the conclusion that the applicant has not been able to identify any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The applicant’s submissions were all aimed at trying to get the Court to embark on an impermissible merits review of the Tribunal’s decision. There was nothing raised by the applicant that could be said to be relevant or that could be said to highlight some jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. It is important to keep in mind what was said by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 where it was stated:-“…any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. This has been made clear many times in this Court. For example, it was said by Brennan J in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1:“The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository’s power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative actions, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone.””

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established