Anthony James Grinsted v Tony Madden Refrigerated Transport Pty Limited
[2001] ACTSC 37
•4 May 2001
Anthony James Grinsted v Tony Madden Refrigerated Transport Pty Limited [2001] ACTSC 37 (4 May 2001)
CATCHWORDS
DAMAGES – Workplace accident – Personal injuries – Liability - Contributory negligence.
Fox v Wood (1981) 148 CLR 438
Hamilton v Nuroof (WA) Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 18
Nominal Defendant v Gardikiotis (1996) 186 CLR 49
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40
No. SC 852 of 1996
Coram: Master T. Connolly
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 4 May 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SC 852 of 1996
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
BETWEEN:ANTHONY JAMES GRINSTED
Plaintiff
AND:TONY MADDEN REFRIGERATED TRANSPORT PTY LIMITED
Defendant
ORDER
Coram: Master T. Connolly
Date: 4 May 2001
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Judgment be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $179,425.69.
The defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs.
This is a claim for damages for personal injuries arising from an industrial accident which occurred on 1 August 1996 at Fyshwick in the Australian Capital Territory. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a driver in the refrigerated meat trade. His duties involved loading and unloading meat, as well as driving a large refrigerated transport. On the course of a run from Cooma to Sydney the plaintiff was required to pick up some meat at a wholesalers premises in Fyshwick, to be subsequently dropped off in Goulburn. Access to the refrigerated transport was via a ramp which was stored underneath the rear van, and which pulled out, providing access to the rear doors. The plaintiff says that on the evening of 1 August 1996 at about 6pm he pulled the ramp out and put it in place, and opened the rear doors, but that as he was going up the ramp with two lamb carcasses and a box of meat the ramp fell away, and he fell to the ground, catching his ankle in the process. He says that the fall has caused significant injuries to his ankle.
Liability was strongly in issue in this case. The question of liability in industrial accident cases is now one that falls within my jurisdiction as Master pursuant to Order 61A rule 1(a).
The accident was witnessed by the plaintiff’s mother, who had arranged to meet her son at the scene in order to pick up some washing. Mr Grinsted was 23 years of age at the time of the accident, and had recently moved out of home to a flat in Cooma associated with this job. He regularly had to drive to jobs in Fyshwick, where his family ran a metal recycling and transport business, and he would arrange to drop off dirty washing and pick up clean washing from his mother. While there was some conflict in the evidence as to whether his mother was sitting in her car or standing by the truck when the accident occurred, I am satisfied that they both were giving truthful evidence as to their recollection of the events on the evening in question.
I am satisfied that the accident occurred in the circumstances described by the plaintiff, that is, that the ramp fell from the rear of the truck as the plaintiff approached the top of the ramp. He said in his evidence that his foot was half on the ramp and half in the floor of the truck when he fell, but he acknowledged in cross examination that this could not have been so, as the ramp ended some 200 mm below the level of the floor of the truck.
I am satisfied, however, that he was near the top of the ramp when it fell.
He says that after the accident he was aware of strong pain in his ankle, and thought that he had broken his ankle. He realised he would not be able to drive the large B double transport, which he says he had parked on the incorrect side of the road in order to make the pick up from the premises. He used his mobile phone to try to ring another driver, and then rang his father, who is familiar with heavy transport, and who was then at home, some 25 minutes from Fyshwick. His father drove to the scene, and on his arrival took photographs of the scene, which were tendered in evidence.
This action was criticised by the defendants, but it was apparent from their line of defence, whereby they strongly suggested that it would have been impossible for the ramp to have come apart from the trailer, that in the absence of photographs being exhibit A in this case showing the ramp on the road below the rear of the truck the defendant would have submitted that the ramp had not in fact come loose. Mr Grinsted senior said that he habitually carried a camera in his vehicle, and from long experience in the transport business thought it was a good idea to take a picture of the accident scene.
It was put to the plaintiff and his father that they had themselves removed the ramp from the rear of the truck after the accident. This was strongly denied, and was not supported by any other evidence. Mr Madden himself said that he did not believe this to have happened. I accept that the ramp did fall.
