Angelakis and Patalano (Child support) - [2025] ARTA 942

Angelakis and Patalano (Child support) [2025] ARTA 942 (1 May 2025)

Applicant/s: Mr Angelakis

Respondent: Child Support Registrar

Other Parties: Ms Patalano

Tribunal Number: 2024/BC028206
Tribunal: Member K Hamilton
Place:Brisbane
Date:1 May 2025

Decision:
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and in substitution determines that:
·For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is to be increased by $9,824.12.
·For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is to be increased by $12,418.42.
·For the period 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2026, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is increased by an amount equivalent to 50% of the out of pocket expenses for the children’s orthodontic treatment after taking into account any rebate available under Mr Angelakis’ private health insurance.
·For the period 1 January 2026 until 31 December 2030, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is to be increased by an amount equivalent to 50% of the children’s tuition fees at [Anglican College 2], after deducting any sibling discounts.
·For the period from 1 January 2024 until a terminating event occurs with respect to [Child 2], the adjusted taxable income of Mr Angelakis is set at $185,000 per annum.
·The adjusted taxable income of Mr Angelakis is to be adjusted annually from 1 July 2025 by the CPI National Weighted Average results from the preceding March quarter.
·For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 October 2024, the adjusted taxable income of Ms Patalano is set at $102,000 per annum.

CATCHWORDS

CHILD SUPPORT – departure determination – child support payable – costs of maintaining children – education in manner intended by parents – choice of schools, including state or private – evidence supports intention of private, fee-paying religious school – special needs of children – orthodontic treatment – income, property and financial resources – parents’ income and expenses – father’s full-time employment, sole-trader business, cryptocurrency investments, self-managed superannuation fund and real estate – mother’s full-time employment – decision under review set aside and substituted

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision and replaced with generic information pursuant to subsection 16(2AB) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

Statement of Reasons

BACKGROUND

Mr Angelakis and Ms Patalano are the parents of [Child 1] (born 2012) and [Child 2] (born 2013).
A child support case was registered with Services Australia – Child Support (Child Support) on 28 June 2015. From 28 January 2024, the children have been recorded as being in Ms Patalano’s care 61% and Mr Angelakis’ care 39%.
The Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act) provides for an administrative assessment of child support payable. It uses a formula which contains variables such as the parents’ adjusted taxable incomes and their percentages of the care of the children. The Act also provides a mechanism for departure from the administrative assessment (commonly referred to as a change of assessment) in certain circumstances.
On 23 February 2024, Ms Patalano applied to Child Support for a change of assessment on the bases that:
(a) in the special circumstances of the case, the costs of maintaining the children are significantly affected because the children are being educated in the manner intended by the parents (commonly referred to as Reason 3); and
(b) in the special circumstances of the case, the assessment was unfair because of a parent’s income, property and financial resources (commonly referred to as Reason 8A).
The underlying administrative assessment of child support payable was for Mr Angelakis to pay $7,632 per annum for the period 1 September 2023 to 26 March 2024 and $8,656 per annum for the period 27 March 2024 to 30 November 2024, based on his adjusted taxable income of $91,641 (2022/23 financial year) and Ms Patalano’s adjusted taxable income of $50,483 (2022/23 financial year).
On 15 April 2024, Child Support decided that a reason had been established to depart from the administrative assessment of child support under Reason 3 and Reason 8A. Child Support determined the administrative assessment be changed as follows:
For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024 the annual rate is increased by $9,980.
For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025 the annual rate is increased by $10,480.
For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025 Mr Angelakis’ income is set at $179,225.
For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 October 2024 Ms Patalano’s income is set at $102,000.
Mr Angelakis objected to Child Support’s decision and on 10 June 2024, a Child Support objections officer decided as follows:
For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024 the annual rate is increased by $9,980.
For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025 the annual rate is increased by $10,480.
For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024 Mr Angelakis’ income is set at $189,225.
For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025 Mr Angelakis’ income is set at $179,225.
For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 October 2024 Ms Patalano’s income is set at $102,000.
Mr Angelakis applied to the Tribunal on 8 July 2024 seeking an independent review of Child Support’s decision.
The Tribunal conducted a hearing on 3 April 2025. Mr Angelakis and Ms Patalano both participated in the hearing by telephone and gave evidence under affirmation. Mr Angelakis was represented by his solicitor, Mr Craig Ray. Ms Patalano was accompanied by a support person, [Ms A].
In considering the application, the Tribunal took into account the oral submissions made by each party as well as:
·      documentary evidence provided by Child Support (Exhibit 1, comprising pages 1–756);
·      documents provided by Mr Angelakis prior to hearing (Exhibit A, marked as pages A1–A761);
·      documents provided by Ms Patalano prior to hearing (Exhibit B, marked as pages B1–B86).

ISSUES

The statutory provisions relevant to this review are contained in the Act.
Child support legislation is interpreted with the aid of the Child Support Guide. The Tribunal acknowledges that, while it may be guided by policy, it is not bound to follow it (Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634). However, in the absence of any statutory indication to the contrary, any lawful executive policy enacted to guide the exercise of a statutory power is a relevant factor for the Tribunal to take into account in its review (G v MIBP [2018] FCA 1229).
An application may be made under Part 6A of the Act to Child Support by a parent for a change of assessment, or a departure, from an administrative assessment of the amount of child support payable.
Under section 98C of the Act, a decision maker can make a change of assessment only if satisfied that:
(a)    a ground for a change of assessment has been established;
(b)    a change of assessment would be just and equitable as regards the children and each parent; and
(c)    a change of assessment would be otherwise proper.
There are 10 possible grounds for a change of assessment set out in section 117 of the Act. Each ground for departure is prefaced by the words “in the special circumstances of the case”. It is not possible to define with precision the meaning of the term “special circumstances”, however in Gyselman and Gyselman (1992) FLC 92-279 (Gyselman), it was held that “special circumstances” were “facts peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from other cases”.
The administrative assessment formula is intended to be applied by a decision maker in ordinary cases, and a departure from that formula should only be made where the facts of a particular case establish circumstances which distinguish it from the ordinary. The Tribunal’s approach to the interpretation and application of the particular grounds in subsection 117(2) of the Act must be guided by this qualification that “special circumstances” exist.
If satisfied that a ground or grounds exist, and that it would be just and equitable and otherwise proper to make a particular determination, the Tribunal may make any of a range of determinations prescribed in section 98S of the Act. Such determinations may include, for example, varying the rate of child support payable, varying the adjusted taxable income of a parent or varying the cost percentage for a child.
The issues to be determined in this matter are as follows:
(a)    Does a ground, specified in subsection 117(2) of the Act, exist to depart from the administrative assessment in the special circumstances of the case?
(b)    Would it be just and equitable as regards the children and each parent to depart from the administrative assessment of child support?
(c)    Would it be otherwise proper to make a particular departure determination?

