Anglican Care v NSW Nurses and Midwives' Association

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Anglican Care v NSW Nurses and Midwives’ Association [2015] FCAFC 81

Citation: Anglican Care v NSW Nurses and Midwives’ Association [2015] FCAFC 81
Appeal from: NSW Nurses and Midwives’ Association v Anglican Care [2014] FCCA 2580
Parties: ANGLICAN CARE (ABN 94 273 103 460) v NSW NURSES AND MIDWIVES’ ASSOCIATION
File number: NSD 1253 of 2014
Judges: JESSUP, BROMBERG AND KATZMANN JJ
Date of judgment: 5 June 2015
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW — Interpretation of s 130(2) of the Fair Work Act 2009 — whether employee “permitted by” s 49 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) to accrue annual leave while receiving workers compensation payments
Legislation: Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) s 97(1)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA, 15AC
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 44(1), 87, 130, Pt 2-2
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 100, 116
Workers Compensation Act 1926 (NSW) s 7(2B)
Workers Compensation Act 1951 (ACT) s 46
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) s 49
Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) s 80(1)
Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 119A
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 40(1)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 4, 5, 227, 237
Workplace Relations (Amendment) Bill 2005 (Cth)
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth)
Cases cited: Australian Postal Corporation v Sinnaiah (2013)
213 FCR 449
Buck v Comcare (1996) 66 FCR 359
Building Workers Industrial Union of Australia v Master Builders’ Association (NSW) (1987) 20 IR 226
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Limited (1997) 187 CLR 384
Goliath Portland Cement Co Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of Customs (2000) 101 FCR 11
Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
Thompson v Armstrong and Royse Proprietary Limited (1950) 81 CLR 585
Date of hearing: 18 February 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Appellant: R Kenzie QC with D Mahendra
Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Business Lawyers and Advisors
Counsel for the Respondent: M Gibian
Solicitor for the Respondent: NSW Nurses and Midwives’ Association

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

NSD 1253 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

ANGLICAN CARE (ABN 94 273 103 460)
Appellant

AND:

NSW NURSES AND MIDWIVES’ ASSOCIATION
Respondent

JUDGES:

JESSUP, BROMBERG AND KATZMANN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JUNE 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

NSD 1253 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

ANGLICAN CARE (ABN 94 273 103 460)
Appellant

AND:

NSW NURSES AND MIDWIVES’ ASSOCIATION
Respondent

JUDGES:

JESSUP, BROMBERG AND KATZMANN JJ

DATE:

5 JUNE 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 81
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Anglican Care v NSW Nurses and Midwives' Association, the Fair Work Commission (FWC) found that Anglican Care was required to pay Ms Copas the value of accrued annual leave from 1 January 2010 until her employment was terminated on 23 May 2011. Ms Copas, an assistant in nursing for Anglican Care, was injured in the course of her employment on 17 December 2009 and subsequently received workers' compensation. Upon termination of her employment, Ms Copas was paid for accrued annual leave only up until 31 December 2009, and the Association argued that Anglican Care was required to pay her for accrued annual leave beyond this date. The central issue before the court was whether s 130 of the Fair Work Act 2009 precluded Ms Copas from accruing annual leave while in receipt of workers' compensation.

The court considered the relevant provisions of the Fair Work Act and the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), focusing on the interpretation of "permitted by" in s 130(2) of the Fair Work Act. Section 130(1) of the Fair Work Act precludes employees from accruing leave during a compensation period unless the taking or accruing of leave is permitted by a compensation law. The court found that the ordinary English meaning of "permitted" should be adopted, and that the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) did not prevent the taking or accrual of leave, nor did it grant permission for it. The court held that the Fair Work Act allows for the accrual of leave in circumstances where the compensation law does not prevent it. Consequently, Ms Copas was entitled to accrue annual leave during the period she remained absent from work and in receipt of workers' compensation.

