Anson & Lace
[2021] FamCA 23
•29 January 2021
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Anson & Lace [2021] FamCA 23
File number(s): LEC 76 of 2017 Judgment of: BAUMANN J Date of judgment: 29 January 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Parenting – Where at the conclusion of the final hearing both parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer contended the Court make interim orders after making findings as to risk – Where there are issues of family violence, drug use and alleged sexual abuse – where the mother seeks the child recommence spending time with the father supervised – Where the Court finds the child is not at unacceptable risk of sexual abuse in the care of the father – Where the child has not spent any time with the father for over two years – Where the Court makes orders to seek to give the child an opportunity to safely engage with her father – Interim orders to be made for the child to spend supervised time with the father and live with the mother, with conditions Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60B, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA Cases cited: Anson & Lace [2018] FamCA 125
Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286
M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69
Number of paragraphs: 111 Date of last submissions: 22 August 2019 Date of hearing: 12, 13 & 14 December 2018; 31 January 2019; 12 June 2019 Place: Brisbane Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Priestley Solicitor for the Applicant: Ferguson Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Sperling Solicitor for the Respondent: Ballina Family Law Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Ms C Smith Solicitor for the Independent Children’s Lawyer Legal Aid New South Wales ORDERS
LEC 76 of 2017 BETWEEN: MS ANSON
Applicant
AND: MR LACE
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
BAUMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 JANUARY 2021
THE COURT ORDERS:
1.That the Independent Children’s Lawyer prepare and circulate to the parties by no later than 4.00pm on 12 February 2021 a draft minute of interim orders consistent with the Reasons for Judgment delivered 29 January 2021.
2.That these proceedings be adjourned for further submissions as to the form of the order at 9.30am (Queensland time) on 25 February 2021 in the Family Court of Australia at Brisbane.
3.That all parties have leave to appear by telephone on 25 February 2021 by using the Microsoft Teams telephone conferencing system as follows:
(a)They shall each telephone … (including any international dialling codes if calling from outside of Australia) by 9.25am (Queensland time) on 25 February 2021;
(b)They shall each then enter the pass code ...; and
(c)Hold the line until the Court is ready to connect and proceed with the matter.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Anson & Lace has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BAUMANN J:
INTRODUCTION
The dispute between the Applicant mother Ms Anson and the Respondent father Mr Lace relating to their eight year old daughter B, has been ongoing since the parents initially separated in June 2014.
In the end analysis that follows in these Reasons, it is clear that the relationship was fuelled by the use of drugs and two quite volatile personalities.
In seeking to determine what is in the best interest of B, the Court has been asked to make findings about past parental behaviour and, to a degree, to speculate whether those issues are an accurate prediction to the future.
In circumstances where the father has spent no time with B for over two years now, the challenges confronted by the Court in shaping a sustainable order likely to meet the growing development needs of B should not be underestimated.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
It is appropriate, because of the length of time these proceedings have been on foot, for a brief procedural history to be noted as follows.
After final separation in October 2016, the mother filed proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in February 2017, with a transfer to the Family Court of Australia ordered in July 2017. An earlier Order for a s 11F Child Inclusive Conference was made and was undertaken on 27 June 2017 with a memorandum released on 11 July 2017 (see Exhibit 7). An Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) had been appointed.
On 19 September 2017, Senior Registrar Spink ordered a family report and also ordered the mother to undertake drug testing (Order 5) and for the mother to “obtain counselling and/or therapeutic support for the child and for that to commence urgently” (Order 7). The child B was to live with the mother and the parents were to contact M Contact Centre to facilitate an order, if made, for supervised time with the father to commence.
Family Consultant Ms F conducted interviews in November 2017, resulting in her first report dated 7 December 2017. At the time of the report, the psychiatric assessment of Dr G of the parents (at the instigation of the ICL) arising from interviews on 30 October 2017 was not available to Ms F.
However Dr G’s report and the family report were available to me when, on 18 January 2018 for Reasons then published (see Anson & Lace [2018] FamCA 125) an interim Order was made for the child to spend supervised time with the father. The first supervised visit occurred on 18 April 2018, however after the mother raised concerns with the Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”) about alleged further disclosures by the child and the father’s criminal conduct, the mother suspended time, which was reinstated by my Order of 20 July 2018, with a hearing listed to commence for three days in N City on 12 December 2018, which it did.
Whilst judgment was reserved, the father was convicted in 2019 by the Local Court of some offences, which was the catalyst for the mother making a formal application to reopen.
The Court, for Reasons delivered orally, reopened the proceedings on a limited basis (see Order made 12 June 2019) and whilst entitled to rely upon affidavits filed in the Application to reopen, further written submissions were permitted and were filed by all parties by 22 August 2019.
The Court regrets its delay in providing these Reasons.
Conscious of the delay, and the concerns arising from that, of its own initiation the Court listed the matter for 15 December 2020, to seek submissions as to whether any party wished to provide any further evidence or submissions. The parents and the ICL did not wish to do so. The mention took place by telephone and “from the bar table”:
(a)the solicitor for the father informed the Court the father is employed and lives with his mother. He was not incarcerated as a result of the charges dealt with by the Local Court;
(b)the solicitor for the mother informed the Court that the child (now aged eight years) has refused to spend time with the father, is going well and that the Contact Centre has withdrawn its service; and
(c)the ICL indicated she was not able to add anything further to what the Court was told by the parents.
The matter was listed for judgment on 29 January 2021.
COMPETING PROPOSALS
As the brief introduction above identified, the best interests of B needs to be considered within the context of two parents (who Ms F opined were both “vulnerable”) and who were in an ambivalent relationship shaped by drug use, allegations of family violence and since at least October 2016, an allegation that the child had been sexually abused by the father – a belief the mother and her mother, under oath when giving evidence in December 2018, continued to believe to be true.
At the conclusion of the trial when oral submissions were delivered by Counsel – Ms Smith for the ICL; Mr Sperling for the father and Mr Priestley for the mother, all Counsel contended that the Court should consider making only interim orders – but supported by findings as to risk that each parent raised against the other.
In this way, it was submitted, a foundation to move forward in the best interests of B could be possibly achieved. The written submissions received in August 2019, although dealing with the “new evidence”, did not seek to depart from the content and tenor of the oral submissions delivered in December 2018 – including that interim orders be the preferred and best outcome.
