Applicant P66-2003 v Hutchnison & Anor

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[2003] HCATrans 444

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Perth  No P76 of 2003

B e t w e e n -

APPLICANT P66/2003

Applicant

and

COLIN HUTCHINSON

First Respondent

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Second Respondent

Summons for interlocutory injunction

CALLINAN J

(In Chambers)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM PERTH BY VIDEO LINK TO BRISBANE

ON THURSDAY, 30 OCTOBER 2003, AT 4.39 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR C.G. COLVIN, SC:   If your Honour pleases, with my learned friend, MR A.R. BEECH, I appear for the applicant in this matter.  (instructed by Stella Koya)

MR P.R. MACLIVER:   If it please your Honour, I appear for the respondents.  (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, Mr Colvin.

MR COLVIN:   If your Honour pleases, this is an application for an injunction to restrain deportation and it is brought pending the hearing of an application for leave to appeal and it is consequent on a decision by his Honour Justice Heydon refusing orders nisi for constitutional writs.

HIS HONOUR:   I have read his reasons, Mr Colvin, and I have read the guidelines.  I have not had an opportunity to read what you say is the new information.  Where do I find that?  In which affidavit do I find that?  Do you know to what I am referring?

MR COLVIN:   Yes, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   I have also read your submissions, I might say, Mr Colvin.

MR COLVIN:   Yes, thank you, your Honour.  There is an affidavit of 2 October of a Ms Koya sworn in support of the application and that has the relevant material appended to it, and it is exhibit SK4 to that affidavit.  Your Honour, unfortunately this is not numbered.  About 15 pages from the end of the exhibit there is a letter on the letterhead of Asylum Seeker Resource Centre.

HIS HONOUR:   And does this letter contain a statutory declaration?

MR COLVIN:   It does, your Honour. The letter is dated 20 November 2002.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, I have it now, Mr Colvin, if you just give me a moment to read it.

MR COLVIN:   Your Honour will see the new evidence listed on the top of the second page.  The particular material relied upon at this point is in paragraph 3.

HIS HONOUR:   Mr Colvin, is there any evidence about when this material came to hand?

MR COLVIN:   There is, but it came to hand following the determination of the application for the protection visa.  I will just identify where in the letter that is apparent.  There is a quotation from the decision of his Honour Justice Emmett just before the conclusion to the letter, on the second‑last page of the letter, which refers to a memorandum indicating that:

since the hearing before the Tribunal, the applicant had been visited in detention by two other people . . . who have been granted refugee status.  It is said that they are able to…

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Details
Case
[2003] HCATrans 444
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Applicant P66-2003 brought an application against Hutchnison and another party. The nature of the dispute and the specific relief sought are not detailed in the provided text, which indicates the matter was heard by Callinan J in chambers.

The central legal issue before the Court was the determination of whether to grant an interlocutory injunction. This involved assessing the applicant's prospects of success in the substantive proceedings and considering the balance of convenience between the parties.

Callinan J applied the principles governing the grant of interlocutory injunctions, which require the applicant to demonstrate a serious question to be tried and that damages would not be an adequate remedy. The Court considered the potential for irreparable harm to the applicant if the injunction were not granted, weighed against any prejudice to the respondents. The decision would have turned on the specific evidence presented regarding these factors.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an application for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the deportation of an applicant, who was previously refused a protection visa and whose appeal against the refusal was also dismissed. The applicant seeks to rely on new evidence that was not available at the time of the original decision, which includes a statutory declaration from another person whose application for a protection visa was granted. The applicant argues that this new evidence is credible, not available before, Convention-related, and new material that enhances the chances of making a successful claim under the Refugees Convention. The applicant contends that the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs has guidelines for processing requests for the exercise of the power under section 48B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and that these guidelines require that applications with new evidence of the kind described should be referred to the Minister. The applicant argues that the departmental officer, who is the first respondent in this case, failed to comply with the guidelines and did not refer the application to the Minister for consideration. The applicant also argues that the Minister has a statutory duty to consider the application and that the failure to do so is a breach of natural justice and grounds for prerogative relief. The Minister, represented by the second respondent, argues that the guidelines are merely administrative and do not impose a duty on the departmental officer to refer the application to the Minister. The Minister also argues that the discretionary power under section 48B is not compellable and that the Minister is not obligated to consider the application or exercise the power in the applicant's favour. The Minister further argues that the duty to remove the applicant under section 198(6) of the Migration Act is not affected by the existence of the discretionary power under section 48B, and that deportation is not inconsistent with the exercise of the discretionary power. The court adjourns the matter to allow the Minister to clarify the instructions and to consider whether a video link can be arranged for the next hearing in Hobart. The court records an undertaking that no action will be taken under section 198 pending the obtaining of instructions.

