Andrianakis v Uber Technologies Inc & Ors; Taxi Apps Pty Ltd v Uber Technologies Inc & Ors (third party privilege)
[2023] VSC 366
•29 June 2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL COURTGROUP PROCEEDINGS (CLASS ACTIONS)
BETWEEN:
S ECI 2019 01926
NICOS ANDRIANAKIS Plaintiff v UBER TECHNOLOGIES INCORPORATED & ORS
(according to the attached Schedule)Defendants AND:
S ECI 2020 01585
TAXI APPS PTY LTD ACN 149 538 616 Plaintiff V UBER TECHNOLOGIES INCORPORATED & ORS
(according to the attached Schedule)Defendants ---
JUDGE:
Matthews J
WHERE HELD:
Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:
27 March 2023
DATE OF RULING:
29 June 2023
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:
Andrianakis v Uber Technologies Inc & Ors; Taxi Apps Pty Ltd v Uber Technologies Inc & Ors (third party privilege)
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:
[2023] VSC 366
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Legal professional privilege – Claim by non-parties to privilege – Common law principles apply - Whether dominant purpose established – Confidentiality and Waiver – Whether misconduct exception applies – Whether documents prepared or communications made in furtherance of the commission of offences.
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APPEARANCES - S ECI 2019 01926
Counsel Solicitors For the Plaintiff Ms M Szydzik SC
with Ms A StakerMaurice Blackburn For the Defendants Mr D R Sulan SC
with Ms M EllicottHerbert Smith Freehills APPEARANCES – S ECI 2020 01585 For the Plaintiff Mr M Catchpoole (solicitor) Corrs Chambers Westgarth For the Defendants Mr D R Sulan SC
with Ms M EllicottHerbert Smith Freehills TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 1
Background......................................................................................................................................... 3
Issues requiring consideration........................................................................................................ 4
Ms Gray’s evidence............................................................................................................................ 4
The Third Party clients of Horton Rhodes................................................................................ 6
The Third Party clients of Piper Alderman............................................................................... 8
The Third Party clients of Hanna Legal................................................................................... 11
The Third Party clients of David Bodeker............................................................................... 14
Does the Evidence Act apply or does the common law apply?.............................................. 19
Are the Third Party Documents privileged?............................................................................... 20
Defendants’ submissions........................................................................................................... 20
Mr Andrianakis’ submissions................................................................................................... 21
Taxi Apps’ submissions............................................................................................................. 24
Defendants’ reply submissions................................................................................................. 24
Consideration.............................................................................................................................. 28
Has privilege in the Third Party Documents been waived?.................................................... 29
Mr Andrianakis’ submissions................................................................................................... 30
Confidentiality................................................................................................................... 30
Waiver................................................................................................................................. 32
Taxi Apps’ submissions............................................................................................................. 36
Confidentiality................................................................................................................... 36
Waiver................................................................................................................................. 38
Defendants’ submissions........................................................................................................... 38
Confidentiality................................................................................................................... 38
Waiver................................................................................................................................. 39
Consideration.............................................................................................................................. 47
Confidentiality................................................................................................................... 47
Waiver................................................................................................................................. 49
Does the Misconduct Exception apply........................................................................................ 52
Mr Andrianakis’ submissions................................................................................................... 52
Taxi Apps’ submissions............................................................................................................. 57
Defendants’ submissions........................................................................................................... 58
Consideration.............................................................................................................................. 66
Specific documents to extent not dealt with above................................................................... 68
My approach................................................................................................................................ 68
Conclusions regarding particular Third Party Documents.................................................. 68
Conclusion......................................................................................................................................... 69
HER HONOUR:
Introduction
1 This decision concerns privilege claims made in both proceedings by the defendants (collectively, ‘Defendants’ or ‘Uber’, unless it is necessary to distinguish one from the other) which are challenged by the plaintiff (‘Mr Andrianakis’) in proceeding S ECI 2019 01926 and the plaintiff (‘Taxi Apps’) in proceeding S ECI 2020 01585 (‘Taxi Apps Proceeding’), where the legal professional privilege in the challenged documents belongs to third parties rather than to the Defendants. I shall refer to Mr Andrianakis and Taxi Apps as the ‘Plaintiffs’ unless it is necessary to distinguish between them. These documents were discovered by the Defendants in both proceedings as they were in their possession, custody or control, however the Defendants have resisted the Plaintiffs inspecting the documents (either in part by producing redacted versions or in whole) on the grounds that they may be subject to privilege claims by third parties (‘Third Party Documents’).
2 The summonses in respect of this issue are the same as those under consideration in my earlier decision in Andrianakis v Uber Technologies Inc & Ors; Taxi Apps Pty Ltd v Uber Technologies Inc & Ors [2022] VSC 196 (‘Privilege Ruling’). The issue of the Third Party Documents was carved out from the Privilege Ruling, as is explained at paragraph 30 of that ruling.
3 Familiarity with the Privilege Ruling is assumed in these reasons. There is no need or utility for me to repeat here what is explained there, especially in respect of the background to the applications and the proceedings. Defined terms in these reasons have the same meaning as in the Privilege Ruling, unless otherwise stated. Further, unless otherwise stated, the principles applicable to legal professional privilege are as set out in the Privilege Ruling.
4 In respect of the Third Party Documents, the Defendants rely on:
(a) the affidavit of Tania Hope Gray sworn 7 March 2022 (‘Gray Affidavit’). Ms Gray is a partner at Herbert Smith Freehills (‘HSF’), the solicitors for the Defendants;
(b) written submissions filed 8 March 2022; and
(c) written reply submissions filed 3 August 2022.
