Anglicare WA v Department of Family and Children's Services
[2000] WASC 47
•14 FEBRUARY 2000
ANGLICARE WA & ANOR -v- DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY & CHILDREN'S SERVICES [2000] WASC 47
| SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [2000] WASC 47 | |
| Case No: | CIV:1152/2000 | 11 FEBRUARY 2000 | |
| Coram: | McKECHNIE J | 14/02/00 | |
| 16 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Temporary injunction discharged | ||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | ANGLICARE WA ROSEMARY KEENAN DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY & CHILDREN'S SERVICES |
Catchwords: | Family law Family and child counsellor Whether statements made in counselling sessions admissible in court proceedings Care and protection application Whether person compelled to give evidence of statements made in counselling sessions Public interest immunity Whether immunity extends to prevent disclosure of statements made in counselling sessions Injunctive relief Injunction to restrain party from calling witness in pending proceedings Interference with a regularly constituted court Balance of convenience |
Legislation: | Child Welfare Act 1947 (WA), s 30 Family Court Act 1997 (WA), s 64 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 19N |
Case References: | Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 Centacare Central Queensland v G and K (1998) FLC 92-821 D v National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] 1 AC 171 Finch v Grieve (1991) 22 NSWLR 578 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 Re D [1970] 1 WLR 599 Relationships Australia v Pasternak (1996) 133 FLR 462 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Limited [1975] AC 396 Beecham Group Limited v Bristile Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Limited (1986) 60 ALJR 300 Northern Territory of Australia v GPAO (1999) 161 ALR 318 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 |
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
- IN CHAMBERS
- First Plaintiff
ROSEMARY KEENAN
Second Plaintiff
AND
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY & CHILDREN'S SERVICES
Defendant
Catchwords:
Family law - Family and child counsellor - Whether statements made in counselling sessions admissible in court proceedings - Care and protection application - Whether person compelled to give evidence of statements made in counselling sessions - Public interest immunity - Whether immunity extends to prevent disclosure of statements made in counselling sessions
Injunctive relief - Injunction to restrain party from calling witness in pending proceedings - Interference with a regularly constituted court - Balance of convenience
(Page 2)
Legislation:
Child Welfare Act 1947 (WA), s 30
Family Court Act 1997 (WA), s 64
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 19N
Result:
Temporary injunction discharged
Representation:
Counsel:
First Plaintiff : Mr M R Berry
Second Plaintiff : Mr M R Berry
Defendant : Mr S A Walker
For Child RB : Mr H O Moser
For Child MB : Ms C P Crawford
For Child C : Ms C P Crawford
For Child CD : Ms C P Crawford
Solicitors:
First Plaintiff : Kim Wilson & Co
Second Plaintiff : Kim Wilson & Co
Defendant : Department of Family & Children's Services
For Child RB : Ilbery Barblett
For Child MB : Bowen Buchbinder Vilensky
For Child C : Bowen Buchbinder Vilensky
For Child CD : Bowen Buchbinder Vilensky
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52
Centacare Central Queensland v G and K (1998) FLC 92-821
D v National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] 1 AC 171
Finch v Grieve (1991) 22 NSWLR 578
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
Re D [1970] 1 WLR 599
(Page 3)
Relationships Australia v Pasternak (1996) 133 FLR 462
Case(s) also cited:
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Limited [1975] AC 396
Beecham Group Limited v Bristile Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618
Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Limited (1986) 60 ALJR 300
Northern Territory of Australia v GPAO (1999) 161 ALR 318
Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1
(Page 4)
- McKECHNIE J:
Introduction
1 This matter raises important issues about the confidentiality of family counselling sessions conducted by an approved family and children's counsellor.
Background to this application
(a) The Children's Court proceedings
2 The defendant, the Department of Family and Children's Services, is making a contested care and protection application in the Children's Court of Western Australia in respect of six children who were apprehended last year.
