Annakin v Western Australia Police
[2020] WASC 277
•24 JULY 2020
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION: ANNAKIN -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIA POLICE [2020] WASC 277
CORAM: FIANNACA J
HEARD: 23 JULY 2020
DELIVERED : 24 JULY 2020
FILE NO/S: MBA 28 of 2020
BETWEEN: ZACHARIAH WOLF ANNAKIN
Applicant
AND
WESTERN AUSTRALIA POLICE
Respondent
Catchwords:
Bail application - Schedule 2 - Need for exceptional circumstances - Inevitable downgrade of charge - Bail granted
Legislation:
Bail Act 1982 (WA)
Result:
Bail granted
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | H Loreck |
| Respondent | : | P Lyons |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | Legal Aid (WA) |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Atherton v Western Australia [2005] WASC 15
De Faria v the Queen [2012] WASCA 256
Donaldson v Western Australia [2010] WASC 264
Jolly v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASC 118
Magistro v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASC 268
Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42 WAR 99
Roberts v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASC 118
Shrivastava v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 96
The State of Western Australia v Sturgeon [2005] WASC 256
Tieleman v The Queen [2004] WASCA 285; (2004) 49 A Crim R 303
YSN v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 155
FIANNACA J:
Introduction
This is an application for bail. At the hearing of the application on 23 July 2020, I allowed the application, granted bail and said I would publish reasons later. These are my reasons for allowing the application.
The application and its history
The applicant, Zachariah Wolf Annakin, has applied for bail in respect of a charge of armed robbery pending in the Magistrates Court, which he is alleged to have committed on 10 April 2020 at Thornlie. At the time of the alleged offence, the applicant was on bail for a charge of aggravated home burglary, in respect of which he is to be tried in the District Court in 2021.
The armed robbery charge arises out of an incident in which the applicant was at a Spud Shed supermarket with his partner. They had their young child with them, in a pram. It is alleged that the applicant's partner stole items from the supermarket by removing them from the store in her handbag without paying for them. It is alleged that, when a security officer attempted to prevent the accused's partner from leaving with the goods, the accused brandished a knife and threatened the security officer with it, and that he did so to prevent the officer from resisting the theft of the items by the accused's partner.
Clause 3A of pt C of sch 1 of the Bail Act 1982 (WA) (the Act) applies to this application. Under that provision, where an accused is in custody awaiting an appearance in court for a serious offence, and the serious offence is alleged to have been committed while the accused was on bail for another serious offence, the court must refuse to grant bail for the later serious offence unless the court is satisfied that there are exceptional reasons why the accused should not be kept in custody and is also satisfied that bail may properly be granted having regard to the provisions of cl 1 and cl 3 of pt C of sch 1.
'Serious offence' is defined in s 3(1) of the Act, relevantly, to mean an offence described in sch 2 of the Act. Both of the offences of armed robbery and burglary are offences described in sch 2 of the Act. Therefore, as the armed robbery is alleged to have been committed by the applicant while he was on bail for the aggravated home burglary, which is alleged to have been committed in 2018, cl 3A applies and the court must refuse to grant bail for the armed robbery, being the later serious offence, unless satisfied there are exceptional reasons why the applicant should not be kept in custody. If satisfied there are exceptional reasons, it will be necessary to consider whether bail is otherwise appropriate having regard to the provisions of cl 1 and cl 3.
The applicant applied for bail in respect of the armed robbery charge in the Magistrates Court on 14 April 2020. He was not represented on that day. Magistrate Gluestein refused the application. The only circumstance considered in terms of whether there were exceptional reasons for the purposes of cl 3A appears to have been the likely lengthy delay in the matter proceeding to trial in the District Court in due course. His Honour was not satisfied that any delay in the District Court amounted to an exceptional reason for the purposes of the application on that day. Further, he was of the view that the seriousness of the charge militated against the grant of bail.
Bail having been refused, the applicant was required to demonstrate a change in his circumstances before he could make any further application for bail in the Magistrates Court.