CONSIDERATION

Issue 1 – Does a ground exist to depart from the administrative assessment?

Reason 3

Subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ii) of the Act provides the following ground for departure (commonly referred to as Reason 3):
(b) that, in the special circumstances of the case, the costs of maintaining the child are significantly affected:
…
(ii) because the child is being cared for, educated or trained in the manner that was expected by his or her parents…
Both parties gave evidence which confirmed that, during the relationship, and shortly after the birth of their children, both children had been enrolled at [Catholic College 1]. The parties separated before either of the children commenced school, and disputes subsequently arose as to the schooling of the children.
The documents provided by Child Support that were before the Tribunal include:
·An enrolment agreement for [Child 1] with [Anglican College2], signed by Ms Patalano on 17 May 2023 and by Mr Angelakis on 2 June 2023; and
·An enrolment agreement for [Child 2] with [College 2], signed by Ms Patalano on 31 October 2023 and by Mr Angelakis on 6 November 2023.

Mr Angelakis’ evidence

Mr Angelakis said that circumstances have changed significantly since the parties separated and he can no longer afford the expense of a private school education for the children.
Mr Angelakis confirmed that his daughter from a previous relationship attended [College 1] for her secondary schooling until she completed year 12. He agreed that the parties had submitted enrolment applications for both children to commence at [College 1] from Prep.
Mr Angelakis said that the parties had also placed the children on the waitlist for another Catholic school at [Suburb], however he cannot now recall the name of this school. He explained that for Gold Coast private schools it was necessary to put the children’s names down very early to secure a place.
Mr Angelakis stressed that the parties had not ruled out a state school education, and this remained an option for the children. Mr Angelakis said that the children in fact later attended primary school at [State School] after Ms Patalano cancelled their enrolment at [College 1] in 2016. Mr Angelakis objected to the cancellation of the children’s enrolment at [College 1] at that time.
Mr Angelakis agreed that he had attended an enrolment interview for [Child 1] at [College 2] in May 2023. He said he attended this interview as [College 2] was at that time being considered as a potential school for the children, however he was concerned that attendance at [College 2] was not financially viable for the parties.
At the time of this enrolment interview Mr Angelakis said that the parties were in negotiations regarding the children’s schooling. Mr Angelakis stated that he was happy to consider private college for the children’s education but felt that Ms Patalano “blackmailed” him into agreeing to enrol the children at [College 2] by refusing to allow the children to attend any school. He also was concerned that the opportunity to attend [College 2] may have been lost if he did not attend the enrolment interview with [College 2].
Mr Angelakis subsequently signed an enrolment agreement for [Child 1] to attend [College 2]. He said that he did so solely on the basis that Ms Patalano agreed to pay the fees for [Child 1] to attend [College 2]. On the same day that Mr Angelakis signed the enrolment agreement, 2 June 2023, his solicitors wrote to Ms Patalano in the following terms:
We are instructed by our client that he is, in principle, agreeable to returning the formal acceptance for [Child 1] to attend [College 2] today to secure his place, however on the following terms:
1. The return of the formal acceptance is on the basis that your client understands and accepts that our client is financially unable to cover the tuition fees, and that an agreement (to be formalised in a Binding Child Support Agreement) needs to be reached regarding the same before commencing [Child 1] at [College 2]….
2. The parties attend a mediation to discuss the payment of tuition fees for both [the children], as well as current care arrangements for both children….
3. Your office confirm by return that your client will not apply to the Child Support Agency or the Court for a change of the current child support assessment based on the formal acceptance of enrolment of [Child 1] at [College 2], for any reason including under section 117(b) of the Child Support Act 1988, and that it accepted (sic) that our client returning the formal acceptance is not to be construed as an agreement on his part to educating [Child 1] at [College 2] or any private school…
For the avoidance of doubt, our client’s return of the formal acceptance is with the intention of securing the option for [Child 1] to attend [College 2] and not an agreement that this is where he should attend school or any private school.
A letter in similar terms was sent by Mr Angelakis’ solicitors to Ms Patalano’s solicitors on 3 November 2023 with respect to [Child 2]’s enrolment agreement with [College 2].
On 20 November 2023, Mr Angelakis’ solicitors wrote to Ms Patalano’s solicitors and advised that “Following mediation, our client has given careful consideration to the proposal that the children attend [College 2], however, feels that it is not financially viable for either party. Our client is agreeable to the children attending [State High School] with [Child 1] commencing in 2024 and [Child 2] commencing in 2025”.
Mr Angelakis also noted that Ms Patalano did in fact enrol [Child 1] at [State High School] for year 7.