3 The hearing is set down for 10 days and commenced on Monday 7 February 2000. The children have separate representation. A married couple, Mr and Mrs D, are contesting the Department's application. Three children are children of their marriage. The other three children are the product of a previous marriage which ended in divorce. Mrs D is the mother of all the children. Her former husband Mr B is also party to the proceedings in the Children's Court.
4 The children range in age from nearly 13 to just over 4. Except for one child, they have been in foster care for some time separated from their parents and some of their brothers and sisters. They all wish the proceedings to be completed as quickly as possible, particularly R the oldest girl who is hospitalised, it would appear, due to the stress of the situation. Obviously it is important to everyone that the Children's Court proceedings are completed as soon as possible with all admissible evidence put before the magistrate.
(b) The family counsellor
5 The second plaintiff Ms Keenan is a family and child counsellor as defined in the Family Law Act 1975 and the Family Court Act 1997. She works for an approved counselling organisation called Kinway Relationship Counselling and Education Services which is a branch of the first plaintiff Anglicare WA. In her capacity as a family and child counsellor she was consulted by Mr and Mrs D and their family.
(Page 5)
6 Between 22 July 1999 and 16 December 1999 she saw all of them, except for R whom she has not seen, on approximately six occasions. In the course of these sessions she has obtained information. She deposes, however, to her belief that during the course of these attendances she has not had the need to comply with the legal requirements to notify the department if she has reasonable grounds to suspect that any of the children were abused or at risk of being abused.
(c) The family counsellor's role in the Children's Court proceedings
7 On Thursday 3 February 2000, shortly before the proceedings were due to commence, Ms Keenan was served with a summons to attend at the Children's Court on Monday 7 February in order to testify on behalf of the Department. She was also required to bring all files, documents, photographs, notes, statements, audio and visual records and any other material in her possession, custody or control relating to the children and their mother.
8 She was not required to give evidence on Monday or Tuesday. On Wednesday 9 February, she attended with an employee of Kinway who submitted on her behalf that the documents should not be produced and that Ms Keenan should not testify for reasons which will become apparent. At that time Ms Keenan produced the documents sought under the subpoena. The magistrate overruled the submission. On Thursday 10 February her solicitor attended before the magistrate and sought to have the issues reconsidered.
9 However, the magistrate did not do so and also rejected a request for a stay of proceedings. I interpose to say that the magistrate's refusal to stay the proceedings in the circumstances was correct. The department made clear that Ms Keenan would be obliged to attend on Friday, 11 February at 11.30 am when she would then be compelled to testify.
(d) The application for an injunction
10 Faced with the requirement that she would be compelled to give evidence, upon matters which she has always understood would be confidential, Ms Keenan has come to this court seeking an injunction restraining the department from calling her as a witness in the care and protection application, and restraining the department from further inspecting the documents produced.
(Page 6)
11 She is joined in the application by Anglicare WA whose executive manager deposes that clients to Kinway are given a letter assuring them of confidentiality, subject to an exception where a person's life or a child's wellbeing is at risk. It is asserted that Kinway, as a division of Anglicare WA, will suffer significant disruption in protocol and client consultation procedures if Ms Keenan is required to give evidence in that the form of the letter will have to be rethought.
12 I am not sure, without further argument and reflection, whether Anglicare has standing to join in this application upon the evidence deposed by the executive manager. However, I am satisfied that Ms Keenan is a person sufficiently affected by the course of the proceedings in the Children's Court to have standing to bring the application and it has not been argued otherwise.
13 The application came on for urgent determination in general chambers last Friday, 11 February, at 10.30 am. As a general rule, this court is extremely reluctant to intervene in proceedings being regularly conducted in the court of competent jurisdiction. The reasons are obvious. If a practice were to develop whereby interlocutory rulings and other matters relating to the admissibility of evidence were challenged in this court, the administration of justice would grind to a halt and the authority of inferior courts would be undermined.
