ANN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ANN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 817

Appeal from: ANN16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2927
File number: VID 1429 of 2018
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 31 May 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where the primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the appellant had been refused a protection visa – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Immigrants And Emigrants Act 1948 (Sri Lanka)

Cases cited:

ANN16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2927

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190; [2007] HCA 26

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34

Date of hearing: 19 February 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr C van der Westhuizen of DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice

ORDERS

VID 1429 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ANN16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 MAY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The notice of appeal filed on 9 November 2018 is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs to be taxed failing agreement.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

REEVES J:

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court delivered on 19 October 2018 (see ANN16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2927). The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister, the first respondent, to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

    FACTUAL CONTEXT

  2. The appellant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity. He entered Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 20 June 2012.

  3. On 27 November 2012, assisted by a registered migration agent, he made an application for a protection visa in which he claimed that, while operating a hardware store in his home town, he had been harassed by members of the Sri Lankan Army who took items from his shop without payment and made threats that he would be detained if he made any complaint about their conduct.

  4. The appellant also claimed that, in May 2012, he was approached by masked men who he believed were from the Sri…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 817
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of ANN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The appellant had been refused a protection visa, and the appeal focused on the assessment of the appellant's claims concerning his political affiliations and social status, the treatment of a debt owed by the Army, and the Tribunal's procedural fairness.

The court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal had properly assessed the appellant's claims and if the primary judge had erred in upholding the Tribunal's findings. Specifically, the appeal contested the Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant's claims about being at risk due to his association with the Tamil National Alliance or his status as a Tamil businessman were not substantiated. It also challenged the Tribunal's finding that the Army's debt to the appellant had been written off and the procedural fairness of the Tribunal's decision-making process.

The court found that the Tribunal had indeed carefully considered the appellant's claims, and there was no jurisdictional error in their assessment. The court also upheld the primary judge's conclusion that there was no illogicality or irrationality in the Tribunal's finding regarding the debt. Regarding the procedural fairness issue, the court held that the Tribunal was not required to explain its thought processes unless the decision was not open on the materials before it, aligning with the High Court's guidance on the scope of ss 424A and 424AA of the Act.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The court found no error in the primary judge's decision and concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated any grounds for appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The notice of appeal filed on 9 November 2018 is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs to be taxed failing agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant’s notice of appeal filed in this Court on 9 November 2018 sets out the following three grounds of appeal:1.The Tribunal has not assessed the appellant’s integer claims to being a supporter of the TNA or his social status as a Tamil Businessman. The Tribunal only made a finding that the appellant had no anti-Government of pro- LTTE political opinion. The learned judge erred in holding with the Tribunal that it did assess the above claims. (Reference is drawn to paragraph 47 of the reasons for judgement)2.The learned judge erred in holding with the Tribunal that the debt owed to the appellant by the Army was written off and therefore the appellant had not encountered any difficulty. This was despite the appellant had closed the business. The learned judge erred in his finding that there was nothing illogical and irrational about the impugned finding and it was open to the evidence before the Tribunal.3.The learned judge erred in his finding that there was no breach of sections 424A or 424AA occurred in which the Tribunal addressed the appellant’s claims. The Tribunal obliged to give an opportunity to the appellant to comment its concerns and made an adverse decision within few days of the hearing. Such action by the Tribunal was arbitrary and breach of procedural fairness. The learned judge erred in making an illogical finding that the applicant was not entitled to a minute by minute disclosure of the Tribunal’s consideration of issues as and when they may have arisen. (Reference is drawn to paragraph 59 of the reasons for judgment).(Errors in original)THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal did not accept that the appellant was a person of interest to the authorities because he sold goods in LTTE-controlled areas during the civil war. As well, the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant was threatened by the CID in May 2012. It found that the appellant’s evidence on these matters was vague. While the Tribunal accepted that the Army owed a debt to the appellant and that he may have been mistreated when he attempted to recover that debt, it concluded that the debt had already been written off as a bad debt and, as a result, that the appellant would not seek repayment of that debt on his return to Sri Lanka. With respect to the suggestion in one of the appellant’s letters of support that he may be at risk of harm from creditors of his hardware business, the Tribunal observed that the appellant gave evidence at the hearing that his hardware business did not owe any money. As a consequence, the Tribunal concluded “that the [appellant did] not have a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm for this reason”. Noting that same letter of support mentioned that false charges may be brought against him if he were to return to Sri Lanka, the Tribunal asked the appellant to clarify what was meant by this statement. In response, the appellant stated that he “was unaware of any charges, false or otherwise”. The appellant did, however, refer to “the possibility that he may be accused of supporting the LTTE by providing goods in the past to shops in areas under their control”. As mentioned above, the Tribunal considered the claim regarding the appellant’s provision of goods to shops within LTTE-controlled areas and did not accept that the applicant would be harmed for this reason.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that the appellant’s third ground was disposed of by the High Court’s judgment in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1 at [9]. Specifically, that the primary judge was correct in finding that the Tribunal was not required to explain its thought processes before making a decision where the information relied upon did not give rise to any obligations under s 424A of the Act. In any event, the Minister submitted that the appellant had not identified the piece of information which gave rise to this obligation. CONSIDERATION The Minister’s submissions should be accepted. With respect to the first ground of appeal, having regard to the primary judge’s review of the Tribunal’s reasons in respect of the appellant’s claims that he would be at risk owing to his association with the TNA or to his status as a Tamil businessman, I am satisfied that the Tribunal carefully considered those claims and the primary judge was correct in finding that no jurisdictional error had been made out in that consideration. As for the second ground of appeal, having regard to the primary judge’s reasons (at [50]–[53]) with respect to the Tribunal’s treatment of the debt owed by the Army, I am satisfied that the primary judge was correct in concluding that there was no illogicality or irrationality in the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant had written off that debt. The third ground of appeal raises an issue concerning the Tribunal’s compliance with ss 424A and 424AA of the Act. Those sections require the Tribunal to give “clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”. It should be noted that the “information” to which those sections relate “does not encompass the tribunal’s subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations” (see SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190; [2007] HCA 26 at [18] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). Consequently, the primary judge was correct in finding that the Tribunal was not required to explain its thought processes before making its decision except where its decision was not open on the materials before it.CONCLUSION For these reasons, I do not consider that the appellant has demonstrated any error in the primary judge’s decision. His notice of appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs. The orders will be that:1. The notice of appeal filed on 9 November 2018 is dismissed.2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs to be taxed failing agreement.