ICL’s position
The ICL’s position was articulated in a form of order emailed to chambers on 30 January 2019 and is now Appendix One to these Reasons. On an interim basis, the ICL submits that orders should be made essentially for:
(a)the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility;
(b)the parents to be restrained from using illicit drugs and are to submit to hair follicle testing;
(c)the father is to complete the L Course and to attend “at a drug and alcohol counselling service”;
(d)the mother is to attend counselling “for the purposes of learning strategies to promote and facilitate the child having a meaningful and positive relationship with her father as well as to address the concerns raised in Dr G’s assessment”; and
(e)whilst all these steps are being taken, at the same time, the child spend unsupervised time with the father commencing each Saturday for four occasions increasing to alternate weekends (Friday to Sunday) and some school holiday time. Changeovers are to occur at M Contact Centre or, if they are unavailable, the N City Police Station.
Father’s position
Although the father’s case outline filed 4 December 2018 proposed that the child live with the father but with the paternal grandmother present for no less than six months and for him to have sole parental responsibility, by final submissions (and sensibly) Counsel for the father broadly adopted the ICL’s proposal which was similar to the alternate proposal identified by the father in the minute marked Exhibit 4.
As Mr Sperling (for the father) correctly noted, up until the final submissions on 14 December 2018, the mother had agitated for the child to spend no time with the father. Cautiously, Mr Sperling submitted there was “no evidence about how to graduate time” and the pace of the time. Certainly however, the father, on an interim basis asserted that his time should be unsupervised.
Mother’s position
On 31 January 2019, the mother’s formal proposal was emailed to chambers – and is Appendix Two to these Reasons.
The mother seeks that the father’s time with B recommence as supervised time – two hours each alternate Saturday and that the child live with her and that she exercise sole parental responsibility.
The mother agreed to undertake counselling; agrees to the parents submitting to a fresh hair follicle test for detection of illicit substances and for the father to undertake both the L Course and to also attend a drug and alcohol counselling service “for the purpose of abstaining from illicit drugs including cannabis”.
In circumstances where the mother, through her legal representatives, now supports the child having some form of relationship with the father, the reasons which follow seek to assess the risks each of the parents present to the child’s future development and their capacity to co-parent with a reduction in conflict, mistrust and suspicion into the future.
Frankly, it is the capacity of the parents to develop a form of “co-parenting” that may present as the highest obstacle to jump – and, in this regard, I accept that the period of two years since evidence was last heard in December 2018 creates a “two edge” sword, namely:
(a)it has given the father an opportunity to demonstrate a cessation of his criminal conduct and accept that continued drug use (including cannabis) must totally cease. The mother, having made concessions through her Counsel at trial that “on the evidence, the father cannot be found to be an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse to B” and then contending for supervised time to recommence, has had the opportunity to reflect on all the evidence and voluntarily engage in the treatment at least recommended by Dr G; and
(b)if neither parent has, with the insight required to improve their capacity to “co-parent”, done anything at all in this regard– then the two years is likely to have only encouraged the child under the sole influence of the mother to be more reluctant to spend time with her father – and this could present as the most significant factor ultimately.
STATUTORY PATHWAY
In all cases involving parenting orders, the child’s best interests are the Court’s paramount consideration. In determining those interests the Court must consider not only the objects of s 60B of the Family Law Act1975 and the right of a child to have a meaningful relationship with all those people significant to them, but also the primary considerations under s 60CC(2) and the additional considerations under s 60CC(3) which will be analysed below to ensure that the order I propose will serve the best interests of the child.
To the extent possible, the Court should ensure orders made do not expose a party or a child to unacceptable risk of harm through family violence, abuse or neglect.
In certain circumstances the Court applies a statutory presumption that it is in the child’s best interests for parents to have equal shared parental responsibility (s 61DA(1)), which relates to making major decisions and not about the time a child spends with each parent.
In Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 the Full Court made it clear that the presumption that equal shared parental responsibility is in the best interests of the child (s 61DA) does not carry with it any presumption about time. The issue of equal time is dealt with in s 65DAA and “when the presumption is applied the first thing the Court must do is to consider when making an order whether it is consistent with the best interest of the child and reasonably practicable for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents. If equal time is not in the interest of the child or reasonably practicable the Court must go on to consider making an order whether it is consistent with the best interest of the child and reasonably practicable for the child to spend substantial and significant time with each of the parents”.
BRIEF CONTEXTUAL CHRONOLOGY
As it is intended in these Reasons to deal as discrete issues with the number of “risk” issues raised, the following succinct chronology is meant to offer a relevant context to the relationship between the parents and the difficulties that B has been required to navigate in her eight years of development.
Statements of fact hereafter should be construed as findings of fact.
Both parents were born in 1989 (and are now 31 years of age) and commenced cohabitation in November 2011, with B born in 2012.
The parents separated initially in June 2014; the mother moving from the Northern New South Wales to Sydney, asserting the father’s drug issues was the reason for the separation. B was 22 months old at this time. The mother returned with the child to R Town in late 2014 in an attempt by the parents to reconcile, but after Christmas 2014 the mother returned to Sydney where she remained until, again, returning to R Town on 29 April 2015. During this period of five months the child only spent limited time again with the father, after he made a visit to Sydney in March 2015.
On 10 May 2015 an incident between the parents on Mother’s Day caused the mother to seek and obtain an Apprehended Violence Order (“AVO”) after which in July 2015 she again returned to Sydney.
Between July 2015 until December 2015, the child spent no time with her father and although I am satisfied the mother’s return to the Northern New South Wales was motivated by her desire to both maintain a relationship with the father and to allow B to spend some time with him, an incident around Christmas 2015 resulted in the father being charged with a breach of the AVO. The mother remained in the region even after eviction from her R Town rental in January 2016, moving to the P Town area in February 2016.
Limited time was achieved for B to contact the father until around Easter 2016, but thereafter between Easter 2016 and October 2016, the mother permitted the father to spend more consistent time with B, closely monitored by the mother.
As set out below, on 20 October 2016, the mother says the child made a disclosure to her that raised a fear in the mother that the child had been sexually abused by the father and by 28 October 2016 (and after a JIRT interview), the mother ceased all time between the child and the father.
Since October 2016, and particularly after the mother commenced legal proceedings which have progressed as set out earlier, the only time B has spent with the father has been limited supervised time – with no time at all for over two years now.
This chronology reveals, at least for the first four years of the child’s life, significant instability; changes of residence and inconsistent contact between the child and the father after initial separation in June 2014.
