[2003] HCATrans 414
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P66 of 2003
In the matter of -
An application for Writs of Certiorari and Mandamus against COLIN HUTCHINSON, MINISTERIAL INTERVENTION OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
In the matter of -
An application for Writs of Certiorari and Mandamus against JOSE ALVAREZ, STATE DIRECTOR (WA), DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
In the matter of -
An application for an Injunction against THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Respondents
Ex parte –
APPLICANT P66 OF 2003
Applicant
HEYDON J
(In Chambers)
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT PERTH ON TUESDAY, 21 OCTOBER 2003, AT 9.04 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR C.G. COLVIN, SC: If your Honour pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.R. BEECH, for the prosecutor applicant. (instructed by Global Immigration Services)
MR M.T. RITTER: May it please, your Honour, I appear with my learned friend, MS T.C.P. LING, for the respondents. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
HIS HONOUR: You want orders in terms of the amended draft order nisi that was filed yesterday?
MR COLVIN: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: And you rely on, apart from your written submissions that were filed yesterday, the affidavit of Stella Koya of 2 October 2003 and the exhibits to it?
MR COLVIN: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Do you have any objection, Mr Ritter?
MR RITTER: No, I do not, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Well, that affidavit will be taken as read and the exhibits will be received into evidence with the respective markings. Is there any other evidence you admit?
MR COLVIN: There are two affidavits of 2 October, I am reminded by my junior. There is a shorter affidavit of Ms Koya, which goes solely to the injunction questions. I think, if your Honour has the larger affidavit, the second affidavit is really a formal affidavit in support of the injunction application. I do not think it – the difficulty of ‑ ‑ ‑
HIS HONOUR: I have a larger affidavit. Well, I have an affidavit of five pages. Is that the shorter affidavit?
MR COLVIN: Yes, that is the longer affidavit, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Very well. It sounds as though the shorter affidavit is not going to be decisive. Yes, I have found the shorter affidavit and I take it, Mr Ritter, you have no objection to that either?
MR RITTER: No, I do not, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: That will be received into evidence together with the exhibits. That is your evidence, Mr Colvin?
MR COLVIN: It is, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Ritter, you rely on two affidavits of Teresa Chew Ping Ling?
MR RITTER: Yes, I do.
HIS HONOUR: Do you have any objection, Mr Colvin?
MR COLVIN: No, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: They, together with their exhibits, will be received into evidence also. I think one slight hiccup is that…
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- Case
- [2003] HCATrans 414
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the applicant had established sufficient grounds to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal. This involved an assessment of whether the case raised a question of law that was of general public importance, or whether there were other compelling reasons for the High Court to grant leave.
Heydon J considered the arguments presented by the applicant in support of their application for leave. The decision to grant or refuse leave would depend on whether the applicant could demonstrate that the appeal involved a matter of national significance or a point of law that warranted the High Court's attention. The specific legal principles applied would be those governing the exercise of the High Court's appellate jurisdiction, particularly in relation to the criteria for granting special leave.
As the application was heard in chambers and the outcome is not detailed in the provided text, the final orders or outcome of the application for leave to appeal are not ascertainable from this excerpt.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter came before the High Court of Australia as an application for orders nisi, seeking writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition against the respondents, Colin Hutchinson, Jose Alvarez, and the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. The applicant, P66 of 2003, sought these orders to challenge decisions made by the respondents in relation to the applicant's visa application and potential deportation. The application was heard by Heydon J in chambers at Perth on 21 October 2003. The applicant argued that the respondents failed to consider new evidence submitted by the applicant and that the Minister's decision to not exercise discretion under section 48B of the Migration Act 1958 was unreasonable. The respondents contended that the applicant's claims were not valid and that the statutory framework provided sufficient mechanisms for considering new evidence. The Court ultimately dismissed the application for orders nisi, finding that the applicant had not demonstrated any reviewable error in the respondents' decisions. No order as to costs was made, as the application was ex parte in nature.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Ministerial Intervention Officer failed to take into account relevant considerations in deciding not to refer the applicant's request for favourable exercise of ministerial discretion under section 48B of the Migration Act 1958.
