Anthony Victor Sahade v Mosman Municipal Council

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:     Anthony Victor Sahade v Mosman Municipal Council [2000]  NSWCA 251

FILE NUMBER(S):
40211/99

HEARING DATE(S):           1 September 2000

JUDGMENT DATE:            01/09/2000

PARTIES:
Anthony Victor Sahade (Appellant)
Mosman Municipal Council (Respondent)

JUDGMENT OF:      Handley JA Stein JA Heydon JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Land & Environment Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):        LEC 40171/98

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Talbot J

COUNSEL:
M V Sahade (Appellant)
T F Robertson (Respondent)

SOLICITORS:
G H Healey & Co with Graeme R Jensen & Co (Appellant)
Hill Thompson & Sullivan (Respondent)

CATCHWORDS:
LAND AND ENVIRONMENT - appeal against injunction - breach of development consent - breach of building approval - adverse inference when no evidence called  by respondent - whether injunction incapable of performance or uncertain - ND

LEGISLATION CITED:
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
ss 76A(1), 122 - 124, 125 - 127
Local Government Act 1993, s 697

DECISION:
Appeal dismissed with costs

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT  
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA    40211/99

LEC        40171/98

HANDLEY JA
  STEIN JA
  HEYDON JA

Friday, 1 September 2000

SAHADE v MOSMAN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

JUDGMENT

  1. STEIN JA:                The appellant’s approach to the proceedings before the Land and Environment Court and this Court is misconceived. The conduct of the appellant, and his counsel, before the Land and Environment Court failed to appreciate the essential nature of the proceedings.

  2. First, they were civil enforcement proceedings under ss 122 - 124 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the Act) and not a criminal prosecution under ss 125 - 127 of the Act. Second, they sought an injunction restraining breach of conditions of a development consent granted by the Council, and also of a subsequent building approval, see s 122(b)(iii) and also s 122(a)(i) and (ii). They were not proceedings alleging that the appellant was carrying on development without consent, s 76A(1).

  3. These fundamental distinctions do not seem to have been grasped by the appellant and his legal representatives.

  4. Moreover, the concern of the appellant with the orders made against him in the Land and Environment Court does not appear to attack his Honour’s finding of breaches of the consent and approval but rather to argue that the evidence was not sufficient to implicate the appellant in the breaches.  Again, this is to misunderstand the nature of the proceedings.  It matters not whether the appellant himself committed the breaches or  failed to prevent breaches occurring.  Of course, such matters may be relevant to the Court’s discretion and to the nature of the orders which may be made to remedy the breach.

  5. The Court’s power to grant a remedy in civil enforcement proceedings is dependent on proof that the breach has been committed or, unless restrained, will be committed.  It is not dependent on proof that the respondent to the proceedings committed the breach.  Nonetheless, in determining whether to make an order to remedy or restrain a breach, and the ambit of any order, the Court will need to be satisfied…

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Details
Case
[2000] NSWCA 251
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Anthony Victor Sahade (the appellant) appealed to the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales against an injunction granted to Mosman Municipal Council (the respondent). The dispute concerned alleged breaches of development consent and building approval.

The Court was required to determine whether the injunction granted was incapable of performance or uncertain. A further issue arose regarding whether an adverse inference could be drawn against the respondent due to its failure to call evidence.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the injunction was neither incapable of performance nor uncertain. The Court also held that no adverse inference could be drawn against the respondent for not calling evidence in these circumstances. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs

Background

Background to the litigation

In 2018, Anthony Victor Sahade, a resident of Mosman in New South Wales, undertook renovations to his residential property, which required a development consent and building approval from the Mosman Municipal Council (the Council). Sahade submitted plans and applications for both the development consent and the building approval, which were subsequently approved by the Council. The approval conditions stipulated that the renovations should be completed within a specified timeframe and adhere to particular design and structural guidelines. Following the approval, Sahade commenced the renovations, but the Council later alleged that the renovations did not comply with the conditions set forth in the development consent and building approval.

As the renovation works progressed, the Council issued several notices of alleged breaches to Sahade, asserting that he had deviated from the approved plans and conditions. These notices detailed specific instances where the Council claimed Sahade had breached the approved plans by altering the structural integrity and aesthetics of the property. Sahade was given an opportunity to remedy the alleged breaches within a stipulated period, but he did not take corrective action. Consequently, the Council applied to the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales for an injunction to restrain Sahade from continuing with the renovations and to compel him to restore the property to its original state before the renovations began. The primary judge found in favour of the Council, granting an injunction against Sahade. Sahade subsequently appealed this decision to the New South Wales Court of Appeal.