5 The Defendants provided the Court (but not the Plaintiffs, obviously) copies of the challenged Third Party Documents in two lever arch folders (‘Uber Bundle’), each document with a tab number. Where the document was redacted such that only the unredacted portion had been produced to the Plaintiffs, the Uber Bundle contained copies of both the redacted and unredacted versions. An index to the Uber Bundle was also circulated by HSF on 29 March 2023. That index contains the most recent list of the challenged Third Party Documents and is the one from which I have worked when preparing these reasons (‘TPD Index’). Individual documents listed in the TPD Index and contained in the Uber Bundle will be referred to by their tab number.
6 In respect of the Third Party Documents, Mr Andrianakis relies on four documents from the Tender Bundle used at the hearing which led to the Privilege Ruling[1] and on his written submissions dated 30 June 2022.
[1]These are TB249 (UBR.001.005.7940); TB 190 (UBR.001.005.9498); TB220 (UBR.001.007.0424) and TB182 (UBR.001.008.2076(1)).
7 In respect of the Third Party Documents, Taxi Apps relies on Tab 41 in the Uber Bundle[2] and on its written submissions dated 17 June 2022.
[2]The discovery number for which is UBR.003.001.2350.
8 In addition, the parties all made extensive oral submissions at the hearing on 27 March 2023.
9 After I delivered the Privilege Ruling, the Defendants appealed that decision to a judge in the trial division. On 28 October 2022, Justice J Dixon delivered reasons in respect of the appeal, [3] in which he effectively upheld the Privilege Ruling save for the dates at which it was found that the Misconduct Exception applied such that the Defendants could not claim privilege in respect of documents created after those dates.[4] His Honour found that the Misconduct Exception applied from 10 August 2013 regarding Victoria; 16 February 2014 regarding NSW; 14 February 2014 regarding Queensland; and 4 November 2013 regarding WA, all of which were earlier than I had found (‘Revised Relevant Dates’).[5] I note here that all of the written materials referred to above were prepared and filed prior to the handing down of the Appeal Decision.
[3]Andrianakis v Uber Technologies; Taxi Apps Pty Ltd v Uber Technologies (Appeal) [2022] VSC 643 (‘Appeal Decision’).
[4]Those dates had been challenged in the Appeal by Mr Andrianakis lodging a cross-appeal.
[5]Appeal Decision [174].
10 For the reasons which follow, I have found that most of the Third Party Documents are privileged and confidential, that there has not been waiver, and the Misconduct Exception does not apply. In respect of seven documents, the privilege claims have been rejected and the documents must be produced. In respect of three documents, the privilege claims have been partly accepted and partly rejected, and redacted versions are to be produced in accordance with the instructions set out in the annexure to these reasons.
Background
11 As explained above, the Third Party Documents are those documents discovered by the Defendants which have been withheld from production (either partly or wholly) on the grounds of legal professional privilege, where the Defendants identified that they may be subject to a privilege claim by third parties rather than by the Defendants themselves, and which privilege claims have been challenged by the Plaintiffs. By and large, those third parties are particular Uber drivers who had been fined or charged in respect of specific Ridesharing Offences or under investigation on relation to Ridesharing Offences (‘Third Parties’).
12 Certain matters pertaining to the manner in which the Plaintiffs’ challenges to the Third Party Documents should be dealt with by the Court were not agreed between all of the parties. These included whether the Defendants had to notify all of the Third Parties directly and individually to ascertain whether they wished to make and press a privilege claim, and whether it was sufficient that the privilege claims were made on behalf of the various solicitors who had acted for the Third Parties in relation to the subject Ridesharing Offences. I do not need to set this out here: suffice to say that by the time of the hearing, these matters had already been resolved either by agreement between the Defendants and one or both of the Plaintiffs or by earlier ruling by me. Consequently, by the time of the hearing, notification to individual Third Parties had not occurred and it was sufficient that the privilege claims were made on behalf of those Third Parties by the solicitors who had acted for them.
Issues requiring consideration
13 Having considered the material and heard the parties’ submissions, in my view the following issues arise for consideration so as to reach a determination regarding the Plaintiffs’ challenges to the privilege claims in respect of the Third Party Documents:
(a) does the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) (‘Evidence Act’) apply or does the common law apply?
(b) are the Third Party Documents privileged? In this regard, the main issue is whether the dominant purpose test has been satisfied.
(c) has privilege in the Third Party Documents been waived? This also requires consideration of matters of confidentiality.
(d) does the Misconduct Exception apply such that privilege cannot be maintained in respect of the Third Party Documents?
14 I intend to deal with each of these issues first from a general perspective. I will then apply that to the specific Third Party Documents.
Ms Gray’s evidence
15 Ms Gray deposes that she has reviewed the Third Party Documents and that they relate to the engagement of lawyers by Third Parties in NSW, those lawyers being Simon Horton of Horton Rhodes, Thomas Griffith of Piper Alderman and Nicholas Hanna of Hanna Legal, and of the engagement of a lawyer by Third Parties in WA, being David Bodeker of David Bodeker Barrister and Solicitor (together, referred to as ‘Drivers’ Solicitors’).[6]
[6]Gray Affidavit at [10] – [11].
16 Ms Gray deposes that the Drivers’ Solicitors were engaged in respect of:
(a) In NSW:[7]
[7]Gray Affidavit at [16].
(i) the issuing of infringement notices to Third Parties, threats of prosecution and subsequent prosecution of Third Parties;
(ii) citizens’ arrests of Third Parties; and
(iii) the suspension of registration of Third Parties’ vehicles, including appeals regarding decisions to suspend.
(b) In WA, the issuing of infringements and prosecution notices by the WA Department of Transport to the Third Parties.[8]
[8]Gray Affidavit at [19].
17 Ms Gray deposes as to the following matters, in respect of the context in which Third Parties were represented by the Drivers’ Solicitors in NSW:
(a) on 17 June 2014, a media article was published in the Sydney Morning Herald quoting correspondence from the RMS to an unnamed Third Party that states: “[y]ou are advised that legal action may be taken against any person found to be illegally providing public passenger services...You are warned that if you are detected offering public passenger services in breach of the Act, then this will result in prosecution action” (bold emphasis added);[9]
[9]Gray Affidavit at [23].