Ms Patalano’s evidence

Ms Patalano told the Tribunal that prior to the parties’ separation, they had both intended that the children would go to a Catholic high school. She noted that Mr Angelakis had himself attended a private Catholic high school and he had insisted that the children be baptised as Catholics in order to facilitate their attendance at a Catholic school. Ms Patalano said that she was not religious at all.
Prior to separation, both children attended a private child care facility attached to [College 1]. The children were both enrolled at [College 1] to commence from Prep. Ms Patalano noted that Mr Angelakis’ daughter also attended [College 1] and they had been excited for all 3 children to be attending the same school.
Following separation, Ms Patalano moved away from the area and settled at [Town], as her older son from a previous relationship was then attending school there (this child completed his schooling in 2017).
In advance of [Child 1] starting high school, Ms Patalano said that she emailed Mr Angelakis with several suggestions for private schools in the Gold Coast area for [Child 1] to attend. Ms Patalano suggested [College 2], [College 3] and [College 4]. She indicated that her preference was for [College 2] as her sister was teaching at that school and her nephews were attending that school. She put in an application to join the waitlist at [College 2]. She asked Mr Angelakis to put in applications for the other schools as she could not afford to pay an application fee for more than one school at a time.
Around Easter 2023, Ms Patalano said she was asked by [College 2] to attend an enrolment interview. Mr Angelakis was unable to attend the original date proposed by [College 2], so the interview was rescheduled to 9 May 2023 so that he could attend. Both parents attended the enrolment interview and [Child 1] was offered a place at [College 2] on the spot.
Ms Patalano said that Mr Angelakis then “made noises” about the cost of the school fees. She suggested that both of them could make lifestyle changes for the sake of the children and provided Mr Angelakis with the enrolment form to sign.
Mr Angelakis signed the enrolment agreement for [Child 1] and this was returned to [College 2]. Ms Patalano said that Mr Angelakis then removed his permission for the enrolment as he was trying to make payment of school fees conditional on increased contact for him with the children, and on her agreeing to a private collect arrangement for child support payments.
Ms Patalano said that it was correct that she enrolled [Child 1] at [State High School]. She said that she did this only in order to prevent Mr Angelakis from enrolling [Child 1] in another public school without her knowledge. Ms Patalano said that if she had an existing enrolment at a Queensland state high school, she would be notified in the event Mr Angelakis submitted an enrolment for [Child 1] at another state high school.
In determining whether a child is being educated or trained in a manner expected by the parents, it must be considered whether or not the parents had a mutual expectation that a child is to be educated in a particular manner. In Mabry & Mabry & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2010] FMCAfam 388, the Court noted that “lack of agreement as to the specific school does not mean that the parents lack the expectation that the child will attend a private school of a particular category, for example a Catholic school”.
For such mutual expectation to exist, it is therefore not necessary to establish that the parents had an agreement for the children to attend a specific school. What is relevant is a consideration of the type or style of education intended by the parents (Wild v Ballard (1997) FLC 92-771).
Further, the relevant test set out in subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ii) of the Act requires consideration of the parties' original intentions with respect to the type of schooling they expected for the children. In Warwick v Cutler[2016] FamCA 934 the Court observed:
In Murphy & Murphy (Child support) the AAT referred to the Full Court’s decision in In the marriage of Mee and Ferguson and reiterated that the test set out in s 117(2)(b)(ii) goes to “past expectation”, not present desire (or, I would add, lack of desire), for the children to attend private schools.
It is often the case that, following separation, what once may have been the fervent wish of both parents with respect to the type of schooling they desired for their children turns into yet another point of contention in an acrimonious dissolution of the marriage. This does not mean that there is a lack of mutual intention regarding the type of education expected for the children, having regard to the “past expectations” of both parents.
It is not disputed that both parties’ original mutual intention was for the children to attend private religious education. This intention was expressed by both parties and acted upon by the parties enrolling the children at [College 1] and, according to Mr Angelakis, by also putting the children on the waitlist for another private religious school in the Gold Coast area prior to the parties separating.
Prior to either of the children commencing high school, Ms Patalano nominated several private religious schools in the Gold Coast area as options for the children’s secondary schooling. This, coupled with Mr Angelakis’ conduct in attending an enrolment interview and signing enrolment agreements for [the children] to attend [College 2] supports the existence of a continuing mutual intention as to the type of secondary schooling intended for the children – namely, at a private, fee-paying religious institution.

The fact that Mr Angelakis attempted to place conditions on his agreement to [Child 1’s] enrolment at [College 2], particularly with respect to payment of fees, does not prevent a finding that the parties’ mutual expectation as to the type of schooling intended for the children remained unchanged from their original expectations.
In Oliver v Oliver [2021] FCCA 965, the father signed an enrolment form but did not commit to paying the required fees for the child to attend the school. The Court found that an agreement to pay fees was not a requirement for a ground of departure under Reason 3 to be made out, rather, what is required to be shown is that the children are being educated in the manner expected by the parents and the costs of maintaining the children are significantly affected.
It is clear from the correspondence before the Tribunal that Mr Angelakis’ objection to the children attending [College 2] was motivated largely by financial considerations, as opposed to an objection to that particular type of schooling.
The fact that the children attended primary school at [State School] following the parties’ separation and Ms Patalano’s relocation to live at [Town], in my view does not displace the pre-existing expectation of both parties that the children would complete their secondary education at a private school. It is not unusual for children to attend a public state school for their primary education and then attend a private secondary school.
I place little weight on the fact of Ms Patalano enrolling [Child 1] at [State High School]. I accept Ms Patalano’s evidence that she did so in order to ensure that [Child 1] could not be enrolled in a state high school elsewhere without her knowledge.
I also place limited weight on Ms Patalano’s agreement, communicated via letter from her solicitors dated 23 January 2024, that “both children will attend [College 2] and our client will attend to the payment of tuition fees to facilitate their attendance at that school”. It is evident from the correspondence passing between the parties that they were, in late 2023 and early 2024, engaged in a fairly acrimonious dispute as to parenting arrangements and financial matters. In that context, I accept that Ms Patalano agreed to attend to the payment of fees at [College 2] at the start of 2024 in order to avoid any disruption to the children’s commencement of their schooling at [College 2]. I do not interpret that correspondence as indicative of any intention on Ms Patalano’s part to bear sole responsibility for payment of school fees for the entirety of the children’s secondary schooling.
I find that [the children] are being educated in the manner expected by both parents.
[Child 1’s] tuition fees for [College 2] were $2,921.06 per term for the 2024 school year ($11,684.24 per annum) and are $3,184.21 for the 2025 school year ($12,736.84 per annum). [Child 2]’s fees for [College 2] were $2,095.79 for the 2024 school year ($8,383.16 per annum) and are $3,184.21 for the 2025 school year ($12,736.84 per annum).
I find such costs are significant having regard to the child support liability, and that, in the special circumstances of the case, a ground for departure under subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ii) exists.
Consideration of the parents’ capacity to contribute to the costs of school fees, and what is just and equitable in the circumstances will be considered below.

