Anwari & Anwari
[2008] FamCA 431
•23 June 2008
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ANWARI & ANWARI | [2008] FamCA 431 |
| FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – alteration of property interests |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| APPLICANT: | Mrs Anwari |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Anwari |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYF | 5380 | of | 1993 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 23 June 2008 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Watts J |
| HEARING DATE: | 20 - 22.8.2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Ms Stomo |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Klonis & Co Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Ms Carr |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Hakki Nami Solicitor |
Orders
Declaration
As between the parties, the wife holds the debt owed by R Anwari to herself in respect of which she has lodged a caveat on a property at W Street, on trust so that both R Anwari and W Anwari are entitled to a equal share in that debt.
Orders
Pursuant to s.79 of the Family Law Act an order be made in the terms of paragraphs 3 to 8 as set out below.
Within 14 days the parties do all things and sign all necessary documents so that the husband receives 70 percent of the funds held in the controlled money account (Account No. …) held with Bank of Queensland including accumulated interest and after State and statutory fees are deducted and that the wife receive 30 percent of the net monies in the controlled money account including interest and after the deduction of fees.
Whenever a splitting payment is payable in respect of the superannuation interest of the wife in the National Australia Bank Group Super Fund A:
4.1.The husband is entitled to be paid an amount calculated in accordance with the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001, using a base amount in the sum of $135,881 at the operative time of four (4) days from the date of this order upon the trustee;
4.2.There is a corresponding reduction in the entitlement of the person to whom the splittable payment would have been made but for this order.
The above order binds the trustee or trustees from time to time of the superannuation fund.
The parties be equally liable and for the payment of a liability of $3,679 to R Sand & Cement and in the event that either party has paid that account then the other party will pay the party who has paid the account the amount of $1,840.
Each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property, chattels and superannuation in their respective names or possession as at the date of these orders and that each party indemnify the other in relation to any debt associated with any asset that is kept by each of them respectively.
In the event that R Anwari and W Anwari each give her instructions to do so, the wife shall do all things necessary to withdraw her caveat on the W Street property.
If either party refuses or neglects to sign (within fourteen (14) days of a written request to do so) any documents necessary to effect the terms of these Orders, the Registrar of the Sydney Registry of the Family Court of Australia is hereby appointed pursuant to the provisions of Section 106A of the Family Law Act to execute such documents on behalf of such party.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Anwari & Anwari is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
FILE NUMBER: SYF 5380 of 1993
| Mrs Anwari |
Applicant
And
| Mr Anwari |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This case is about what alteration should be made to the property of the husband and wife. The parties had settled issues in relation to the parenting of the child M.
APPLICATIONS
Wife’s application
At the final hearing the wife sought the following orders:
1.That the Applicant Wife and Respondent Husband each receive fifty percent of the funds held in the controlled money account (AC No […]) held with the Bank of Queensland after state and statutory fees are deducted within 14 days of the date of these Orders being made.
2.That the applicant wife forthwith upon making of these Orders causes 30% of the current value of her superannuation entitlements to be transferred and/ or allocated to the Respondent Husband.
3.That the husband retains all his right title and interest in his superannuation entitlements.
4.Each party be declared to have the sole right title and interest in the following:
a)Any chattels, goods, furnishings and other property including any interest in any business, which are at the date hereof in their possession respectively and
b)Any moneys, shares, debentures, that stand in their sole name respectively at the date of the Orders.
In final submissions Counsel for the wife suggested that the property of the parties should be divided evenly between them apart from adjustment of $14,000 to the wife in respect of superannuation contributions she could be presumed to have made after the separation. Counsel for the wife submitted that there should be a splitting order of a third of the wife’s superannuation to the husband. The notice given in Exhibit 13 was for a 50 percent split.
Husband’s application
At the final hearing the husband sought the following orders:
1.That the applicant do all things and sign all documents to remove the caveat held in her name over [the A Street property].
2.That the parties sign all documents necessary to authorise the Bank of Queensland to pay to the husband, by way of bank cheque made out to the husband’s solicitor, the funds in the Controlled Money Account held on behalf of the parties.
3.That each party be entitled to all other personalty in that party’s name, possession and control and indemnify the other party in respect of any liabilities which may attach to that personality.
4.That in the event either party fails to execute any deed, document, instrument or writing necessary to effect a transfer of any item of property pursuant to these orders, then pursuant to section 106A of the Family Law Act, the Registrar of the Family Court of Australia be appointed to execute such deed, document, instrument or writing in the name of the person to whom the direction was given and do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to that deed, document, instrument or writing.
In final submissions Counsel for the husband suggested a 65/35 split of the pool of assets in favour of the husband with the husband to receive as much of the cash monies in the controlled monies account as that division of assets allowed. It was submitted that the rationale for this was that the wife had a greater borrowing capacity.
CHRONOLOGY
The husband was born in April 1961 in Lebanon and is 47 years of age.
The wife was born in December 1962 and is now 43 years of age.
In 1978 the husband migrated to Australia.
In 1980 the husband commenced to work with the public service.
In 1980 the husband purchased a property at T Street with his brother.
In 1982 the T Street property was sold and the husband received $20,000.
In 1982 the wife migrated to Australia.
In September 1983 the parties met and married in December 1983.
Between 1983 and 1985 the parties resided with the husband’s parents.
In October 1984 the parties’ son, R Anwari, was born.
In 1985 the parties purchased a property at P Street with the husband’s brother and wife’s sister for $85,000.
The parties paid for their half share in this property by borrowing $17,500 from Westpac and contributing $23,600 from their personal savings.
In April 1986 the wife commenced work with the National Australia Bank.
In 1986 the parties sold their share of P Street. The parties received from the sale $25,000 or $30,000 (nothing turns on that difference).
In December 1987 the parties purchased a property at W Street for $106,000, using the money from the sale of the P Street property as a deposit and borrowing the reminding $55,000 from a bank and $30,000 from the husband’s family.
In April 1987 the second child of the marriage, W Anwari, was born.
In June 1988, $30,000 was repaid to the husband’s family.
In about 1989 the garage at the W Street property was converted into a granny flat which was rented out.
On 5 March 1989 the husband injured his knee at work. He started receiving workers’ compensation payments.
