FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ANV15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2015] FCCA 2859 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – application for a Protection (Class XA) visa – no jurisdictional error – oral application for an extension of time pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is dismissed – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.417, 476, 477(1), 477(2) 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees |
| Applicant: | ANV15 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | MLG 864 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Hartnett |
| Hearing date: | 29 September 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 23 October 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant: | In Person |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr Young |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The name of the Second Respondent be changed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
The Applicant’s oral application for an extension of time pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is dismissed.
The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the sum of $5,800.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 864 of 2015
| ANV15 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Before the Court is an application for an extension of time to apply for judicial review, under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’), of a decision of the Second Respondent (‘the Tribunal’) dated 11 March 2015 affirming the decision of the Delegate of the First Respondent (‘the Delegate’) to refuse the Applicant’s Protection (Class XA) visa (‘protection visa’) application.
The substantive Application was filed on 23 April 2015. It was amended by Amended Application filed on 23 September 2015. The substantive Application should have been made within the 35 day period specified by s.477(1) of the Act, that is, by 15 April 2015. Accordingly, the application is eight days out of time.
Section 477(2) of the Act provides that this Court may, in certain circumstances, order that the 35 day period be extended. Section 477(2) of the Act is as follows: -
“(1) An application to the Federal Circuit Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court’s original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.
(2) The Federal Circuit Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Circuit Court considers appropriate if:
(a) an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and
(b) the Federal Circuit Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.
(3) In this section:
date of the migration…
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- Case
- [2015] FCCA 2859
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the Court was the interpretation and application of section 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which permits the Federal Circuit Court to extend the 35-day period for making an application if it is satisfied that doing so is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice. This requires the applicant to provide written reasons for the request and demonstrate why the extension is necessary.
Judge Hartnett reasoned that while the applicant had not formally made the application for an extension of time in his filed documents, his affidavit and the conduct of the hearing indicated a clear intention to do so. The Court considered the non-exhaustive factors for determining if an extension is in the interests of justice, including the extent of the delay, the reasons for it, the merits of the substantive application, and any prejudice to the respondent. The Court noted that the delay was not substantial and that any prejudice to the respondent could be addressed by a costs order. The applicant's affidavit cited a lack of legal assistance, intellectual disability, and psychological health issues as reasons for the delay, which the Court accepted as demonstrating an intention to apply for the extension.
The Court was satisfied that the applicant intended to apply for an extension of time and that the matter proceeded on that basis without objection from the respondent. Consequently, the Court proceeded to consider the merits of the application for an extension of time.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 477(2) of the Act provides that this Court may, in certain circumstances, order that the 35 day period be extended. Section 477(2) of the Act is as follows: -“(1) An application to the Federal Circuit Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court’s original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.(2) The Federal Circuit Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Circuit Court considers appropriate if:(a) an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and(b) the Federal Circuit Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.(3) In this section:date of the migration decision means:(a) in the case of a migration decision made under subsection 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975—the date of the written decision under that subsection; or(b) in the case of a written migration decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal—the date of the written statement under subsection 368(1) or 430(1); or(c) in the case of an oral migration decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal—the date of the oral decision; or(d) in any other case—the date of the written notice of the decision or, if no such notice exists, the date that the Court considers appropriate.(4) For the purposes of subsection (1), the 35 day period begins to run despite a failure to comply with the requirements of any of the provisions mentioned in the definition of date of the migration decision in subsection (3).(5) To avoid doubt, for the purposes of subsection (1), the 35 day period begins to run irrespective of the validity of the migration decision.” The non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered by the Court in determining whether an extension of time is “in the interests of the administration of justice” include:-a)the extent of the delay; b)the reasons for it;c)the merits of the proposed substantive application; and d)any prejudice to the respondent. There is no prejudice to the First Respondent that cannot be satisfied by a costs order. The extent of the delay is not substantial, and the Applicant says in an Affidavit filed by him and dated 14 April 2015 in paragraph 6 therein:-“I hereby submit to the Court an Application for an extension of time in this proceeding due to lack of any form of legal assistance that I have at this time, and as my intellectual disability and inequal (sic) psychological health greatly reduces my ability to comprehend and understand legalities and the processes related.” Although the Applicant sought an application for an extension of time in his Affidavit, he did not do so in his Application or in his Amended Application. Indeed, in answer to the question - does the Applicant apply for an order that the time for making an application be extended under s.477 of the Act as set out in the Application, the Applicant responded, “No”. I am satisfied, however, that the Applicant indeed intended to apply, and on the hearing of this matter did apply, for an extension of time within which to file his application. No objection to that was taken by Counsel for the First Respondent, and the matter proceeded on the basis that the Applicant sought such extension of time.