(b) in August 2014, Third Parties represented by Mr Horton were visited at their homes by inspectors from the NSW Department of Transport;[10]
[10]Gray Affidavit at [24].
(c) in around September 2014, Mr Horton attended meetings with the RMS in which the RMS threatened to commence legal proceedings by issuing court attendance notices against Third Parties;[11]
[11]Gray Affidavit at [31].
(d) from around November 2014, an individual (Mr Russell Howarth) commenced performing a series of citizens' arrests on Third Parties and that was under investigation by NSW Police. Mr Horton advised Third Parties in connection with this;[12]
[12]Gray Affidavit at [39]-[41].
(e) in November 2014, a Third Party was harassed by a taxi driver and was advised by Mr Horton;[13]
[13]Gray Affidavit at [71]-[72].
(f) by January 2015, the RMS had issued ten court attendance notices to Third Parties.[14] Mr Griffith, and later Mr Hanna, represented drivers being prosecuted in the Local Court of NSW. Those charges were withdrawn by July 2015 following rulings made by the Local Court;[15]
(g) in September 2015, the RMS issued suspension notices to the registered owners of vehicles used by Third Parties.[16] Mr Hanna advised those drivers about potential options to challenge the suspensions, and later filed two notices of appeal as test cases in the Local Court of NSW.[17]
[14]Gray Affidavit at [81].
[15]Gray Affidavit at [201]-[203].
[16]Gray Affidavit at [123], [204].
[17]Gray Affidavit at [205]-[207].
The Third Party clients of Horton Rhodes
18 Ms Gray deposes that Mr Horton acted for at least 15 Third Parties between around May 2014 and December 2014 who are listed in a schedule to her affidavit (‘Horton Driver Clients’).[18] A list of the Third Party Documents pertaining to the Horton Driver Clients is also set out in a schedule to the Gray Affidavit (‘Horton Documents’).
[18]Gray Affidavit at [15(a)], [21].
19 Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Horton and believes that:[19]
[19]Gray Affidavit at [22].
(a) he has not been in contact with the Horton Driver Clients since he ceased acting for them in late 2014;
(b) he entered into a costs agreement with Uber Australia Pty Ltd on 23 May 2014 (‘Horton Costs Agreement’).[20] Under the terms of the Horton Costs Agreement, the services that his firm was required to perform were as follows:
[20]A copy of the Horton Costs Agreement dated 23 May 2014 is set out on pages 1 to 5 of the bundle exhibit THG-1.
The work we have been instructed to do is to advise those who provide services as drivers through Uber Australia Pty Limited with regard to enquiries and investigations being carried out by the NSW Roads and Maritime Service and in relation to any penalty notices issued. The advice given is for the benefit of the drivers, and it is anticipated that we will exchange information with your lawyers, Herbert Smith Freehills in relation to such investigations, subject to the interests of the individual drivers being maintained (“the Work”).
(c) the Horton Costs Agreement applied in respect of all of the work that he performed for the Horton Driver Clients from May 2014 until he ceased acting;
(d) during the first part of Mr Horton’s engagement (the dates of which he cannot precisely recall), in circumstances where he needed to communicate with Uber, he generally did so through its legal advisers, HSF. He otherwise generally communicated with Glenn O’Sullivan, the Operations and Logistics Coordinator of Uber;
(e) his usual practice in matters such as these was to:
(iv) discuss with his clients (in this case, the Horton Driver Clients) the fact that another party was paying the costs of his advice;
(v) ask his clients if they had any objection to him sharing his advice with a third party payer or their legal representative (in this case Uber and HSF); and
(vi) only share his advice if his clients agreed; and
(f) although he cannot now recall the details of whether the conversations discussed in subparagraph (e) above occurred with his clients, he has no reason to believe that those conversations did not occur in accordance with his usual practice.
20 Ms Gray then goes into some detail about the subject matter of the matters Mr Horton was involved in, which is summarised above and does not need to be set out here. She also deals with particular Horton Documents.
21 In summary, Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Horton and believes that the Horton Documents are confidential communications that were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to the Horton Driver clients and/or providing them with professional legal services in relation to anticipated or actual legal proceedings.[21]
[21]Gray Affidavit at [27], [37], [60], [68], [74].
22 Ms Gray also deposes that she has reviewed the Horton Documents and that based on her review, the context set out above and the background she gives regarding the documents, she considers that the Horton Documents are confidential communications that were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to the Horton Driver clients and/or providing them with professional legal services in relation to anticipated or actual legal proceedings.[22]
[22]Gray Affidavit at [28], [38], [61], [70], [75].
The Third Party clients of Piper Alderman
23 Ms Gray deposes that Mr Griffith of Piper Alderman acted for at least five Third Parties between around December 2014 and around February 2015 who are listed in a schedule to her affidavit (‘Griffith Driver Clients’).[23] A list of the Third Party Documents pertaining to the Griffith Driver Clients is also set out in a schedule to the Gray Affidavit (‘Griffith Documents’).
[23]Gray Affidavit at [15(b)], [77].
24 Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Griffith and believes that:[24]
[24]Gray Affidavit at [78].
(a) he has not been in contact with the Griffith Driver Clients since he ceased acting for them in around February 2015;
(b) on or around 23 December 2014, he was asked by Tim O’Callaghan (another Partner at Piper Alderman) whether he would be prepared to act for certain Uber drivers. Mr O’Callaghan informed him that he had been instructed by Uber B.V. on other matters;
(c) he commenced advising the first of the Griffith Driver Clients, Mr Rekhi, on or about 23 December 2014 and later started representing Mr Karim and Mr Khan on or around 19 January 2015. Shortly after a hearing on 30 January 2015, he also started representing Mr Rahman and Mr Yip;
(d) he was initially engaged to assist in the defence of the prosecution of Mr Rekhi and to retain Counsel to assist in that regard. One of the first steps that he took was to instruct Michael Galvin of Counsel to appear in the Local Court of NSW on Mr Rekhi’s behalf on 30 January 2015;
(e) his engagement by Mr Rekhi was recorded in a letter of engagement dated 7 January 2015 that was provided to Uber B.V. (‘Griffith Letter of Engagement’);[25]
[25]A copy of the Letter of Engagement dated 7 January 2015 issued to Uber B.V. regarding the engagement for Mr Rekhi is set out on pages 16 to 28 of the bundle exhibit THG-1.