The father asserts that the mother has been responsible for this lack of engagement – whilst the mother points to the father’s erratic lifestyle, shaped by drug offences, criminal convictions and lack of effort by the father to take control of his life.
Whilst I will now analyse, as necessary some of these events, what seems to be an inescapable conclusion is that although, at the age of 22 years, the parties were attracted to each other, the early birth of their daughter some 10 months after cohabitation, did not give them sufficient time to get to know each other and to develop a relationship likely to support co-parenting. Drug use was a feature of both parents’ lifestyle (more so the father), and their rather ambivalent relationship has not really improved.
With the limited and inconsistent contact the father has spent with B since she was two years of age, it is hardly surprising that this little girl says some of the things she does about developing a relationship with her father. As I further explore in these Reasons, any reluctance the child expresses about seeing her father may simply demonstrate that she has “moved on” in her life and sees no value in connecting with him. I return to this challenge shortly.
As earlier noted, I intend to deal succinctly with the “risk” issues raised in the material and as invited by Counsel for the ICL (and as required by principle), make a number of findings. I do so in no particular order of severity of risk.
SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATION
By the time of final oral submissions, Mr Priestley of Counsel for the mother conceded, properly in my view, that after cross-examination and testing of the evidence, the Court could not be satisfied the child is at risk of sexual abuse in the care of the father. Certainly that has always been the father’s position and was so contended by his Counsel, Mr Sperling.
Counsel for the ICL actually went a little further – submitting that the Court should make a finding that “no sexual abuse” had occurred at the hands of the father at all.
For reasons consistently explained by higher authority, and as the High Court said in M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 at [76]:
Viewed in this setting, the resolution of an allegation of sexual abuse against a parent is subservient and ancillary to the court’s determination of what is in the best interests of the child. The Family Court’s consideration of the paramount issue which it is enjoined to decide cannot be diverted by the supposed need to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the allegation of sexual abuse …
The evidence of alleged abuse, consistently denied by the father, forms a basis for the mother’s fixed belief that the father is not only capable of perpetrating such acts upon his daughter but did so. Even though such belief is also maintained by the maternal grandmother Ms Q, her evidence was in my assessment of little assistance.
Although Ms Q was absolutely sure about an incident referred to at paragraph 17 of her affidavit sworn 27 November 2018 that B one morning when she “randomly exposed her lower private parts and gesticulating and pointing at her vagina” said when told she should never expose herself or show this private part to anyone that “Daddy likes it”, under cross-examination she was unable to provide a plausible explanation why such a serious allegation was not included in her affidavit filed in May 2017.
The father deposes to him observing the child in 2015 putting toys down her pants and her hand down her pants and says he raised this issue with the mother. I accept he did so and that, in such circumstances, the mother, dismissing her mother’s concerns as she did at the time meant that the bodily exploration by the then three year old girl, was not a matter of concern.
However, when the relationship between the parents had further deteriorated (for other reasons explained next), when the mother observed the child “masturbating with part of a broken toy” over the long weekend in October 2016, the mother took a different view.
On all the evidence from that point at least, and continuing for some time, the mother inappropriately questioned the child. B was only four years old at the time. The mother’s evidence of further details from the child, under her questions, meant that as time elapsed the disclosures seemed to become more particularised, including:
(a)the father “sticking a stick in her bum”;
(b)it really hurt; and
(c)a vague disclosure in the JIRT interview on 28 October 2016. The interview was played in Court, but in my assessment, despite almost immediately on commencement the child volunteering that “Daddy put a stick in my bum”, she was extremely vague about time and place; asserting the father got the stick from the “stick shop”; asserted it happened in a cupboard at her mother’s place; that she bled and during the interview of 37 minutes became increasingly unresponsive and vague.
The mother gave evidence of contacting a support service “V Services” and asserted to them the child “had been raped”. The records of V Services (Exhibit 9) reveal many discrepancies between the sworn evidence now given by the mother and her recorded comments to this support service proximate to the alleged abuse.
Even after the Police indicated that there was not enough evidence to prosecute the father, the mother kept questioning the child. In time, the mother asserted the child then disclosed B felt “gagging” and then was “snot” – which the mother then assumed meant in fact the “stick” must have been the father’s penis and the “snot” a suggestion of ejaculation.
Considering the mother was so certain that initially the father had inserted a stick into the child’s anus to cause bleeding, her decision not to seek medical advice or inspection urgently makes no sense. Her explanation for not at least seeking a medical opinion was unconvincing.
The Court well understands that in the absence of any corroboration either after a medical examination or even another adult hearing the alleged disclosure, a person against whom the allegation is made and (as here) has consistently denied any inappropriate behaviour, can quickly jump to the conclusion that the other parent has made the allegation up maliciously.
Whilst I find that the child is not at risk of sexual abuse in the care of the father, the evidence is not sufficient for me to be satisfied that the mother has maliciously fabricated the statements. More likely, the mother failed to apply a proper filter to what the child may have said; could have misunderstood the words and context or by further questioning of the child, influenced this little girl to use words the mother, through her constant questions, encouraged her to make.
The ICL says it is important that the Court find that sexual abuse did not occur. To do otherwise, it is contended, the mother will have a continued belief about abuse occurring. The difficulty with this submission is that the evidence of the mother’s belief (confirmed through her exchanges with Dr G and Ms F) are now firmly fixed and I believe there is nothing the Court can say that will help the mother to modify her views – without the assistance of counselling, which she says she does not need.
However, it is important that the child not embrace the mother’s belief system and hold a view that her father is a risk of sexually abusing her. In my view he is not. The child’s future counselling needs to have, as part of its foundation, that she is not at risk. A copy of these Reasons will be made available to the counsellor in due course.
It follows that whilst the allegation of sexual abuse has hung over this mother for over four years now, that is not a basis for requiring time to be supervised.
More pressing and immediate issues arising from the parents’ behaviour and capacity to parent on the evidence need to be now examined.
FAMILY VIOLENCE
The mother’s evidence is that from the time of cohabitation and during the relationship the father was verbally abusive and denigrating towards her. Certainly in the early years I am satisfied that the father’s use of illicit substances caused him to act erratically at times and, notwithstanding his denials, I regarded him as a poor historian.
