Applicants S335-2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor

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[2006] HCATrans 399

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S539 of 2005

B e t w e e n -

APPLICANTS S335 OF 2003

Applicants

and

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

First Respondent

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Second Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

Publication of reasons and pronouncement of orders

KIRBY J
CALLINAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 3 AUGUST 2006, AT 1.22 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

KIRBY J:  

Background

The applicants, nationals of Fiji, arrived in Australia in January 1997.  In April of that year the applicant husband (who was the moving party) applied for a protection visa pursuant to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), on the basis of an alleged refugee status. Essentially, his claim was founded on his Indian ethnicity and what he submitted was the serious disadvantage occasioned to him and his wife and daughter on that ground as citizens of Fiji. In particular, he complained that he was discouraged by the government of Fiji from having children and that he and his wife had been pressured to have an abortion by a nursing sister and doctor, by inference allegedly as part of state policy antagonistic to ethnic Indian citizens.

Following the refusal of the application by the primary decision‑maker, the applicant sought review by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).  In March 1998, the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s application and affirmed the primary decision.  The Tribunal stated, on the basis of identified country information, that there was no evidence to suggest that abortion was legal in Fiji, let alone encouraged.  It accepted that there was some discrimination against persons on the basis of ethnicity.  However, it concluded that the applicant had exaggerated his claims and that any problems experienced by the applicant (and his wife) were not Convention-related.  Thus no protection obligations were owed attracting an entitlement to a protection visa.

The applicant initially sought constitutional writs in this Court.  By order of Gaudron J, dated 25 November 2002, this Court remitted the applicant’s proceedings instanter to the Federal Court of Australia.  So remitted, the proceedings were assigned to Wilcox J.  His Honour dealt with them on the papers.  In a brief statement of reasons for his disposition, his Honour ordered that subrule (1) of Order 51A rule 5 of the Federal Court Rules should apply to the case and that the applicant’s application for an order nisi should be refused.  His Honour did this for the reason that, having considered the papers “including the applicant’s submissions” he did not think that any of the grounds referred to by the applicant was fairly arguable.  For that reason his Honour decided that it would be inappropriate to grant an order nisi and the application for order nisi was refused. 

The applicant then sought leave to appeal within the Federal Court from this order of Wilcox J.  He sought leave, being in doubt as to whether the order was interlocutory…

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Details
Case
[2006] HCATrans 399
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, identified as S335-2003 and S336-2003, sought judicial review of decisions made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) which affirmed the Minister's refusal to grant them protection visas. The matter came before the High Court of Australia, with Justices Kirby and Callinan presiding. The core of the dispute concerned the RRT's assessment of the applicants' claims for protection, particularly in relation to the risk of persecution they alleged they would face upon return to their country of origin.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the RRT had erred in law in its assessment of the applicants' claims. Specifically, the court was required to consider whether the RRT had failed to adequately consider the evidence before it, whether it had applied the correct legal principles in assessing the risk of persecution, and whether its findings were supported by the evidence. The applicants contended that the RRT had made jurisdictional errors in its review process.

Justices Kirby and Callinan considered the nature of the RRT's review and the standard of proof required for a protection visa claim. They examined the evidence presented by the applicants and the RRT's reasons for decision, applying principles of administrative law concerning the proper exercise of statutory power. The court focused on whether the RRT had properly applied the "real chance" test for assessing the risk of persecution, and whether its conclusions were logically open on the material before it.

The High Court dismissed the applications for judicial review, finding that the RRT had not made any jurisdictional error in its assessment of the applicants' claims. The court concluded that the RRT had properly considered the evidence and applied the relevant legal principles in reaching its decisions.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants, nationals of Fiji, arrived in Australia in January 1997. The applicant husband, who was the primary applicant, applied for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in April 1997. His application was based on his Indian ethnicity and the alleged disadvantages faced by him and his family as citizens of Fiji. Specifically, he claimed that he and his wife had been pressured to have an abortion by a nursing sister and doctor, allegedly as part of a state policy antagonistic to ethnic Indian citizens. The application was subsequently refused by the primary decision-maker, leading the applicants to seek a review by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). In March 1998, the Tribunal rejected the applicants’ application, affirming the primary decision. The Tribunal found that while there was some discrimination against persons on the basis of ethnicity in Fiji, the applicants had exaggerated their claims and the problems they experienced were not related to the Convention on the Status of Refugees. Consequently, no protection obligations were owed to them, and they were not entitled to a protection visa.

Following the Tribunal’s decision, the applicants sought constitutional writs in the High Court. By order of Gaudron J, dated 25 November 2002, the proceedings were remitted to the Federal Court of Australia. Wilcox J dealt with the case on the papers and ordered that subrule (1) of Order 51A rule 5 of the Federal Court Rules should apply, refusing the applicant’s application for an order nisi. Wilcox J concluded that none of the grounds raised by the applicants were fairly arguable. The applicants then sought leave to appeal within the Federal Court from this order. Lindgren J heard the application, identifying the alleged denial of procedural fairness as the only conceivably arguable ground. However, Lindgren J found no merit in the ground of failure to accord procedural fairness and refused leave to appeal. In this Court, the applicants’ draft notice of appeal primarily addressed the suggested failure of the Federal Court judges to understand and give effect to the applicants’ complaints of persecution. The Court, however, was not convinced that a reconsideration of the matter would have any prospect of succeeding, given the established rules that restrain appellate courts from disturbing interlocutory procedural decisions of this kind.