On 23 June 2020, the applicant made a further application before Chief Magistrate Heath. On that occasion he was represented by counsel. The Chief Magistrate accepted that there had been a change of circumstances, in that the applicant was now represented and had been able to present his case more fully.[1] However, he also refused the application. The applicant again relied on the likely delay of the matter proceeding to trial in the District Court. He also relied on the fact that his grandmother had been diagnosed with motor neurone disease (MND) and had been given a prognosis of only five months from June of this year. The applicant said that he was close to his grandmother, who had been a significant figure in his life. The Chief Magistrate concluded that, while the circumstances were unfortunate, they did not amount to exceptional reasons why the applicant should not be kept in custody.[2]
[1] ts 6 - 7, 23 June 2020.
[2] ts 7, 23 June 2020.
The applicant was remanded in custody to 5 August 2020 for committal mention.
The present application is brought under s 14(2) of the Act, and invokes this court's jurisdiction under s 14(1), by which the court may exercise afresh the power to grant bail conferred by s 13 and sch 1 pt A of the Act on the magistrate who refused bail. It is not an appeal from the magistrate's decision. The application was filed on 3 July 2020.
The legal framework
The issues to be determined
Clause 3A creates a rebuttable statutory presumption against the grant of bail.[3] There are two elements about which the judicial officer must be satisfied before bail can be granted. The first is that there are exceptional reasons why the accused should not be kept in custody. The second is that bail may properly be granted, having regard to the provisions of cl 1 and cl 3 of sch 1 pt C of the Act. In Milenkovski, McLure P referred to the two elements in reverse order and said that:[4]
If the judicial officer is not satisfied that bail may properly be granted under the general provisions in cl 1 and cl 3, it is not necessary to consider whether there are exceptional reasons.
[3] Milenkovski v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 99; (2011) 42 WAR 99 (Milenkovski) [36].
[4] Milenkovski [37].
That approach reflects the possibility that, if there are exceptional reasons, they may not be relevant to or inform the answers to the mandatory questions the court must consider in cl 1(a) to (g) of sch 1 pt C. However, as Simmonds J noted in Jolly,[5] the approach that had been taken in cases before Milenkovski tended to put the consideration of whether there were exceptional reasons first. That has been the case in a number of first instance considerations of bail since Milenkovski as well. Simmonds J took that approach in Jolly, partly in deference to the fact that counsel had argued the matter in that way. I too have taken that approach previously.[6]
[5] Jolly v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASC 118 (Jolly).
[6] Magistro v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASC 268.
Given that both elements are necessary conditions of which the court must be satisfied under cl 3A before bail can be granted, it does not matter in which order they are considered. If either condition is not satisfied, it would not be necessary to go on to consider the other.
What are exceptional reasons?
The use of the word 'exceptional' denotes something which is unusual, out of the ordinary, in some way special or an exception to the general run of cases.[7] There is no closed list of exceptional reasons.[8] What might constitute exceptional reasons will depend upon the facts in each particular case.[9] As with bail applications generally, it is necessary to look at the circumstances as a whole, weighing competing factors in determining whether exceptional reasons have been established.[10]
[7] Tieleman v The Queen [2004] WASCA 285; (2004) 49 A Crim R 303 [15] (Murray J); Shrivastava v The State of Western Australia[2010] WASCA 96 [28] - [32] (Mazza JA); De Faria v the Queen [2012] WASCA 256 [13].
[8] Roberts v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASC 118 [9] (Murray J).
[9] Donaldson v Western Australia [2010] WASC 264 (Murray J).
[10] Atherton v Western Australia [2005] WASC 15 (Blaxell J).
The policy behind the requirement for exceptional reasons where an accused is charged with committing a serious offence while on bail for another serious offence was discussed in Sturgeon.[11] Although an accused is presumed innocent of any charge unless and until found guilty, there is obvious community concern when someone is charged with a serious offence or offences alleged to have been committed while on bail for one or more other serious offence. The risk that the person may commit offences if released on bail is given prominence as a factor that tells against release on bail.
Clauses 1 and 3
[11] The State of Western Australia v Sturgeon [2005] WASC 256 (EM Heenan J).
The second requirement under cl 3A requires consideration of whether bail may properly be granted having regard to the provisions of cl 1 and cl 3. The provisions of cl 1 are in the form of questions which address, firstly, whether there are grounds to refuse bail, and secondly, whether there are any conditions that the court can impose which would remove the reasons for refusing bail.