The father’s evidence is that the mother verbally abused him. The nature of this volatile relationship was such that I am satisfied the parents often engaged in very robust exchanges, often within the hearing of B. I am less confident about making a finding as to the alleged physical abuse and destruction of property (including a Christmas tree in 2014 and 2015). These allegations include:
(a)September 2015 – the mother alleges the father would shake her and put his hands around her neck, as well as damage property. I am not persuaded on the evidence to make this finding;
(b)the paternal grandmother alleges after she accidently hit the metal basket for the pram on the driveway in her car, the mother began smashing things in the unit and was verbally abusive – although the mother apologised some hours later. I accept the evidence of the paternal grandmother of the mother’s reaction;
(c)on 24 July 2014 the Magellan report (Exhibit 6) confirms the evidence of the paternal grandmother that she notified the Department about the mother physically abusing the father. This was the catalyst for the separation and the Department completed the investigation in October 2014 by which time the mother and child had been living away from the father for some months. The report records that at this time “both parents were advised about the impact that violence in their relationship was having on B as well as exposing B to their substance abuse”. The incident in July 2014 I find was fuelled by the parents being drug affected at the time;
(d)the father and paternal grandmother assert the mother smashed the family Christmas tree in December 2014 but the evidence makes it difficult to make a finding on this incident;
(e)certainly the serious incident of violence on Mother’s Day 2015 (10 May 2015) is confirmed by both parents – although with different perspectives (see the father’s affidavit at paragraphs 33-37; the mother’s affidavit at paragraphs 35-36). I am satisfied the mother became angry when she found material on the father’s computer she interpreted as him having “internet sex”. The father says he sought to restrain the mother from hitting him, whilst the mother says in the process of her seeking to destroy some marijuana plants the father was cultivating downstairs, the father grabbed her by her wrists and threw her on the ground. Neighbours (who gave no evidence) alerted Police who attended (see Exhibit 24). The Police note supports more of the mother’s version – and certainly was sufficient for an AVO to issue against the father in favour of the mother. Although the father says he was the “victim” but did not contest the application because he was “too ashamed to say that it was him being hurt”, I find the father’s evidence overall on this incident unconvincing save for accepting the mother got angry;
(f)A further attempted reconciliation of sorts in late 2015 created further incidents of conflict. The father says (but the mother denies) she destroyed the Christmas tree and presents in December 2015. The paternal grandmother in January 2016 was contacted by the father alleging the mother was in a violent rage and was smashing things. The mother says the father attended on her home unannounced; was affected by drugs; destroyed windows and the flyscreen door and was yelling. The paternal grandmother, when she attended said that she observed scratches on the father’s face; but the mother appeared calm and dressed as if she was going out. After the father left the mother’s home, the mother said he returned on two further occasions. There is some evidence the father admits to being angry with the mother; smashing things and putting the garden hose around his neck and made as if he was about to hang himself. The father denies the mother’s evidence that at one stage she rain inside the house and grabbed a big kitchen knife to cut the hose to release him. This incident, which resulted in the father being charged with a breach of the AVO (and pleaded guilty), was on any version ugly. Little detail of where B was or what she saw and heard during this chaos is available to the Court in a reliable form.
This examination of some (not all) of the numerous allegations – shaped I am satisfied by both parents’ immature and volatile personalities and the father’s drug use – calls into sharp focus the nature of the parties’ adult relationship. After these events, the mother continued it seems to support reasonably consistent interaction between the child and the father (in her presence) until the disclosures of October 2016. There is little data from agencies including Police and the Department between February 2016 and October 2016 to suggest those agencies were required to intervene.
We know that since October 2016 the interaction between the parents has been limited.
It is clear that the parents have the capacity to provoke the other parent. A dispute between them can escalate quickly. I have reached a conclusion that generally their capacity to get angry quickly is less likely to erupt without the friction caused by the parents’ close interaction. These characteristics and the history fully justified the decision of the ICL to have the parents independently assessed by psychiatrist Dr G, which I examine shortly.
Whether the absence of interaction for over four years has caused the parents to reflect on their contribution to the family violence is difficult to assess. No new family violence orders are now in existence on the evidence. There is no evidence that either parent has had therapeutic counselling that may have been of assistance.
In short however, the family violence issues are a concern but the drug issues (and the consequence of such behaviour) trouble the Court more significantly.
DRUG ISSUES
It is conceded by both parents that during their relationship they have used illicit substances. Whilst the mother claims her usage was mostly of cannabis, the father admitted drug abuse from the age of 14 years, involving long term use of cannabis as well as ice and other substances.
Intervention by the Department began as early as mid-2014, with case worker Mr S using every endeavour to support the family. The mother was charged with driving a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs in May 2015. The father in January 2016 was arrested on charges relating to the cultivation of a prohibited plant.
Hair follicle testing was initiated by the father on 23 June 2017. The mother submitted quickly to a hair follicle test on 29 September 2017 after the Court ordered she do so. The results at that time for the parents revealed that neither test detected the presence of cocaine, opiates or amphetamines yet both tests detected positive levels of cannabinoids. In the father’s test the level was MS 84.3pg/10mg whilst for the mother the level was MS 52.8pg/10mg.
Of course, when parents consume illicit substances, they may not come to the attention of authorities. It is appropriate to be cautious about unverified claims by parents that they have ceased the use of drugs, and it is appropriate (in addition to random testing), to look to any behaviour that might suggest continual drug use.
In the mother’s case, there is an absence of evidence to confirm continued drug use by her. In orders the Court proposes to make, the mother agrees to undertake a further hair follicle test.
In the father’s case, the father admitted at the hearing that he continues to use cannabis – he claims for therapeutic benefits. However his public behaviour has come to the attention of Police resulting in convictions – most recently (and pending at the time of the hearing) for a physical altercation with another person the mother alleges stemming from a dispute over a drug deal. His criminal record was tendered as Exhibit 20, and speaks for itself. That incident occurred on 29 November 2018, and the father pleaded not guilty to the assault charge on the basis of self-defence. The father’s submissions (after the limited re-opening) filed 21 August 2019 contended that the Magistrate “could not be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the father’s actions were reasonable and hence the defence failed”.
The father was sentenced to an 18 months Community Corrections Order ending 30 November 2020. Although the submissions by the mother (on both 21 August 2019 and 22 August 2019) invite the Court to “look behind” the Magistrate’s decision, no transcript of either that hearing or the Reasons are available to this Court. In those circumstances it is unsafe to speculate beyond the simple fact that the conviction establishes the father’s defence was not accepted as the law required.