In May 1993 the parties separated. Consent orders were filed pursuant to s.79 Family Law Act (“FLA” to the following effect:-
25.1.The two children are to reside with the wife;
25.2.The husband to have liberal contact;
25.3.The wife was to retain the property at W Street;
25.4.The wife was to pay the husband $50,000 (wife’s versions); $60,000 (husband’s version) – nothing turns on this difference.
These orders have subsequently been set aside.
The wife’s total mortgage at that time increased to $100,000.
The husband was not paying child support at this time.
In 1993 after separation, the husband received $45,000 as a compensation payout.
In 1993 the husband purchased a property at Y Street for $170,000 (the wife says $175,000). The husband used the property settlement monies plus lump sum payment and a small amount of savings as deposit. He borrowed $60,000 from the Westpac Bank. The sources of funds were: loan from Westpac $75,000; from property settlement with the wife $50,000; from compensation money $50,000.
In 1994 the parties reconciled and resided at Y Street.
In 1995 the parties restructured the mortgages and the parties renovated the Y Street property. Tenants were placed in the wife’s property at W Street. A line of credit for the amount of $20,000 was arranged with National Australia Bank to assist with the renovation. The parties then decided to repay the whole of the loan on the Y Street property. To achieve this, the line of credit on W Street was increased to $180,000 and the mortgage on Y Street was discharged.
In November 1995 the parties’ daughter, M, was born (now aged 12).
After M was one year old the wife returned to work and the husband stayed at home to look after her.
The husband’s workers’ compensation payments of $250 per week cease and the wife predominately pays accounts with the assistance from rents received.
In August 1998 the husband redeemed his right to weekly compensation payments and received a lump sum of $80,000.
On 28 October 1998 the parties purchased a property at M Street for $467,000. The parties used the $80,000 redemption payment plus $15,000 of savings from the wife’s earnings together with a loan from NAB for $373,600. The loan on W Street was increased from $170,000 to $220,000 to allow for the renovations to M Street.
The husband claims that part of the purchase monies for M Street came from a loan from his brother in the sum of $35,000 but I discuss below why I found that not to be so.
In 1999 the parties moved into the M Street property (between January 1999 and May 1999) and rented the Y Street property.
In May 1999 the parties moved back to W Street. The Y Street property was leased at $265 per week and the M Street property was leased at $300 per week. Money was deposited into a joint account for mortgage repayments and outgoings. The short falls were made up from the wife’s income.
Between February 2000 and June 2000 the parties obtained a loan of $250,000 from NAB to develop the W Street property as a duplex construction. Two duplexes were built at a total cost of $320,000. The proposed plans were lodged and development commenced. The parties moved into rented accommodation at H Street during construction. I accept the wife’s evidence, set out at paragraph 74 of her affidavit as to the state of her borrowings from NAB at that time.
In February 2001 the property at Y Street was sold for $293,000 with net proceeds of $265,000. The sale was necessary as a result of an overrun on construction costs on the duplex at W Street. Those funds were deposited with NAB to reduce indebtedness.
In 2001 one duplex was sold. After sale costs, the parties received net proceeds of $350,000. The parties used those proceeds to reduce the monies outstanding to NAB. The parties kept the other duplex. The parties move into the other duplex.
The parties were using the line of credit with NAB to fund living expenses (see details at paragraph 84 of the wife’s affidavit).
The husband was on unemployment benefits for some part of 2001.
In 2002, the husband, with the wife’s assistance, established Anwari Finance. The wife had authority to operate the account.
In 2002 or 2003 the husband purchased a property at G with Mr AY for $720,000. The NAB line of credit was used to assist in the periodic payments required by the borrowing for this property. The intention was to build town houses. The amount of $820,000 was borrowed.
In 2002 the parties purchased a second-hand Lexus for $21,000. This vehicle was paid for in cash.
In 2003 the husband, with the wife’s assistance, established AP Finance. The wife had authority to operate the account.
In October 2003 the parties sold the second W Street duplex to their son R Anwari (this transaction is discussed in more detail later).
The parties and children continued to live in the W Street duplex.
In 2003 the parties arranged a line of credit with NAB to buy a property at Bankstown but instead purchased a second-hand BMW for $46,000.
At the beginning of 2004 the parties organized Flexi Plus Credit with NAB for $165,000.
In 2004 the G property site was sold with development application approved for town houses. The husband realized a profit of $50,000 from joint venture.
In January 2004 the line of credit account increased from $80,000 to $165,000 to meet development costs at M Street. The parties also contributed to this development; $160,000 from “the sale” of the second W Street duplex and $50,000 from proceeds of the G property joint venture.
On 11 March 2005 the parties separated and the wife moved out of the W Street property.
At separation the wife took $135,000 from the line of credit account and thereafter made payments as set out at paragraph 100 of her affidavit.
After separation the husband withdrew the remaining amount in the Flexi Plus facility of $58,000.
In August 2005 the father and the children moved from the duplex to live with the parental grandmother.
In our about May 2006 the parties divorced.
CREDIT
On the whole, both parties gave evidence in a relatively straight forward manner.
It seemed during the hearing to be an agreed fact that the parties entered into a property settlement in 1993 and at that time the husband did not disclose to the wife that he had or was about to receive an amount by way of workers’ compensation payment of $45,000. That fact does not help the husband’s submission that his credit should be preferred over the wife’s credit.
Although nothing of significance turns upon it, where the evidence of the parties differs on matters relating to borrowings from NAB at a time when the wife was employed there, I prefer the history given by the wife.
Counsel for the husband made submissions in relation to the wife’s credit asserting that the husband gave more credible evidence than the wife did.
Not a lot turns on issues of credit in this case. There are probably four issues in respect of which the parties’ credit might be relevant:
64.1.the husband has given evidence of conversations with the wife which he says demonstrates that she hid and kept money to herself during the marriage (for example, paragraph 39 of his affidavit).
64.2.the dispute between the parties as to what furniture was taken by the wife at the date of separation;
64.3.whether the wife left US dollars in the house at the date of separation;
64.4.whether monies were transferred to the wife’s account from Beirut in 1999.