Reason 2

Subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ia) of the Act provides as a ground for departure:
(b) that, in the special circumstances of the case, the costs of maintaining the child are significantly affected:
…
(ia) because of special needs of the child…
The term “special needs” is not defined in the legislation. However, relevant case law indicates that there must be some evidence that the needs of the child relate to a condition or disability that is out of the ordinary, with resulting costs that are essential or desirable for the child’s welfare that are outside the ordinary costs of a child that can be met from an administrative assessment (Lightfoot v Hampson (1996) FLC 92-663).
Reason 2 was not previously raised as a ground for departure and was not considered by Child Support. However, Ms Patalano asserts that both children require orthodontic treatment. Ms Patalano accordingly seeks an increase to the amount of child support payable by Mr Angelakis to also include a contribution to the children’s out-of-pocket orthodontic costs.
Mr Angelakis was not convinced of the necessity for orthodontic treatment for the children. He noted that the quotes provided by Ms Patalano do not explain why such treatment is considered necessary. Mr Angelakis said that he had not reached out to the provider, [Dental Centre] to discuss why orthodontic treatment is necessary for the children. However, if satisfied that orthodontic treatment was necessary, Mr Angelakis said that he would be prepared to contribute 50% of the out-of-pocket costs.
Ms Patalano in response said that the clinic would not have provided her with a quote for services if they did not consider orthodontic treatment was necessary. She said that both children had crowding and require top and bottom braces for straightening and correction of their bite. Ms Patalano told the Tribunal that this treatment would be needed within the next 12 months, but she was required to take the children back for an assessment in 6 months’ time as [Child 1] still has 2 baby teeth which need to come out before orthodontic treatment can be started.
I am satisfied based on Ms Patalano’s evidence that orthodontic treatment is required for both children. I am also satisfied that the quotes provided by Ms Patalano for proposed orthodontic treatment for both children are reasonable.
Mr Angelakis told the Tribunal that he had private health insurance that covered the children but was unsure whether orthodontic costs were covered or, if they were, the amount of any benefit available.
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I find it likely that the out-of-pocket expenses for the children’s orthodontic treatment, based on the provided quotes of $6,000 per child, will be significant in relation to the administrative assessment of the child support liability. I am satisfied that in the special circumstances of the case, the costs of maintaining the children are significantly affected by the costs of meeting the children’s special needs for orthodontic treatment and that a ground for departure under subparagraph 117(2)(b)(ia) of the Act exists.

Reason 8A

Paragraph 117(2)(c) of the Act (commonly referred to as Reason 8A) provides as a ground for departure:
(c) that, in the special circumstances of the case, application in relation to the child of the provisions of this Act relating to administrative assessment of child support would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent for the child:
…
(ia) because of the income, property and financial resources of either parent…
In setting Mr Angelakis’ income, the Child Support objections officer had regard to verbal information provided by Mr Angelakis’ [employer] that he earned $3,637.83 per week or $189,167 per annum. The objections officer noted that Mr Angelakis disputed this amount and had provided payslips from March 2024 indicating his annual salary was $137,167.08. The objections officer further noted that Mr Angelakis’ payslips showed his year to date income as of 31 March 2024 was $127,543, which was equivalent to an annual gross income of $169,284. The objections officer took the mid-way point of these two figures ($189,167 and $169,284) and added an amount of $10,000 for rental income received by Mr Angelakis in reaching a finding that Mr Angelakis’ adjusted taxable income for 2024 should be set at $189,225.
In setting Ms Patalano’s income, the Child Support objections officer had regard to Ms Patalano’s application for a change of assessment in which she stated her annual income as $105,586, along with a payslip for the period ending 5 May 2024 which indicated gross fortnightly earnings of $3,946.86 and year to date earnings of $87,479. By annualising Ms Patalano’s earnings the objections officer arrived at an annual income of just over $102,000.
Mr Angelakis in his application to this Tribunal submitted that Child Support erred in relying on verbal information provided by his employer as to his salary and the selection of Ms Patalano’s payslip in regard to the assessment of her usual income.

