Applicant A219/2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Applicant A219/2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCA 1311

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – remitter of application for constitutional writs in High Court – application outside time limited by High Court Rules – whether time limit imposed by High Court Rules applies in proceedings remitted to Federal Court – whether extension of time required

Federal Court Rules
High Court Rules O 55 r 17, O 55 r 30, O 60 r 6
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 44
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601 referred to
Re Commonwealth of Australia;  Ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491 cited
Applicant M216/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 931 cited
Das v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2004) 208 ALR 229 cited
S58 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 451 cited
M206 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 24 cited
Daniel v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 205 ALR 198 cited
Applicant S70 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 204 ALR 115 cited
Applicant VUAD of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1331 cited
Applicant M29 of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1266 cited
M162 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1146 cited
Thayananthan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1054 cited
Hassen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1036 cited
Applicant A16 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 567 cited
Applicant A2 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 576 cited
Re Ross; Ex parte The Australian Liquor, Hospitality & Miscellaneous Workers’ Union (2001) 108 FCR 399 cited
P33 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCA 474 approved
Applicant S422 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 89 cited
Applicant A184 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1076 cited
Applicant S61 of 2002 v Refugee Review Tribunal (2004) 206 ALR 461 cited
M211 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 660 cited
NABC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 317 cited
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389 cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs;  Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441 cited
The King v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration;  Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd (1949) 78 CLR 389 applied

Aronson, Dyer and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, 2004)

APPLICANT A219/2003 v REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS & COMMONWEALTH OF…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 1311
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Applicant, a non-citizen, sought relief from the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution, challenging a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal had previously dismissed an application for review of its decision, and the matter was remitted to the High Court following the Muin and Lie representative proceedings. The Applicant sought writs of certiorari and mandamus against the Tribunal. The Applicant claimed that he was not provided with certain documents and information, which would have affected the Tribunal’s decision. The Applicant argued that the Tribunal did not consider all the relevant information and that there was a failure in procedural fairness.

The central legal issue was whether the High Court should grant the writs of certiorari and mandamus against the Tribunal. The court needed to consider whether there was a procedural unfairness in the Tribunal’s handling of the Applicant's case. The court also needed to assess whether the Applicant's delay in pursuing his case was justifiable and whether the grant of relief should be withheld under the discretionary nature of s 75(v) relief.

The court found that the Applicant's claims of procedural unfairness were unsubstantiated. The Applicant's evidence was inconsistent and lacked corroboration. The court was not convinced that the Tribunal had failed to consider the relevant documents and information. The court also noted the Applicant's significant delay in pursuing his case and found it to be unwarrantable. Given the discretionary nature of s 75(v) relief and the Applicant's delay, the court concluded that it would be unjust to grant the relief sought.