Counsel for the husband submitted that the wife had incorrectly stated in paragraph 100 of her affidavit, that she had opened a particular account with a balance of $109,000 when in fact she had opened it with a balance of $140,000 (see paragraph 100 of the wife’s affidavit filed 18 September 2006). The figure of $109,531.66 appears on annexure G on a bank account opened by the wife with the Commonwealth Bank number 9027. However, annexure G, whilst it has ‘opening balance’ on it is not the first statement for that account which was opened at around about the time of the separation (as opposed to September 2005 which is the date of annexure G). The implication in the submissions by counsel for the husband is that the wife has deliberately attempted to mislead the court as to what the opening balance was (it being $140,000 rather than $109,000). The wife really was not tested on that exact point. It was not put to the wife that she had deliberately provided a later statement to disguise the amount that was originally put into the account. I am not satisfied that the wife deliberately tried to disguise the amount that she had transferred. Other records make it clear as to the source of funds for the opening of the account and before me it was never really in issue that an amount of $135,000 had been taken from joint funds (which made up the bulk of the $140,000 that was used to start that account).
Other submissions made by counsel for the husband in relation to the wife’s credit lacked any substance.
Counsel for the wife made no submissions in relation to the husband’s credit. However, there was some areas of his evidence that I did not accept.
The husband at paragraph 50 of his affidavit filed 18 September 2006 says that when the wife left the matrimonial home she took with her “our furniture which was purchased between 2001 and 2004 for about $15,000 but she left the old furniture for us, I had no problem with this. The furniture she took was purchased for the new home which was being built at M Street and consisted of bathroom accessories, kitchen ware bedroom linen, leather lounge suit, various tables, wall decorations etc”.
I found the husband’s evidence when tested in relation to this issue to be less than satisfactory.
I find that at the date of separation (and in fact continuing to the date of hearing) the husband was significantly affected by the breakdown of the marriage and particularly his conviction that his wife had been unfaithful to him for some time.
The wife’s evidence that the husband only allowed her to take two lounge suits is inherently more credible.
It was clear during his oral evidence that the husband had significant distrust of what the wife was doing at the date of separation and that distrust continued to the date of hearing. The husband ran his case on the basis that the wife had mismanaged or pilfered funds during their marriage.
The husband was particularly concerned that he was unaware that the line of credit which had been paid out in 2003 was subsequently drawn upon by the wife in 2005, he says, without his knowledge that that facility was still available. This in the husband’s mind meant that the wife was up to no good.
A more appropriate interpretation was that although the husband had a general knowledge of the finances of the family, it was the wife who managed both the major and day to day transactions. There is nothing in the analysis of the accounts that have been poured over during the hearing that would indicate that the wife has done anything untoward in relation to the management of family finances nor has there been any lack of full and frank disclosure by her in relation to those finances.
In the end, on the issue of credit, no general finding can be made that the evidence of one of the spouses should be accepted over the evidence of the other spouse. Objective evidence or evidence in relation to what circumstance was more inherently likely needs to be relied upon in relation to individual issues.
Husband’s assertion that the wife had not made a full and frank disclosure and had not fully accounted for funds
Assertion that the wife failed to account for the sum of $205,000
As I have already said, much of the time at the hearing was spent looking at the husband’s assertion that the wife had in some way not fully and frankly accounted for monies which she controlled during and after the marriage.
Counsel for the husband commenced this attack by asserting in an opening submission that there was about $160,000 that was unexplained.
Later on the first day a document prepared by counsel for the husband was tendered (Exhibit 7). On the face of that document the husband asserted that the wife needed to explain an amount of $205,034.
This amount was calculated by first looking at the outstanding monies owed to the NAB as at the date of separation (11 March 2005).
The details of those liabilities were as follows:-
Account number
Total
1422 Flexiplus mtge on M Street
$100,846 DR
7023 Flexiplus mtge on M Street (in wife’s name but repayable to ANZ on sale)
$103,664 DR
6823 Home loan account
$347,042 DR
Total:
$551,552
By 18 December 2006, following the sale of the M Street property, the balances that were paid back to the NAB were as follows:-
Account number
Total
1422 Flexiplus mtge on M Street
$182,501 DR
7023 Flexiplus mtge on M Street (in wife’s name but repayable to ANZ on sale)
$262,653 DR
6823 Home loan account
$383,006 DR
Total:
$828,160
The difference between these two tables was in the sum of $276,608 ($828,160 – $551,552).
A further calculation was done by Counsel for the husband to the effect that between March 2005 and December 2006 an amount of $95,067 had been paid to the NAB by way of interest and further deposits of $24,101 had been made.
That left the alleged balance which was unaccounted for by the wife of an amount of $205,034 ($276,000 - $95,067 + $24,101).
It was not a matter of controversy between the parties that (as set out in the above chronology) that after the separation the husband removed from joint facilities an amount of $58,000 (Exhibit E indicates this happened on 21 March 2005) and the wife removed from joint facilities an amount of $137,000. That is, the parties took from joint facilities an amount of $195,000 after separation ($137,000 + $58,000). The unexplained difference therefore is only about $10,000.
Later in the proceedings a letter dated 14 December 2006 from Klonis & Co Lawyers to Chad Partners relating to the proposed settlement of the sale of the M Street property, was tendered in evidence. This document authorises and directs the purchaser of the M Street property to pay to the husband and wife inter alia a cheque to the NAB in the sum of $839,167.41.
The total of the payout figures as listed by counsel for the husband on Exhibit 7 is $828,160. The difference between these two figures more than explains the short fall of $10,000.
Mortgage balances at separation
The next issue that counsel for the husband wished to attack the wife about was the level of the mortgage balances in the accounts of the parties as at the date of separation (11 March 2005).
The husband’s first concern was about the Flexi-plus mortgage account on the M Street property. Exhibit B is a schedule tendered by the wife of what is a relatively complex set of movements between 12 accounts in the period 1993 through to 2005.
The history of the Flexi-plus mortgage account (No. 1422) is that a line of credit was established in the sum of $165,000 in May 2003. The purpose of the facility was to develop the M Street property.
Exhibit E contains the bank statements for account No. 1422 for the period May 2003 through to March 2005.
