Anobis Pty Ltd v Magoffin

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Anobis Pty Ltd v Magoffin  [2017] QSC 182

PARTIES:

ANOBIS PTY LTD ACN 169 138 130

(Applicant)

v
JOHN EDWARD MAGOFFIN AS TRUSTEE FOR DIAMANTINA TRUST

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

No S203 of 2017

DIVISION:

Trial  

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Cairns

DELIVERED ON:

31 August 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Cairns

HEARING DATE:

26 May 2017, further written submissions filed 2 June 2017, 9 June 2017, 13 June 2017

JUDGE:

Henry J

ORDER:

1.   The respondent’s statutory demand to the applicant     dated 4 April 2017 is set aside.

2.   The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

CORPORATIONS – WINDING UP – WINDING UP IN INSOLVENCY – STATUTORY DEMAND – APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE DEMAND – GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO INDEBTEDNESS – where the applicant had been served with a statutory demand by the respondent – where the respondent was the vendor and the applicant the purchaser in a property transaction – where the statutory demand related to an amount owing under a ‘deed of rescission’ – where the applicant argued amount due under the deed was a penalty – where the applicant further argued both misrepresentation and waiver by the respondent in relation to the deed – where the real estate agent acting for the respondent was also a director of the applicant – whether the statutory demand should be set aside

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s128(4), s 129(4), s 180, s 459E, s 459G, s 459H

Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Pekell Delaire Holdings Pty Ltd (2017) 118 ACSR 592, applied

El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1994] 2 All ER 685, cited Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785, applied
Re Morris Catering (Australia) Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 601, applied
Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 147 ALR 444, applied
Wood v Richardson (1840) 49 ER 305, cited

COUNSEL:

J Jacobs for the applicant

C Ryall for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Murray & Lyons for the applicant

Walkers Lawyers for the respondent

  1. The applicant company applies to set aside a statutory demand dated 4 April 2017.

  2. The statutory demand, for $250,000, was prima facie compliant with the requirements of s 459E Corporations Act 2001 (Qld).

  3. The issue is whether there exists a “genuine dispute” within the meaning of s 459H Corporations Act.

    Background

  4. The applicant was the purchaser of real property at 129 Abbott Street, Cairns (“the Abbott Street property”), a commercial property owned by two solicitors, Mr Magoffin and Mr Lagois, in their respective capacities as trustees.  Their solicitors’ practice, which was a tenant at the Abbott Street property, had acted for Sibona Kema and her husband Assik Tomscoll in the conveyance of two residential properties in Cairns.  That connection prompted the idea of Ms Kema and Mr Tomscoll buying the Abbott Street property.  Mr Magoffin’s and Mr Lagois’ real estate agent appointed for…

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Details
Case
[2017] QSC 182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Anobis Pty Ltd was served with a statutory demand by Magoffin, the vendor of the Abbott Street property. Anobis, the purchaser, argued that the amount owing under a deed of rescission should be set aside as it was a penalty. Anobis further argued that there was a waiver of the debt by Magoffin and that there was misrepresentation in the property transaction. Anobis sought to set aside the statutory demand on the basis that there was a genuine dispute as to the amount owing.

The central issue for the court was whether Anobis had a genuine dispute as to the amount owing under the deed of rescission. The court considered whether there was a reasonable view of the facts that the amount was a penalty, and whether there was a waiver or misrepresentation. The court found that there was a genuine dispute as to the amount owing, and that the statutory demand should be set aside.

The court found that Anobis had put forward a reasonable view of the facts that the amount owing under the deed was a penalty. The court also found that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the amount was owing, as there was evidence of misrepresentation and waiver by Magoffin. The court held that the statutory demand should be set aside as there was a genuine dispute as to the amount owing.

The court ordered that the respondent’s statutory demand to the applicant dated 4 April 2017 be set aside. The court further ordered that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s statutory demand to the applicant dated 4 April 2017 is set aside.

2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

The issue is whether there exists a “genuine dispute” within the meaning of s 459H Corporations Act.Background The applicant was the purchaser of real property at 129 Abbott Street, Cairns (“the Abbott Street property”), a commercial property owned by two solicitors, Mr Magoffin and Mr Lagois, in their respective capacities as trustees. Their solicitors’ practice, which was a tenant at the Abbott Street property, had acted for Sibona Kema and her husband Assik Tomscoll in the conveyance of two residential properties in Cairns. That connection prompted the idea of Ms Kema and Mr Tomscoll buying the Abbott Street property. Mr Magoffin’s and Mr Lagois’ real estate agent appointed for the purpose of selling the Abbott Street property was Robert Smith of Australian First Realty. Ms Kema and Mr Tomscoll decided to acquire the property through a corporate entity and to that end the applicant company was incorporated as a trustee for a discretionary trust on 16 April 2014. Ms Kema deposes this occurred “with the assistance of Mr Lagois” but she does not address the capacity in which he did so. The initial directors of the applicant company were Ms Kema, Mr Tomscoll and, remarkably, the real estate agent Mr Smith. Perhaps, Mr Smith was appointed director as a matter of convenience, to fill corporate governance residency requirements. If that was the underlying reason then it is surprising that, of all the residents in Australia who might have become a director of the purchaser, the decision was made to appoint the vendors’ agent. A contract for the applicant’s purchase of the Abbott Street property (“the first contract”) for $4,264,000 was entered into on 21 April 2014. The first contract was due to, but did not, settle on 30 July 2014. Settlement extensions were granted by the vendors. Some 17 payments were made towards the purchase price between 3 March 2014 and 27 October 2015, usually at points when the vendors agreed to extend the settlement date. The total of those amounts according to the payments listed in Ms Kema’s affidavit was $1,745,930.06 and according to the total identified in the below discussed deed of rescission was $1,725,900.22, a difference of roughly $20,000. Ms Kema deposes that during this era, at Mr Smith’s suggestion, Mr Lagois prepared a General Power of Attorney giving Mr Smith general power of attorney for the applicant company. Mr Smith suggested the first contract be rescinded and a second contract for a lower purchase price be entered into. On 14 January 2016 Ms Kema, Mr Tomscoll and Mr Lagois attended Mr Smith’s office. On Ms Kema’s account, the sole account of these events before the court, a number of documents were executed, including a second contract (“the second contract”) to purchase the property for $2,540,000, a deed of rescission (“the deed”) and a guarantee. The deed is the source of the present controversy. The deed’s recitals record that, pursuant to the first contract, referred to in the deed as “the Current Contract”, the purchaser had paid the vendors the sum of $1,725,900.22 towards the purchase price on the basis that the amount was non-refundable. The recitals recorded the granting of numerous extensions of the settlement date and that the purchaser was still not in a position to effect settlement. Thus, the recitals recorded:“D. As a consequence, the parties have agreed to mutually terminate the Current Contract on the basis that the amount paid by the Purchaser to the Vendor of $1,725,900.22 is to be forfeited to the Vendor.”[1][1] Affidavit of Sibona Kema court file document 3 ex SK5 p 22.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Once it is realised that such a view of the facts is reasonably open the court can be well satisfied there is a genuine dispute as to whether the alleged debt is owing. Conclusion The application should succeed. Costs should follow the event. It was not suggested costs should be other than on the standard basis.[14][14] While the letter of the applicant’s solicitor of 20 April 2017 clearly put the respondent on notice of what I have concluded is a genuine dispute I do not detect in the respondent’s contesting of this application unreasonableness of a kind calling for indemnity costs.Orders My orders are:1.The respondent’s statutory demand to the applicant dated 4 April 2017 is set aside.2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application on the standard basis.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established