In light of the court's reasoning, the appeal was dismissed, and Anglican Care was required to pay Ms Copas the value of accrued annual leave from 1 January 2010 until her employment was terminated on 23 May 2011. The Fair Work Commission's decision was upheld, and the appellant's argument that the compensation law must confer the right to take or accrue leave was rejected. The court's interpretation of "permitted by" in s 130(2) of the Fair Work Act clarifies the interaction between workers' compensation and annual leave accrual for employees in similar situations.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Although the amount at stake in the appeal is relatively small, the question is an important one.Background The facts were agreed. Ms Copas worked for Anglican Care, an aged care provider, from 26 February 2007 until 23 May 2011. She was employed as an assistant in nursing. On 17 December 2009 she sustained an injury in the course of her employment. From then on she was unable to work. From the date of her injury until the termination of her employment she was absent from work and in receipt of weekly payments of compensation. Upon termination Ms Copas was paid an amount of $1,879.65 in respect of accrued and untaken annual leave for the first two weeks (until 31 December 2009), which covered her entitlement to accrued leave under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (“WR Act”). But she was not paid the value of any annual leave which accrued thereafter. The Association contended that by failing to make such a payment, Anglican Care contravened the FW Act. Anglican Care accepted that under the WR Act employees of the Association were entitled to accrue and take annual leave while in receipt of workers compensation, but contended that the position under the WR Act no longer applied after 31 December 2009.The relevant legislation Section 87(1) of the FW Act provides that for each year of service with his or her employer, an employee is entitled to four weeks of paid annual leave and, in the case of certain categories of shiftworkers, five weeks. Section 87(2) states that the entitlement accrues progressively during a year of service according to the employee’s ordinary hours of work and accumulates from year to year. Section 90(2) states that:If, when the employment of an employee ends, the employee has a period of untaken paid annual leave, the employer must pay the employee the amount that would have been payable to the employee had the employee taken that period of leave. Section 130, however, precludes some employees from taking or accruing any leave. The question at the heart of this case is whether Ms Copas was precluded. Put another way, it is whether s 130 deprives her of the entitlement conferred by s 87. Section 130 relevantly states:(1)An employee is not entitled to take or accrue any leave or absence (whether paid or unpaid) under [Pt 2‑2] during a period (a compensation period) when the employee is absent from work because of a personal illness, or a personal injury, for which the employee is receiving compensation payable under a law (a compensation law) of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory that is about workers’ compensation.(2)Subsection (1) does not prevent an employee from taking or accruing leave during a compensation period if the taking or accruing of the leave is permitted by a compensation law. (Original emphasis.) These provisions form part of the National Employment Standards contained in Pt 2‑2 of the Act (ss 60‑131). They are minimum standards which employers are required to provide to all national system employees (defined in Pt 1‑2 Div 3 of the Act). They relate, amongst other things to maximum weekly hours of work and a range of employee entitlements. They relevantly confer entitlements to parental leave, annual leave, personal/carer’s and compassionate leave, community service leave, long service leave and public holidays.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge reviewed the legislative history, the terms of the relevant sections of the various Acts and the arguments advanced by the parties. The essence of her Honour’s reasons appears at [38]‑[39] of her judgment. 38The purpose or object of s.130 is clearly to deny to an employee the benefit of accruing leave during the period of receipt of workers compensation unless such accrual is permitted by a compensation law. However, s.49 of the Workers Compensation Act does not prevent a worker from receiving both compensation and accruing annual leave. In that sense, on a beneficial construction, s.49 permits receipt of those payments by the worker. The Fair Work Act provides to the worker the benefit of the accrual of annual leave. Conclusion 39In circumstances where s.49 of the Workers Compensation Act does not prevent the worker from receiving both, and, indeed expressly contemplates receipt of both workers compensation and accrued leave, a beneficial construction of s.130(2) of the Fair Work Act would allow for s.130(2) to be enlivened by reason of s.49 of the Workers Compensation Act because s.49 does not prevent it. In that sense, s.49 “allows” or “permits” the receipt of both. Consequently, her Honour concluded that, despite s 130(1), Ms Copas was not prevented from accruing leave in the period from 1 January 2010 until 23 May 2011 during which she remained absent from work and in receipt of compensation. The appellant’s case Anglican Care contended that s 49 creates no entitlement to take or accrue leave. Its case is that s 130(1) extinguishes the employee’s claim and s 130(2) is not enlivened. Its short point is that in order for that to occur the compensation law must confer the right to take or accrue leave and s 49 does not do this. It is not enough, Anglican Care argued, that the compensation law does not prevent the taking or accrual of leave or that it contemplates or allows it. Did the primary judge misconstrue the legislation? The first question is what is meant by “permitted” and more precisely “permitted by” in s 130(2). The expression is not defined and, unless the context suggests otherwise, it is to be inferred that it carries its ordinary English meaning. The difficulty, of course, with the ordinary English meaning is that the expression admits of more than one meaning. It might refer to a situation in which permission is granted. More commonly, however, “permitted” is used as a synonym for “allowed”. Anglican Care placed considerable emphasis on the accompanying preposition “by”. In our opinion, as used in s 130(2), it does not have the effect for which Anglican Care contended. The preposition is merely a grammatical device, denoting a preference by the draftsperson for the passive rather than the active voice. If the active voice had been used, the subsection would read:Subsection (1) does not prevent an employee from taking or accruing leave during a compensation period if a compensation law permits the taking or accruing of the leave.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.