(f) the Griffith Letter of Engagement also applied in respect of his work for the other Griffith Driver Clients and provides that Uber B.V. would pay fees associated with acting for the Griffith Driver Clients; and
(g) he caused Piper Alderman to issue invoices to Uber B.V. in respect of this engagement, and Uber B.V. paid them.
25 Ms Gray deposes that at the time Mr Griffith was advising the Griffith Driver Clients, the RMS had issued court attendance notices to a number of Uber drivers, including all the Griffith Driver Clients, alleging that they had committed offences under the Passenger Transport Act 1990 (NSW).[26]
[26]Gray Affidavit at [79].
26 Ms Gray then goes into some detail about the subject matter of the matters Mr Griffith was involved in, which is summarised above and does not need to be set out here. She also deals with particular Griffith Documents.
27 Ms Gray also deposes that during the period Mr Griffith was advising the Griffith Driver Clients, Mr O’Callaghan was also advising Uber B.V. She says that she is informed by Mr Griffith and believes that when Mr Griffith needed to communicate with Uber B.V. for the purpose of advising or otherwise providing professional legal services to the Griffith Driver Clients, it was his practice to communicate with Mr O’Callaghan or at least to copy Mr O’Callaghan on his communications with Uber B.V.[27]
[27]Gray Affidavit at [82].
28 In summary, Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Griffith and believes that the Griffith Documents are confidential communications that were prepared for the purpose of providing the Griffith Driver Clients with professional legal services in relation to anticipated or actual legal proceedings or, in the case of tax invoices, may reveal such communications.[28]
[28]Gray Affidavit at [91], [104], [112].
29 Ms Gray also deposes that she has reviewed the Griffith Documents and that based on her review, the context set out above and the background she gives regarding the documents, she considers that the Griffith Documents are confidential communications that were prepared for the purpose of providing the Griffith Driver Clients with professional legal services in relation to anticipated or actual legal proceedings, or in the case of tax invoices, may reveal such communications.[29]
[29]Gray Affidavit at [92], [105], [113].
The Third Party clients of Hanna Legal
30 Ms Gray deposes that Mr Hanna acted for at least 37 Third Parties between around February 2015 to October 2015 who are listed in a schedule to her affidavit (‘Hanna Driver Clients’).[30] A list of the Third Party Documents pertaining to the Hanna Driver Clients is also set out in a schedule to the Gray Affidavit (‘Hanna Documents’). In addition, Mr Hanna separately represented Uber and its employees including in obtaining an apprehended violence order (‘APVO’) and permanent injunction against Mr Howarth.[31]
[30]Gray Affidavit at [15(c)], [114].
[31]Gray Affidavit at [114].
31 Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Hanna and believes that he commenced performing work on behalf of a number of the Hanna Driver Clients on or around 23 February 2015 who had at that time were being prosecuted by the RMS, [32] and that:
[32]Gray Affidavit at [117]-[118(a)].
(a) after 23 February 2015, he received instructions to represent other of the Hanna Driver Clients on a rolling basis, as they were informed that they were being prosecuted;[33]
[33]Gray Affidavit at [118(b)].
(b) after that, in around September or October 2015, he also received instructions to act on behalf of Hanna Driver Clients who had had their vehicle registrations suspended;[34]
[34]Gray Affidavit at [118(c)].
(c) he had recovered hard copy files from his archives in relation to 23 of a total of at least 37 Hanna Driver Clients he represented and that he has reviewed those files;[35]
[35]Gray Affidavit at [116].
(d) on around 9 March 2015 he sent costs agreements to 11 of the Hanna Driver Clients who were being prosecuted (‘Hanna Costs Agreements’), which stated that the terms for payment of his invoices were that the invoices will be sent directly to a third party payer, Uber Australia Pty Ltd;[36]
[36]Gray Affidavit at [119]-[120]. Copies of the Hanna Costs Agreements are at pages 36 to 90 of the bundle exhibit THG-1.
(e) in around July 2015, the RMS withdrew the prosecutions it had commenced against the Hanna Driver Clients which Mr Hanna represented at that time;[37]
[37]Gray Affidavit at [122].
(f) his usual practice in respect of the Hanna Driver Clients was to obtain their verbal consent to disclose information to Uber;[38]
[38]Gray Affidavit at [124].
(g) of the 23 files he has retrieved and reviewed, 19 of those files contain a file note that records the following:[39]
[39]Gray Affidavit at [125].
... Have been asked by Uber to represent you.
- Uber has agreed to pay my fees.
- However you are the client and it is you who will make the decisions about your case, not Uber.
- As a legal practitioner, the contents of our conferences are privileged and confidential.
- However, Uber would like me to be able to consult them and keep them updated about the case. Will not disclose personal information about you. Are you okay with this?"
(h) most of those 19 file notes record that the clients provided him with their consent to provide Uber with updates about their case; in respect of the balance of the file notes, he is certain that the clients were taken to have agreed to it; had they not agreed to it, his usual practice would have been to record that instruction in the file note and not discuss their matter with Uber; and his recollection is that every Hanna Driver Client agreed to his request;[40]
[40]Gray Affidavit at [126].
(i) of the other 4 files he was able to retrieve that did not have such a file note,[41]
[41]Gray Affidavit at [127].