During opening statements there was detailed discussion in relation to what was agreed and asserted in relation to movements in that account. Some of the more important items are as follows:-
16 June 2003
Purchase of BMW motor vehicle
$45,900.00
25 June 2003
Bank card payment
11,000.00
26 August 2003
Bank card
8,004.00
25 September 2003
Stamp duty for son’s property
19,794.00
27 January 2004
Transfer to wife for payment of architect bill of $11,825
12,000.00
27 January 2004
Credit card
3,900.00
27 February 2004
Internet transfer by wife to husband
2,000.00
27 February 2004
Payment to husband
4,400.00
22 March 2004
Loan tax
6,394.00
30 March 2004
Payment by husband in respect of the development of the G property
2,400.00
16 April 2004
Engineer for M Street
2,000.00
12 May 2004
Pay husband’s tax
6,000.00
18 May 2004
Withdrawal by the wife of American dollars
5,654.00
20 May 2004
Demolisher
3,500.00
21 May 2004
Credit card (no full explanation)
10,200.00
1 June 2004
Transfer by husband
4,000.00
9 June 2004
Payment to the husband’s brother
2,200.00
11 June 2004
Unexplained cheque number 1
5,000.00
17 June 2004
Concreter
10,000.00
27 July 2004
Money for bricks
7,000.00
27 July 2004
Credit card
7,945.61
29 July 2004
Concreter
20,000.00
5 August 2004
Concreter
18,000.00
12 August 2004
Unexplained
3,000.00
20 August 2004
Cash to the wife
2,500.00
24 August 2004
Payment to the husband
2,535.00
10 September 2004
Unexplained
8,000.00
15 September 2004
Payment to Visa card (unclear as to whether or not it is husband or wife)
6,465.00
6 October 2004
Payment to trades
5,520.00
7 October 2004
Payment in respect of R’s loan
2,000.00
27 October 2004
Husband’s credit card
5,945.00
28 October 2004
Concreter
10,000.00
25 November 2004
Concreter
10,000.00
13 December 2004
Concreter
5,000.00
6 January 2005
Concreter
5,000.00
14 January 2005
Cash for wife
5,000.00
21 January 2005
Carpenter
2,500.00
9 February 2005
Concreter
5,000.00
11 February 2005
Plumber
7,000.00
23 February 2005
Husband’s MasterCard
6,652.00
28 February 2005
Tradesperson for ceiling
4,000.00
1 March 2005
Electrician
8,000.00
4 March 2005
Non explained
2,200.00
4 March 2005
Air conditioning
280.00
15 March 2005
Renderer
2,000.00
15 March 2005
Renderer
3,000.00
16 March 2005
Sydney Tiles
1,000.00
The entry of 18 May 2004 is the only entry which raises any particular query. Counsel for the wife asserted that the wife used $5,654 on 18 May 2004 to purchase American dollars (about $4,000 American dollars). The wife says that she proposed to go on a holiday to America at that time. She didn’t. Her case is that the cash remained in the matrimonial home until March 2005 when she left and that the husband retained it. The husband said he did not. I am unable to resolve by any objective means who is being the accurate historian but it is more inherently likely that the wife retained possession of the US dollars.
Sale of second duplex
In October 2003 the second duplex was sold to the eldest child of the marriage.
The details in relation to the sale are not fully clear but as the following tracing shows, I am unable to say any funds went missing.
It is agreed that a loan was arranged for R in the approximate sum of $477,000. Part of that sale price to R was used to discharge the debt on the line of credit account number 7023. After that liability had been discharged there was an amount of $238,000 left. Of that amount $78,000 was immediately deposited into account 1422 with the balance ($160,000) being put into a term deposit numbered 7139. There were draw downs on term deposit 7139 back into account 1422 as follows:-
2 June 2004 $60,000
4 August 2004 60,000
28 August 2004 40,000
$160,000
The above analysis gives no rise, in my view, for any concern that the wife has done anything untoward with any of these funds. The monies coming from the sale of the second duplex are fully accounted for.
R’s loan
Evidence was given about a loan agreement whereby R owes his mother $100,000 plus accumulated interest from the date of the loan arising out of a transaction that was entered into at the time of the purchase by R from his parents of the property at W Street. The wife has lodged a caveat in relation to that loan.
The wife asserted that her interest in the loan was only as a trustee and I accept that that was so. The loan should therefore not appear as an asset against the wife on the balance sheet. I deal below with what orders should be made in relation to this loan.
Whatever might be the arrangements between the mother and her sons, I am satisfied that she herself holds no personal benefit under any loan agreement with her adult son.
I discuss below the orders I intend to make in relation to this issue.
Loan 7023
The husband complained that he was unaware as to the increase in the Flexi-plus mortgage on the M Street property. As at the date of separation (11 March 2005) this account is said to have had a balance of $103,664. This line of credit was originally established in 1993. At that time it had a $20,000 limit. The limit was increased to $125,000 in September 2001 and to $150,000 in September 2003.
The husband was under the impression that this line of credit was extinguished upon the sale of the first of the W Street duplexes in August 2001. Exhibit D discloses that on 23 February 2005 an amount of $100,000 was withdrawn from account 7023. The wife agrees that she did that (it was this withdrawal that was responsible for the balance being $103,664 as at 11 March 2005).
It is clear however from Exhibit B that the $100,000 that was withdrawn from account 7023 went into account 1422 on 23 February 2005.
This is the simple explanation for the level of debt in account 7023 as at the date of separation. Expenditure from account 1422 has already been analysed above.
There is nothing sinister or undisclosed, in my view, arising from account 7023.
By 18 December 2006 (the sale of the M Street property) account 7023 had a balance of $262,653. I note the balance in March 2005 (see Exhibit D) is in the approximate sum of $240,000. Account 7023 had moved from about $103,000 to $240,000 between February and March 2005 as a result of the wife withdrawing $135,000 after separation (which withdrawal is discussed above).
Conclusion about husband’s allegations that the wife had not fully accounted for monies
In the end the husband was not able to demonstrate to me any significant pilfering by the wife and significant time was lost during the hearing as a result of the husband embarking upon an exercise when proper analysis of the accounts by him would have indicated that such a process was without merit.
I indicated to counsel for the husband on a number of occasions during the trial that, absent proper forensic expert analysis, the hearing was not an appropriate occasion to conduct a trawl through multiple movements in multiple bank accounts in the hope that something might turn up.
GLOBAL OR ASSET BY ASSET APPROACH
I have, in endeavouring to arrive at a just and equitable division of their property, formed the view it is appropriate to deal with their assets on a global basis (see Norbis v Norbis (1986) FLC 91-712; Lenehan & Lenehan (1987) FLC 91-814; Zyk & Zyk (1995) FLC 92-644).