The court dismissed the Applicant's application with costs. The court held that even if procedural unfairness had been established, the discretionary nature of the relief and the Applicant's delay would have warranted withholding the writs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This proceeding for relief under s 75(v) of the Constitution in respect of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal was filed in the High Court pursuant to leave granted by Gaudron J consequent upon the decision of the High Court in the Muin and Lie representative proceedings: see Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601. The applicant was a party represented in the Lie representative proceedings. On his filing a draft order nisi, the applicant’s proceeding was remitted instanter to this Court pursuant to a further order of Gaudron J. The relief the applicant seeks against the Tribunal is the issue of writs of certiorari and mandamus.BACKGROUND TO PROCEEDING The decision of the Tribunal in issue was handed down almost a decade ago on 20 October 1994. On 22 November 1994 the applicant applied for an order of review of that decision. This was dismissed by O’Loughlin J on 9 June 1995. No appeal was made against that decision. There is no evidence before me of any action being taken under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to secure his removal from the country. On 9 November 1998 the applicant was named as a member of a representative proceeding which was later consolidated in the Muin and Lie proceedings. No explanation has been given as to what, if anything, the applicant did to prosecute his case during the almost three and a half year period between O’Loughlin J’s decision and his joining the representative action. No explanation of the delay has been proffered at all. In these circumstances, and having regard to the merits of the application, it is inconceivable that the applicant would be given an extension of time in which to apply for writs of certiorari and mandamus if his application as remitted is nonetheless subject to the time limits of the High Court Rules (six months and two months respectively: see O 55 r 17 and O 55 r 30), notwithstanding there is a general discretion under those Rules to enlarge time: see O 60 r 6: on that discretion see Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491 at [16]; Applicant M216/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 931. The Applicability of the High Court Rules There is a large number of decisions of this Court in which it has been either decided or assumed that time limits imposed by the High Court Rules in which to apply for mandamus or certiorari apply as well to matters remitted under s 44 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) notwithstanding that (i) no application was made to the High Court for an enlargement of time under O 60 r 6; (ii) the remitter did not give any direction in relation to determining whether an enlargement of time should be given; and (iii) the Federal Court Rules impose no such time limits within which to apply for these writs: see e.g. Das v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2004) 208 ALR 229; S58 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 451; M206 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 24; Daniel v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 205 ALR 198; Applicant S70 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 204 ALR 115; Applicant VUAD of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1331; Applicant M29 of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1266; M162 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1146; Thayananthan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1054; Hassen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1036; Applicant A16 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 567; Applicant A2 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 576; and see also Re Ross; Ex parte The Australian Liquor, Hospitality & Miscellaneous Workers’ Union (2001) 108 FCR 399.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant’s response in his affidavit to this is as follows:“I have since had an opportunity to look at the Part B documents. I believe that the Part B Documents were very helpful to my case. In particular, the Part B Documents include a US Department of State Report about India for 1993, an Amnesty International Report regarding India dated May 1991, and a DFAT Cable number ND84486. All of these documents are strongly supportive of my claim that I suffered persecution in India because of my religion, and because of my involvement in Sikh politics. If I had known that this important information had not been sent to the Tribunal by the delegate, I would have drawn the documents to the attention of the Tribunal. In my opinion, the Tribunal could not possibly have reached a fair view in my case without having regard to these documents. In relation to the documents referred to by the Tribunal in its decision, I can say that if I had been provided with copies of those reports, I would have highlighted to the Tribunal the aspects of the reports that were favourable to my case.In addition, had I been informed of the adverse information referred to by the Tribunal in its decision, I would have undertaken additional research and produced additional information and evidence to the Tribunal.”The applicant gives evidence I should make the following observations at the outset. The applicant does not speak or read English. His brother, who clearly has assisted him throughout and who was present at the hearing before me, does. Such comprehension as the applicant has of the communications made to him from the Department and the Tribunal – if he had or has much comprehension of them at all – was probably derived from his brother. His brother did not give evidence. The applicant was cross-examined on his affidavit. Such was the tenor of his oral evidence that it would be unsafe to rely upon any portion of that affidavit in the absence of corroborating evidence. The claim he articulated in cross-examination was at marked variance with what was said in his affidavit. The documentation which he equated with the Part B documents and about which he was concerned appear only to have been those two documents which were sent by him to the Department prior to the delegate’s decision and the three documents his solicitor sent to the Tribunal. He repeatedly referred back to these in his evidence – even despite valiant attempts by his counsel in re-examination to get him to focus on the country information documents. Emblematic of his evidence is the following passage of cross-examination:“MR RODER: Could you tell the court why it was important to you that all of the documents that you have sent to the department were sent to the tribunal? Why was it important to you that all the documents you had sent to the department were sent to the tribunal?INTERPRETER: Those papers had the police report, plus the cuttings from the newspapers regarding my arrest, and all the details, which were important to my file.MR RODER: And as long as the tribunal had those documents before it you didn’t have any concerns, did you?INTERPRETER: Then the decision would have been in my favour.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J (dissent)
I am not prepared to accept the evidence that adverse country information was not put to him by the Tribunal. The applicant’s memory has proved to be more than fallible. He does not recall the detail of the hearing. This is unsurprising given that it occurred ten years ago. However, I am not prepared to infer from his bare assertions that there was any denial of procedural fairness in how the Tribunal put to him adverse matters upon which it could or would rely. It would be grossly unfair to the Tribunal to do so in the circumstances. CONCLUSION The manner in which the applicant’s claim was formulated brought it within the rather distinctive rubric recognised by the Full Court of this Court in NABC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 317. It was a claim that there was a failure to send the Part B documents to the Tribunal; the applicant was misled as to this; and if he had realised the documents had not been sent, he would have taken different action. As I have indicated, I have rejected the substance of his claim as put in his affidavit. His oral evidence betrayed misunderstandings on his part but they were unrelated to the procedural unfairness alleged. His concern was with the documentation he sent to the delegate and to the Tribunal. Whatever he may have believed or been led to believe about this, the Tribunal had that documentation. It nonetheless did not accept he was persecuted as he claimed. The application must be dismissed with costs. I would add that, even if a case of procedural unfairness had been made out, a very real question would have arisen as to whether the grant of relief should be withheld. It is well accepted that “relief under s 75(v) of the Constitution is, like prerogative relief generally, discretionary”: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389 at [33]; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441 at [90]. As was said of the writ of mandamus in The King v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust) Ltd (1949) 78 CLR 389 at 400:“the writ may not be granted if a more convenient and satisfactory remedy exists, if no useful result could ensue, if the party has been guilty of unwarrantable delay or if there has been bad faith on the part of the applicant, either in the transaction out of which the duty to be enforced arises or towards the court to which the application is made. The court’s discretion is judicial and if the refusal of a definite public duty is established, the writ issues unless circumstances appear making it just that the remedy should be withheld.” Emphasis added.See generally Aronson, Dyer and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 736ff (3rd ed, 2004). On the material before me the present seems to be a case of “unwarrantable delay”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

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