The first category of questions requires consideration, relevant for this application, of whether the applicant will appear at a future court date, will commit an offence, will endanger the safety or welfare of others, or will interfere with witnesses or obstruct justice.
In considering those questions, the court must have regard to the factors set out in cl 3 of sch 1 pt C, which include (a) the nature and seriousness of the offence and the probable method of dealing with the applicant for it if he is convicted; (b) the applicant's character, previous convictions and antecedents; (c) the history of any previous grants of bail to him; and (d) the strength of the evidence against him.
The second category of questions in cl 1 requires consideration of conditions that may alleviate the risks that would otherwise justify a refusal of bail.
The approach to be taken when considering the factors or questions in cl 1 and 3 is well known and was explained in Milenkovski[12] and YSN.[13] It is sufficient to note for present purposes that there must be an actual risk or possibility that the accused will do one of the things referred to in cl 1(a), and the court must consider whether the nature and extent of that risk provides a proper ground for refusing to grant bail, having regard to the matters set out in cl 3(a) - (d) and any other matters the court considers to be relevant. That requires weighing the risk that such conduct would pose to the integrity of the criminal justice process and community safety, against the potential injustice to the accused if he is ultimately acquitted of the charged offences after being held in custody for a lengthy period. The assessment is made in the context that an accused person is presumed to be innocent. Where the nature and extent of the risk provides a proper ground for refusing to grant bail, the next question is whether conditions of bail could reasonably be imposed that would sufficiently reduce the risk, so that the remaining risk no longer warrants the detention of a person who has not been convicted and is presumed to be innocent.
[12] Milenkovski [24] - [25] and [39] - [41] (McLure P).
[13] YSN v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 155 (YSN) [15] - [21].
It will be obvious that the circumstances which bring this application within the provisions of cl 3A will also be relevant to a number of the factors to be considered under cl 1 and cl 3.
The basis of the application
The applicant argues that there are exceptional reasons why he should not be kept in custody pending his trial. Those reasons are:
(1)the length of time the applicant was on bail prior to the alleged armed robbery charge;
(2)the delay in relation to the hearing of the original aggravated home burglary charge, and the likely delay in the hearing of the current armed robbery charge;
(3)the applicant's personal circumstances, specifically the terminal illness of the applicant's grandmother, Ms Hodsdon; and
(4)the nature of the armed robbery charge.
The applicant submits that, if I am satisfied there are exceptional reasons for a grant of bail, then a grant of bail would be proper, as there are conditions that could be imposed that would sufficiently reduce the risk the applicant may fail to appear at a future hearing, or may reoffend.
The evidence in the proceedings
The evidence in these proceedings filed by the applicant consists of the indictment and amended statement of material facts in respect of the aggravated home burglary (the original charge), the prosecution notice and police statement of material facts in respect of the armed robbery, the magistrate court transcripts (14 April and 23 June 2020), the applicant's criminal record and a letter from the applicant's grandmother.
The applicant has also filed an affidavit sworn by him 14 July 2020, and affidavits from:
(1)Ms Amber Rose Schulz, the applicant's de‑facto partner, sworn 1 July 2020;
(2)Ms Lorraine Hodsdon, the applicant's grandmother, sworn 8 July 2020; and
(3)Ms Antoinette Fedele, solicitor for the applicant, sworn 3 July 2020; and
Ms Schulz's affidavit sets out: (a) her version of events on 10 April 2020 in Spud Shed, claiming that the applicant was not aware of her stealing the grocery items; (b) details of the co‑parenting duties (of their eight month old daughter) that she and the applicant share; and (c) details of her current accommodation. In that regard, she says that she and the applicant had relied on friends and family members for accommodation for some six years in circumstances described by her as 'couch surfing'. She says that now she has moved into a private rental property in Armadale, and that accommodation will be available to the accused.
Mrs Hodsdon's affidavit sets out: (a) the role she plays in the applicant's life; (b) details of her progression of symptoms leading up to the diagnosis she received of MND; and (c) details of the current level of support that she requires and her inability, therefore, to visit the applicant in prison. At the hearing on 23 July 2020, the applicant tendered a report from Ms Hodsdon's treating specialist, confirming her condition and her prognosis.