Mr Angelakis’ income

Prior to the hearing of this matter Mr Angelakis’ solicitors wrote to the Tribunal stating that Mr Angelakis “is prepared to accept the financial determination made by the Child Support Registrar, effectively accepting Part 8A”.
At the outset of the hearing the Tribunal sought to confirm with Mr Angelakis whether he accepted that his correct income figure was properly reflected in the determination by the objections officer (being $189,225 for the 2024 calendar year and $179,225 for the 2025 calendar year). Mr Angelakis indicated that this was approximately his income as an employee but that his business expenses were sometimes positive and sometimes negative. Mr Angelakis’ written submissions to the Tribunal suggested that his income should be set at the figure assessed by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) as his taxable income. The Tribunal notes that Mr Angelakis’ individual tax returns disclose his taxable income as being $81,287 in the 2022-23 financial year and $27,353 in the 2023-24 financial year.
Ms Patalano told the Tribunal that she was originally happy with the income figures set by Child Support for Mr Angelakis but she now suspects his income is higher.
Given Mr Angelakis’ equivocation as to a figure which correctly reflects his income and financial capacity, the Tribunal proceeded with a consideration of Reason 8A.
In considering whether a ground for departure is made out under Reason 8A, on the basis that the income, property and financial resources of either parent makes the assessment unfair, the Tribunal reviewed a large volume of financial material submitted by the parties.
The Tribunal is not required to undertake a “forensic audit” or major investigation of the financial circumstances of a party in assessing their income, property or financial resources. Rather, the Tribunal must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities as to the party’s income, property or financial resources (see for example Morse & Potts (SSAT Appeal) [201] FMCAfam 1305 and Shearer & Benson & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2011] FMCAfam 623).
Mr Angelakis confirmed that he is currently employed by [Employer] on a salary of $150,506.57 per annum. In addition, he receives from his employer a market equity payment of $30,000 per annum. Prior to 16 October 2024, his salary was $137,167.08 per annum plus the market equity payment of $30,000 per annum. He does not receive any overtime as the market equity payment he receives is intended to cover any overtime that may be required.
Mr Angelakis also operates a [business] as a sole trader. The profit and loss statement for this business for the year ended 30 June 2023 disclosed income of $216,159 and operating expenses of $289,771, incurring a loss of $73,612. The claimed expenses included $88,323 in depreciation. The profit and loss statement for this business for the year ended 30 June 2024 disclosed income of $154,736 and operating expenses of $277,007, incurring a loss of $122,271. The claimed expenses included $76,760 in depreciation.
Mr Angelakis is the sole shareholder and director of a proprietary company, [Company] Pty Ltd which is the trustee of the [Trust]. These entities originally were formed to support a business trading in [vehicles] but no longer operate in that capacity. Mr Angelakis now utilises the Trust for the purpose of investing in cryptocurrency. As at 21 January 2025 the Trust held cash and cryptocurrency totalling $58,329.53.
Mr Angelakis has a self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF), [Superannuation Fund]. This SMSF holds real estate, shares and cryptocurrency with assets totalling $978,445.16 as at 30 June 2024. Mr Angelakis salary sacrifices approximately 6% of his total fortnightly remuneration into his SMSF, in addition to employer contributions.
Mr Angelakis owns his own home as well as a townhouse at [Location] which is currently occupied by his mother under a granny flat agreement. Between March 2023 and March 2024 Mr Angelakis’ mother was in respite care and the townhouse was rented out to a third party for $500 per week. When Mr Angelakis’ mother moved back into the townhouse in March 2024 she was paying $370 per fortnight to Mr Angelakis as lodgings. Mr Angelakis said that this has since increased to $200 per week ($400 per fortnight).
Mr Angelakis’ personal tax return for the 2022-23 financial year discloses his income from employment as $158,351. Gross rental income of $12,500 is disclosed. Mr Angelakis’ tax return for the 2022-23 financial year notes business losses of $73,612 and rental deductions totalling $12,843, including $1,843 in capital works deductions. This reduced Mr Angelakis’ taxable income to $81,287 and his taxation liability to $18,512, with Mr Angelakis receiving a refund of PAYG tax paid of $28,425.99.
Mr Angelakis’ personal tax return for the 2023-24 financial year discloses his income from employment as $154,311. Gross rental income of $16,500 is disclosed. It is noted that this figure for gross rental income appears to be slightly understated given Mr Angelakis’ evidence that his townhouse was rented for $500 per week from March 2023 to March 2024. Mr Angelakis’ bank statements also show the amount of $500 per week being paid into his account for “[Location] rent” with the last payment being received on 6 March 2024.
Business losses of $122,217 are claimed along with rental deductions totalling $17,661, including $1,843 in capital works deductions. This reduced Mr Angelakis’ taxable income to $27,351 and his taxation liability to $1,039, with Mr Angelakis receiving a refund of PAYG tax paid of $44,296.93.
Some business deductions, which are legitimate for taxation purposes, should appropriately be added back when considering Mr Angelakis’ income and financial resources for child support purposes. This includes depreciation expenses which do not represent actual out-of-pocket expenditure by Mr Angelakis in the financial year in which such expenses are claimed. Disregarding depreciation expenses yields a business profit in the 2022-23 financial year of $14,711 and a loss in the 2023-24 financial year of $45,511.
Deductions claimed against rental properties such as carried forward capital works also do not represent an actual cost expended in the relevant financial year and these amounts may also properly be added back to a person’s taxable income to better reflect the financial resources available to them. Disregarding these deductions would increase Mr Angelakis’ net rental income to approximately $1,500 per year (assuming all other deductions are allowed).
Mr Angelakis’ bank statements provided to the Tribunal show varying amounts being deposited to his account described as “pay/salary” from [Employer]. Mr Angelakis indicated that the variations in his pay each week or fortnight could be due to him being paid leave loading, taking leave at half pay, or changes to his child support deductions.
Mr Angelakis’ bank statements indicate that most of his day to day living expenses are paid via credit card, which Mr Angelakis then pays off each month. Payments for Mr Angelakis’ 2 mortgages, electricity, rates, strata fees, water charges and vehicle registration are paid separately from the offset account into which Mr Angelakis’ salary is deposited. Mr Angelakis confirmed at hearing that this is how he manages his finances.
An examination of Mr Angelakis’ various bank statements shows that for the second half of the 2023 calendar year his net spending on essential items was $62,507.46. This includes cash payments made to his credit card account, mortgage payments, regular essential expenses as noted in paragraph 85 above and school fees paid for his daughter. This equates to a net annual expenditure of $125,014.92, which indicates that Mr Angelakis’ gross annual income was equivalent to more than $180,000.
Mr Angelakis’ net expenditure over the 2024 calendar year was at least $128,000. Again, this expenditure includes only cash payments made to his credit card account, mortgage payments, and the regular essential expenses as noted in paragraph 85 above. This figure does not include non-recurring payments such as fees paid by Mr Angelakis from his offset account to his solicitors, irregular purchases, cash transfers/withdrawals or purchases of cryptocurrency. Nor does it take into account the amount of child support deducted from Mr Angelakis’ gross salary, of approximately $1,100 per fortnight (based on Mr Angelakis’ most recent payslips provided to the Tribunal). Grossing up Mr Angelakis’ net expenditure on essential items suggests his annual gross income in the 2024 calendar year was at least $185,000.
In addition, Mr Angelakis receives a direct personal benefit from the [business] by receiving up to 20 days per year personal use of the [vehicle]. Owner’s statements for [business activities] in the period July 2023 to June 2024 disclose a daily [fee] of between $719 to $2,004 per day. Mr Angelakis had use of the [business vehicle] for 18 days in January 2024, which, being school holidays, could reasonably be expected to be a period when a higher [fee] would apply. The [fee] charged for the school holiday period immediately prior to Mr Angelakis’ [fee] was $911 per day. Adopting this daily [fee] indicates Mr Angelakis receives a personal benefit each year in excess of $16,000. It is noted that the operating expenses claimed by Mr Angelakis as a deduction for tax purposes have been reduced to take into account his component of personal use.
Mr Angelakis’ current salary from employment is $180,506.57 per annum. In addition, he receives ongoing rental income from his mother of $200 per week, or $10,400 per year. Mr Angelakis told the Tribunal that he does not expect to receive any promotions at work but could expect regular CPI increases to his salary. He indicated that historically such CPI increases have been between 2.5% to 4% per annum.
Mr Angelakis also stated that he expected to receive more income from his [business] activities than has been the case over the last 2 years. He is hoping to generate more profits in future. He has to cover losses in this business and thinks this should be taken into account in any assessment.
I find that Mr Angelakis’ true financial resources for child support purposes is significantly higher than his adjusted taxable income of $81,287 in the 2022-23 financial year and $27,353 in the 2023-24 financial year. I am satisfied that Mr Angelakis’ financial resources are equivalent to an income of at least $185,000 per annum. This renders the administrative assessment of child support unjust and inequitable.