The ramp is constructed of steel mesh, with a frame of box section steel. It slides away under the floor of the refrigerated transport, and there is a steel lip bolted on to the end of the transport which is designed to prevent the ramp from coming out. After the accident the mechanic for Maddens, Mr Seary, says that he noticed that the lip had been bent outwards, and he welded a larger piece of steel over the lip to make it even harder for the ramp to come out. The original lip is shown in exhibit A, and the larger lip is shown in exhibit B. It is the plaintiff’s case that the original lip had been insufficient to prevent the ramp from coming loose, and so amounted to an unsafe system of work. The plaintiff says that the rectification work performed to increase the size of the lip confirms the fault in the original design.
The plaintiff and his father said that the ramp was replaced in the rear of the van by the plaintiff’s father and a bystander on the evening of the accident before the plaintiff’s father moved the truck to a safer location. Mr Grinsted senior said that this was not difficult to do. There has been conflicting evidence as to the ease or difficulty persons have had in removing or replacing the ramp from the truck. The plaintiff engaged Dr A Watson, then a senior lecturer in mechanical engineering, to inspect the truck on 9 August 1997. By this time the additional plate had been put in place, and Dr Watson had no knowledge of Mr Seary’s observations as to the bend in the plate observed immediately after the accident. He said, however, that he and Ms Blanch, the plaintiff’s solicitor, were able to get the ramp out of the truck. His report sets out a scenario which explains how the ramp could become dislodged in the ordinary course of work.
Dr Watson said,
“The trailer is equipped with a pull out ramp that slides back under the floor of the trailer when not in use. To use the ramp, it is pulled out and normally prevented from completely disengaging from the trailer by a plate that engages the end of the ramp. In that position the free end is lowered to the ground so that one can easily walk up the ramp and into the back of the trailer.
It could be seen that the ramp could be lifted over the previous end plate. This would not normally occur, for the lift of the ramp would be at the free end of the ramp and not at the end of the trailer. However, if the ramp were pulled out at an angle to the centre line of the trailer, and if the ramp were twisted about its longitudinal axis, one end of the ramp could be placed on top of the end plate. This twisting of the ramp could occur if the ground behind the trailer were not level, for the operator could then unconsciously twist the ramp. If the ground was also falling away behind the back of the trailer, any load on the ramp would cause the end of the ramp to slide along the end plate and thus move backwards from the trailer and disengage from the trailer. This is probably what happened to Mr Grinsted when walking up the ramp.
It was also observed that a further end plate had been welded to the back of the trailer. The top of this plate was higher than the previous plate to now prevent the ramp being lifted over the new end plate. The new plate does not completely cover the length of the old plate so that the old plate can still be easily identified.”
When Dr Watson wrote this report he was not aware that the original end plate had been observed to have been bent outwards, and indeed this was not put to him in cross examination. I am satisfied that this observation of Mr Seary’s was probably not known to counsel, but it does seem to me that Dr Watson’s scenario would be rendered more likely had this been known. Mr Seary described how the end plates would often be bent, and he said that this happened because the drivers would pull the ramp out at “a million miles an hour”. It seems to me that the dimensions of the original end plate, and the fact that the end plate was known to have been prone to bend outwards, and that this end plate was observed to have been so bent, adds to the risk of the accident occurring in the manner described by Dr Watson. There was no expert evidence in contradiction to his report.
Mr Madden, who has over many years operated over a dozen vehicles with this ramp mechanism said that he had never experienced a ramp falling away, nor heard of such a thing. I am sure he was being truthful, and he impressed as an employer generally concerned about his workers’ safety. That an industrial accident is unusual, even rare, does not, however, make it unforeseeable. As Mason J said in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 at 47, “The magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action” must be taken into account. In the case of a ramp affixed to the end of a refrigerated transport, which is intended to be used by the operator to carry quite heavy loads into and out of the truck, the degree of injury likely to result if the ramp should fall out is clearly significant, in these circumstances liability can be established if the degree of risk of an accident is “real and not fanciful or inconsiderable” (per Dixon CJ and Kitto J in Hamilton v Nuroof (WA) Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 18 at 26.)