However, the father’s submissions filed 21 August 2019 disclosed that on 19 June 2019 the father “regrettably” was again charged with possession of cannabis but was also at that time facing breaches of bonds. This Court was informed that the father was not incarcerated, but is now on probation.
Although the father has been ordered previously by State Courts to undertake rehabilitation treatment, which cannot be demonstrated as causing his drug use or criminal behaviour to end, in the father’s last submissions the Court was informed that:
The father has pleaded guilty and made arrangements for admission to U Centre at Suburb T, a 3 month residential rehabilitation program, to commence immediately if he is not given a custodial sentence on 22 August 2019.
The mother’s submissions filed 21 August 2019 contends, at [9], that:
Thirdly, the father is sliding further into the drug milieu. He has now graduated to including on his criminal record, crimes of drug dealing related violence. The fact that the father could be standing outside his home when recognised by a dissatisfied “customer” and then descend into beating that dissatisfied customer to the face with a piece of wood, is extremely disturbing and goes directly to the issue of risk. The father professes a desire to stop his extreme drug use (it must be remembered that the evidence disclosed that on hair follicle testing, the THC found was some 80 times the level expected for a regular user) but he still takes no true steps. The MERIT report within the Court file dated 2 May 2019 is highly instructive. Firstly, for such a crucial report, the father was unable or simply unwilling, to attend until the third time an appointment had been made for him. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, when he was advised that he should go into a suitable residential program, the father indicated that he had a professional support network to allow him to address his issues. If ever there was a father failing to deal with a chronic marijuana abuse issue, it is this father. It fits perfectly with the previously tendered material displaying so clearly the father has no intention of ceasing his drug use. He appears to place more importance on his drug use than his parenting.
I agree with the thrust of the submission that the absence of any evidence that the father had, as he suggested was his intention, actually undertaken the three month rehabilitation from August 2019 and can demonstrate some changed behaviour, the father does, on the current evidence, present as a unacceptable risk to B should time occur unsupervised.
Because the Court, subject to the stipulations raised in the proposed orders, seeks to give B an opportunity to safely engage with her father, the need to make a supervised time order that is on an interim basis (as all parties urged at the final submissions) is compelling in my view.
PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT
The father has been concerned about the mental health of the mother. The mother says, and I accept, that during the relationship he often questioned her mental health. He claims the mother rang him when the child was five months of age, claiming she was going to hang herself – an assertion the mother denied.
In the s 11F Memorandum dated 11 July 2017 (Exhibit 7), the Family Consultant recommended an expert report about “numerous queries about Ms Anson’s mental health”, and the ICL gained funding for Dr G to assess both parents. Both parents were interviewed on 30 October 2017 and Dr G’s report dated 13 December 2017 was filed under cover of her affidavit. Dr G was briefly cross-examined at the hearing on the opinions expressed by her in her report and clarified that:
(a)she did not diagnose the mother with a personality disorder (which she would be cautious doing in a cross sectional rather than longitudinal assessment), but that she was satisfied the mother exhibited personality traits that could be detrimental to her parenting capacity;
(b)the father met the criteria for a diagnosis of an Adjustment Disorder which arises from the stressors related to Court processes, although potentially his continued use of marijuana does not assist his disorder;
(c)the mother was preoccupied with (she kept returning to) the topic of the allegations of sexual abuse and she held an entrenched and fixed view that abuse had occurred; and
(d)if the Court found that the mother put forward a belief she knew to be false (about the sexual abuse) and is therefore fraudulent, this would be a concern of a pathological character. I note that the Court has not made that finding, whilst not accepting the child is at any risk of sexual abuse in the father’s care.
It is not necessary to record in these Reasons significant parts of the very comprehensive psychiatric assessment by Dr G. Generally her opinions were not challenged and I accept them – couched as many of them are by the need to rely upon the history given by the parents and ultimately the fact finding exercise undertaken by the court.
However I do record the recommendations offered by Dr G to the Court as follows:
1.That if any risk is identified to the child, B, that such measures are put in place as are necessary to ensure her safety.
For the mother, Ms Anson:
2.Abstinence from illicit substance use and maintain alcohol use within safe drinking guidelines for females.
3.Participation in a Dialectic Behaviour Therapy program if available, otherwise to engage in counselling with a practitioner experienced in working with personality disorders who can assist Ms Anson in understanding her emotions and behaviours and the impact on her parenting of B.
4.Non-denigration of the father or father’s family to B.
5.If available, engagement in a parent-child community group such as a play-group or library reading group for pre-school children.
6.Ensure that B commences school in the 2018 year.
For the father, Mr Lace:
7.Abstinence from illicit substance use and maintain alcohol use within safe drinking guidelines for males.
8.Consider drug and alcohol counselling to manage ceasing cannabis use and assist in developing alternate strategies to manage sleep.
9.Continued engagement with the psychologist to address symptoms of anxiety, monitor mental state and facilitate adaptive coping mechanisms.
10.To discuss with GP potential role of anti-depressant medication should mood or functioning deteriorate, or as advised by psychologist, with review by a psychiatrist should the GP deem that appropriate.
11.As noted above, there is no psychiatric reason identified in the father’s assessment that supervised contacted with B should not occur. Further supervised contact would allow for assessment of the father-child relationship and the father’s parenting capacity.
For both parents:
12.Completion of co-parenting course such as the Parenting Orders Program.
13.Completion of a relationally based parenting group such as Circle of Security parenting.
FAMILY REPORTS
Experienced social worker and family consultant Ms F, has published two family reports:
(a)one dated 7 December 2017 arising from interviews and observations on 29 November 2017; and
(b)one dated 15 November 2018 arising from interviews and observations on 6 November 2018.
The benefit arising from the second report includes that by those interviews, the report of Dr G was available to Ms F, as well as notes from W Services (see Exhibit 33) about the supervised contact visits between 18 April 2018 and 17 November 2018 (six-eight completed visits).