This case involves an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the deportation of the applicant, pending the hearing of an application for leave to appeal a decision of Justice Heydon, who had refused the applicant's application for orders nisi for constitutional writs. The applicant argues that there was a failure to take into account relevant considerations and unreasonableness in the decision of the first respondent, an official of the department, not to refer the application to the Minister for consideration under section 48B of the Migration Act. The applicant also contends that there is a common law duty to properly and duly administer the exercise of power by the public official. The respondents argue that the guidelines issued by the Minister do not create a duty to make a decision in accordance with them and that there was no arguable error in Justice Heydon's decision to refuse interlocutory relief. The court adjourned the matter to allow the respondents to clarify their instructions, particularly in relation to the interaction between sections 48B and 198 of the Migration Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was there a statutory duty for the Minister to consider the guidelines in making a decision about the applicant's request?
2. Did the Minister's guidelines constitute a statutory decision or merely an administrative instruction?
3. Was there a common law duty on the departmental officer to follow the Minister's guidelines in processing the applicant's request?
4. Did the applicant's new evidence meet the criteria set out in the Minister's guidelines for consideration under section 48B?
5. Did the departmental officer fail to take into account relevant considerations when assessing the applicant's request?
6. Was the decision to reject the applicant's request Wednesbury unreasonable?
7. Does the existence of a request under section 48B affect the statutory duty to remove under section 198(6)?

Held
1. The court concluded that there was no statutory duty for the Minister to consider the guidelines in making a decision about the applicant's request. The Minister's guidelines were characterized as administrative instructions rather than a statutory decision.
2. The court found that the Minister's guidelines did not constitute a statutory decision but rather were administrative instructions. The court emphasized that the guidelines were not mentioned in the Act and were intended to promote administrative efficiency and consistency.
3. The court determined that there was no common law duty on the departmental officer to follow the Minister's guidelines in processing the applicant's request. The court noted that the guidelines did not create any duty to make a decision in accordance with them.
4. The court held that the applicant's new evidence did not meet the criteria set out in the Minister's guidelines for consideration under section 48B. The court found that the guidelines required a more comprehensive assessment beyond just the credibility of the new evidence.
5. The court concluded that the departmental officer did not fail to take into account relevant considerations when assessing the applicant's request. The court found that the officer had considered the applicant's case in light of the Minister's guidelines.
6. The court decided that the decision to reject the applicant's request was not Wednesbury unreasonable. The court found that the officer had the Minister's guidelines in mind and there was no basis for a claim of unreasonableness.
7. The court held that the existence of a request under section 48B does not affect the statutory duty to remove under section 198(6). The court concluded that the Minister's discretion under section 48B does not impact the duty to remove under section 198(6).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court in this case considered several key issues, including the statutory duty of the Minister to consider the guidelines, the nature of the guidelines themselves, the common law duty of departmental officers to follow these guidelines, and the reasonableness of the decision to reject the applicant's request.

Firstly, the court examined whether there was a statutory duty for the Minister to consider the guidelines in making a decision about the applicant's request. The applicant argued that the guidelines constituted a decision by the Minister in the exercise of legislative power, but the court found that the guidelines were merely administrative instructions. The court held that the Minister had no statutory duty to consider the guidelines in exercising their discretion under section 48B.

Secondly, the court considered whether the Minister's guidelines constituted a statutory decision or merely an administrative instruction. The applicant argued that the guidelines were a determination by the Minister, but the court found that they were administrative instructions to promote efficiency and consistency. The court relied on previous authority, such as the decision in NAQG, to conclude that the guidelines did not impose any statutory duty on the departmental officers to make a decision in accordance with them.

Thirdly, the court examined whether there was a common law duty on the departmental officer to follow the Minister's guidelines in processing the applicant's request. The applicant argued that there was a common law duty to properly and duly administer the exercise of power, but the court found that the guidelines did not impose any such duty. The court held that the departmental officer had no duty to refer the application to the Minister for consideration under section 48B.

Fourthly, the court considered whether the applicant's new evidence met the criteria set out in the Minister's guidelines for consideration under section 48B. The court found that the evidence did not meet the criteria as it was not credible and did not enhance the applicant's chances of making a successful claim under the Refugees Convention.

Fifthly, the court examined whether the departmental officer failed to take into account relevant considerations when assessing the applicant's request. The court found that the departmental officer had taken into account the relevant considerations, including the new evidence and the applicant's previous application for a protection visa.

Sixthly, the court considered whether the decision to reject the applicant's request was Wednesbury unreasonable. The court found that the decision was not unreasonable as the departmental officer had considered the relevant factors and had a valid basis for rejecting the application.

Lastly, the court examined whether the existence of a request under section 48B affected the statutory duty to remove under section 198(6). The court held that the existence of a request under section 48B did not affect the statutory duty to remove under section 198(6), and that the Minister's decision to deport the applicant was not inconsistent with any favourable exercise of the power under 48B.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that there is no statutory duty for the Minister to consider the guidelines in making a decision about the applicant's request, the Minister's guidelines are merely administrative instructions, there is no common law duty on the departmental officer to follow the guidelines, and the decision to reject the applicant's request was not Wednesbury unreasonable. Additionally, the existence of a request under section 48B does not affect the statutory duty to remove under section 198(6).