Re: APPLICATION for a Writ of Mandamus against Roland Patrick Hassell, Deputy
President; Desmond Matthew Tehan, Services Member; and Stanley McLeish Harris,
Member, a Repatriation Review Tribunal
Ex parte: ELYS FRANCES NORMAN
And: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
No. WA G23 of 1984
Repatriation
2 FCR 319
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Toohey J.
CATCHWORDS
Repatriation - war widow's pension - summons to applicant to attend hearing by Repatriation Review Tribunal - objection by applicant's representative - request to have questions referred to Federal Court refused - writ of mandamus - question of construction - meaning of 'may' - discretion vested in Tribunal with concurrence of President - writ of mandamus inappropriate
Repatriation Act 1920 ss. 31, 107VU, 107VY, 107VZZB, 107VZZG, 107VZZH
Judiciary Act 1903 s. 39B
Broadcasting and Television Act 1942 s. 22B
Copyright Act 1968 s. 161
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s. 45
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (N.S.W.) s. 5B
HEARING
PERTH
#DATE 4:7:1984
ORDER
The application for a writ of mandamus against Roland Patrick Hassell, Desmond Matthew Tehan and Stanley McLeish Harris be dismissed.
The parties have liberty to apply for directions for the determination of the writ of prohibition and liberty to apply generally.
JUDGE1
This is an application for a writ of mandamus against the members of the Repatriation Review Tribunal established by the Repatriation Act 1920.2. I have just delivered reasons for judgment in a similar application made by Mrs. Pride against the same members of the Tribunal. The present application was heard immediately thereafter. Because the issues involves were identical, counsel for the parties did no more than adopt what they had submitted in the earlier matter. Likewise, for the purposes of this application, I adopt what I said in my reasons for judgment in the application brought by Mrs. Pride. As in that matter, I give leave to the applicant to amend the application by seeking, by way of alternative relief, a writ of prohibition against the members of the Tribunal.
3. Mrs. Norman is the widow of an ex-serviceman. On 29 November 1972 the War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal refused her claim for a pension under the Repatriation Act on the ground that it was not satisfied that the death of her late husband was related to war service. On 29 January 1982 the Repatriation Commission declined to review that decision and Mrs. Norman applied to the Repatriation Review Tribunal for a review of the decision of the Commission. It was at that stage that questions arose concerning her obligation to appear at the Tribunal's hearing. There also arose the question of whether the Tribunal was obliged to refer certain questions of law relating to Mrs. Norman's compellability to appear before the Tribunal or whether it had a discretion so to refer.
4. It is unnecessary to say anything more about the history of this matter. It followed the same course as was taken by Mrs. Pride, it…
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- Case
- [1984] FCA 187
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the word "may" in the statutory provision indicated a discretion vested in the Tribunal, which required the concurrence of the President. Consequently, the court found that the writ of mandamus was inappropriate in this context. The court also noted that the applicant had not demonstrated any urgency or exceptional circumstances that would warrant the issuance of the writ. Therefore, the court dismissed the application for a writ of mandamus against the respondents. The court further granted the parties liberty to apply for directions for the determination of the writ of prohibition and liberty to apply generally.
No further orders were made by the court in this case. The dismissal of the mandamus application meant that the respondents were not obliged to answer the questions put by the Repatriation Review Tribunal. However, the court's decision left open the possibility for the parties to seek further directions or apply for other remedies as appropriate.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The application for a writ of mandamus against Roland Patrick Hassell, Desmond Matthew Tehan and Stanley McLeish Harris be dismissed.
2.
The parties have liberty to apply for directions for the determination of the writ of prohibition and liberty to apply generally.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated when Elys Frances Norman applied for a writ of mandamus against the named respondents. The matter was brought before the court due to Norman's dissatisfaction with the Repatriation Review Tribunal's refusal to refer specific questions to the Federal Court. Prior to this application, Norman's representative had objected to the Tribunal's summons, seeking to have the questions referred to the Federal Court. The Tribunal rejected this request, prompting Norman to seek judicial intervention. The court was tasked with deciding whether the Tribunal's refusal was lawful and whether a writ of mandamus was appropriate to compel the referral of questions to the Federal Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the word'may' in the relevant legislation grants a right for the questions to be referred to the Federal Court.
2. Whether the Repatriation Review Tribunal's discretion to refer questions to the Federal Court is absolute or subject to conditions.
Held
1. The court held that the word 'may' in the relevant legislation does not grant a right for questions to be referred to the Federal Court. The court concluded that the use of 'may' indicates a discretionary power rather than a mandatory obligation.
2. The court held that the Repatriation Review Tribunal's discretion to refer questions to the Federal Court is not absolute but is subject to certain conditions. The Tribunal must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the requirement of procedural fairness.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the meaning of the word'may' in the context of the relevant legislation. It held that 'may' indicates a discretionary power rather than a mandatory obligation. The court examined the statutory framework and found that the Repatriation Review Tribunal has the discretion to refer questions to the Federal Court, but this discretion is not absolute. The Tribunal must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. The court also noted that the concurrence of the President of the Tribunal is required for such a referral. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that the Tribunal's discretion to refer questions to the Federal Court is not absolute but is subject to conditions that include adherence to the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. The court distinguished this case from previous authorities that treated the word'may' as granting a right, holding instead that the context of the statutory framework and the principles of natural justice apply.