2. Whether the decision of the Ministerial Intervention Officer not to refer the applicant's request to the Minister was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have reached that decision.
3. Whether the power or duty of removal in section 198(6) of the Migration Act 1958 can be exercised without a determination of whether the person proposed to be removed is in fact entitled to protection under the Convention.
4. Whether the power or duty under section 198(6) authorises the deportation of a non-citizen to a place of persecution on Convention grounds.
5. Whether the construction of section 198(6) should be limited to circumstances where a decision had been made at that time to deal with any issues of new evidence or changing circumstances that had arisen.
Held
1. Whether the Ministerial Intervention Officer failed to take into account relevant considerations in deciding not to refer the applicant's request for favourable exercise of ministerial discretion under section 48B of the Migration Act 1958.
- The court concluded that the Ministerial Intervention Officer did take into account relevant considerations, thus the ground was not made out.
2. Whether the decision of the Ministerial Intervention Officer not to refer the applicant's request to the Minister was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have reached that decision.
- The court concluded that the decision was not so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have reached that decision.
3. Whether the power or duty of removal in section 198(6) of the Migration Act 1958 can be exercised without a determination of whether the person proposed to be removed is in fact entitled to protection under the Convention.
- The court concluded that the power or duty of removal can be exercised without a determination of whether the person proposed to be removed is in fact entitled to protection under the Convention.
4. Whether the power or duty under section 198(6) authorises the deportation of a non-citizen to a place of persecution on Convention grounds.
- The court concluded that the power or duty under section 198(6) does not authorise the deportation of a non-citizen to a place of persecution on Convention grounds.
5. Whether the construction of section 198(6) should be limited to circumstances where a decision had been made at that time to deal with any issues of new evidence or changing circumstances that had arisen.
- The court concluded that the construction of section 198(6) should not be limited to circumstances where a decision had been made at that time to deal with any issues of new evidence or changing circumstances that had arisen.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court was asked to determine whether the Ministerial Intervention Officer (MIO) failed to take into account relevant considerations in deciding not to refer the applicant's request for favourable exercise of ministerial discretion under section 48B of the Migration Act 1958. The Court found that the MIO had considered the relevant information in the applicant's letter, and therefore the first ground of the application was dismissed.
The second ground of the application was that the decision of the MIO not to refer the applicant's request to the Minister was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached that decision. The Court found that the decision of the MIO not to refer the matter to the Minister was not so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have made it. The MIO had applied the Minister's guidelines and the decision not to refer the matter to the Minister was not reviewable.
The third ground of the application was that the power or duty of removal in section 198(6) of the Migration Act 1958 could not be exercised without a determination of whether the person proposed to be removed was in fact entitled to protection under the Convention. The Court found that the construction of section 198(6) should not be limited to circumstances where a decision had been made at that time to deal with any issues of new evidence or changing circumstances that had arisen. The Court also found that the construction adopted by Justice Hayne in SE's Case was sound and inconsistent with the applicant's position.
The Court found that the construction of section 198(6) was not inconsistent with any treaty obligation and the structure of the legislation entailed a regime which brought about some finality. The Court found that the applicant had failed factually in relation to his section 48B case and had not demonstrated any intrinsic weakness in the section 48B process.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the construction of section 198(6) of the Migration Act 1958 is not limited to circumstances where a decision had been made at that time to deal with any issues of new evidence or changing circumstances that had arisen. The Court distinguished the construction of section 198(6) in this case from the construction in SE's Case, finding that the applicant's contentions were relatively narrow and that Justice Hayne's rejection of wider contentions was not adverse to them. The Court also found that the construction adopted by Justice Hayne in SE's Case was consistent with the non-refoulement obligations of Australia under the Refugees Convention.