14 However, I am conscious that if, as a result of being compelled to give evidence, Ms Keenan breaches a confidence which statute enshrines, there is no other effective remedy for her. The damage will have been done. Balancing those considerations, I granted a temporary injunction and directed that the Department be served forthwith. The matter come on for hearing before me on Friday 11 February at 2.15 pm.
15 In this way, although there would be some disruption to the Children's Court proceedings, the disruption could be kept to the minimum necessary. The Children's Court adjourned at 1 pm Friday 11 February. I heard argument during Friday afternoon and have reserved my decision over the weekend. I am delivering it before proceedings in the Children's Court recommence at 10 am Monday, 14 February.
Legislative provisions
16 The resolution of this matter involves to some degree an exercise in construction of statutes and it is to these that I now turn.
(Page 7)
The Child Welfare Act 1947
17 The Children's Court has jurisdiction with respect to care and protection applications. The powers of the court are to be found in s 30 which provides, by subs (3):
"In relation to any application for a declaration that a child is in need of care and protection … -
(a) the court shall admit in evidence any statement, whether oral or otherwise, voluntarily expressed or necessarily implied, and whether made in the presence of a party to these proceedings or not; and
(b) the child, the parents and any guardian of the child, and any person who is alleged to have contributed by action or neglect towards the need of the child for care and protection, shall be deemed to be parties to the proceedings."
18 The purpose of s 30(3)(a) appears to be to allow for the expansion of the ordinary rules of evidence so as to render admissible oral statements, some of which would be otherwise inadmissible under the general rules as hearsay.
The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
19 The Family Law Act s 4 defines "family and child counselling" in terms which mean marriage counselling and child counselling. Each of these terms are themselves defined.
20 The Family Law Act places a considerable emphasis on counselling. Part III is entitled Primary Dispute Resolution. By s 14 the object of the part is stated as follows:
"(a) to encourage people to use primary dispute resolution mechanisms (such as, counselling, mediation arbitration and other means of conciliation or reconciliation) to resolve matters in which a court order might otherwise be made under this Act, provided the mechanisms are appropriate to the circumstances and proper procedures are followed; and
(b) to ensure that people have access to counselling:
(Page 8)
- (i) to improve relationships covered under this Act; and
(ii) to help them adjust to court orders under this Act".
21 The Family Law Act s 19(1) provides:
"A family and child counsellor shall, before entering on the performance of the functions as such a counsellor, make before a person authorized under the law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory to take affidavits, an oath or affirmation of secrecy in accordance with the prescribed form".
22 Ms Keenan has taken such an affirmation. The provisions of the Family Law Act s 19N(2) are the crucial provisions. They provide:
"Evidence of anything, said or any admission made, at a meeting or conference conducted by a person to whom this section applies while the person is acting as such a person is not admissible:
(a) in any court (whether exercising federal jurisdiction or not), or
(b) in any proceedings before a person authorised by a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, or by the consent of the parties to hear evidence".
23 While those words seem of wide import, they are conditioned by the definition in s 4 of "court":
"'Court', in relation to any proceedings, means the court exercising jurisdiction in those proceedings by virtue of this Act;"
"'Proceedings' means a proceedings in a court, whether between parties or not, and includes cross-proceedings or an incidental proceeding in the course of or in connexion with a proceeding".
24 The plaintiffs immediately concede that read literally the provisions of s 19N do not apply to proceedings for care and protection in the Children's Court of Western Australia. That concession is rightly made. The plaintiffs nevertheless submit that the confidentiality principle should be interpreted broadly.
(Page 9)
25 In making that submission the plaintiffs rely on a decision of the Full Court of the Family Court in Relationships Australia v Pasternak(1996) 133 FLR 462. In that case at issue was the predecessor to s 19N, namely, s 18, and whether a conflict between the paramountcy of the interests of the child and the public interests and the need to preserve the confidences of a counselling session.
26 The Court held at 471 that the scales came down squarely in favour of the preservation of the confidence. However, the case is not authority for a so-called broad view of the meaning to be attributed to s 19N, when the effect of the broad view would be to extend the coverage of the Family Law Act to jurisdictions not within the scope of the plain meaning of the Act.