Ms Fedele's affidavit sets out, among other things, (a) the history of the charges and bail applications; (b) details of the applicant's change of circumstances; (c) details of the applicant's grandmother's health diagnosis; and (d) proposed bail conditions.
The applicant's affidavit sets out: (a) his relationship with his grandmother, and the effect his incarceration has had on him, (b) the effect that being in custody has had on his partner and child, and (c) the basis on which he maintains his not guilty plea to the armed robbery charge.
The respondent has filed a statement of material facts, which relate to PE 19248 of 2016, a charge of being armed in a way that may cause fear. The applicant was convicted of that offence on 4 January 2017 The respondent submits this is a similar offence to the armed robbery alleged.
The case against the applicant
The issues to be decided require consideration of the facts alleged against the applicant in respect of each of the charges. I outlined them earlier, but it is appropriate to provide some further details.
Shortly before 6.30 pm on Friday, 10 April 2020, the applicant was at the Spud Shed supermarket in Thornlie with Ms Schulz, who was pushing a pram which held their five month old child.
Ms Schulz filled her handbag with grocery items and left the store without attempting to pay for the items, which were concealed in her handbag. A security officer who had observed Ms Schulz in the store, followed her and stopped her by putting his hand on the pram, and asked her to return the items she had taken. At that point in time, the applicant was at a cash register, making a purchase. He saw the security officer stopping Ms Schulz.
The applicant walked over to the security officer and assaulted him by punching him in the face. A struggle ensued between them, during which the security officer grabbed Ms Schulz's handbag and threw it into the store. The applicant kicked the officer in the back and threated him with a block of Coca Cola soft drinks, which he grabbed from a display. The applicant is alleged to have produced a knife from a bag in his possession. He then threatened the security officer with the knife. During the incident, the applicant's child remained in the pram some three to four metres away.
Ms Schulz retrieved her bag. However, she was detained soon after by the store manager and the stolen property was recovered. The items were worth $33.98. Both the applicant and Ms Schulz then ran from the area. The applicant was pushing the pram.
The incident in the shopping complex was captured on CCTV. The applicant and Ms Schulz were arrested later the same day, at different locations. Although he was interviewed by police, the applicant made no comment.
The applicant's personal circumstances
Before turning to the applicant's arguments in respect of exceptional reasons, I will outline the evidence in respect of his personal circumstances.
The applicant is 27 years of age. Ms Schulz is his long term partner. They have a child who is less than a year old.
The applicant is very close to his grandmother. She describes having spent a lot of time with the applicant and his family over the course of his life. She states that the applicant would bring his partner and baby to visit her frequently.
Ms Schultz describes the applicant's family home as being overcrowded, with no hot water or electricity. She and the applicant moved out of that home six or seven years ago, and since then have been 'couch surfing', and unable to find a place of their own, which she says made it 'hard for [them] to stay out of trouble'. Since the applicant has been in custody, Ms Schultz has acquired private rental accommodation, which she says will provide a 'new start' for them to stay out of trouble.
The applicant has described the fact that knowing Ms Schultz and their child are now in rental accommodation has 'taken a lot of worry off [his] mind', and will assist him to stay out of trouble.
In the event that the applicant is released on bail, it is proposed that he reside with Ms Schultz and their daughter at their rented property.
Criminal History
The applicant has a significant criminal history including multiple occasions of breaching bail undertakings and community based orders, including intensive supervision orders. As an adult this record of breaches spans from April 2013 to April 2019. The applicant also has a juvenile criminal record demonstrating breaches of an intensive youth supervision order and a bail undertaking. The applicant's first armed robbery offence was in 2010.
Whether there are exceptional reasons
Time on bail
The aggravated home burglary charge, for which the applicant was on bail at the time of the alleged commission of the armed robbery charge, was originally listed for a two‑day trial to commence on 16 March 2020. That trial was one of many that had to be vacated, due to the suspension of jury trials in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The applicant's trial has been relisted to commence on 24 May 2020. At the time of the alleged commission of the armed robbery offence, the applicant had been on bail for the aggravated home burglary charge for 18 months, with the exception of short periods in custody, in relation to his failure to attend court.
