| [2025] FWC 2485 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.365—General protections
Anthony Magris
v
Madison Group Enterprises Pty Ltd, Craig Moulin
(C2025/6955)
| COMMISSIONER PERICA | MELBOURNE, 22 AUGUST 2025 |
Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal
On 27 June 2025, Mr. Anthony Magris was dismissed from his employment with Madison Group Enterprises Pty Ltd (MGE).
On 19 July 2025, he made an application alleging he was dismissed from his employment in contravention of Part 3-1 of the Act, and that Mr. Craig Moulin was involved in that contravention (MGE and Mr. Moulin are collectively referred to as the Respondents). General protections applications are required to be made within 21 days of the dismissal taking effect. His application was made at 12:07 AM on the day after the expiry of the statutory time limit.
The Commission has power to extend the time for making the application if the Commission is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances under s 366(1)(b).
On 21 August 2025, I heard Mr. Magris’ extension of time application by way of a determinative conference by Microsoft Teams. Mr. Magris appeared and represented himself. The Respondents were represented by Ms. Kate Drew, Head of People. Mr Moulin, the Second Respondent, also attended the conference.
For the following reasons, I do not grant an extension of time to Mr. Magris and therefore his application is dismissed.
When must an application for the Commission to deal with a dispute be made?
Before dealing with the dispute, I must be satisfied that the application was made in time.
Section 366(1) of the Act provides:
(1) An application under section 365 must be made:
(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or
(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (2).
Was the Application made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect?
The 21-day period does not include the day on which the dismissal took effect.[1]
Mr. Magris’ dismissal took effect on 27 June 2025. It follows the final day for filing the application was 18 July 2025 and ended at midnight on that day.
Mr. Magris’ application was filed at 12:07 AM (AEST) on 19 July 2025. It was 7 minutes late. I therefore need to consider whether to make an order to extend the period to make the application.
I may allow a further period for a general protections application if I am satisfied there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:[2]
(a) Mr. Magris’ reason for the delay.
(b) any action taken by Mr. Magris to dispute the dismissal.
(c) prejudice to MGE or Mr. Moulin (including prejudice caused by the delay).
(d) the merits of the application; and
(e) fairness as between Mr. Magris and other persons in a similar position.
Each of these matters must be considered in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances.[3] I set out my consideration of each matter below.
REASON FOR THE DELAY
The reason for the delay is not in itself required to be an exceptional circumstance.…
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- Case
- [2025] FWC 2485
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Mr. Magris provided two reasons for the delay: ongoing communications with the employer regarding termination payments and the emotional impact of not being able to continue these discussions. Neither reason was deemed exceptional. The Commissioner found that while Mr. Magris had sought external advice on his termination payments, he had not taken any action to dispute his dismissal itself. Furthermore, the merits of Mr. Magris' application were poor, as there was no evidence he had raised a complaint about unpaid commission during his employment, as required by the Act. The delay caused no prejudice to the Respondents, and there were no arguments regarding fairness to other similarly situated persons. Weighing these considerations, the Commissioner concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time, and dismissed the application.
The decision underscores the importance of timely lodgement of applications with the Fair Work Commission, and the rigorous scrutiny applied to requests for extensions. The Commissioner’s conclusion that Mr. Magris’ reasons for delay were not exceptional and that his application lacked merit highlights the high threshold an applicant must meet to secure an extension. The case serves as a reminder to both employees and employers of the necessity to adhere to statutory timelines and the potential consequences of failing to do so.
The final orders of the Commission were that Mr. Magris’ application for an extension of time be dismissed and that the application concerning his dismissal be dismissed for being out of time.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr. Magris filed his application to the Fair Work Commission on 19 July 2025, which was 7 minutes past the 21-day statutory period for making such an application. On 21 August 2025, the Commission heard Mr. Magris’ application for an extension of time to file his general protections application by way of a determinative conference via Microsoft Teams. Mr. Magris appeared and represented himself, while the Respondents were represented by Ms. Kate Drew, Head of People, and Mr. Moulin also attended the conference.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the Commission satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances under s 366(1)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 to extend the time for making Mr. Magris’ application?
