Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Application of Mary-Anne Lukic [2015] NSWSC 822 Hearing dates: 29 June 2015 Date of orders: 29 June 2015 Decision date: 29 June 2015 Jurisdiction: Equity Division Before: White J Decision: 1. Order that the claim for relief in the summons be dismissed.
2. Order that there be no order as to the plaintiff's costs to the intent that she bear her costs personally and without recourse to the estate of the person described in these reasons as Hanna.Catchwords: WILLS, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION – application by consent for the making of a will for a person lacking testamentary capacity – where that person had previously made a will in 2011 – whether it is reasonably likely that the proposed will would have been made if the person had testamentary capacity – application dismissed, with the parties to bear their own costs Legislation Cited: Succession Act 2006 (NSW)
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)
Powers of Attorney Act 2003 (NSW)Cases Cited: Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544
Lachmi Parshad v Maharajah Narendro Kishore Singh Bahadur (1891) LR 19 Ind App 9
Re Fenwick [2009] NSWSC 530; (2009) 76 NSWLR 22
Re Will of Jane [2011] NSWSC 624Category: Principal judgment Parties: Mary-Anne Julieanna Romaine Lukic (Plaintiff)
Irene Mihopoulos (Interested Party)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
J Heazlewood (Plaintiff)
D J Price (Interested Party)
Lewarne & Goldsmith Solicitors (Plaintiff)
Danny Eid Lawyers (Interested Party)
File Number(s): 2014/312190
Judgment
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HIS HONOUR: This is an application under s 19 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) for leave to apply for an order under s 18 of that Act authorising the making of a will for a person who lacks testamentary capacity. If leave is given the plaintiff seeks an order under s 18 that the Court authorise the making of a new will for that person. I will call the person for whom the Court is asked to make a new will, Hanna.
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Hanna was born in 1922 and is currently aged 93. She was admitted to a nursing home on 5 June 2013 and resides in a dementia specific unit. I am satisfied from the report of Professor Richard Lindley, a professor of geriatric medicine, that Hanna lacks testamentary capacity. Professor Lindley says that her lack of testamentary capacity is very clear and unambiguous.
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Hanna made a will as recently as 30 April 2011. At the time she made her will she was married to her husband Cecil. They had no children. She and Cecil made mirror wills in which each left their property to their spouse if their spouse survived them with a gift over in the same terms if their spouse did not survive. Cecil died on 1 May 2012.
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Hanna's will relevantly provides:
“1. I REVOKE all former Wills and Testamentary Dispositions.
2. I APPOINT as my executor and trustee MARY-ANNE JOYBELLE IVOREEN ANDREOPOULOS of [xx xxxxxxxx xxxxxx, yyyyyyyyyy] in the State of New South Wales provided that if MARY-ANNE JOYBELLE…
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- Case
- [2015] NSWSC 822
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the proposed will would have been made by the person if they had possessed testamentary capacity. The applicant argued that the proposed will was consistent with the person's wishes and circumstances, while the respondent argued that the proposed will was not consistent with the person's wishes. The court considered the evidence of the person's wishes and circumstances, including the evidence of the applicant, and found that it was not reasonably likely that the proposed will would have been made by the person if they had possessed testamentary capacity.
The court found that the proposed will was not consistent with the person's wishes and circumstances. The court noted that the person had previously made a will in 2011, which was not consistent with the proposed will. The court also noted that the evidence of the applicant did not establish that the proposed will was consistent with the person's wishes and circumstances. The court dismissed the application, with the parties to bear their own costs.
The court dismissed the application and ordered that the parties bear their own costs. The court found that the proposed will was not reasonably likely to have been made by the person if they had possessed testamentary capacity. The court considered the evidence of the person's wishes and circumstances, including the evidence of the applicant, and found that the proposed will was not consistent with the person's wishes and circumstances.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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