Ms F was the subject of cross-examination and through that process clarified or emphasised the following matters:
(a)She believed she had properly identified concerns with both parents who she described as “vulnerable”;
(b)It could have a significant long term effect on B’s sense of identity and self if she had no relationship with her father. This observation was conditional upon the Court finding the child was not at an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse from the father. That finding has now been made earlier in these Reasons;
(c)In opining that B should continue to live with her mother, Ms F deposed that she held less concerns with the mother’s capacity to parent then the father’s capacity to parent. I agree;
(d)Having interviewed the paternal grandmother she did not assess it as harmful for B for the paternal grandmother to attend supervised visits;
(e)In circumstances where Ms F felt the mother had maintained an “unwavering view” that the father had sexually abused the child, the mother would find it difficult to facilitate the child’s relationship with the father. If the mother undertook therapeutic counselling with a genuine intent on assisting B reconnecting with her father, this could have a significant positive effect. Ms F expressed concerns about the mother’s “influence” on B around her relationship with the father – in part demonstrated by her continual questioning of the sexual abuse allegations. I share the concerns expressed by Ms F;
(f)Even though B was only six years old at the time of the interviews for the second family report, the views she expressed to Ms F (set out at paragraphs 64-84 some in direct quotations), are not ignored by the Court or Ms F. I agree that “B has been invited to have her views of her father and paternal grandmother re-defined through her mother’s eyes” (paragraph 139). The mother’s view of the father is that he abused the mother and is therefore a risk to B; and
(g)Whilst “both parents are probably equipped to meet the basic care needs of B … there is more to raising a child if one aims for said child to grow into an emotionally and psychologically well-adjusted young adult, and it is these parenting abilities I have assessed Mr Lace and Ms Ason lack” (see paragraph 151). I agree with this opinion.
The child’s expressed concerns (in November 2018) summarised at paragraph 80 of the family report about spending time with her father include the words “I hate my Dad and my Nanny and I never want to go to that place ever again” (a reference to the contact centre). However those words were not so clearly reflected in the observations of the child’s interaction with the father and paternal grandmother (see paragraphs 85-96) although I accept B’s expressed views that she “disliked the time she spent with her father and paternal grandmother” are somewhat inconsistent with her “having too much fun”. The notes of the supervised visits were not wholly negative and, to some extent reveal a growing warmth. Those visits ended two years ago.
The Court is not bound by the opinions of the family report writer, but where, as here, the longitudinal assessment is founded on facts found generally by the Court to be true, weight should be given to the opinions and recommendations of the expert.
In this case I do give weight to these opinions. The recommendations made in the first report (at paragraph 151) for the child to initially spend supervised time with a transition to limited unsupervised time (where the Court determines B has not been sexually abused) are maintained in the second report.
PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS
Having dealt in detail with the discrete issues above, I believe a more narrative exploration of the primary considerations (s 60CC(2)) and the additional considerations (s 60CC(3)) is appropriate setting out findings that illuminate the pathway to the Court’s decision.
I find the child, who will continue to reside with the mother benefits from a close and meaningful relationship with the mother – although both Ms F and Dr G raised some concerns about whether the relationship is moving towards an unhealthy enmeshed relationship. I make no finding that the close relationship has reached that level.
I do find that B will benefit from a meaningful relationship with her father, provided it is safe, and as is clear from earlier Reasons, that now largely depends on how the father is, or is not, engaged with substance and illicit drug abuse.
I rely upon earlier findings about risks. It is a great pity that the mother, despite earlier recommendations she undertake counselling, had at the time of hearing elected not to do so in a meaningful and beneficial manner. This may mean the mother has not been required to examine her belief system and have an insight as to the benefits to B of having a safe relationship opportunity with the father.
The lack of current evidence (noting the father did not seek to reopen to provide fresh evidence of any rehabilitation or the results of such therapy in respect of his drug use) is a significant obstacle to the Court contemplating B spending unsupervised time with the father. By making the Orders proposed, in a relatively short period of time hopefully the Court will have evidence revealing the father’s abstinence from drug use and/or improvement in functioning as an adult.
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The wishes expressed by the child may only have become more strident since November 2018. She is of course older. The Court does not know what further discussions (if any) about the father or the alleged sexual abuse the mother (as sole and primary carer) has had with the child.
However, if the child continues to hold an unchallenged belief that the father abused her, then this mistaken view could well shape her future healthy development. Counselling and an attitudinal change and focus by the mother on this issue, might be the way in which the child’s relationship can be recommenced. I say this as I think it is fair to assume, the child’s relationship with the father is tenuous at this stage.
The mother is the centre of the child’s development and generally in respect of the day to day needs of B including her educational needs, there is no evidence to demonstrate the care is wanting. As already noted, the capacity of the mother to support and facilitate the child’s relationship with the father is limited, but I assess she has the capacity to improve her attitude to parenting in this respect, with assistance.
The current living arrangements of the parents, and the difficulties they present (geographically) to facilitating time are unknown, but will be the subject of further submissions.
Although all Counsel contended for the Court to make an interim order, of course that is not the preferred approach. The Court is asked to consider making an order “least likely to lead to further proceedings” – and when an interim order rather than a final order is made, inevitably the proceedings continue. I deal with this issue below.
CONCLUSION
I again express the Court’s regret that these Reasons were not delivered in a timely manner. Whether, as earlier speculated, the time that has elapsed has caused reflection and insight to occur for these parents, who I accept both deeply love their daughter and want the best for her, is uncertain.
The Court could make final orders, but with the lack of current evidence on matters earlier raised about the father’s drug use, the Court could not order unsupervised time.
Ample authority exists for the Court’s historical reluctance to make long term supervised time orders. In my view the child deserves an opportunity to have a more meaningful relationship with the father.
In her Counsel’s formal written submissions filed 21 August 2019, it is clear the mother seeks supervised visits with “stringent” conditions imposed including:
(a)the production of a hair follicle test showing no marijuana use;
(b)a period of crime free existence; and
(c)ongoing psychological counselling.
As set out in the competing proposals, where the mother finally supported initial continuance of supervised time, many of the “conditions” sought by the ICL in Appendix One were agreed.
I am not prepared at this time to order that B spend unsupervised time with the father. I do not know now what might be available for supervised time in the region or what the waiting times for community centres offering this service, if available, are at the moment.
I would, subject to hearing further submissions on 25 February 2021, propose to make orders covering at least the following parameters, on a further interim basis:
(a)the mother shall have sole parental responsibility but with an obligation to consult the father before making any major long term decisions;
(b)the child B live with the mother;
(c)subject to further submissions, the child should recommence spending supervised time with the father (at which the paternal grandmother could also be present), at the cost of the father. I will need to hear further submissions as to whether these supervised visits should commence before or after some or all of the following conditions are met, namely:
(i)counselling for the child to assist in the “re-introduction” of the father to the child and to enhance the prospects of such re-introduction being successful;
(ii)drug use counselling for the father;
(iii)the L Course by the father;
(iv)counselling for the mother;
(v)any counselling for the child should take place after the chosen counsellor has a copy of these Reasons for Judgment as well, subject to any further submissions, the psychiatric assessment of Dr G and the last family report;
(vi)the parents both undertake a hair follicle test, at their individual cost; and
(vii)standard provisions, as set out at proposed orders 18, 19 and 20 of Appendix One.