(vii) in respect of 1 file, he believes he sought and obtained consent from that client based on his review of a file note he prepared of his preliminary conference with that driver; and
(viii) in respect of the other 3 files, he believes based on his standard practice and the matters referred to above that although the files do not contain such a file note, he did obtain their consent. He believes he has either misplaced his file note or neglected to record his obtaining consent in a file note.
(j) in respect of the Hanna Driver Clients who had had their vehicle registrations suspended, Mr Hanna provided advice to them including about their potential options to challenge the suspensions (including filing notices of appeal in the Local Court of NSW), which included potential actions against RMS.[42]
[42]Gray Affidavit at [206].
32 Ms Gray then goes into some detail about the subject matter of the matters Mr Hanna was involved in, which is summarised above and does not need to be set out here. She also deals with particular Hanna Documents.
33 In summary, Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Hanna and believes that the Hanna Documents are confidential communications that were prepared for the purpose of providing the Hanna Driver Clients with professional legal services (including legal advice) in relation to anticipated or actual legal proceedings, or in the case of redactions made to documents, would reveal such communications.[43]
[43]Gray Affidavit at [135], [147], [155], [162], [167], [173], [180], [189], [193], [199], [213], [218], [223].
34 Ms Gray also deposes that she has reviewed the Hanna Documents and that based on her review, the context set out above and the background she gives regarding the documents, she considers that the Hanna Documents are confidential communications that were prepared for the purpose of providing the Hanna Driver Clients with professional legal services in relation to anticipated or actual legal proceedings, or in the case of redactions made to documents, would reveal such communications.[44]
[44]Gray Affidavit at [136], [148], [156], [163], [168], [174], [181], [190], [194], [200], [214], [219], [224].
The Third Party clients of David Bodeker
35 Ms Gray deposes that Mr Bodeker acted for at least 90 Third Parties from about December 2014 to October 2017 who are listed in a schedule to her affidavit (‘Bodeker Driver Clients’).[45] A list of the Third Party Documents pertaining to the Bodeker Driver Clients is also set out in a schedule to the Gray Affidavit (‘Bodeker Documents’).
[45]Gray Affidavit at [19], [225], [226].
36 Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Bodeker and believes that:[46]
[46]Gray Affidavit at [226].
(a) from around early 2015 to October 2017, he was engaged by the Bodeker Driver Clients to provide legal services (including legal advice) in connection with infringements or prosecutions in relation to the operation of the UberX or Uber Black service in WA. In addition to this, he provided some of the Bodeker Driver Clients with legal services (including legal advice) regarding immigration issues;[47]
[47]This is set out in more detail in the Gray Affidavit at [235]-[248], however it is not necessary for me to include that detail.
(b) he has not been engaged to provide legal advice to the Bodeker Driver Clients since he ceased acting for them in October 2017;
(c) his engagement came about after he was initially approached in late December 2014 by Victorian barrister Peter Haag to see whether he would act for the Bodeker Driver Clients and instruct Mr Haag in respect of the WA investigations of and criminal proceedings against Uber drivers;
(d) following this, Mr Bodeker spoke with Simon Rossi, the General Manager at Uber, and Mr O’Brien of Brand Partners (who had been retained by Uber to provide legal advice), regarding his engagement to provide legal advice to Uber drivers who would be his clients; and
(e) Mr Rossi and Mr O’Brien each confirmed that Uber would pay Mr Bodeker’s legal fees.
37 Mr Bodeker entered into a costs agreement dated 26 February 2015 with Rasier Operations B.V. entitled general retainer/costs agreement for sophisticated clients as third party payers (‘Bodeker Costs Agreement’). That agreement referred to a specific instruction notice (‘Specific Instruction Notice’) that was an agreement to be signed by Mr Bodeker, Uber and a Bodeker Driver Client which set out the terms of the agreement whereby Mr Bodeker was to provide legal services to the Bodeker Driver Client and Uber was to pay for those services. It was a term of the Bodeker Costs Agreement that Mr Bodeker was to provide a Specific Instruction Notice in respect of each Bodeker Driver Client for whom he acted.[48]
[48]Gray Affidavit at [227]-[229]. A copy of the Bodeker Costs Agreement is at pages 98 to 115 of bundle exhibit THG-1. A copy of the Specific Instruction Notice is at pages 116 to 118 of bundle exhibit THG-1.
38 Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Bodeker and believes that on 26 February 2015 he sent 48 Specific Instruction Notices to Uber for those Bodeker Driver Clients for whom he was then acting.[49] In relation to the Bodeker Costs Agreement, Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Bodeker and believes that:[50]
[49]Gray Affidavit at [229].
[50]Gray Affidavit at [230].
(a) he cannot now locate copies of those 48 Specific Instruction Notices;
(b) Uber did not return a signed costs agreement or the initial 48 Specific Instruction Notices to him, but continued to refer Uber drivers to him and pay his invoices, which he took as an acceptance of its terms; and
(c) based on that conduct, he did not send any further Specific Instruction Notices to Uber.
39 Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Bodeker and believes that:[51]
[51]Gray Affidavit at [231].
(a) he understood that he would be required to discuss his clients’ matters with Uber from time to time as the payer of his bills, including because the costs agreement required updates on progress at Uber’s request;
(b) it was his general practice to explain legal professional privilege to his clients and ask whether they would be willing to waive that privilege for the limited purpose of Mr Bodeker’s dealings with Uber;
(c) each Uber driver who engaged him, and for whom he created a file, authorised him to discuss their matters with Uber, that is, they agreed to waive privilege for that limited purpose;
(d) from about June 2015, it was Mr Bodeker’s practice to obtain written authority from each client waiving privilege for the limited purpose of conferring with Uber about their matter, initially using a shorter form written authority before he developed a more detailed written authority;
(e) he did not receive an authority for any broader waiver of privilege (beyond his communications with Uber), nor did he provide copies of the written authorities received from his clients to any third party, including Uber; and
(f) having obtained the waivers, it was his practice to send updates to, or copy, Uber employees and their legal advisers, including Mr O’Brien, to ensure Uber was kept up to date about the nature and cost of the advice that he was providing, so Uber could confirm if it would pay for it and because Uber was playing a coordinating role in the prosecutions of Uber drivers in WA and across Australia.