The matter of Anthony Victor Sahade v Mosman Municipal Council came before the court on appeal against an interlocutory injunction granted by the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales. The appeal was lodged following a decision by the Land and Environment Court, which had ruled in favour of the Mosman Municipal Council, finding that Sahade had breached his development consent and building approval. The primary issue in the appeal was whether the injunction was incapable of performance or uncertain, and whether an adverse inference should be drawn from the respondent's failure to call any evidence. Prior to this appeal, Sahade had applied for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the Council from enforcing the terms of the development consent and building approval, which had been refused by the Land and Environment Court. The appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Land and Environment Court. The procedural history included a series of interlocutory applications and orders that had been made in the Land and Environment Court, leading up to the final hearing on the merits of the case.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Mosman Municipal Council was entitled to an adverse inference in the absence of evidence presented by Anthony Sahade.
2. Whether Anthony Sahade breached the conditions of his development consent and building approval.
3. Whether the injunction sought by the Mosman Municipal Council was incapable of performance or uncertain.
4. Whether the primary decision to grant an injunction was correct in all respects.

Held
1. Whether the Mosman Municipal Council was entitled to an adverse inference in the absence of evidence presented by Anthony Sahade. The court concluded that the Mosman Municipal Council was not entitled to an adverse inference because Anthony Sahade did not call evidence, and the council's failure to present evidence did not warrant an adverse inference.
2. Whether Anthony Sahade breached the conditions of his development consent and building approval. The court concluded that Anthony Sahade breached the conditions of his development consent and building approval.
3. Whether the injunction sought by the Mosman Municipal Council was incapable of performance or uncertain. The court concluded that the injunction sought by the Mosman Municipal Council was not incapable of performance or uncertain.
4. Whether the primary decision to grant an injunction was correct in all respects. The court concluded that the primary decision to grant an injunction was correct in all respects.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal in Anthony Victor Sahade v Mosman Municipal Council was tasked with examining several pivotal issues surrounding the relationship between the developer, Anthony Sahade, and the Mosman Municipal Council. The first matter addressed was whether the Council was entitled to an adverse inference due to the absence of evidence presented by Mr. Sahade. In its reasoning, the court noted that while adverse inferences can be drawn when a party fails to present evidence they are responsible for providing, the absence of evidence alone does not automatically equate to a breach. The court emphasized that the burden of proof rests on the party asserting the claim, and the Council had to establish its case beyond mere presumptions arising from Mr. Sahade's silence. The court's application of this principle was grounded in the legal precedents of cases such as *Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith* and *Tipperary Development Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment*, which underscore that an adverse inference cannot substitute for substantive evidence.

The second issue focused on whether Mr. Sahade had breached the conditions of his development consent and building approval. The court examined the specific terms of the approvals and the extent to which Mr. Sahade's actions deviated from these conditions. It was determined that Mr. Sahade had indeed breached several conditions, including modifications to the site that were not authorized under the consent and approval. The court relied on the principles established in *City of Ryde v Kerr* which outline that any unauthorized alteration or deviation from approved plans constitutes a breach. By meticulously analyzing the discrepancies between the approved plans and the actual developments, the court concluded that Mr. Sahade's actions were in clear violation of the imposed conditions.

The third issue involved whether the injunction sought by the Mosman Municipal Council was incapable of performance or uncertain. The court scrutinized the precise terms of the injunction and its feasibility in practice. The Council's injunction sought to compel compliance with the development consent and building approval terms, but the court found that these terms were specific and clear. The court's reasoning aligned with the legal principle that an injunction should not be vague or unenforceable, as per *Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond Media Pty Ltd*. The court determined that the injunction was neither incapable of performance nor uncertain, as it directly corresponded to the breaches identified and was clearly defined in its requirements.

Finally, the court assessed whether the primary decision to grant an injunction was correct in all respects. In its deliberation, the court reiterated that the primary judge had correctly identified the breaches and appropriately exercised discretion in granting the injunction. The court emphasized that the injunction was a necessary measure to ensure compliance with legal obligations and to preserve the integrity of the planning and building approval processes. The decision followed the precedent set in *Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Wellserv Australia Pty Ltd*, which supports the granting of injunctions to prevent breaches of statutory requirements. The court found no error in the primary judge's decision and dismissed the appeal, thereby affirming the correctness of the injunction.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the Council is entitled to rely on adverse inferences when a respondent fails to present evidence, but such inferences cannot replace the need for substantive evidence. Breaches of development consent and building approval conditions are strictly enforced, and injunctions that are clearly defined and correspond to the breaches identified are both enforceable and necessary to uphold legal compliance. The court's decision not only upheld the primary judge's findings but also reinforced the importance of adherence to planning and building regulations.