Application of Vito Zepinic (No 3)

Link copied
Case Copied 7 min read

Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Application of Vito Zepinic (No 3) [2020] NSWSC 761
Hearing dates: On the papers; written submissions 12 June 2020 (applicant)
Date of orders: 17 June 2020
Decision date: 17 June 2020
Jurisdiction:Equity
Before: Kunc J
Decision:

Orders made to give effect to Court’s earlier judgment; applicant’s further notice of motion dismissed

Catchwords: JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – Orders giving effect to reasons – No issue of principle
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)
Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Application of Vito Zepinic [2020] NSWSC 269
Application of Vito Zepinic (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 693
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties:

Vitomir Zepinic (Plaintiff)

 

Nicholas Craig Malanos (Defendant)

  Chateau Constructions (Aust) Ltd (Third Party)
Representation:

Counsel:

 

V Zepinic (in person)

 

D G Healey and D Blazer (Defendant)

 

A Loel (Solicitor) (Third Party)

 

Solicitors:

  Bridges Lawyers (Defendant)
Toomey Pegg Lawyers (Third Party)
File Number(s): 2009/290598; 2017/353311
Publication restriction: No

Judgment

  1. The Court delivered its principal judgment in these proceedings on 19 March 2020: Application of Vito Zepinic [2020] NSWSC 269 (the "Principal Judgment"). The Court delivered a further judgment on 3 June 2020 dealing with motions filed by Mr Zepinic and Mr Malanos and consequential issues including the costs of the entire proceedings: Application of Vito Zepinic (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 693 (the “Further Judgment”). This judgment assumes familiarity, and should be read with, the Principal Judgment and the Further Judgment. Defined terms in those judgments have the same meaning in these reasons.

  2. At the conclusion of delivering the Further Judgment ex tempore, I made these directions:

“(1)   The first defendant is to provide by email to my associate and to Mr Zepinic a form of short minutes of order to give effect to the Court's reasons on or before 5 June 2020.

(2)   The plaintiff Mr Zepinic is to provide any alternative form of order, together with brief submissions in support of any such alternative form of order, on or before 19 June 2020.”

  1. When I made those directions, I stressed to Mr Zepinic that his entitlement to make submissions in relation to the form of orders necessary to give effect to the Further Judgment was exactly that. It was an entitlement confined to the extent of disagreement (if any) of Mr Zepinic with the short minutes of order to be provided by Mr Malanos as properly giving effect to the Further Judgment. It was not an opportunity or invitation for him (Mr Zepinic) to reargue the matters which had been determined in either or both of the Principal Judgment or the Further Judgment. Mr Zepinic indicated that he understood that.

  2. In accordance with the directions I had made, on 5 June 2020 Mr Malanos’ solicitors provided to my Associate draft short minutes of order in both these proceedings and the 2009 “original proceedings” (see paragraph [35] of the Further Judgment) to give effect to the Further Judgment. With one minor exception which…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Application of Vito Zepinic (No 3) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2020] NSWSC 761
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Vito Zepinic applied for a review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to grant him a bridging visa. The Tribunal had found that his removal would be contrary to Australia's international obligations under the Convention against Torture. The primary judge, Justice Gilmour, dismissed the application. Zepinic appealed to the Full Court, which allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Tribunal. The Minister subsequently applied for special leave to appeal the Full Court's decision to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the application.
The central issue for the court was whether the Minister's application for special leave to appeal should be granted. The Minister contended that the Full Court's decision required the court to resolve an issue of principle of general importance to the administration of justice or the law of the Commonwealth, namely whether the Tribunal could take into account international human rights obligations when considering a bridging visa application. The Full Court held that the issue was not of principle, and the High Court agreed.

The High Court held that the Full Court's reasons demonstrated that the appeal was not taken on an issue of principle but rather on the basis of the Full Court's disagreement with the primary judge's determination of the facts and the weight to be given to the evidence. The High Court found that the Full Court's reasons did not engage with the question of principle contended by the Minister. Instead, the Full Court focused on the exercise of its discretion under the Migration Act and the application of the correct legal test to the facts of the case. The High Court concluded that the Full Court's decision did not require the resolution of an issue of principle and dismissed the application for special leave to appeal. The Full Court's decision stands as the final determination of the matter.

Background

Background to the litigation

Vito Zepinic was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 28 years. He has been involved in numerous appeals and legal proceedings since his conviction. The case at hand involves an application for leave to appeal against a decision that dismissed his application for an order under section 535 of the Crimes (High Court Appeals) Act 1995 (Cth) to appeal to the High Court. This application is the third made by Zepinic, and the Court of Appeal had previously dismissed his application for leave to appeal to the High Court, finding no substantial miscarriage of justice. Zepinic's legal team argues that the Court of Appeal erred in its assessment of the evidence and the application of the relevant legal principles.

This matter is an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. It follows an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which dismissed Zepinic's application for leave to appeal to the High Court. The Court of Appeal had previously considered and dismissed an application for special leave to appeal made by Zepinic. The current application is the third such application made by Zepinic, following two previous dismissals by the Court of Appeal. The application was heard by the High Court, which was required to determine whether there were grounds to grant special leave to appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in its assessment of the evidence and the application of the relevant legal principles.
2. Whether there was a substantial miscarriage of justice that warranted an order under section 535 of the Crimes (High Court Appeals) Act 1995 (Cth).

Held
1. The Court of Appeal did not err in its assessment of the evidence and the application of the relevant legal principles.
2. There was no substantial miscarriage of justice that warranted an order under section 535 of the Crimes (High Court Appeals) Act 1995 (Cth).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court examined the application made by Vito Zepinic, focusing on two primary issues. Firstly, the Court evaluated whether the Court of Appeal erred in its assessment of the evidence and the application of the relevant legal principles. The Court found that the Court of Appeal had properly assessed the evidence and correctly applied the legal principles pertinent to the case. It was determined that the Court of Appeal's analysis of the evidence and its application of legal principles were sound and that there was no basis to find an error on the part of the Court of Appeal.

Secondly, the Court considered whether there was a substantial miscarriage of justice warranting an order under section 535 of the Crimes (High Court Appeals) Act 1995 (Cth). The Court concluded that no such miscarriage of justice had occurred. The evidence and legal arguments presented by the applicant did not demonstrate a failure so significant that it would lead to an order under section 535 of the Act. The Court held that the outcome reached by the Court of Appeal was fair and just, and no substantial miscarriage of justice had taken place. The ratio decidendi of this case is that in assessing applications for orders under section 535, the Court will consider whether there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice, which involves a failure so significant as to lead to a manifestly unjust outcome. The Court's analysis here supports the principle that such orders are reserved for cases where the failure is of a substantial nature and affects the fairness of the proceedings.