Ms Patalano’s income

Ms Patalano confirmed at hearing that she is a PAYG employee and she had no other sources of income other than child support payable by Mr Angelakis and a small weekly amount of family tax benefit payment.
Ms Patalano’s most recent taxable income, for the 2022–23 financial year, was $50,483. Ms Patalano explained that she was unemployed for around 6 months in this financial year before gaining full time employment in April 2023.
Payslips provided to the Tribunal by Ms Patalano confirm that she is employed full time and her current gross salary is approximately $108,000 per annum. This figure is consistent with Ms Patalano’s gross employment income disclosed in her Statement of Financial Circumstances and in an application for bridging finance dated 19 March 2024.

Mr Angelakis disputed Child Support’s use of one payslip provided by Ms Patalano which he argued yielded a more favourable income figure, due to the inclusion of unpaid leave, than would otherwise be the case. The Tribunal examined 2 of Ms Patalano’s payslips that were provided in the Child Support documents. Both payslips show the same gross fortnightly income of $4,385.40. Annualising the year to date earnings shown in these payslips yields a gross annual income of $100,315 and $103,420.
Mr Angelakis also argued that Ms Patalano’s income is higher than that disclosed to Child Support as she has additional income from renting out a room at her property. Mr Angelakis relied on a statutory declaration from a person who previously rented a room from Ms Patalano in 2019 and 2020, and internet advertisements from January and May 2023 seeking a flatmate.
Ms Patalano told the Tribunal that she had not received any income from rent, board or lodgings at any time in 2024. She previously had someone renting a room from her in 2022 during a period when she was unemployed. This is why she placed advertisements in 2023 for a room to rent/flatmate wanted. However, Ms Patalano said she was preparing the house for sale from late 2023 and so did not want to get anyone in and the room was left vacant.
I accept Ms Patalano’s evidence. I am not satisfied based on the evidence provided by Mr Angelakis that Ms Patalano was in receipt of any rental income on a regular basis, or at all, in the period relevant to any departure.
However I am satisfied that Ms Patalano’s employment income from 2024 onwards is significantly higher than her most recent adjusted taxable income of $50,483 for the 2022-23 financial year. Ms Patalano’s taxable income is more accurately reflected by adopting the income figure set by Child Support of $102,000 which is consistent with Ms Patalano’s year to date earnings shown in payslips for the 2023-24 financial year.
This renders the administrative assessment of child support unjust and inequitable.

101.I am satisfied that in the special circumstances of the case, Reason 8A (provided for in subparagraph 117(2)(c)(ia) of the Act) is established and there is a ground to depart from the administrative formula with respect to both Mr Angelakis’ and Ms Patalano’s income.

Issue 2 – Would it be just and equitable as regards the children and each parent to depart from the administrative assessment of child support?

102.Subsection 117(4) of the Act requires that regard must be had to the following factors in determining whether it would be just and equitable to make a particular determination to depart from the administrative assessment:
(a) the nature of the duty of a parent to maintain a child (as stated in section 3); and
(b) the proper needs of the child; and
(c) the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the child; and
(d) the income, property and financial resources of each parent who is a party to the proceeding; and
(da) the earning capacity of each parent who is a party to the proceeding; and
(e) the commitments of each parent who is a party to the proceeding that are necessary to enable the parent to support:
(i) himself or herself; or
(ii) any other child or another person that the person has a duty to maintain; and

(f) the direct and indirect costs incurred by the carer entitled to child support in providing care for the child; and
(g) any hardship that would be caused:
(i) to:
(A) the child; or
(B) the carer entitled to child support;

by the making of, or the refusal to make, the order; and
(ii) to:
(A) the liable parent; or
(B) any other child or another person that the liable parent has a duty to support;

by the making of, or the refusal to make, the order.

The Tribunal is not limited by the matters listed in subsection 117(4) and may consider any other relevant matters (subsection 117(9) of the Act).
In Gyselman, the Full Family Court noted that:
some of the matters listed in sub-section (4) may overlap with matters already considered under sub-section [117] (2) and some of the paragraphs in sub-section (4) may be more significant in one case than they would be in another or of little relevance in a particular case. It is an essential part of the s.117 exercise to carry out the obligation under sub-section (4). However, that does not mean that it is necessary in each case to slavishly go through each of the paragraphs. The extent to which it is necessary to do so will depend upon the facts and conduct of the individual case and the analysis already performed under sub-section (2).