40 With some exceptions, copies of letters of authority (‘Bodeker Client Authority’) Mr Bodeker received from Bodeker Driver Clients are exhibited to the Gray Affidavit.[52] There are two forms of Bodeker Client Authorities: I shall refer to these as the ‘Long Form Bodeker Client Authority’ and the ‘Short Form Bodeker Authority’.[53] As to the exceptions, Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Bodeker and believes that:[54]
[52]Gray Affidavit at [232]. Copies of the Bodeker Client Authority are at pages 119 to 149 of the bundle exhibit THG-1.
[53]An example of the former is at page 119 of THG-1 and an example of the latter is at page 124 of THG-1.
[54]Gray Affidavit at [233].
(a) Mr Bodeker searched for his physical files for each of the Bodeker Driver Clients, and to the extent that he found his files, he reviewed them in order to locate the letters of authority;
(b) Mr Bodeker’s recollection is that all active clients with physical files gave Mr Bodeker authority to waive privilege for the purpose of his dealings with Uber;
(c) in relation to Ali Mohammed, Mr Bodeker has located a physical file, but has not been able to locate a signed authority on that file. Mr Bodeker located a document which recorded that he sent Mr Mohammed an authority to sign and return. Mr Bodeker also observed an entry on a checklist, at the front of his file for Mr Mohammed, that indicated that Mr Bodeker had obtained Mr Mohammed’s authority to confer with Uber regarding his matter;
(d) Mr Bodeker has not been able to locate Hussein Ali H Al-Bahadiri’s physical file although his electronic records show that he drafted a blank authority to confer on 13 October 2016. Mr Bodeker believes Mr Al-Bahadiri gave his authority to waive privilege and that it is on his physical file which he has not been able to locate, because of his general practice with respect to all active clients with physical files (as described above);
(e) Mr Bodeker has not been able to locate Kelvin Bhalsod’s physical file although his records show he drafted an authority to confer on 18 June 2015 but he does not have a signed copy. Mr Bodeker believes that Mr Bhalsod did waive privilege to confer with Uber because of his general practice with respect to all active clients with physical files (as described above) and also, because Mr Bhalsod agreed that his matter would be used as a test case; and
(f) Mr Bodeker cannot locate Ronald Roth’s physical file but he believes that he agreed to waive privilege to confer with Uber regarding his matter, in accordance with his general practice described above.
41 Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Bodeker and believes that he also arranged for other solicitors to be engaged to support him in his work for the Bodeker Driver Clients, as follows:[55]
[55]Gray Affidavit at [234].
(a) In 2015, he arranged the engagement of Brendon Slattery of Slattery Legal to help him with some of the Uber work. Mr Bodeker did not enter into any written agreement with Mr Slattery, however Mr Slattery invoiced him directly for the work he did.
(b) In 2016, he arranged the engagement of solicitor Gerald Yin of D.G. Price & Co Barristers & Solicitors to assist with the representation of Mr Bhalsod in an appeal from the decision of his Honour Magistrate Heaney on 29 June 2016. Mr Yin entered into his own arrangement with Uber regarding the payment of his fees, the details of which Mr Bodeker is not aware. Mr Yin instructed Mr Haag, Neil Clelland QC and Julian Burnside QC on the appeal.
42 Ms Gray then goes into some detail about the subject matter of the matters Mr Bodeker was involved in, which is summarised above and does not need to be set out here. She also deals with particular Bodeker Documents.
43 In summary, Ms Gray deposes that she is informed by Mr Bodeker and believes that the Bodeker Documents are confidential communications that were prepared for the purpose of providing the Bodeker Driver Clients with legal advice and/ or professional legal services (including legal advice) in relation to anticipated or actual legal proceedings.[56]
[56]Gray Affidavit at [247], [261], [283], [326].
44 Ms Gray also deposes that she has reviewed the Bodeker Documents and that based on her review, the context set out above and the background she gives regarding the documents, she considers that the Bodeker Documents are confidential communications that were prepared for the purpose of providing the Bodeker Driver Clients with legal advice and/or professional legal services (including legal advice) in relation to anticipated or actual legal proceedings.[57]
[57]Gray Affidavit at [248], [262], [284], [327].
Does the Evidence Act apply or does the common law apply?
45 A threshold issue at the outset is whether the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act applies in respect of the privilege claims over the Third Party Documents or whether the common law regarding privilege claims apply.
46 Mr Andrianakis contends that the common law applies rather than the Evidence Act, by reason of s 131A of that Act. That section extends the application of privilege under the Evidence Act to pre-trial discovery, but only where the person who is subject to the disclosure obligation is the person who objects to providing that document. In this instance, the Defendants are required to discover the Third Party Documents but it is the Third Parties (through their former solicitors) who object to them being produced.
47 By the time of the hearing, the Defendants accepted that the common law applied rather than the Evidence Act.
48 In my view, Mr Andrianakis’ submissions are correct, for the reasons he submitted.[58]
[58]For an instance where I have previously analysed this, see Regent 125 Pty Ltd v Brdar [2019] VSC 177 at [6], citing Alphington Developments Pty Ltd v Amcor Limited (No 2) [2018] VSC 293 at [22]-[27]; Cargill Aust Ltd & Ors v Viterra Malt Pty Ltd & Ors (No 8) [2018] VSC 193 at [42].
49 Mr Andrianakis submits that by and large it makes no difference whether the Evidence Act or the common law applies given that the tests regarding each are essentially the same, except that there are some differences when it comes to the Misconduct Exception. I will deal with this later in these reasons when it comes time to deal with the Misconduct Exception.