I am satisfied on all of the evidence, that the accident occurred due to the ramp being pulled out at some angle, and thus, with the assistance of the bent end plate, coming to rest on top of the end plate. This allowed the ramp to remain in place when Mr Grinsted went up to open the doors, but when he returned with a full load, being two lamb carcasses and a box of meat of perhaps 25 kilos in weight, the ramp twisted on its unstable axis on the end place and fell away. Much was made of claims by Mr Seary and Mr Madden that no damage was observed to the fibreglass below the ramp, to suggest that the ramp could not have fallen because if it fell it would have to have damaged the fibreglass below. I am not satisfied that this is so, as Dr Watson’s report described a motion in which the ramp would fall back and away. In any event, I am satisfied that the ramp did in fact fall. I am satisfied that this occurred because the end plate was not of sufficient size, and had become bent back. The risk of an accident thus occurring was not in my view remote or fanciful, and the means for securing a safer workplace were simple and straightforward - checking for bends in the endplate, and placing a thicker piece of steel over the end plate to make it more difficult for the ramp to come up and over the end plate. In these circumstances I am satisfied that liability is made out.
Contributory negligence by the worker was pleaded, but I am not satisfied that it has been made out. I am satisfied that the plaintiff operated the ramp in the way he had been instructed to. The minor degree of twist from the centre line of the truck which Dr Watson said would have been necessary to allow the ramp to edge up on to the top of the lip, particularly when the lip was itself bent, was not something that had been dealt with in his training. He had been instructed on the need to go up the ramp in the direct line of the ramp, and not at an angle, because the mesh was designed to be most slip resistant in this angle of approach. He says that he did approach in this manner, and I am satisfied that this is the case. He was criticised for carrying too great a load, but I am satisfied that the load of two lamb carcasses and a box of meat was what was expected of him, and within the normal conditions of employment of meat carriers. He was also criticised for going up the ramp too quickly. There was some conflict in the evidence on this point. The plaintiff had described his action as a run, and then explained that he approached the ramp with some speed in order to maintain momentum as he went up with his load. His mother said he approached deliberately. In either event, I am satisfied that his approach was within the normal conditions of the meat trade, and did not amount to contributory negligence.
I therefore find that the defendant was in breach of its duty of care, and is liable for the injury sustained by the plaintiff.
I turn now to the assessment of damages. The plaintiff was born in 1972, and educated in Canberra. He left school in year 12 and commenced an apprenticeship as a chef, which he successfully completed in 1994. Although he had now obtained his trade qualification, he did not continue to work as a chef full time. Although he has framed his claim for damages on the basis that his passion in life was to be a full time chef, a job which he says is no longer suitable for him due to the effects of the long periods standing on his ankle injury, he seems to have worked more as a truck driver than as a chef. He did work part time for the caterers at Parliament House, working he says mostly after hours, while undertaking interstate truck driving work.
His parents run a metal recycling and transport company, and he first learned truck driving skills with his father. He says that he had his first overseas trip in 1996, and like many young Australians, became enthusiastic about living and working in England for a time. He says that he could earn better money as a truck driver, while still doing some part time cooking, in order to save for further travel. He also acknowledged that cooking mostly required him to work on evenings and at weekends, whereas in truck driving he could have this time to himself.
The work he had with the defendant was very well paid, and it was no doubt hard work, combining high level trucking skills, as he was driving a “B double” articulated truck, with heavy lifting in loading and unloading meat. In applying for the job he filled in a form which stated that he had worked for the previous 3 ½ years as an interstate truck driver. This was supported by a reference from the transport manager of his family company which said, “Tony Grinsted has been employed at MG Metals for a period of 3 ½ years in the position of interstate truck driver.” He acknowledged that the reader of the form and reference would have gained the impression that this was full time. He acknowledged that this was untrue, and that he had in fact been driving trucks for his family interstate on a part time basis in the period leading up to the accident, as well as cooking part time. He said that he knew that if he described himself as a part time cook and part time truck driver he would not have got the job. Mr Madden said that he employed him on the basis of the history he gave, and that he may not have employed him if he had known the truth. He said that experience in interstate driving was an important factor for insurance purposes, and the untruthful claim was indeed made on an insurance form. While I can understand the plaintiff’s motive, the fact remains that he has acknowledged that he has been untruthful, and he has prepared false documentation for financial advantage.
The plaintiff says that as the ramp fell away he fell to the ground, with his head, fortunately, being cushioned by the carcasses of lamb that he was carrying, and his right ankle becoming caught on the truck as he fell. His parents took him to the after hours medical clinic near the hospital, where the on call doctor diagnosed probable soft tissue ligamentous injury to his right ankle, superficial grazes to his left elbow and grazes to his left knee, and referred him for x-ray to the emergency department of Canberra Hospital. An x-ray taken on 1 August 1996 of the right ankle showed no fracture.
