Application of Dawn Wade - Re Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Glass Slipper Racing Pty Ltd
[2009] NSWSC 1216
•28 September 2009
CITATION: Application of Dawn Wade - Re Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Glass Slipper Racing Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1216 HEARING DATE(S): 28 September 2009 JURISDICTION: Equity Division
Corporations ListJUDGMENT OF: Brereton J EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 28 September 2009 DECISION: Notice of Motion dismissed with costs. CATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS – External administration – Deregistration – Reinstatement – standing – whether applicant person aggrieved – where deregistration produced no consequences for applicant. LEGISLATION CITED: (CTH) Corporations Act 2001, s 601A(h) CATEGORY: Principal judgment PARTIES: Dawn Wade (applicant)
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (plaintiff/respondent)
Glass Slipper Racing Pty Ltd (defendant)FILE NUMBER(S): SC 4000/03 COUNSEL: Mr Le (solicitor) (plaintiff/respondent)
Mr Jones (applicant)SOLICITORS: ATO Legal Practice (plaintiff/respondent)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
CORPORATIONS LIST
BRERETON J
Monday 28 September 2009
4000/03 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Glass Slipper Racing Pty Limited
JUDGMENT (ex tempore)
1 HIS HONOUR: This is an application under s 601A(h) of the (CTH) Corporations Act 2001 for reinstatement of Glass Slipper Racing Pty Limited in liquidation, which has since been deregistered consequent upon the completion of the winding up. The applicant, Dawn Wade, seeks an adjournment for the purposes of adducing further evidence in connection with the application. The respondent Deputy Commissioner seeks that the application be dismissed and the adjournment refused on the basis that it is futile, since the applicant cannot establish that she has standing as a person aggrieved for the purposes of s 601A(h).
2 The evidence establishes that the applicant had been a Director of the company but resigned some months before the winding up application was instituted and before the winding up order was made. It also establishes that the applicant’s son, Matthew Trnka, was a Director of and shareholder in the company. It appears that the applicant’s main claim to standing as a person aggrieved depends on the circumstance that she was said to be managing the company on behalf of Matthew Trnka after she resigned as a Director, and that reinstatement of the company will produce some benefits for Mr Trnka.
3 Counsel has not been able to identify any meaningful benefit in reinstatement to Ms Wade, as opposed to her son. It is said that she has some claim for remuneration for work done by her managing the company. That was, as I understand the evidence, more than six years ago. If she does have standing as a creditor, then it would have been open to her to prove in the winding up as such.
4 There is no prejudice or grievance occasioned to the applicant by the deregistration of the company. Its deregistration produced no consequences for her. I am satisfied that Ms Wade is not a person aggrieved, and does not have standing to bring this application.
5 I order that the Notice of Motion filed on 6 July 2009 and amended on 12 August 2009 be dismissed with costs.
0
0
1