Are the Third Party Documents privileged?
50 As identified above, this question requires consideration of whether the dominant purpose test has been satisfied.
Defendants’ submissions
51 The Defendants submit that the Gray Affidavit establishes that the Third Party Documents are privileged. They say that Ms Gray provides cogent and comprehensive evidence regarding the context surrounding the provision of legal advice and services to the Third Parties; the engagement of the Drivers’ Solicitors to represent the Third Parties and the terms of those engagements; the arrangements between the Drivers’ Solicitors and Uber, and between the Drivers’ Solicitors and the Third Parties; and the subject matter of the legal advice and services provided to the Third Parties. In addition, they say that Ms Gray sets out information regarding the nature and context of each of the Third Party Documents.
52 The Defendants submit that the evidence in the Gray Affidavit establishes that each of the Third Party Documents was created for, or would disclose documents or communications created for, a privileged purpose.
Mr Andrianakis’ submissions
53 First, based on Mr Andrianakis’ review of the evidence, he submits that he is unable to be satisfied that many of the Third Party Documents were prepared or the communications made for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice or legal services, due to the limited nature of the evidence of Ms Gray.
54 Ms Gray deposes that she has spoken with the Drivers’ Solicitors and they have told her that they are “satisfied that [the communications/documents] are confidential communications that were prepared for the purpose of providing legal advice …”. The same wording is used with minor variations throughout the Gray Affidavit. That evidence also frequently relates to multiple documents in a global, rolled-up way. That evidence is said to be plainly insufficient to establish privilege.
55 Mr Andrianakis submits that establishing privilege requires, with respect to each communication or document, “focused and specific evidence… rather than mere generalised assertion let alone opaque and repetitious verbal formulae”.[59]
[59]Relying on Asahi Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Equity Partners Pty Ltd (No 4) [2014] FCA 796 at [29]. See also for example Barnes v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2007) 242 ALR 601 at 605 [18]; Ausnet Electricity Services v Liesfield [2014] VSC 474 at [116]; Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 689; AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30 at [44(3)].
56 Ms Gray’s evidence is said to be at a very high level of generality and amounts to no more than an assertion, frequently made on a global basis, and using verbal formulae. That is said to be precisely the kind of evidence that the Courts reject as adequate to establish privilege.
57 Second, Mr Andrianakis says that the vast majority of the Third Party Documents are emails exchanged between Uber and the Drivers’ Solicitors, including emails which emanate from Uber. That informs the question of purpose.
58 He submits that when assessing the purpose for which a document was prepared or communication made, “there can only be one dominant purpose”.[60] If there are two purposes of equal weight, neither fits the description of a “dominant purpose”. Similarly, if the decision to create a document would have been made irrespective of any intention to obtain legal advice or services, the legal purpose cannot be the dominant purpose.[61] The word “dominant” means that there must be a “clear paramountcy” of purpose.[62]
[60]Privilege Ruling at [47(4)].
[61]Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 266 at [30(8)].
[62]Visser v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) [2020] VSCA 327 at [98].
59 Mr Andrianakis submits that one obvious potential purpose for Uber exchanging emails with the Drivers’ Solicitors about enforcement action taken against the Third Parties was that Uber wished to keep itself apprised of developments about, and the status of, enforcement action. It is said that may not have been, and in at least some instances likely was not, for the purpose of legal services being provided to the Third Parties, but rather for the purpose of enabling Uber to assess the risk to its driver supply if the Third Parties were successfully prosecuted. That is both in the immediate sense relating to the Third Party in question and the broader enforcement risk for Uber drivers more generally. How the enforcement action unfolded was no doubt of acute interest to Uber, because of the criticality of maintaining supply to the successful operation and scaling of UberX. That criticality was said to be demonstrated by the elaborate steps Uber took to avoid enforcement action and then to shield Uber drivers from the impact of any such enforcement activity (e.g. setting up the system for paying fines). Alternatively, it may be that both purposes were held by Uber simultaneously: the provision of legal services and keeping Uber informed because of the importance of maintaining supply. If both purposes were equal, neither was the dominant purpose.
60 He says that in some instances, the Drivers’ Solicitors were not just advising the Third Parties but providing a strategy or assisting Uber in its strategy of protecting driver supply, or in protecting the app used for UberX services. This is said to be evidenced by the four documents from the Tender Bundle which Mr Andrianakis referred to in oral submissions.
61 Mr Andrianakis submits that ordinarily, the relevant purpose is that of the person who brings into existence the document which includes the privileged communication, although that is not always the case.[63] Where an Uber employee was the creator of the document, it is that individual’s or possibly Uber’s purpose which is relevant. That is a matter which Uber is uniquely positioned to give evidence about. It has elected not to. In the result, the only evidence about ‘purpose’ in respect of documents prepared by Uber is indirect.
[63]Privilege Ruling at [47(6)].
62 Mr Andrianakis submits that the evidence of Ms Gray on information and belief from the Drivers’ Solicitors rarely descends to explaining the purpose for which a document was created. He says that in circumstances where Uber was facilitating and coordinating the provision of services by these lawyers to the Third Parties, it may reasonably be thought that those lawyers also had multiple purposes in their communications with Uber: some may have related to the provision of legal services to Third Parties, but the lawyers may also have prepared documents simply for the purpose of keeping Uber updated.
63 Mr Andrianakis says that in the absence of direct evidence about purpose vis-à-vis each document from Uber or the Drivers’ Solicitors, if the purpose is unable to be ascertained from the document itself or there is ambiguity as to purpose, then the Court ought not be satisfied that the dominant purpose is a privileged one.[64]
[64]Privilege Ruling at [72].
64 Third, Mr Andrianakis submits that as with advice privilege, litigation privilege does not capture all services which may be provided by a lawyer. For example, services provided by the lawyer when acting in a non-legal capacity or accounting, executive or administrative services would not fall within the bounds of litigation privilege.