The applicant submits that, despite the fact that he has accrued two breach of bail charges for failing to attend court in respect of the aggravated home burglary charge (on 28 September 2018 and 22 February 2019), both matters were dealt with by way of fines, and they do not reflect a pattern of serial offending while on bail, given the lengthy period for which the applicant has been on bail without further allegations of offending.
Delay
It is submitted that, given the delay already experienced by the applicant with respect to his aggravated home burglary charge, there is an anticipated significant delay before the armed robbery charge would get to trial.
The applicant submits that, in this case, the expected delay is a factor which, when viewed with other factors, should be considered an exceptional reason for granting bail.
Family circumstances
The applicant's grandmother, Ms Hodsdon, has been diagnosed with MND, and she has been advised that her condition is terminal and she is unlikely to live until Christmas.
The applicant only became aware of his grandmother's illness after he was remanded in custody. The applicant is very close with his grandmother. Ms Hodsdon cannot visit the applicant in prison due to her condition. It is evident from the affidavits of both Ms Hodsdon and the applicant that their separation has been stressful for both of them.
It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that, due to the clear limitation on Ms Hodsdon's life expectancy, and the fact that it is likely the applicant would not see his grandmother again if he were to remain in custody, each day the respondent spends in custody is more onerous upon him than would otherwise be the case.
Nature of the offence
It is also submitted by the applicant that the facts of the offence, as alleged, do not suggest any premeditation or use or threat of force. The items stolen were $33.98 worth of groceries. It is submitted that the applicant only became involved when the security officer placed his hand on the pram, where the applicant's baby was.
It is further submitted that the evidence in relation to the charged offence is not overwhelming.
The State's submissions
The respondent was represented at the hearing of the application by counsel from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Although the respondent is properly named as the WA Police, the submissions made on behalf of the respondent reflected the position the State, which will ultimately have the carriage of the prosecution. It is convenient in that context to refer to the State's position.
The State had not made an assessment of the evidence presented by the WA Police until the listing of the present application. Having assessed the evidence, it has conceded that the case for the offence as presently charged is not strong. The concession is made, properly, in respect of the need for the State to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew or believed that Ms Schulz had stolen something and that he used violence towards the security officer in order to obtain the thing stolen or to prevent or overcome resistance to the property being stolen. The State quite properly acknowledges that, although a final determination has not yet been made as to the prospects of conviction, it seems from a review of the materials disclosed to date that there is limited evidence from which an irresistible inference of such knowledge or belief on the accused's part can be drawn. The State therefore considers that is 'relatively unlikely' that the charge of armed robbery will proceed.
The applicant's legal advisers have made a submission to the DPP of which, in effect is an offer by the applicant to plead guilty to alternative charges. The State is seeking further information from the defence in respect of the submission. However, it accepts that there is 'a reasonable likelihood that there will be a substantial change in the nature and seriousness of the offence with which the accused is presently charged'. In particular, it is likely that any alternative charge with which the State might proceed is likely to be objectively less serious, by reference to its maximum penalty, than the present charge.
In those circumstances, the State accepts that the likely development in respect of the charge or charges with which it will proceed, in combination with the other factors relied on by the applicant, is 'sufficient to allow the court to consider that there are exceptional reasons not to require the accused to be held in custody'. A factor that flows from the likely development in respect of the charge is the injustice that may be occasioned to the applicant if he remains in custody and the charge is downgraded. The applicant has been in custody consistently since 10 April 2020. He has therefore been in custody for more than 3 months. As the State conceded, there is a reasonable possibility that the applicant may ultimately be convicted of an offence or offences, 'the total effective sentence for which may not greatly, if at all, exceed that period'.
Conclusion as to exceptional reasons
In my opinion, the State's concession that the court may find there are exceptional reasons is properly made.