27 Relationships Australia v Pasternak (supra) concerned proceedings entirely under the Family Law Act. Where the ordinary meaning of words in the statutes is plain, a Judge cannot invest them with a different meaning in order to arrive at a solution which the particular Judge considers to be socially just. A Judge's duty is to interpret the words used by Parliament.
28 In the present case there is another reason why a court would be slow to go beyond the plain or literal meaning of the Family Law Act. The Family Law Act is a statute of Federal Parliament. There are good reasons why the Commonwealth would seek to limit the reach of the Federal Act into the jurisdiction of State courts. Such a reach would have constitutional implications. I would be reluctant to interpret s 19N to extend its ambit into proceedings in the Children's Court of Western Australia without clear and express words being used by Parliament to achieve that purpose.
29 For these reasons, I hold that the Family Law Act 1975 has no application to the present case or, in language more suited to injunctive relief, the plaintiffs have failed to establish in this respect a serious question to be tried.
The Family Court Act 1997 (WA)
30 This is a Western Australian statute. The Family Court Act both mirrors and complements the Family Law Act, providing jurisdiction in the Family Court of Western Australia for both Federal and non-Federal matters.
(Page 10)
31 A "family and child counsellor" is defined in s 5 to include a person authorised under the Family Law Act or by regulations under the Family Court Act to offer family and child counselling. Ms Keenan is such a person. "Court" is defined by s 8 to mean the Family Court of Western Australia and a summary court exercising non-Federal jurisdiction of the Family Court Act.
32 Part 4 is headed "Primary Dispute Resolution". Section 48 mirrors the Family Law Act s 14, to which I have referred. Also to be found in Part 4 is s 64, headed: "Admissions made to counsellors, mediators etc.-". The comparable Family Law Act section is s 19N. Section 64(1) provides:
"This section applies to -
(a) a family and child counsellor or welfare officer;"
- and other persons.
"64(2) Subject to subsection (3), evidence of anything said or any admission made, at a meeting, conference or consultation conducted by a person to whom this section applies while the person is acting as such a person is not admissible -
(a) in any court (whether of a kind referred to in section 8(a) or (b) or otherwise); or
(b) in any proceedings before a court authorized by a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, or by the consent of the parties, to hear evidence."
34 There was discussion before me as to the different results which might occur in regard to children who are the natural children of Mr and Mrs D and the children who are the natural children of Mrs D and Mr B. It was submitted, on behalf of the Department, that they were all children of a marriage and that therefore the Family Law Act applies.
(Page 11)
35 On behalf of the plaintiffs, it was submitted that the natural children of Mrs D and Mr B were not children of the marriage within the meaning of the Family Law Act and so that Act did not apply but that the Family Court Act s 64 applied. In the event, I think the distinction is immaterial.
36 Section 64 focuses upon the counsellor or other person mentioned therein. In order to enliven s 64 it is enough that a person fulfils the requirements in s 64(1). Ms Keenan has given evidence that she does fulfil those requirements. Once a family and child counsellor comes within s 64, the next question is whether there is evidence of anything said or done or admission made at a meeting, conference or consultation.
37 It is to be observed that these terms are not defined or terms of art but are to be given their ordinary meaning within the context of the Family Court Act s 53 which provides that a person may at any time request a family and child counsellor to provide counselling about a matter relating to a child.
38 By the Family Court Act s 56, a family and child counsellor must take an oath or affirmation of secrecy. This reinforces the nature of the confidential relationship and supports an interpretation of s 64 which allows its provisions to apply to Children's Court care and protection proceedings rendering evidence inadmissible. By s 161 a family and child counsellor is absolved from confidence, and indeed required to breach confidence, by reporting to the director suspicions of abuse or ill-treatment of a child.