2. What are the relevant factors to consider when determining whether exceptional circumstances exist to justify an extension of time?
3. Does Mr. Magris’ reason for the delay, including his communication with MGE about termination payments and the emotional impact of being denied further communication, constitute exceptional circumstances?
4. Did Mr. Magris take any action to dispute his dismissal, and if so, does this action constitute exceptional circumstances?
5. Has there been any prejudice to MGE or Mr. Moulin due to the delay in filing the application, and does this factor support an extension of time?
6. What are the merits of Mr. Magris’ application, and do they support the granting of an extension of time?
7. Is there a consideration of fairness as between Mr. Magris and other persons in a similar position that supports an extension of time?
Held
1. The Commission is not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances under s 366(1)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 to extend the time for making Mr. Magris’ application.
2. The relevant factors to consider when determining whether exceptional circumstances exist to justify an extension of time include Mr. Magris’ reason for the delay, any action taken by Mr. Magris to dispute his dismissal, prejudice to MGE or Mr. Moulin, the merits of the application, and fairness as between Mr. Magris and other persons in a similar position.
3. Mr. Magris’ reason for the delay, including his communication with MGE about termination payments and the emotional impact of being denied further communication, does not constitute exceptional circumstances.
4. Mr. Magris did not take any action to dispute his dismissal, and this action does not constitute exceptional circumstances.
5. There has been no prejudice to MGE or Mr. Moulin due to the delay in filing the application, and this factor does not support an extension of time.
6. The merits of Mr. Magris’ application are entirely without merit, and this factor counts against the granting of an extension of time.
7. There is no compelling argument regarding fairness as between Mr. Magris and other persons in a similar position, and this factor is neutral to an extension of time being granted.
8. Based on the above considerations, the application is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Commission considered whether to grant an extension of time for Mr. Magris to file his application under s 365 of the Fair Work Act 2009. The statutory period for filing the application had expired by 7 minutes, and the Commission could only extend the time if there were exceptional circumstances under s 366(1)(b). The Commission assessed the application against the relevant factors outlined in s 366(2), including Mr. Magris’ reason for the delay, any action taken by Mr. Magris to dispute his dismissal, prejudice to MGE or Mr. Moulin, the merits of the application, and fairness as between Mr. Magris and other persons in a similar position.
Regarding Mr. Magris’ reason for the delay, his efforts to resolve his termination payments dispute and the emotional impact of being denied further communication did not amount to exceptional circumstances. The Commission noted that such circumstances are not required to be unique or unprecedented but must be out of the ordinary course, unusual, special, or uncommon. The communication with MGE regarding termination payments did not prevent Mr. Magris from filing the application, and an emotional response to termination is routine and not special.
Mr. Magris did not take any action to dispute his dismissal, which is a factor that could support an extension of time. The Commission found that the correspondence between Mr. Magris and MGE primarily concerned termination payments and did not amount to action to dispute his dismissal.
The Commission found that there was no prejudice to MGE or Mr. Moulin due to the delay in filing the application, which is a neutral factor in the consideration of whether to extend time.
The merits of Mr. Magris’ application were entirely without merit, as he did not raise a complaint about not being paid commission for the notice period before his employment ended, which is a critical factor for establishing a claim under s 365. The application being without merit strongly counts against the granting of an extension of time.
The factor of fairness as between Mr. Magris and other persons in a similar position did not receive compelling arguments from either party and was therefore neutral to the decision on extending time.
In conclusion, three factors counted against an extension of time being granted, and two factors were neutral. The Commission was not satisfied there were exceptional circumstances to justify an extension of time, and the application was dismissed. The binding legal principle in this case is that the lack of merit in an application, along with insufficient justification for the delay and no action taken to dispute the dismissal, are significant factors against granting an extension of time under s 366(1)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009.