I will give the ICL 14 days from today to prepare and circulate a draft minute of interim order and list the matter before me at 9.30am (Queensland time) on 25 February 2021, for further oral submissions as to the form of the order.
It would be of assistance at that time if the Court had information as to:
(a)any supervised contact centre availability and cost;
(b)whether the parents, no doubt with the assistance of the ICL, have identified a suitable counsellor for B and further when the counselling could begin; the cost of such therapy and how it will be paid and whether the counselling should be reportable or non-reportable;
(c)if the father is able to enrol in the L Course, and if so the likely date of commencement and duration of the program;
(d)if the father agrees to the drug counselling directed to assisting him to abstain totally from use of all drugs (including marijuana), and if so with whom and when can it begin; and
(e)if the mother agrees to the counselling directed to assisting her capacity to support B’s relationship with the father and to find ways, if necessary, to compartmentalise her views that the child was sexually abused by the father, and if so with whom and when can it begin.
I am conscious of the statutory presumption for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility, but in my view applying the presumption is not in the best interests of B at this time. The parents do not communicate at any effective level and the challenges to the father’s functioning (still uncertain) reduce his current capacity to consult. In time it would be ideal for equal shared parental responsibility to apply – but on the current evidence it is too early to do so.
In any event, the evidence does not call into question any major long term decisions the mother has made since separation where she has been effectively exercising sole parental responsibility.
The matter, for the reasons given will be listed for further submissions at 9.30am on 25 February 2021.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and eleven (111) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Baumann. Associate:
Dated: 29 January 2021
APPENDIX ONE
UNTIL FURTHER ORDER:
1. That all existing Parenting Orders shall be and are hereby discharged
Parental Responsibility
2.The father and the mother shall have equal shared parental responsibility for all major long-term issues in respect of the child B born in 2012 including, but not limited to, issues of that nature about:
2.1 education (both current and future); and
2.2 religious and cultural upbringing; and
2.3 health; and
2.4 name; and
2.5 changes to the child’s living arrangements that make it significantly more difficult for her to spend time with a parent.
3.The father and the mother shall consult with each other about decisions to be made in the exercise of their equal shared parental responsibility, as follows:
3.1 they shall inform the other parent about the decision to be made;
3.2 they shall consult with each other on terms that they agree; and
3.3 they shall make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of Orders 2 and 3 of these Orders:
4.1the father shall be responsible for the daily care, welfare and development of the child when she is living with him; and
4.2the mother shall be responsible for the daily care, welfare and development of the child when she is living with her.
5. That the child live with the mother.
6. That the child spend time with the father as follows:
6.1 from 9.30am until 4.30pm each Saturday for 4 occasions;
6.2from 9.30am on Saturday until 4.30pm on Sunday each alternate week for 6 occasions;
6.3 thereafter –
6.3.1during school terms from 4.30pm on Friday until 4.30pm on Sunday each alternate week, such time to be suspended from the last day of the school term and to recommence at the commencement of the next school term as if the fortnightly cycle had not been broken;
6.3.2for 4 consecutive nights during the school holidays at the end of Terms 1, 2 and 3 in 2019, commencing from 4.30pm on the last day of the school term and concluding at 4.30pm on the 5th day thereafter;
6.3.3on the weekend which includes Father’s Day on the basis that the child does not spend time with the father on the weekend which includes Mother’s Day;
7.That all changeovers shall take place at M Contact Centre, with the parents to share the costs associated, and save that if that Centre will be closed on any given changeover date, changeover shall take place at the N City Police Station, with a person known to the child, not being the father, effecting changeover.
8.That within 14 days of these orders the mother attend on her general practitioner for the purpose of obtaining a mental health plan and referral to an appropriate therapist and thereafter attend that therapist at the earliest available appointment and for the purposes of learning strategies to promote and facilitate the child having a meaningful and positive relationship with her father as well as to address the concerns raised in Dr G’s assessment of her and she is to:
8.1.1 Comply with all reasonable directions made by the therapist; and
8.1.2 Ensure they attend appointments as requested by the therapist;
8.1.3Ensure that when the therapist deems it to be appropriate that the child attend each appointment made by the therapist for as long as deemed appropriate.
9.In respect to Order 8 leave is granted for the mother to provide a copy of the psychiatric report prepared by Dr G, the family reports prepared by the family consultants and a copy of the reasons for judgment to the therapist and the mother is ordered to do so.
10.The father is to attend at a drug and alcohol counselling service within 14 days of these orders for the purposes of abstaining from illicit drugs and significantly reducing his use of cannabis with a view to abstinence and he is to;
10.1.1 Comply with all reasonable directions made by the service; and
10.1.2 Ensure he attend appointments as requested by the service;
10.1.3Undertake all testing as requested by the service and provide results to the ICL as requested
11. The parents are restrained from using illicit drugs while the child is in their care.
12.Within 14 days of these orders the parents are to submit to a hair follicle test for the detection of illicit drugs and again at 14 weeks and again at 25 weeks from the date of these orders.
13.For the purpose of hair follicle tests, the parents shall not cut their hair shorter than 3 centimetres.
14.The tests be conducted at a laboratory accredited by the National Association of Testing Authorities, Australia in accordance with the current Australian Standard for the collection and detection of drugs of abuse.
15.Each test shall be for the detection of amphetamine-type substances, cannabis, opiates (including heroin and morphine), sedative-type drugs, cocaine, and any other drugs of abuse.
16.The parents are to provide the pathologist with photographic identification, to be recorded before each test and they are to provide the results of each test to the lawyers for all parties immediately upon their receipt of the results.
17.The father is to contact the L Course provider within 21 days of these orders to organise to complete the intake program and to attend the first available L course.
18. That the parents shall:
18.1keep the other parent informed at all times of their residential address and contact telephone numbers;
18.2keep the other parent informed of the names and addresses of any treating medical or other health practitioners who treat the child and authorise those practitioners to provide the other parent with information that they are lawfully able to provide about the child;
18.3Inform the other parent as soon as reasonably practicable of any medical condition, significant health issue, illness or injury suffered by the child. This Order authorises any treating medical practitioner to release the child’s medical information to the other parent.