He came under the care of his family general practitioner, Dr Jolley. He noted ongoing significant ankle pain, and referred him to Dr Stubbs, orthopaedic surgeon on 7 August 1996. In his report of 11 November 1996 he said,
“My initial review showed no clinical abnormality of the ankle nor did his private x-rays show a fracture but I felt that he would be best managed by a short leg walking cast.”
The cast caused the plaintiff discomfort, and it was removed after a couple of weeks only, and he undertook exercises and physiotherapy. By 11 November Dr Stubbs felt it was resolving, but said it was,
“sufficiently tender that it would prevent him from returning to his former employment. He is well enough to resume clerical duties providing a good proportion of his time was spent sitting down. If such duties could be offered to him I would think he would be able to accept them immediately though he would need some time off for continuing physical therapy.”
The plaintiff was offered office based work by the defendant in their Cooma depot, and then at their Harden base, but he declined these offers. He remained on compensation benefits until he commenced full time work for his parents driving a tip truck on daily return runs to Sydney with scrap metal in February 1997. Despite Dr Stubb’s views as recorded in his report of 11 November, he had ongoing medical certificates for time off from his general practitioner, and he did resume quite heavy work early in the new year. I note also that the plaintiff had long been a Canberra resident, and was receiving his treatment here. The offer of clerical work in Cooma for a limited period and then a move to Harden would not have been convenient for him. While I accept that he was improving, and find that he did refuse an offer of lighter duties in late 1996, he did not remain indefinitely on compensation, returning to work in February 1997 to a substantive job, although this job did not involve the heavy lifting of meat carting. This job was not as well remunerated as the meat carting job.
Dr Stubbs obtained an MRI scan of his ankle in early 1997, and reported that at the time of his consultation in February 1997,
“he was making a recovery from his injuries, MRI scanning had not revealed any significant pathology and he was anticipating returning to the workforce in the immediate future.”
The view that the plaintiff’s ankle injury had substantially resolved by early 1997 was also shared by doctors who examined him for the defendant. Dr Bodel reported in April 1997 that,
“this patient appears to have suffered a forced inversion injury to the right ankle as a result of the incident that occurred on 1.8.96. He has suffered a soft tissue injury to the ankle and as yet the exact pathology has not been determined. On the balance of probabilities it is likely that he has suffered a lateral ligament strain and this has slowly improved. The patient has regained a full range of passive and active ankle movement but he still has some wasting of the right cast. I would encourage the patient to exercise as much as possible in order to optimise function in the right lower limb. The patient should be able to return to a wide range of work tasks and I am at a loss to understand why he still requires an ankle brace.”
In January 1998 the plaintiff embarked on another trip to England. He found work in a London hotel as a chef, working with his girlfriend on a live in basis at a Victoria Hotel. He says that he had to work very long hours, of up to 75 hours a week, and that his ankle was giving him problems. He did not seek or obtain any treatment for his ankle while overseas. He changed jobs, and moved with his girlfriend to Edinburgh for a time, where he had family connections. He obtained work in Scotland as a tip truck driver, earning good money of in the order of five hundred pounds a week. He says that his girlfriend did not enjoy Scotland, and could not find suitable employment, and they returned to London, and again worked in the hotel trade. They also took time out to travel on the continent.
I accept that the plaintiff had ankle pain while overseas, but I also note that this did not cause him to come to treatment at any time. He returned to Australia in November 1999, and again found work in the trucking field with his family company, before leaving for London again in April 2000. During his time in Australia he was seen for medico legal reports, but not treatment. Dr Scott reported in November 1999 that the plaintiff still contained of a painful right ankle, and he noted instability on the ankle. He recommended ankle strengthening exercises. Dr Bodel, in his report of the same month for the defendant, said that the plaintiff had sustained “a significant soft tissue injury to the region of the right foot and ankle”, and accepted that although the plaintiff was fit for truck driving work he would have difficulty with labouring work or work on uneven surfaces. He further observed that the plaintiff’s condition should improve with exercises.