The approach taken in these Reasons for Judgment
In this matter my task is to:
111.1.Identify and value the property, assets, financial resources and liabilities of the parties;
111.2.Identify relevant contributions and assess them;
111.3.Consider relevant matters referred to in s.79(4)(d) – (g) FLA;
111.4.Ensure my order adjusting the property assets and liabilities of the parties is just and equitable.
BALANCE SHEET
There has been substantial agreement in relation to the values to be attributed to those assets and liabilities contained in the pool of assets, which are set out in the table below. “Determined” in the agreed/determined column in that table indicates items for which no value has been agreed. A determination has been made in relation to contentious items for the reasons set out after the table.
| Assets | ||||||
| Item no. | Title | Description | H value | W value | Agreed/ Determined | Value |
| 1 | J | Monies in controlled money account | $286,416 | $286,416 | Agreed | $286,416 |
| 2 | W | Wife's Saab motor vehicle | $66,500 | $66,500 | Agreed | $66,500 |
| 3 | W | Wife's contents | $25,000 | $25,000 | Agreed | $25,000 |
| 4 | W | Wife's NAB shares sold | $3,000 | $3,000 | Agreed | $3,000 |
| 5 | W | Wife's NAB shares sold | $5,000 | $5,000 | Agreed | $5,000 |
| 6 | W | Wife's superannuation | $191,549 | $191,549 | Agreed | $191,549 |
| 7 | W | BMW taken by wife on or about separation and sold | $28,000 | $28,000 | Agreed | $28,000 |
| 8 | W | Monies transferred to wife's account on or about separation | $137,000 | $73,000 | Determined | $95,700 |
| 9 | H | Monies used for the husband's benefit alone from the $58,000 withdrawn by the husband at separation | $20,000 | $58,000 | Determined | $28,538 |
| 10 | H | Husband's 1997 Lexus motor vehicle | $8,000 | $8,000 | Agreed | $8,000 |
| 11 | H | Husband's contents | $3,000 | $3,000 | Agreed | $3,000 |
| 12 | H | Husband's superannuation | $3,963 | $3,963 | Agreed | $3,963 |
| 13 | W | Legal fees paid by the wife | $2,388 | $2,388 | Agreed | $2,388 |
| 14 | H | Legal fees paid by the husband | $3,160 | $3,160 | Agreed | $3,160 |
| 15 | W | Monies converted to US dollars | $5,654 | $0 | Determined | $5,654 |
| Total assets | $755,868 | |||||
| Liabilities | ||||||
| Item no. | Title | Description | H value | W value | Agreed/ Determined | Value |
| 16 | W | Wife's GE Finance on SAAB motor vehicle | $60,000 | $60,000 | Agreed | $60,000 |
| 17 | J | Parties' loan from husband's brother | $35,000 | $0 | Determined | $0 |
| 18 | J | R sand and cement | $3,679 | Agreed | $3,679 | |
| 19 | W | Wife's NAB visa | $11,948 | Agreed | $0 | |
| 20 | H | Husband's visa | $7,752 | Agreed | $0 | |
| 21 | H | Husband's mastercard | $8,932 | Agreed | $0 | |
| Total liabilities | $63,679 | |||||
| Total net assets | $692,189 | |||||
Item 8
The wife conceded that she received after separation an amount of $137,000 from joint funds. This whole amount would ordinarily be added back against her. Exhibit 20 (note 1) sets out credits that she seeks in relation to the total add back of that amount. Those credits sought are as follows:-
113.1.When the wife left matrimonial home, the husband had the benefit of the home and all of the matrimonial furniture and chattels. The wife was unable to take any matrimonial furniture and chattels, except for two lounges. The wife had to relocate to rented premises and set up a new household. She was primarily responsible for the care of M. She says she used approximately $25,000 for set up costs and that $25,000 should be deducted from the add back.
113.2.The wife paid six months interest on all loan accounts estimated at $25,000 after separation, to which the husband did not contribute.
113.3.The wife used approximately $4,000 to purchase a motor vehicle for W.
113.4.The wife paid R’s loan repayments after separation estimated at $5,000.
113.5.The wife remained in rental accommodation whilst the husband had the benefit of living at the matrimonial property at the time of separation and thereafter with his mother in Housing Commission accommodation. Wife paid $3,000 for initial bond, rent and outgoings.
113.6.The wife paid bills relating to the M Street property and the A Street property after separation.
In relation to the wife’s claim for set up costs, the wife amended her position and conceded that the evidence would not allow any adjustment more than $8,000. Counsel for the wife submitted that that was a reasonable amount to allow the wife.
The actual evidence by way of tendered receipts was that the wife had expended $2,827 on a kettle, refrigerator, washing machine and toaster. The wife gave evidence that she brought Christmas lights to make her new home more comfortable for M at that time of year. The wife also spent money on a bookshelf, filing cabinet and acer computer and a LCD plasma television screen. These were additional amounts to the four amounts totalling $2,827.
I conclude that it is reasonable for the wife to be given the allowance suggested by counsel for the wife in the sum of $8,000 for re-establishment costs.
The husband and wife gave conflicting evidence as to how much of the matrimonial contents the husband had allowed the wife to take. The wife gave evidence that the husband only allowed her to take two lounges. As I have already said, the husband’s evidence was less convincing. He indicated that he allowed the wife to take what she wanted, without being specific about what she actually did take. I prefer the wife’s evidence to the husband’s in relation to what the wife was allowed to take at the time of the separation. The husband gave other evidence that he was greatly affected by the separation.
It was agreed that the wife should be allowed $23,000 in relation to payment of interest on loan accounts post separation. It was agreed that the amount of $4,000 relating to the purchase of W’s motor vehicle should be allowed as a credit to the wife. The same applies to the claim for $3,400 in relation to R’s loan repayments.
Counsel for the wife reduced the claim by the wife in relation to rent to an amount of $1,400 (conceding that the initial bond would be able to be recovered by the wife).
Counsel for the wife conceded that there is no evidence that would allow me to make any adjustment to the credit of the wife in relation to bills paid by her in respect of M Street and A Street after the separation.