19.That the parents authorise, by this Order, the school attended by the child to give each parent information about the child’s educational progress and other school related activities and supply them with copies of school reports, photographs, certificates and awards obtained by the child (at that parent’s cost).
20. That during the time the child is with either parent, that parent shall:
20.1respect the privacy of the other parent and not question the child about the personal life of the other parent;
20.2 speak of the other parent respectfully;
20.3not denigrate or insult the other parent in the presence or hearing of the child and use their best endeavours to ensure that others do not denigrate or insult the other parent in the hearing or presence of the child;
20.4 not speak to the child about the court proceedings between the parties;
20.5not speak to the child about the allegation that the father indecently assaulted the child sometime between June and October 2016.
21.That pursuant to s.62B of the Family Law Act, information about the family counselling services, family dispute resolution services and other courses, programs and services available, is set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto.
22.That pursuant to s.65DA(2) of the Family Law Act, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in the Fact Sheet, attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.
NOTATION
1.These are interim orders made to allow the parents to attend to what is required of each of them to facilitate, repair and promote the child’s relationship with her father and to address issues identified with each party’s parenting and lifestyle.
2.It is the intention of the parties to take positive steps to encourage the child in having a safe and positive relationship with both her parents and to have the court monitor the progress by having the matter return to the court after 6 months.
APPENDIX TWO
UNTIL FURTHER ORDER:
1. That all existing Parenting Orders shall be and are hereby discharged
Parental Responsibility
2.That the mother shall have sole parental responsibility for all major long-term issues in respect of the child B born in 2012.
3.Prior to exercising parental responsibility in respect of any major long term issue in respect of the child, the mother shall:
3.1 Inform the father about the decision to be made;
3.2Consult by way of email and the father shall, as soon as practical, respond expressing his opinion and views;
3.3 The mother shall consider those views while making the decision; and
3.4 The mother shall advise the father of the decision and the reasons for same.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of Orders 2 and 3 of these Orders:
4.1the father shall be responsible for the daily care, welfare and development of the child when she is living with him; and
4.2the mother shall be responsible for the daily care, welfare and development of the child when she is living with her.
5. That the child live with the mother.
6.That the child spend time with the father supervised at the N City Contact Centre for two hours each alternative Saturday.
7.That within 14 days of these orders the mother attend on her general practitioner for the purpose of obtaining a mental health plan and referral to an appropriate therapist and thereafter attend that therapist at the earliest available appointment and for the purposes of learning strategies to promote and facilitate the child having a meaningful and positive relationship with her father as well as to address the concerns raised in Dr Gs assessment of her and she is to:
7.1.1 Comply with all reasonable directions made by the therapist; and
7.1.2 Ensure they attend appointments as requested by the therapist;
7.1.3Ensure that when the therapist deems it to be appropriate that the child attend each appointment made by the therapist for as long as deemed appropriate.
8.In respect to Order 7 leave is granted for the mother to provide a copy of the psychiatric report prepared by Dr G, the family reports prepared by the family consultants and a copy of the reasons for judgment to the therapist and the mother is ordered to do so.
9.The father is to attend at a drug and alcohol counselling service within 14 days of these orders for the purposes of abstaining from illicit drugs including cannabis and he is to;
9.1.1 Comply with all reasonable directions made by the service; and
9.1.2 Ensure he attend appointments as requested by the service;
9.1.3Undertake all testing as requested by the service and provide results to the ICL as requested
10. The parents are restrained from using illicit drugs while the child is in their care.
11.Within 14 days of these orders the parents are to submit to a hair follicle test for the detection of illicit drugs and again at 14 weeks and again at 25 weeks from the date of these orders.
12.For the purpose of hair follicle tests, the parents shall not cut their hair shorter than 3 centimetres.
13.The tests be conducted at a laboratory accredited by the National Association of Testing Authorities, Australia in accordance with the current Australian Standard for the collection and detection of drugs of abuse.
14.Each test shall be for the detection of amphetamine-type substances, cannabis, opiates (including heroin and morphine), sedative-type drugs, cocaine, and any other drugs of abuse.
15.The parents are to provide the pathologist with photographic identification, to be recorded before each test and they are to provide the results of each test to the lawyers for all parties immediately upon their receipt of the results.
16.The father is to contact the L Course provider within 21 days of these orders to organise to complete the intake program and to attend and complete the first available L course.
17. That the parents shall:
17.1keep the other parent informed at all times of their residential address and contact telephone numbers;
17.2keep the other parent informed of the names and addresses of any treating medical or other health practitioners who treat the child and authorise those practitioners to provide the other parent with information that they are lawfully able to provide about the child;
17.3Inform the other parent as soon as reasonably practicable of any medical condition, significant health issue, illness or injury suffered by the child. This Order authorises any treating medical practitioner to release the child’s medical information to the other parent.
18.That the parents authorise, by this Order, the school attended by the child to give each parent information about the child’s educational progress and other school related activities and supply them with copies of school reports, photographs, certificates and awards obtained by the child (at that parent’s cost).
19. That during the time the child is with either parent, that parent shall:
19.1respect the privacy of the other parent and not question the child about the personal life of the other parent;
19.2 speak of the other parent respectfully;
19.3not denigrate or insult the other parent in the presence or hearing of the child and use their best endeavours to ensure that others do not denigrate or insult the other parent in the hearing or presence of the child;
19.4 not speak to the child about the court proceedings between the parties;
19.5not speak to the child about the allegation that the father indecently assaulted the child sometime between June and October 2016.
20.That pursuant to s.62B of the Family Law Act, information about the family counselling services, family dispute resolution services and other courses, programs and services available, is set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto.
21.That pursuant to s.65DA(2) of the Family Law Act, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in the Fact Sheet, attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.
NOTATION
1.These are interim orders made to allow the parents to attend to what is required of each of them to facilitate, to repair and promote the child’s relationship with her father and to address issues identified with each party’s parenting and lifestyle.
2.It is the intention of the parties to take positive steps to encourage the child in having a safe and positive relationship with both her parents and to have the court monitor the progress by having the matter return to the court after 28 weeks.
Key Legal Topics
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Family Law
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Evidence
Legal Concepts
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Appeal
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Remedies
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Procedural Fairness
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