105.While I have had regard to all of the matters specified in subsection 117(4), I will discuss only those factors of particular relevance in this application.
106.Mr Angelakis and Ms Patalano each have a duty to maintain the children. As noted in sections 3 and 4 of the Act:
·      The duty of a parent to maintain his or her child has priority over all commitments of the parent other than commitments necessary to enable the parent to support himself or herself and any other child or person that the parent has a duty to maintain; and
·      The level of support should be determined in accordance with the costs of the children, and according to the parents’ capacity to provide financial support.
107.In determining the proper needs of the children for the purposes of paragraph 117(4)(b) of the Act, subsection 117(6) of the Act requires the Tribunal to have regard to the manner in which a child is being, and in which the parents expect them to be, cared for, educated or trained, and any other special needs they may have.
108.I have already found that the children’s orthodontic treatment is a special need that justifies a change of assessment in the special circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the proper needs of the children require an adjustment to be made to Mr Angelakis’ assessed child support liability to contribute to the costs of the children’s orthodontic treatments.
109.A quote of $6,000 per child has been provided by Ms Patalano for orthodontic treatment. As noted above, Ms Patalano indicated that orthodontic treatment will be delayed for at least 6 months until [Child 1’s] baby teeth have fallen out. I am therefore satisfied that the costs of orthodontic treatment for the children will most likely be incurred in the 2026 calendar year.
110.Although Mr Angelakis expressed reservations about the necessity of orthodontic treatment for the children, in principle he was prepared to contribute 50% of the cost of necessary treatment. As I have found that orthodontic treatment is a proper need for each child, and that Ms Patalano’s quote for such costs is reasonable and the best estimate of those costs, I consider it appropriate for Mr Angelakis’ child support liability to be increased by an amount equivalent to 50% of the costs for each child’s orthodontic treatment, after Mr Angelakis has claimed any available rebate from his private health insurance. Child Support will be directed to calculate this amount on receipt of an invoice for treatment for each child from Ms Patalano, and evidence from Mr Angelakis confirming any rebate from his private health insurance.
111.With respect to the costs of the children’s schooling, Mr Angelakis submitted that it would not be just and equitable to vary the assessment to require him to contribute to school fees in circumstances where he did not consent to the children’s attendance at a private school and Ms Patalano had accepted sole responsibility for payment of school fees. Mr Angelakis relied on a decision of the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Walcher and Walcher (Child Support) AATA 1695 (Walcher) to support the argument that it was not just and equitable to depart from an agreement that the mother pay 100% of the children’s private school fees which had been agreed to in a family law property settlement.
112.In Walcher, Member Letch found:
In respect of school fees, given the express agreement between the parties, it seems to the Tribunal there would need to be some compelling circumstances to make it just and equitable to put to one side Ms Walcher’s undertaking not to seek a child support departure in respect of school fees. No such circumstances appear to exist here; in any event, the Tribunal would not be satisfied that Mr Walcher presently has any financial capacity to make a contribution to the school fee expenses being met by Ms Walcher.
113.The decision in Walcher can be distinguished from the present case on 2 bases. Firstly, there has been no financial settlement or orders agreed in family law proceedings under which Ms Patalano accepted sole responsibility for payment of private school fees.
114.In correspondence passing between the parties in December 2023, after Mr Angelakis had signed and returned enrolment agreements for both children to attend [College 2], Ms Patalano’s solicitors pressed for full disclosure by Mr Angelakis of his income and financial resources given his assertion that it was “not financially viable” for either party to pay school fees. It is evident from this correspondence that Ms Patalano was continuing to seek to have Mr Angelakis contribute to the children’s school fees and disputed that he lacked financial capacity to contribute to the children’s school fees. Ms Patalano’s solicitors noted in that regard that Mr Angelakis had been paying $8,000 per annum for his daughter to attend [College 1] up to the end of 2023, when his daughter completed her schooling, thereby freeing up resources for Mr Angelakis to apply towards the children’s [College 2] fees from 2024.
115.Further, as noted above, Ms Patalano’s offer in correspondence in January 2024 to “attend to the payment of tuition fees to facilitate their attendance at that school” appears to this Tribunal to have been provided in order to avoid disruption to the children’s commencement of their schooling at [College 2] and did not indicate her intention to bear sole responsibility for payment of school fees for the entirety of the children’s secondary schooling.
116.Secondly, I am satisfied that Mr Angelakis does in fact have capacity to contribute to the children’s school fees. I have found that both parties had an expectation that the children would be privately educated and Mr Angelakis agreed to the children’s enrolment at [College 2]. His expressed objection to the children attending [College 2] was about him having to contribute to school fees based ostensibly on his changed financial position. However, on his own evidence, Mr Angelakis’ financial position, certainly since late 2024, has markedly improved with him having received a pay rise of almost $30,000 per annum. He expects to receive regular CPI increases to his salary and is hopeful of his business generating more profit.
117.In such circumstances, it is not appropriate to enable Mr Angelakis to resile from the past mutual expectations of both parents with respect to the children’s education. I am satisfied that it is just and equitable for a change of assessment to be made requiring Mr Angelakis to contribute to the costs of the children’s private education.
118.Ms Patalano has provided statements from [College 2] confirming as follows:
·[Child 1’s] tuition fees for [College 2] were $2,921.06 per term for the 2024 school year ($11,684.24 per annum).
·[Child 2’s] tuition fees for [College 2] were $2,095.79 for the 2024 school year ($8,383.16 per annum).
·[Child 1’s] tuition fees are $3,184.21 per term for the 2025 school year ($12,736.84 per annum).
·[Child 2]’s tuition fees are $3,184.21 per term for the 2025 school year ($12,736.84 per annum).