Counsel for the wife conceded during submissions that a further amount of should be credited to the wife being around $1,500 as a post separation contribution towards a tradesman (a cement renderer).
Consequently the credit to be given to the wife in relation to the amount of $137,000 received by her is in the sum of $41,300 ($8,000 + $23,000 + $4,000 + $3,400 + $1,400 + $1,500).
It follows the amount to be added back against the wife is in the sum of $97,200 ($137,000 – $41,300 = $95,700).
Item 9
After the separation the husband received from joint funds an amount of $58,000.
The husband seeks some credits in relation to that sum. The husband set out in Exhibit 15 a schedule of expenses that were paid from the $58,000. This schedule totalled $21,009.
Counsel for the wife indicated that he had a problem with a number of the entries on that account. They were:-
B Smash Repairs $850
Real estate professionals $1,147
EB Company $550
The husband gave no explanation as to why those amounts would lead to a valid credit in his favour as against the wife. I accept that those three amounts should not be included as a credit against the husband. Those three amounts total $2,547 ($850 + $1,147 + $550). The allowance of $21,009 is consequently reduced to $18,462 ($21,009 - $2,547).
In addition the husband indicated that when he went overseas in the year of the separation for two months he left $10,000 behind to cater for the needs of the two boys who were living with him. I accept that that amount should be credited back to the husband. The total credit to the husband would therefore be in the sum of $28,462. The adjustment on the balance sheet will be the difference between $57,000 and $28,462, namely $28,538.
The husband conceded that he used $20,000 in respect of his overseas trip in 2005.
Item 15
The wife converted $5,654 into about US$4,000 in cash because she proposed to go on an overseas holiday which did not go on. She said she kept that money in the house for almost a year prior to the final separation but did not take it with her when she left. I do not accept that and that money will be added back against the wife.
Item 17 – loan from husband’s brother
The husband presented his case on the basis that there was a current outstanding debt owed to his brother in the sum of $35,000.
The evidence as to whether or not an actual debt exists, is to say the least, unsatisfactory.
The husband’s brother gave evidence by telephone from Germany. He had sworn an affidavit dated 26 October 2006.
In that affidavit he asserts that in about 1999 he received a telephone call from his brother who asked him something. He then said to his brother “I have US $10,000 which is about AUD $15,000 with our brother […] in Beirut, Lebanon. I will tell him to send that money to you. Also I have a bank account, I think it was St George Bank, I can give you AUD $20,000 from that account, our father, […], has power of attorney to operate it. I’ll tell our father to withdraw the money and give it to you”.
In his affidavit the husband’s brother said is that he then telephoned his brother in Lebanon and told him that the husband needed money to purchase a property near … in Sydney (it is agreed that that is the M Street property) and he asked me to help him. He asserts that he requested his brother to send him the sum of US $10,000.
He further claims that he spoke to his father by telephone and told him that he wanted him to withdraw AUD $20,000 and give it to his brother for the purposes of buying the property in Sydney.
The affidavit was witnessed by Ms K. The husband’s brother gave evidence that Ms K is a lawyer in Germany who speaks English and German.
It was clear when the husband’s brother gave evidence that he had difficulty with the English language. Some simple questions that were put to him were not understood by him in the English language. In his oral evidence the husband’s brother conceded that the document was prepared by the husband’s lawyer and sent over to him to sign. It is unclear as to the process by which the instructions were given for the preparation of that affidavit, although counsel for the wife called for an email and that email was not tendered in evidence.
The basic problem with the husband’s brother’s evidence is that he spoke insufficient English to be effectively tested on his evidence. This was not withstanding the fact that I was assured at a preliminary hearing by the solicitor for the husband that the husband’s brother did not need an interpreter and could speak in the English language. The husband’s brother’s affidavit in fact had no certificate of interpretation attached to it.
The husband’s brother was not able to precisely remember when the money was transferred. He initially said that it was 12 – 13 years ago (he then changed that to 10 – 12 years). His affidavit would place it as only eight years ago.
The brother’s oral evidence was that the monies that were sent from Beirut from his brother were sent by electronic transfer from an international bank to he thought, his sister-in-law’s National Bank. There is no objective corroborative evidence of this electronic transfer. The husband’s brother said it was the husband who told him the account number to which he should send the monies.
In his oral evidence the husband’s brother asserted that there was a promise made by the husband at the time of the initial request for the monies that the monies would be paid back.
Given the husband’s brother’s lack of English it was impossible to test him on when it was that he remembered that piece of information.
The husband in paragraph 21 of his affidavit filed 18 September 2006 says that the purchase price of the M Street property in 1999 was the sum of $470,000. He says that that purchase price and the cost of purchasing including stamp duty was comprised in the following:-
$80,00 from Workers redemption money
$35,000 loaned from his brother
$370,000 loaned from the National Australia Bank in joint names.
In paragraph 22 of his affidavit the husband gives evidence consistent with his brother’s evidence in relation to the arrangements made for the transfer of the funds to him.
Apart from asserting that it was a loan in paragraph 21 there are no details of any conversation with this brother to that effect.
The total of the amounts referred to in paragraph 21 of the husband’s affidavit is $485,000. There is no independent corroboration that the purchase costs including stamp duty was in the sum of $15,000 ($485,000 – $470,000), although I accept that the acquisition costs were somewhere between $470,000 and $485,000.
The wife’s evidence is contained at paragraph 71 of her affidavit. She says that the M Street property was purchased for $467,000. She agrees that $80,000 was used from the husband’s compensation money. She said that she had savings of about $15,000 for deposit, stamp duty, legal fees and the balance of the purchase price and that she arranged a loan with her employer NAB in the sum of $373,600. On the wife’s figures there was $373,600 + $80,000 = $453,600. The shortfall on the purchase price was $453,600 – $467,000 = $13,400. This would mean that there was only $1,600 left for stamp duty and legal fees.
Neither party’s version is more likely to be mathematically correct than the other. There is no independent documentation. The actual monies needed to purchase the M Street property probably fall somewhere in the middle of the two versions. There is nothing in the mathematical calculations that would help me work out which version should be accepted.
The wife gives no evidence of having received any monies into her bank from Beirut. She was not tested during cross examination as to her receiving funds by way of an electronic transfer from Beirut.
The husband’s brother gave evidence that he had never at any stage asked for the money back.