The plaintiff was again in Europe from April to August 2000, and found employment and travelled. Again he did not seek treatment while away. On his return he sought advice from Dr Still, a sports physician, on the basis of a family recommendation. Dr Still examined the plaintiff, and diagnosed a chronic rupture of the anterior ligaments of the right ankle, and referred the plaintiff to Dr Sullivan, head of the foot and ankle surgery unit at St Vincent’s Hospital.
Dr Sullivan arranged for a further MRI scan, which he said showed,
“chondral damage of the mid lateral margin of the talar dome. There was also chondral damage of the medial margin of the talar dome. There was prominence of the posterior process of the talus with fluid distention posteriorly.”
He performed arthroscopic surgery on 13 September 2000 to reconstruct the ligament and repair the chondral damage. He concluded that the plaintiff will have permanent impairment and disability, but he said, “His prognosis in the long term is good. He is likely to have ongoing activity related pain.”
Mr Grinsted returned to London immediately after the surgery because of issues with his relationship with his girlfriend, but returned shortly afterwards after that relationship broke down. He did not have the full 6 week peroneal strengthening programme which was recommended, and in his latest report of March 2001 Dr Sullivan said that he would like to review him after he had completed this programme. He said,
“Occasionally, some patients require a secondary procedure, which would involve taking half the peroneus brevis tendon and attaching it to the fibula to give him more stability.”
Dr Bodel, who examined him for the defendant in March 2001, referred to Dr Sullivan’s procedure as being “appropriate surgery.” He noted that the plaintiff had quite significant calf wasting consistent with ongoing ankle problems, and he said that his long term prognosis was uncertain, with,
“a good chance that he will require further surgery as proposed by Dr Sullivan. The patient is not fit for unrestricted work at this time. He would have difficulty returning to work as a chef or any other activity that requires him to stand or walk on hard surfaces for a long period of time.”
The plaintiff’s medical reports in this case display a marked degree of agreement between doctors who have reported for medico legal purposes for the plaintiff and the defendant. There seemed to be an early consensus that the plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries only to his right ankle, that should resolve. Reports obtained while the plaintiff was back in Australia in 1999 were at one on the ongoing level of complaints, but again took the view that the problem was soft tissue in nature, and should resolve over time without need for surgery. On the plaintiff’s return to Australia in August 2000, he has had frank injury diagnosed, which there is agreement is related to the work accident, and which has resulted in reconstructive surgery. He still complains of instability, however, and there is agreement that further surgery may be needed in the future.
The principles to be applied in determining compensation in personal injuries cases have been summarised by McHugh J In Nominal Defendant v Gardikiotis (1996) 186 CLR 49 where His Honour said (at 54):
“When a defendant has negligently injured a plaintiff, the common law requires the defendant to pay a money sum to the plaintiff to compensate that person for any damage that is causally connected to the defendant’s negligence and that ought to have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant when the negligence occurred. The sum of money to be paid to the plaintiff is that sum which will put the plaintiff, so far as is possible, ‘in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation’.”
The plaintiff has sustained an ankle injury of some significance as a young man, and he will continue to suffer a degree of restriction of movement and instability on rough ground, even if further surgery is successful. Although he had ceased to engage in competitive sports by the time of the accident, he has lost the ability to engage in a range of recreational activities. He says that in his travels he was limited in the degree of walking he could do, and had to avoid engaging in some adventure sports activities which his then girlfriend was keen to try. He used to enjoy a jet ski, which he says he can no longer engage in.
He remains able to work, however, and to engage in extensive travel and related activities. There has been very little treatment until the operative procedure in September 2000, and no attendances on doctors while he has been overseas for treatment or pain relief. While he sustained some abrasions at the time of the accident these have long healed, and his only significant injury is his ankle. There has been some back complaint, related he says to his gait, and it seems to me that to the extent that this has been a problem, it is appropriate to include this within his ankle injury.
He has had to undergo one operative procedure, and may well have to undertake another. There has been some evidence of problems with his ankle as a youth, but I am satisfied on all of the evidence that his present condition is entirely attributable to the accident. In respect of general damages I assess the plaintiff in the sum of $45,000, with $30,000 attributable to the past, generating interest of $2,855 for a total award of $47,855.