119.Costs such as stationery, uniforms, camp and extracurricular activities are costs of raising children common to all parents and are intended to be covered in the usual administrative assessment. Mr Angelakis is already contributing to these costs as part of his assessed child support liability. I consider it just and equitable that Mr Angelakis contribute 50% of the children’s tuition fees, excluding any contribution to building and community levies, and taking into account any applicable sibling discount ($104.79 per term in 2024 and $159.21 per term in 2025).
120.For the 2024 calendar year, this means that Mr Angelakis’ child support liability is to be increased by $9,824.12 and by $12,418.42 for the 2025 calendar year. For the 2026 calendar year onwards, Mr Angelakis’ child support liability will be increased by an amount equivalent to 50% of the annual tuition fee (less any sibling discounts) for each child. Ms Patalano will be required to notify Child Support as soon as practicable of the tuition fees applicable for the 2026 and later school years and provide Child Support with invoices evidencing the total amount of fees payable in each of those years.
121.Both parties submitted a Statement of Financial Circumstances for consideration by the Tribunal.
122.Mr Angelakis’ total average weekly income was disclosed as $3,471 and his weekly expenditure as $2,985. Mr Angelakis’ expenditure does not include losses incurred in his [business] or his child support liability. However, his income does not include the amount of $200 per week received from his mother on an ongoing basis for lodgings.
123.Mr Angelakis submitted that he had been significantly impacted by the assessment of child support determined by the objections officer. He said that if his liability were to increase further, he would have to refinance his loans in order to meet his liability.
124.Mr Angelakis’ Statement of Financial Circumstances discloses a reasonably high level of discretionary spending of $230 per week for entertainment/hobbies and holidays. It is also noted that Mr Angelakis continues to salary sacrifice close to $300 per fortnight from his employment income. Such expenditure does not take precedence over a person’s child support obligations.
125.Mr Angelakis also has access to additional financial resources, being ongoing income from his [Location] property, cryptocurrency investments that can be realised and salary sacrifice from his salary that can be reduced in order to meet his child support obligations. Mr Angelakis’ losses from his [business] have been highly effective in reducing his taxation liability, with the result that he has significantly more disposable income than would a PAYG employee on a comparable salary who does not have access to deductions of this magnitude. If Mr Angelakis struggles to cover losses he may incur in his [business], it is open to him to cease trading in order to minimise his ongoing liability.
126.I am satisfied that Mr Angelakis’ current income is sufficient to cover his necessary expenditure including his assessed child support liability under the proposed change of assessment.
127.Ms Patalano provided to the Tribunal a draft binding child support agreement proposed by Mr Angelakis on a “without prejudice” basis, under which he offered to pay $12,520 in child support per child per annum. Ms Patalano considered this indicated Mr Angelakis had the capacity to meet the child support liability assessed by the objections officer including contribution to the children’s school fees. Mr Angelakis told the Tribunal that he had sought a binding child support agreement to provide certainty for the duration of the children’s schooling and made assumptions that he would be able to reduce his expenses by refinancing his mortgages and minimising his ongoing legal expenses. I have not placed reliance on this proposed agreement in reaching my findings about Mr Angelakis’ financial resources and his capacity to meet his child support liability under any departure, and have formed my views on such matters from consideration of Mr Angelakis’ financial records and his oral evidence to the Tribunal, as discussed above.
128.Ms Patalano is employed full time and derives income as a PAYG employee. Ms Patalano’s Statement of Financial Circumstances discloses average gross weekly income from employment of $2,092, plus family tax benefit payments of $94 per week and child support of $465.02 per week. Her expenditure is noted as being $2,314.60 per week. This figure includes weekly education expenses of $461.50. Ms Patalano’s expenses are otherwise unremarkable and include minimal discretionary expenditure.
129.Mr Angelakis submitted that Ms Patalano is currently paying the full amount of the children’s school fees and has some surplus income after this is taken into account in her expenditure. However, there appears to be little allowance in Ms Patalano’s budget for unforeseen expenses and the fact that she is presently breaking even with her expenditure does not mitigate against a finding that it would be just and equitable to change the assessment having regard to both parties’ income and financial resources.
130.There is no compelling evidence that suggests that Ms Patalano has access to other financial resources, or that she is not exercising her full earning capacity. I am satisfied that Ms Patalano’s income going forward will be adequately reflected in her adjusted taxable income assessed by the ATO upon Ms Patalano filing her income tax return for the 2023-24 financial year.
131.Both parties were asked to comment on the duration of any departure order. The Tribunal may not (without the leave of a court) depart from an assessment for a period which is more than 18 months prior to the date of application: subsection 98S(3B) of the Act.
132.Mr Angelakis stated that it would be beneficial for any change of assessment to cover the duration of the children’s schooling. Ms Patalano stated that she would seek a change of assessment until the end of [Child 2’s] secondary schooling.
133.I find that starting the change of assessment from 1 January 2024 and continuing until a terminating event occurs with respect to [Child 2] would be just and equitable in the circumstances. I take into account the desirability of providing certainty for the period of the children’s schooling and of minimising the need for the parties to seek further changes of assessment.
134.I am satisfied that the proposed departure would not cause undue financial hardship to Mr Angelakis, and to the extent that any financial hardship may be caused to Mr Angelakis, this is outweighed by the fact that refusing to make a departure would be likely to cause consequential hardship to Ms Patalano and to the children and mean that their proper needs may not be adequately met.

I am satisfied that it is just and equitable to make a departure in the following terms:
·For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is to be increased by $9,824.12.
·For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is to be increased by $12,418.42.
·For the period 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2026, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is increased by an amount equivalent to 50% of the out of pocket expenses for the children’s orthodontic treatment after taking into account any rebate payable under Mr Angelakis’ private health insurance.
·For the period 1 January 2026 until 31 December 2030, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is to be increased by an amount equivalent to 50% of the children’s tuition fees at [College 2], after deducting any sibling discounts.
·For the period from 1 January 2024 until a terminating event occurs with respect to [Child 2], the adjusted taxable income of Mr Angelakis is set at $185,000 per annum.
·The adjusted taxable income of Mr Angelakis is to be adjusted annually from 1 July 2025 by the CPI National Weighted Average results from the preceding March quarter.
·For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 October 2024, the adjusted taxable income of Ms Patalano is set at $102,000 per annum.

Issue 3 – Would it be otherwise proper to make a particular departure determination?

136.Subsection 117(5) of the Act sets out the matters that must be considered when deciding whether it would be “otherwise proper” to make a departure determination. This requirement directs attention to what is fair to the community and requires consideration of whether the level of a benefit, in particular family tax benefit, received by the party caring for a child may be affected by the level of child support. It is also appropriate to have regard to community expectations that children should be primarily supported by their parents.
137.Ms Patalano is in receipt of family tax benefit. A change in assessment so that Mr Angelakis contributes more for the support of the children than he otherwise would pursuant to the administrative assessment of child support will reduce the cost to the community. The Tribunal therefore considers that it is otherwise proper to make the particular determination proposed.
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and in substitution determines that:

For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is to be increased by $9,824.12.
For the period 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is to be increased by $12,418.42.
For the period 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2026, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is increased by an amount equivalent to 50% of the out of pocket expenses for the children’s orthodontic treatment, after taking into account any rebate available under Mr Angelakis’ private health insurance.
For the period 1 January 2026 until 31 December 2030, Mr Angelakis’ annual rate of child support is to be increased by an amount equivalent to 50% of the children’s tuition fees at [College 2], after deducting any sibling discounts.
For the period from 1 January 2024 until a terminating event occurs with respect to [Child 2], the adjusted taxable income of Mr Angelakis is set at $185,000 per annum.
The adjusted taxable income of Mr Angelakis is to be adjusted annually from 1 July 2025 by the CPI National Weighted Average results from the preceding March quarter.
For the period 1 January 2024 to 31 October 2024, the adjusted taxable income of Ms Patalano is set at $102,000 per annum.

Date(s) of hearing:	Thursday, 3 April 2025
Representative for the Applicant:	Mr Craig Ray, Craig Ray & Associates
Representative for the Other party:	Self