I am comfortably satisfied that there was no loan owing by the husband to his brother. Also, given that the money was alleged lent more than six years ago, any loan is statute barred (see Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560 at 566 (Dixon CJ, Mc Tiernan and Taylor JJ); Haller v Ayre [2005] QCA 224 (Keane JA, de Jersey CJ and Mullins J concurring); Ogilvie v Adams [1981] VR 1041 at 1043 (Fullagar J).
In addition, on the balance of probabilities, I am also not able to find that the husband’s brother provided the parties with $35,000 in 1999 to assist them in the acquisition of the M Street property.
CONTRIBUTIONS
The husband says that based on contribution there should be a 50/50 division of the assets. The wife agrees that there should be a 50/50 division on contributions, except that she seeks a further adjustment for superannuation which she has contributed to after the separation of the parties.
The chronology set out above gives a history of how the current net assets of the parties were accumulated.
The husband had some initial contributions which I shall refer to shortly. The parties traded in real estate and various properties were brought, improved and sold.
The net wealth of the parties at the end of a relatively long marriage was affected by the fact that a family of five were living well, notwithstanding the fact that for a significant period the husband was on workers’ compensation and the only wage from personal exertion was the wife’s.
Prior to the marriage the husband had funds which had originally come from him selling a property prior to the marriage that he owned in T Street. The husband said he had $20,000 from the sale of that property and he also had about $8,000 in savings as well. The wife said that she had savings of about $10,000. The wife says that she agrees the husband had approximately $30,000 in his Westpac account at the time of the marriage but that he sent that money to Lebanon soon after the marriage. I find that it is inherently unlikely the husband sent $30,000 back to Lebanon.
Neither party was cross examined in relation to the differing accounts that they gave as to what cash each had at the date of marriage.
The wife was in paid employment for significant periods during the marriage and earned income which she has detailed in paragraph 57 of her affidavit.
The husband was medically released from the public service in November 1991 and was on workers’ compensation payments until 1998. It is agreed that in 1993 he received a compensation payout from the public service in the sum of $45,000 and in 1998 he received $80,000 from the public service by way of redemption of weekly compensation payments.
Counsel for the wife submitted that the $45,000, whilst it was a payment in relation to the husband being impaired in some way (the husband probably incorrectly describes it as “pain and suffering”), should be ignored or discounted because of the fact that around about the time of the receipt of those monies, the parties entered into their first property settlement and therefore everything was neutralised at that point and I should look at contributions at the date of their reconciliation as the starting point. I do not accept that analysis. I make an alteration of property interests based on contributions by the parties over the whole duration of their marriage. In doing so, I look at the whole of the period of their marriage, not just the period since the time of the first set of orders. The first set of orders have been set aside by consent. That is not to say that the fact that orders were made and the parties acted in certain ways is not part of the financial history which I must consider.
The $45,000 received by the husband at the time of the first separation substantially represented income lost by the husband during the marriage to that point.
The $80,000 the husband received for redemption of future payments to be made to him should be seen in the nature of a reimbursement to the husband for lost income (probably future lost income). At that point the parties still had seven years of their marriage left and the $80,000 might be seen in terms of the husband receiving a capitalised amount to compensate him for lost income.
At page 12 of her affidavit the wife has set out how she attended to the children’s needs during the marriage. She sets out other non financial contributions in paragraphs 103 to 105 of her affidavit and she was not challenged on those matters.
In 1996, when M was one year of age, the wife returned to work and the husband looked after M and that continued up until M started school.
In 2002 the husband substantially worked from home in his businesses “Anwari Finance” and “AP Finance”. His role as homemaker and parent continued at this time. I find that both parties made a significant contribution in the role of homemaker and parent during the marriage.
In 2002 the husband worked as a project manager on the development of the two townhouses at W Street. In 2004 he was project manager in respect of the construction of the M Street property.
There is a lot of evidence about the work the husband did as a project manager. However, the wife during this period was working full time and also fulfilling her role as parent and homemaker.
In regard to post separation contributions, the parties had to a large degree minded M equally, notwithstanding the fact the husband had gone overseas for two months because of the way he felt after the separation.
Wife’s contribution to superannuation after separation
Counsel for the wife submitted that a figure of $14,000 should be taken into account for the wife’s post separation contributions towards superannuation. The submission made was that I could take judicial notice of the statutory rate of nine percent of contributions on gross earnings. The wife’s gross earnings at the moment are about $78,000. Nine percent of that amount is about $7,000. Contributions since separation to date of hearing were more than two years and that would be an amount of a bit more than $14,000. I accept that the wife has made contributions post separation to her superannuation of an amount in excess of $14,000.
The wife’s superannuation as at the date of separation was about $135,000 (see annexure J to the wife’s primary affidavit). Exhibit 14 shows that the current level of superannuation in the wife’s name is $191,549. There has been consequently an increase of about $56,500 in the wife’s superannuation since separation. As mentioned above only a bit over $14,000 of that relates to contributions made by the wife post separation. I infer that the balance increase is natural increment in the fund during a period when superannuation funds have done well in terms of their investment in equities.
In final submissions Counsel for the wife submitted that there should be an adjustment for contributions by the wife post separation. Counsel for the wife originally sought a 55/45 adjustment in the wife’s favour. How that calculation was made was not clear to me ($14,000/$692,000 is about 2 percent).
Conclusion on contributions
The husband made greater initial contributions than the wife and I accept that some monies that were received by the parties related to pain and suffering he suffered as a result of injury. His injury however created an extra burden on the wife. The wife made greater contributions post separation by way of contribution to superannuation. Overall however, there is nothing in the evidence that would indicate that the parties should be assessed other than having made an equal contribution over a long period to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of the property of the parties.
SECTION 79(4)(d) – (g) FACTORS
The wife submitted that there should be no adjustment for these matters. The husband submitted that there should be a 10 percent adjustment for s.79(4)(d) – (g) matters.
The husband is 47 years of age and his health does not prevent him from working full time. The wife is 45 years of age and is in good health.
The wife has a gross earning capacity of about $80,000, and works full time with the National Australia Bank. The husband’s earning capacity was not being fully exercised by him.
He pointed to the fact that during 2003 and 2004 the husband had earned $48,000 and $40,000 respectively and said that that was his earning capacity and he was capable of earning that.
