JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: APT FINANCE PTY LTD -v- WINGSIDE NOMINEES PTY LTD [No 2] [2009] WASCA 235
CORAM: WHEELER JA
NEWNES JA
HEARD: 20 OCTOBER 2009
DELIVERED : 22 DECEMBER 2009
FILE NO/S: CACV 54 of 2009
BETWEEN: APT FINANCE PTY LTD (ACN 080 974 278)
Appellant
AND
WINGSIDE NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 078 036 281)
First RespondentCHRISTOPHER PETER GALE
STEPHANIE LEE GALE
Second Respondents
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MASTER SANDERSON
File No :CIV 1532 of 2004
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Application to join or substitute plaintiff - Delay in commencing application - Acquiescence of other parties in delay - Waiting for outcome of appeal concerning similar issues - Reliance on Limitation Act point not raised below - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Limitation Act 2005 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 18 r 6, O 18 r 7(2)
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 60(1)(f)
Result:
Leave to appeal refused
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr P N Bevilacqua
First Respondent : Mr D Vilensky
Second Respondents : Mr D Vilensky
Solicitors:
Appellant: Price Sierakowski
First Respondent : Bowen Buchbinder Vilensky
Second Respondents : Bowen Buchbinder Vilensky
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
APT Finance Pty Ltd v Bajada [2008] WASCA 73
Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Lancaster Banking Company v Cooper (1878) 9 Ch D 594
Southern Cross Pipelines Australia Pty Ltd v Kenneth Comninos Michael Western Australian Independent Gas Pipelines Access Regulator [2002] WASC 149
The State of Western Australia v Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 40
Wilson v Metaxas [1989] WAR 285
WHEELER JA:
Introduction
This is an application for leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, an appeal against a decision by Master Sanderson to refuse the appellant leave to join a second plaintiff, Seiza Investments Pty Ltd (Seiza), in the Supreme Court matter CIV 1532 of 2004. Although in form an application for joinder of a party, it appeared at the hearing of the appeal that what the appellant actually sought was to substitute Seiza as plaintiff in the action against Wingside Nominees Pty Ltd (Wingside) and Christopher Gale, and to join Seiza as a second plaintiff against Stephanie Gale. This position was not clearly articulated before the master. The matter has an unhappily confused and complex history.
The main proceedings and the chain of assignment
In the action, the appellant alleges that it made two loans, one to the first respondent (Wingside) and another to the first‑named second respondent (Christopher Gale) pursuant to loan deeds dated 31 May 2001. These two loans were supported by a guarantee and indemnity granted by the second respondents (Christopher and Stephanie Gale) on 25 May 2001.
It appears from the appellant's chronology that on 13 April 2002, an unsecuritised assets…
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- Case
- [2009] WASCA 235
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the Master erred in his approach to the appellant's delay, and if the Master had the discretion to refuse an order for substitution. The court was also required to determine whether the reliance on a point from the Limitation Act, which was not raised in the lower court, was appropriate in this context. The court had to balance the discretionary power to join a party with the necessity for the effectual and complete determination and adjudication of all matters in dispute.
The court found that there was a strong presumption in favour of the Master's decision, given it was a discretionary decision on a matter of practice and procedure. The appellant had to demonstrate an express or implied material error of fact or law, which they failed to do. The court held that the Master's decision was based on the delay in the application and the merits of the case, which were relevant considerations. The court also noted that the appellant did not assert that the Master applied a wrong test. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Master was upheld.
There were no final orders made in this appeal, as the decision of the Master was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This appeal is one against a discretionary decision of the learned master. Therefore there is a strong presumption in favour of its correctness unless the appellant can show it to be clearly wrong: Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation v The Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627. The appellant appeals from a discretionary decision on a matter of practice and procedure. The appellant must demonstrate an express or implied material error of fact or law: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. The power to join a plaintiff is found in O 18 r 6(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), which provides:At any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter the Court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application ‑(a)order that any person who has been improperly or unnecessarily made a party or who has for any reason ceased to be a proper or necessary party, to cease to be a party;(b)order that any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon, be added as a party,but no person shall be added as a plaintiff without his consent signified in writing or in such other manner as may be authorised. It is unclear why the appellant has sought to rely on O 18 r 6(2), when there is an express power in O 18 r 7(2) to add an assignee of a cause of action as a party. However, it has been held that O 18 r 6 may also be relied on to permit the substitution of a party in the same circumstances: Bajada. On any application under this rule, it is necessary to determine whether or not the proposed party has an interest which makes it necessary for it to be before the court for the effectual and complete determination and adjudication of all matters in dispute in the cause. It has been held that the court has a discretion to refuse an order for joinder: Lancaster Banking Company v Cooper (1878) 9 Ch D 594. However, it is difficult to justify the exclusion of a party whose presence is necessary for the effectual determination and adjudication of matters in dispute and, consequently, it would seem that any discretionary power to decline an order would generally be confined to practical matters of convenience or disruption which might tell against the late admission of such a party: Southern Cross Pipelines Australia Pty Ltd v Kenneth Comninos Michael Western Australian Independent Gas Pipelines Access Regulator [2002] WASC 149 at [8]. It is important to note, however, that the appellant does not assert in this appeal that the learned master applied a wrong test. There might be reason to doubt his observation that "the two important principles" are the delay and the merits of the case. The overriding principle is the more general one identified above. However, delay may be relevant to that issue. The appellant accepts that delay is relevant in the present case, but asserts that the master erred in his approach to the appellant's delay.