The relationship between the Family Court Act and the Child Welfare Act
39 I am of opinion that the provisions of the Family Court Act override the provisions of the Child Welfare Act s 30. Section 30 applies generally. Section 64 would exempt certain specific statements made in the context of a counselling relationship. Section 30 does not place paramountcy of children's welfare so high as to require admission of all statements. For example, involuntary statements are not admissible. Section 64 provides another exemption. As I will discuss shortly, proper claims for privilege may provide a further exemption.
40 When reconciling the competing provisions I find considerable help in the reasoning of the Full Court in Relationships Australia v Pasternak. Support is also derived from Centacare Central Queensland v G and K(1998) FLC 92-821 which, inter alia, confirmed the correctness of Relationships Australia v Pasternak.
(Page 12)
41 In Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, the majority, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ said at 381 to 382:
"The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute: see Taylor v Public Service Board (NSW) (1976) 137 CLR 208 at 213, per Barwick CJ. The meaning of the provision must be determined 'by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole': Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 320, per Mason and Wilson JJ. See also South West Water Authority v Rumble's [1985] AC 609 at 617, per Lord Scarman, 'in the context of the legislation read as a whole'. In Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos (1955) 92 CLR 390 at 397, Dixon CJ pointed out that 'the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed'. Thus, the process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being construed: Toronto Suburban Railway Co v Toronto Corporation [1915] AC 590 at 597; Minister for Lands (NSW) v Jeremias (1917) 23 CLR 322 at 332; K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 309 at 312, per Gibbs CJ; at 315, per Mason J; at 321, per Deane J.
A legislative instrument must be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals: Ross v The Queen (1979) 141 CLR 432 at 440, per Gibbs J. Where conflict appears to arise from the language of particular provisions, the conflict must be alleviated, so far as possible, by adjusting the meaning of the competing provisions to achieve that result which will best give effect to the purpose and language of those provisions while maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions: see Australian Alliance Assurance Co Ltd v Attorney-General (Q) [1916] St R Qd 135 at 161, per Cooper CJ; Minister for Resources v Dover Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 565 at 574, per Gummow J. Reconciling conflicting provisions will often require the court 'to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other': Institute of Patent Agents v Lockwood [1894] AC
(Page 13)
- 347 at 360, per Lord Herschell LC. Only by determining the hierarchy of the provisions will it be possible in many cases to give each provision the meaning which best gives effect to its purpose and language while maintaining the unity of the statutory scheme.
Furthermore, a court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision: The Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414, per Griffiths CJ; at 419, per O'Connor J; Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 12-13, per Mason CJ. In The Commonwealth v Baume (supra) Griffith CJ cited R v Berchet (1688) 1 Show KB 106 [89 ER 480] to support the proposition that it was 'a known rule in the interpretation of Statues that such a sense is to be made upon the whole as that no clause, sentence, or word shall prove superfluous, void, or insignificant, if any other construction they may all be made useful and pertinent'."
42 Although the High Court's comments are made in respect of apparently conflicting provisions within one statute, the comments have general application to apparently conflicting provisions within different statutes both passed by the same Parliament.
43 Adapting those comments to the present case, I am of the view the Family Court Act s 64 conditions the directive to the Children's Court in the Child Welfare Act s 30 so as to exempt from admissibility, statements made in the course of counselling sessions with an authorised family and children's counsellor.
44 I am conscious that this point in relation to the Family Court Act s 64 was either not advanced or not vigorously pressed before the magistrate. Therefore, it may be unfair to say that he has erred in the law in failing to consider it. I am also conscious that it was a new point to counsel for the department before me who was therefore unable to provide assistance by way of submissions upon it. This is no criticism of counsel. He is conducting the hearing before the magistrate and, as I have outlined, this application for injunctive relief has come on very suddenly.
45 However, with these cautions in mind, I am nevertheless persuaded that the plaintiffs have made out a strongly arguable case that the Family Court Act s 64 applies to these care and protection proceedings to render
(Page 14)
- inadmissible anything said by anyone at meetings, conferences or consultations with Ms Keenan.