The husband’s evidence is that he had set up a new business., being a hospitality business. Whilst it may be that that business might succeed or fail, Counsel for the wife submitted that the husband has demonstrated a clear earning capacity. The fact that the husband had taken six months to set up the business was something he chose to do and is not something that impinged upon his earning capacity.
In reply, Counsel for the husband said that the income earned by the husband in 2003 and 2004 was unusually high. She said I should infer that it was supported or underpinned by referral by the wife of bank customers to him. I should infer that that source of work was no longer provided by the wife and that there was no basis upon assuming that the husband had the ability to earn $50,000 a year.
The wife has a relationship with Mr W but they are not cohabiting. The wife’s evidence in relation to her financial relationship with Mr W is less than satisfactory. The wife indicated that she paid him $3,000 ($1,000 a week) for the three weeks that she stayed with him in an emergency situation after she had left the matrimonial home in March 2005. Her evidence is that she pays all her rent on the property in which she lives and although she receives contributions in certain ways she retains control over the property. She told me in evidence that this was because she wants to be in a situation where she can ask her current boyfriend to leave if the relationship deteriorates.
It is clear that the wife does have some sort of financial relationship with Mr W. However, there is insufficient detail given by the wife for me to be able to understand entirely what that relationship is. I accept however that currently the relationship falls short of a defacto relationship. The wife was not tested in any significant way in cross examination about the financial relationship that she has with Mr W.
Under the arrangements that the parties have in relation to M, the costs in respect of M are shared equally.
The husband has less expenses in relation to accommodation than the wife given that he is living in Housing Commission accommodation with his 87 year old mother and the two adult children of the marriage.
The parties have no capital apart from that capital which they get from the distribution of assets set out in these Reasons.
In relation to s.79(4)(d) – (g) adjustment, I accept that the wife has a superior earning capacity to the husband. She also has not fully explained her financial relationship with her new partner. I think it is appropriate that there be a 5 percent adjustment in favour of the husband in relation to s.79(4)(d) – (g) matters.
JUST AND EQUITABLE
Based on my findings in relation to contributions and s.79(4)(d) – (g) matters, the distribution would be 55 percent to the husband and 45 percent to the wife.
I find that the wife has a borrowing capacity. As Counsel for the wife pointed out, that borrowing capacity is constrained by whatever equity or deposit she is able to achieve in terms of cash out of this settlement. However, I am attracted to the concept that the husband should receive more of the cash and I have decided that amount should be $200,000. In order to achieve the division the husband would need to have the benefit of a splitting order with a base amount of $135,881 and the distribution would be as follows:-
Husband gets 55% Assets Description Value 1 Monies in controlled money account $200,000 6 Wife's superannuation $135,881 9 Monies used for the husband's benefit alone from the $58,000 withdrawn by the husband at separation $28,538 10 Husband's 1997 Lexus motor vehicle $8,000 11 Husband's contents $3,000 12 Husband's superannuation $3,963 14 Legal fees paid by the husband $3,160 Liabilities Description Value 18 R sand and cement $1,839 20 husband's visa $0 21 husband's mastercard $0 Net Assets $380,703 Wife gets 45% Assets. Description Value 1 Monies in controlled money account $86,416 2 Wife's Saab motor vehicle $66,500 3 Wife's contents $25,000 4 Wife's NAB shares sold $3,000 5 Wife's NAB shares sold $5,000 6 Wife's superannuation $55,668 7 BMW taken by wife on or about separation and sold $28,000 8 Monies transferred to wife's account on or about separation $95,700 13 Legal fees paid by the wife $2,388 15 Monies converted to US dollars $5,654 Liabilities Description Value 16 Wife's GE Finance on SAAB motor vehicle $60,000 18 R sand and cement $1,840 Net Assets $311,486
Standing back and looking at this distribution of assets, I am satisfied that altering the property of the parties in this way achieves a just and equitable result. There will have been interest accumulated on the controlled monies account and the parties are to share in that proportionally as to the wife 70 percent and as to the husband 30 percent ($200,000/$286,416 = 70 percent).
The Trustee of the wife’s superannuation fund has been given notice of the wife’s proposed application on 21 August 2007 (see Exhibit 13). The Trustees have not participated in these proceedings and I am satisfied that procedural fairness has been afforded the Trustees sufficient for me to make the proposed orders given the nature of the wife’s superannuation interest.
ORDER IN RELATION TO WITHDRAWAL OF THE CAVEAT ON THE SECOND DUPLEX OWNED BY THE OLDEST CHILD R
The wife’s evidence in relation to the sale of the second duplex to the oldest child R was that at the time of the sale that property was worth about $580,000. R borrowed and contributed $477,000. On paper, at the time of the sale, the parties gave away an equity in the property of about $100,000. The wife’s evidence is that it was the intention of the husband and wife to give that amount of equity to the two eldest boys in equal shares. The wife’s evidence is since the acquisition of the property it has been rented out and the rent has gone towards paying off the mortgage. In addition, both boys have been making equal payments to the shortfall in terms of the mortgage and other outgoings on the property. The husband does not want the wife to continue to control this situation.
The solicitor who did the conveyancing transaction set up an unusual arrangement whereby there was a loan agreement between the registered proprietor, the eldest son R and the wife for $100,000 and that is now secured by a caveat lodgement by the wife on the title of the property. The loan agreement was not tendered in evidence. Neither of the adult children were joined as parties to the proceedings. Any order that I make could only be an order as between the parties.
Neither Counsel made submissions to me in respect of what order in fact I should make in relation to the caveat held by the wife.
I think the most appropriate order to make is a declaration that as between the parties, the wife is to hold the debt owed by R to herself on trust so that both R and W are each entitled to that debt in equal shares. Any other adjustment that is to be made between R and W arising out of contributions they have made towards repayment of the mortgage on the W Street property is a matter that is outside the scope of this hearing given that they are not parties to these proceedings and I am not in a position to deal with any equitable interest W might have in a property that is legally owned by R. I shall also order that if required by R and W, the wife will withdraw her caveat on the property.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and ninety-four (194) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Watts
Associate:
Date: 23 June 2008
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Family Law
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Equity & Trusts
Legal Concepts
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Constructive Trust
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Remedies
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Jurisdiction
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