FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AOX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2018] FCA 397
Appeal from: AOX17 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1881 File number: NSD 1497 of 2017 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 26 February 2018 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, Div 3, Subdiv C, ss 5J, 36, 46A, 473BB, 473CA, 473DB, 473DD Cases cited: AOX17 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1881
City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 347 ALR 405
Date of hearing: 26 February 2018 Date of last submissions: 27 February 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 41 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia ORDERS
NSD 1497 of 2017 BETWEEN: AOX17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 FEBRUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs except the costs of producing the appeal book.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to refuse the appellant Constitutional writ relief from the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority given on 12 January 2017 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa: AOX17 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 1881.
Background
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity who arrived in Australia on 26 October 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. The Minister decided, pursuant to s 46A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), that the appellant could apply for a temporary protection subclass 785 visa, known as a Safe Haven Enterprise visa.
The appellant sought protection, in his visa application, under s 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act on the basis of his claims to fear a real chance of persecution or that he would suffer significant harm were he returned to Sri Lanka then or in the reasonably foreseeable future. He founded his claims on the following bases, namely that first, he was of Tamil ethnicity from the Eastern Province. Secondly, his name was pronounced and spelt the same as the former leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Thirdly, he would be imputed with supporting the LTTE, because he had a cousin who had been a member of the LTTE for six years until he had been killed in combat and whom, about 10 years before the application, the appellant had visited on a number…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read AOX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] FCA 397
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues before the court included whether the appellant had a genuine fear of persecution based on his past association with a relative in the LTTE, his religious conversion, and his ability to relocate within Sri Lanka. The court had to determine if the AAT erred in its review of the delegate's decision, particularly in considering the appellant's claims about his employment history and his religious practice. Additionally, the court assessed whether the AAT correctly applied the relevant legislative provisions and if it was justified in concluding that the appellant could relocate within Sri Lanka to avoid persecution.
The court found that the AAT did not make any jurisdictional errors in its review. It was within the AAT's jurisdiction to conclude that the appellant could relocate within Sri Lanka, based on the material before it. The court held that the AAT was entitled to find that the appellant's claims about his inability to relocate were not substantiated. Furthermore, any errors in fact made by the AAT, such as regarding the appellant's employment history, did not constitute a jurisdictional error, as such errors are within the administrative decision-maker's jurisdiction. The court determined that the AAT's decision was legally sound and based on the evidence presented.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and for the appellant to pay the respondent's costs, except for the costs of producing the appeal book. This decision underscored the importance of the AAT's role in reviewing administrative decisions and the limited scope for judicial review of factual findings made within the AAT's jurisdiction.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs except the costs of producing the appeal book.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant argued that the main reason that he feared returning was his name. He told me that he could not live in Colombo because it would not be safe and that the authorities would trace him and find him there. He said that the Authority was wrong to say that he had worked overseas or that he had had more than one job other than in his local area. Consideration The scheme of Pt 7AA of the Act is that the Minister must refer to the Authority a decision that falls within the definition (in s 473BB) of a fast track reviewable decision as soon as reasonably practical after such a decision is made. Relevantly, the Authority must, as the heading to s 473DB states, “review decisions on the papers”, and only when there are exceptional circumstances is the Authority justified in giving consideration to any new information (see s 473DD). In this matter there was no new information before the Authority, so that it is not necessary to consider how Subdiv C of Div 3 of Pt 7AA operates in the circumstances. As was clear from the post-interview submission by the solicitor migration agent acting for the appellant in the proceeding before the delegate, the question of his relocation was in issue. The basis on which the appellant said he could not relocate anywhere in Sri Lanka was because the authorities would find him and harass him or subject him to various aspects of the harms which he claimed to fear. The appellant also consistently asserted that he would not be able to be a Christian around his family or local community. But, he did not suggest in the written material before the delegate or the Authority that he would be unable to relocate elsewhere in Sri Lanka and freely practise his religion. The appellant’s post-hearing submission to the delegate asserted that he would not be safe in “any other parts of Sri Lanka, including Colombo” only because of the harm he feared from the authorities. In those circumstances, the Authority had material before it from which it was entitled to conclude that the appellant could relocate to other parts of Sri Lanka, where he could practise his religion without fear of suffering the risk of significant or substantial harm for the purposes of s 36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The appellant argued that there was no evidence before the Authority that he had worked overseas or that he had held jobs other than as a storeman at the port authority in Sri Lanka. However, there was no evidence before the trial judge or on appeal of the interviews that the appellant gave at any stage of the processing of his claims for protection, including before the delegate, on which to found that argument. In his statement of claims attached to his application for a protection visa, the appellant had referred to two jobs he had held, the first between about 2005 and 2006 and the second from about 2008 to 2010 working as a storekeeper for the port authority, and to his educational qualifications. There is no error of law in an administrative decision-maker simply making a wrong finding of fact: City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 at 154 [44] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. To the extent that the Authority made an error of fact about the appellant’s employment (in other jobs or overseas), and I am not satisfied that there is any material before me to suggest that it did, such a finding was an error within its jurisdiction and not a jurisdictional error.