Public interest immunity
46 This was another point which may or may not have been put in any detail to the magistrate. Any public interest immunity which may be claimed arises if the view I have formed on the Family Court Act s 64 is wrong. If the issue of public interest immunity arises, three questions are posed.
Question 1
47 Can either plaintiff claim an immunity from disclosure of documents or giving evidence on the basis that it is in the public interest that they should not be compelled to do so?
Answer 1
48 A consistent line of authority would appear to extend public interest immunity to organisations such as Kinway and counsellors like Ms Keenan. Both are authorised under the Family Law Act and Family Court Act and both perform functions which are essential to the general purpose and procedures of each Act, and I refer again to the primacy of counselling and mediation which is stressed within each Act..
49 Each plaintiff has deposed (with varying degrees of strength it must be said) that their work may be impaired if forced to make disclosure of confidential information. To my mind, a claim for public interest immunity in these circumstances ought to be considered by a court: seeD v National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] 1 AC 171, Re D [1970] 1 WLR 599, Finch v Grieve (1991) 22 NSWLR 578, and Relationships Australia v Pasternak.
Question 2
50 Does the Child Welfare Act s 30 have the effect of overriding any such claim?
(Page 15)
Answer 2
51 It has been held that the wide powers of the Crimes Act s 10 authorising a search warrant are to be read subject to a claim for legal professional privilege: Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. This is because the statute did not evince an intention to oust the common law claim. In my view, the provisions of the Child Welfare Act s 30 cannot be used to make admissible matters the subject of legal professional privilege. There is no reason to suppose the Parliament, in enacting s 30, intended to abrogate the common law doctrine of legal professional privilege. Therefore, there is also no reason to suppose that Parliament intended to abrogate the analogous principle of public interest immunity.
Question 3
52 What factors are to be taken into account if the claim of public interest immunity can be made?
Answer 3
53 A claim for public interest immunity involves a weighing of various matters to decide where the public interest lies in a particular case. In this case there is the public interest in having all available relevant evidence before the court, as against the public interest in the confidentiality of communications in the course of counselling. The cases to which I have referred examine these competing interests in detail.
54 The balancing of these interests, however, is in the first place a matter for the trial court, in this case the Children's Court. That Court knows the issues before it and the weight of the proposed evidence compared with the possible injustice brought about by non-disclosure in the proceedings.
Conclusion on the application for injunctive relief
55 I return finally to the subject matter of these proceedings which is injunctive relief. The children have intervened by leave through counsel to impress upon me the need for proceedings in the Children's Court to be completed as quickly as possible. This is a strong factor in weighing the balance of convenience. I am told from the bar table that there was some communication last December between Ms Keenan and a member of the department concerning matters raised in the counselling sessions.
(Page 16)
56 This communication may have been by consent of the mother. I am unaware of the extent, but it does indicate at least to a degree that secrecy has already been lost. I am advised that the documents produced last Wednesday 9 February have been inspected by the parties or at least partially inspected. If this is so an injunction against further inspection would appear to be pointless.
57 However, the principal reason for declining to make an order for an injunction is my reluctance to interfere with the processes of the Children's Court.
58 When Ms Keenan comes to give evidence she may object to answer any question which she considers will disclose confidential communications. At that point the magistrate can rule on the objection. In making a ruling he will no doubt be guided by the observations I have made, particularly in relation to the Family Court Act s 64, and my view that it operates to render any evidence from the counselling sessions inadmissible.
59 Ms Keenan may object to answering questions or producing documents for tender in evidence on the grounds of public interest immunity. If she does so, the magistrate will be required to rule on that claim, guided no doubt by the principles contained in the cases I have mentioned together with any other authority which the industry of counsel can supply. In this way the balance of convenience manifest in the continuation of the proceedings will be observed and decisions on evidence will be made in the proper forum. For these reasons I discharge the injunction temporarily granted on Friday 11 February 2000 and dismiss the application.
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
-
Family Law
Legal Concepts
-
Admissibility of Evidence
-
Injunction
-
Res Judicata
3
21
3