The plaintiff’s economic loss claim has been set out on the basis of a claim for his full wages from the date of the accident to 17 February 1997 when he commenced full time employment as a truck driver. His earnings as a meat carter had been $628.59, and it seems to me that the claim for the 28 weeks is made out, for a sum of $17,600. He has been paid workers compensation for this period in the sum of $12,628, so interest should be awarded on the sum of $4,792 only for this period, generating interest of $1,140, for a total award of $18,740.
The plaintiff claims the difference between his meat carting earnings and his earnings as an ordinary truck driver for the period from 17 February 1997 to the end of that year when he left for overseas. I am satisfied that the plaintiff would have sought to continue in the onerous work as a meat carter in order to maximise his earnings before travelling, and I award him this sum, which is based on the difference between his net earnings of some $628 and his actual net earnings of about $400. I award the sum of $228 for 45 weeks, which amounts to $10,260. This generates interest of $2,160 for a total award of $12,420.
I am satisfied from all of the evidence that the plaintiff would have engaged in his overseas travel regardless of his accident. While he was overseas he worked variously as a chef, barman, and truck driver, and his earnings varied. His highest earnings were in the order of five hundred pounds a week, as a truck driver, and it seems to me that it is inappropriate to make any award for his period overseas, as he would have been moving from job to job regardless of the accident. While he says he was unable to continue long term as a cook, despite working for some months at up to 75 hours a week with no treatment, his most remunerative employment was as a truck driver, which he acknowledges was within his limits.
It seems to me that it is not appropriate in this case to continue to assess his past economic loss for the periods he was within Australia on the basis of the difference between his earnings as a meat carter and his actual earnings. The job he had been doing for the defendant was particularly well paid, but he did obtain the job by deception, by giving a false employment record and obtaining a false reference, both giving the impression that he had worked as an interstate driver full time for 3 ½ years. It does not follow that, but for the accident, he would have again found such employment each time he returned to Australia. Moreover, the job that he had, based in Cooma and working through Canberra, no longer exists, as the Cooma depot was being closed down, and he elected not to take up lighter duties with the defendant, which would have involved a move to Harden. I award a buffer of $10,000 for the balance of past wage loss inclusive of interest, making a total award of $41,160.
He paid tax on his compensation payments which is recoverable pursuant to the principles of Fox v Wood (1981) 148 CLR 438 in the sum of $2,100.
In respect of future economic loss, the plaintiff submitted that this should be assessed on the basis of a buffer claim. The medical evidence satisfies me that he will be most unlikely to ever regain full and unrestricted movement and strength of his ankle, and this will preclude him from heavy work. He can operate as an interstate truck driver, as he has since the accident, but he will be restricted to driving duties only, and not to work such as that of a meat carter, where heavy lifting is also expected. He would also find long hours standing as a cook a difficulty.
While he said that cooking was his passion, evidence was also given by his parents that he greatly enjoyed truck driving. He did not seem to utilise his claimed passion for cooking greatly before the accident, where his earnings were derived more from truck driving, and his evidence was that this was more pleasant work with better earnings. Nevertheless, he has had one avenue closed to him. He has only worked as a cook since the accident while in London, and says this caused difficulties, although he was then working particularly long hours, and gave evidence that the premises in which he was working had a lot of stairs. He has not attempted any part time work as a cook in Australia since the accident, but I do accept that in the long run this is probably unsuitable, and this is the field where he did obtain his trade qualification.
The plaintiff is still a young man, and his restrictions will be permanent. I award the sum of $65,000 by way of a buffer against future economic loss, including loss of superannuation, based on the assumption that he will be able to work full time as an interstate truck driver, but not as a meat carrier or cook.
Out of pocket expenses for the past were agreed in the sum of $15,810.69, which I award. In respect of future out of pocket expenses, a further procedure seems likely, as well as some associated strengthening and conditioning exercises. The plaintiff generally avoids medications. I award the sum of $7,500 in respect of future out of pocket expenses.
This amounts to an award of $179,425.69 which I consider to be appropriate in all of the circumstances of the case and award, with costs.
I certify that the preceding forty seven (47) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of Master T. Connolly.
Associate:
Date: 4 May 2001
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr Parker
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Pappas J Attorney
Counsel for the Defendant: Mr Grey
Solicitor for the Defendant: Barker & Barker as agents for PriceWaterhouseCoopers Legal
Date of hearing: 2 & 3 April 2001
Date of judgment: 4 May 2001
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