It would have been doubtful that the factors of delay and the sad personal circumstances relating to the applicant's grandmother would have been sufficient to constitute exceptional reasons. As the Chief Magistrate said, while it is clearly desirable that the applicant be able to spend time with his grandmother, it is the inevitable, albeit unfortunate, consequence of an accused being remanded in custody, that they are removed from contact with loved ones, including those who are gravely ill. Personal hardship of that kind would not ordinarily be regarded as an exceptional reason for the purposes of cl 3A. However, given the combination of factors in the applicant's case, particularly the State's concession that the case in relation to the armed robbery charge is not strong and that the charge will likely be downgraded, and the prospect that any sentence imposed may not greatly exceed the period he has already spent in custody, I am satisfied that there are exceptional reasons why the applicant should not be held in custody, provided a grant of bail is otherwise appropriate.
Whether it would otherwise be proper to grant bail
There are a number of matters weighing against the conclusion that it would otherwise be proper to grant the applicant bail. Foremost among them is the applicant's lengthy record for breaches of bail (12 in total), including recent breaches of bail by failing to appear, and breaches of other community based orders. In addition, the accused has previously been convicted of numerous offences involving a disregard for authority, including giving false personal details (conviction on 24 June 2016), escaping lawful custody (conviction on 20 January 2016), which involved the applicant escaping from the rear of a police vehicle, and obstructing police officers, which involved the applicant running from police officers who were trying to arrest him.
Those matters raise the possibility that the applicant would fail to appear.
There is also a conviction on 4 January 2017 for an offence of being armed in a way that may cause fear, which had similarities to the offence currently alleged. The offence occurred on 23 March 2016, when the accused and his partner were in the carpark at Westfield Carousel Shopping Centre. When instructed to leave by a security guard employed by the Centre, the applicant produced a knife from his pants pocket and threatened the guard, inviting him to fight. The applicant was placed on a community based order. Nevertheless, that history, together with the allegation that the applicant made a threat with a knife on this occasion to a security officer who was performing his duty suggests that the applicant does pose a risk of harm to the community, particularly in similar circumstances. The fact that he was carrying a knife is itself a matter of concern.
However, weighing in favour of a grant of bail is the fact that the applicant has already been in custody for nearly three and a half months since his arrest for this charge. As I have already said, in dealing with the issue of exceptional reasons, there is a reasonable possibility that the applicant will ultimately be sentenced for a less serious offence (or offences) for which the sentence, if a custodial sentence, may not greatly exceed that period.
Further, the applicant was on bail for a lengthy period before the incident that resulted in the armed robbery charge, and there is no suggestion that he committed any offence (other than the breaches of bail) during that time. The applicant has indicated that he has a new motivation to abide by any bail conditions that may be set, in that he has a small child and an grandmother who is critically ill, both of whom have been affected by his absence. These are said to be protective factors that did not exist in 2019, when he last failed to appear in court, thereby breaching his bail. The applicant now knows that, if he were to breach bail again, he would face more time away from his child, and away from his grandmother.
Finally, I accept that the fact the applicant now has rental accommodation he can go to is potentially a further protective factor. The fact that Ms Schulz has admitted that she stole the groceries and was the person who effectively placed the applicant in the situation of using violence or threats of violence against the security officer might suggest that she is not a protective factor.
However, on balance, in light of the change in their circumstances, and the very real threat of a lengthy period in custody on remand if there were to be a breach of bail, I am satisfied that there are conditions that could be imposed to sufficiently reduce the risk that the applicant would reoffend or fail to appear at a future court hearing. The State accepts that to be the case.
The conditions submitted by the State, which incorporate those proposed by the applicant, and add protective conditions, are:
1.a personal undertaking;
2.a surety or, alternatively, a reporting condition;
3.a residential condition, requiring the applicant to reside at 3/37 John Street in Armadale;
4.a curfew condition;
5.a protective condition that the applicant is not to approach within 100 m of the Thornlie Spud Shed; and
6.a protective condition that the applicant is not to communicate, or attempt to communicate, either directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever, with the complainant in the present matter.
On balance, having regard to the principles in YSN, I am satisfied that the conditions that have been proposed would sufficiently reduce the risk to which I have referred.
Conclusion
For the reasons I have given, the application for bail is granted.
There is to be no publication outside the courtroom of this decision, or these published reasons, until the proceedings in respect of the charges the subject of this application are concluded.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
HF
Associate to the Honourable Justice Fiannaca
24 JULY 2020
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