The applicants, nationals of Fiji, applied for a protection visa in April 1997, claiming refugee status based on their Indian ethnicity and alleged persecution by the Fijian government, including claims of state policy antagonistic towards ethnic Indians, which included pressure to have an abortion. Their initial application was refused by the primary decision-maker, and subsequently, the Refugee Review Tribunal rejected their application in March 1998, finding no evidence to support the claims of legal abortion or Convention-related persecution. The applicants initially sought constitutional writs in the High Court, which were remitted to the Federal Court by Gaudron J. Wilcox J in the Federal Court dismissed the application, and Lindgren J denied the subsequent appeal for leave to appeal from that decision. The applicants then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, arguing that the Federal Court judges failed to understand their complaints of persecution and procedural fairness. The High Court found that the Federal Court’s decision was a procedural one and unlikely to be disturbed on appeal due to the negligible prospects of success and the well-established rules that restrict appellate courts from interfering with interlocutory procedural decisions. Consequently, the High Court refused the application for special leave.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Federal Court erred in concluding that the applicant’s application for an order nisi was frivolous or vexatious, warranting the refusal of an opportunity for the applicant to be heard.
2. Whether the Federal Court misapplied the law in determining that the applicant was not denied procedural fairness by not being given an opportunity to respond to country information relied upon by the Tribunal.
3. Whether the Federal Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing leave to appeal the interlocutory decision.
4. Whether the factual conclusions made by the Tribunal were open to it, and whether the prospects of disturbing those conclusions on appeal to the High Court are negligible.

Held
1. The Court concluded that the Federal Court did not err in finding the applicant’s application for an order nisi was frivolous or vexatious, thus refusing the opportunity for the applicant to be heard. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
2. The Court found that the Federal Court did not misapply the law in determining that the applicant was not denied procedural fairness by not being given an opportunity to respond to country information relied upon by the Tribunal. The application on this issue was dismissed.
3. The Court held that the Federal Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing leave to appeal the interlocutory decision. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
4. The Court determined that the factual conclusions made by the Tribunal were open to it and that the prospects of disturbing those conclusions on appeal to the High Court are negligible. The application for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court was asked to determine whether it should grant the applicants special leave to appeal against the Federal Court's refusal to grant an order nisi. The applicants argued that the Federal Court erred in concluding that their application was frivolous or vexatious and that they were not denied procedural fairness. The applicants also claimed that the Federal Court should have exercised its discretion to allow an appeal of the interlocutory decision. The High Court found that the Federal Court's decision was correct and refused the applicants special leave to appeal.

Firstly, the Court considered whether the Federal Court was correct in concluding that the applicants' application was frivolous or vexatious. The Court found that the Federal Court was correct in this regard, as the applicants' submissions did not disclose a fairly arguable case. The Court noted that the Rules of the Federal Court permit the Court to relieve itself of the obligation to hear the parties in certain circumstances, such as when a case is indisputably clear or an abuse of process. In this case, the Court found that the Federal Court's conclusion that the application was frivolous or vexatious was fully open to it.

Secondly, the Court considered whether the Federal Court misapplied the law in determining that the applicants were not denied procedural fairness by not being given an opportunity to respond to country information relied upon by the Tribunal. The Court found that there was no merit in this ground of appeal, as the applicants had not been denied a fair opportunity to respond to the country information. The Court noted that the applicants had been given the opportunity to respond to the country information in their submissions to the Tribunal and that the Tribunal had considered their submissions.

Thirdly, the Court considered whether the Federal Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing leave to appeal the interlocutory decision. The Court found that the Federal Court correctly exercised its discretion in this regard, as the prospects of disturbing the factual conclusions made by the Tribunal on appeal to the High Court were negligible. The Court noted that the applicants' claims were rejected on the basis of factual conclusions that were open to the Tribunal and that the prospects of success on appeal were weaker than in other cases.

Lastly, the Court considered whether the factual conclusions made by the Tribunal were open to it, and whether the prospects of disturbing those conclusions on appeal to the High Court were negligible. The Court found that the factual conclusions made by the Tribunal were open to it, and that the prospects of disturbing those conclusions on appeal to the High Court were negligible. The Court noted that the applicants' claims were rejected on the basis of factual conclusions that were open to the Tribunal and that the prospects of success on appeal were weaker than in other cases.

In summary, the High Court found that the Federal Court was correct in concluding that the applicants' application was frivolous or vexatious, that the applicants were not denied procedural fairness, and that the Federal Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing leave to appeal the interlocutory decision. The Court also found that the factual conclusions made by the Tribunal were open to it, and that the prospects of disturbing those conclusions on appeal to the High Court were negligible. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the High Court will not disturb interlocutory procedural decisions of the Federal Court unless there are exceptional circumstances, and that the prospects of success on appeal must be stronger than in this case.