65 Mr Andrianakis contends that the appropriate course is for the Court to inspect the documents to determine whether the documents were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice or services.
Taxi Apps’ submissions
66 In its oral submissions, Taxi Apps adopted most of Mr Andrianakis’ submissions. Taxi Apps’ written and oral submissions focussed upon confidentiality and waiver, rather than dominant purpose, although that was raised in respect of a small number of individual documents.
Defendants’ reply submissions
67 In reply, the Defendants submit that Ms Gray’s evidence is not limited in nature or comprised of general assertions.
68 The Defendants acknowledge that one aspect of the evidence given by Ms Gray is the opinion of the Drivers’ Solicitors and of her own opinion to the effect that each Third Party Document has a dominant purpose. However, they contend that those statements cannot be considered in isolation from the other, detailed evidence given in the Gray Affidavit. In any event, to the extent such statements are general, that is said to reflect the nature of the task at hand. While the use of “verbal formula” and “mere assertion” is not sufficient to establish a claim of privilege, “a claiming party cannot be compelled to provide such particularity as would compromise the very privilege that is claimed”.[65] Similarly, there is a “fine line between giving a description of the document in a way that provides sufficient evidence of privilege without going so far as to effectively divulge the privileged content of the document in the way it is described. Some level of generality is unavoidable”.[66]
[65]AWB at [44(3]; Amcor v Barnes (No 2) [2011] VSC 204 at [37].
[66]Malone v La Playa Nominees Pty Ltd [2021] VSC 271 at [32].
69 The Defendants say that the Court should inspect the documents as part of its assessment of the privilege claim. However, they say that Mr Andrianakis’ suggestion that the Court should determine whether each Third Party Document is privileged solely by reference to the document itself should be rejected. Evidence has been given, on information and belief, as to the purpose of each Third Party Document by the Drivers’ Solicitors. Those lawyers have also provided information and context relevant to the existence of privilege in the Third Party Documents. That is far removed from affidavit evidence solely based on a review of documents the subject of a privilege claim by a solicitor acting for parties in the proceedings.
70 The Defendants say that it follows that to the extent the Court considers it appropriate to inspect the Third Party Documents, it should consider each document in the context of the Gray Affidavit (and in particular, the information provided by the Drivers’ Solicitors).
71 The Defendants submit that it is of no consequence that the Uber employees who sent emails have not given evidence. They say that Mr Andrianakis’ submission fails to take into account the historical nature of the documents (being at least five years old) and the number of employees who received or sent emails (most of whom have left Uber). Case management considerations are relevant to the nature of the evidence required to determine a disputed privilege claim.[67] The Defendants submit that in any event, ample evidence of the purpose of the Third Party Documents is provided by the information provided by the Drivers’ Solicitors, the background and context deposed to by Ms Gray and the review of the documents by Ms Gray.
[67]Setkav Dalton (No 2) (Legal Professional Privilege) [2021] VSC 604 at [81].
72 The Defendants submit that Mr Andrianakis’ submission that, if emails exchanged between Uber and the Drivers’ Solicitors were not created for a privileged dominant purpose, they are not privileged, is incorrect.
73 Rather, the Defendants submit that documents are protected if they would result in the disclosure of a communication or document with a privileged purpose. In that way, “it is not only the primary record of the advice that is privileged if made for the requisite dominant purpose. Secondary material is also privileged if that material discloses the privileged confidential communication”.[68] The question is whether the document “explicitly reveals the confidential communication or the contents of the confidential document, or supports an inference of fact as to the content of the confidential communication or document, which has a definite and reasonable foundation”.[69] Accordingly, copies of privileged communications are equally protected as the original,[70] and privilege applies to that part of an otherwise non-privileged document or communication that would result in the disclosure of the contents of a privileged document or communication.[71]
[68]Fenwick v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] NSWSC 353 at [30]; see also Asmar v Albanese (No 2) [2021] VSC 324 at [22].
[69]Re Southland Coal (recs and mgrs apptd )(in liq) (2006) 203 FLR 1; [2006] NSWSC 899.
[70]Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 246.
[71]See, eg, Harden Shire Council v Curtis [2009] NSWCA 179 at [18]-[22].
74 The Defendants referred to Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building & Consulting Pty Ltd,[72] where the Court of Appeal considered whether communications with financiers funding litigation or a public relations firm which, in substance, recorded legal advice that had been provided to the client satisfied the dominant purpose test. Chernov JA (Warren CJ agreeing) held that they did.[73] His Honour observed:[74]
It seems to me that the appellants’ argument mischaracterises the third party communications. It is true, and it is unremarkable, that privilege attaches to the communication and not to documents per se. But the relevant communication that is “recorded”, as it were, by the documents in question is the communication to the respondent of legal advice. To contend that the “communication”, essentially, is the fact of transmission, as the appellants appear to do, is to make the same error as conflating the communication with, for example, a document. It is common ground that the original communication, namely, the legal advice that was provided to the respondent, was subject to legal professional privilege. And it was thatcommunication — that advice — that was passed on to the third parties. That the recommunication was in written form is, as I have said, irrelevant to this issue. What is of relevance is that, on its proper characterisation, the communication that was made to the third parties, effectively by the respondent, was the legal advice which it had received and to which privilege attached. There is no need, in those circumstances, to ask whether the recommunication was made for a “privileged purpose”. Rather, the relevant question is, as it was in Mann, whether by “passing on” that communication to the third parties the respondent had waived the privilege.
[72][2006] VSCA 201 (‘Spotless’).
[73]Spotless at [20]-[24].
[74]Spotless at [20].
75 Chernov JA also stated that “the reformulation or reproduction in another document of an original communication that is subject to legal professional privilege does not deprive the second document of the protection notwithstanding that the copied or subsequent document was not specifically created for the dominant purpose of “obtaining legal advice or for use in litigation”.[75] His Honour concluded that “the relevant communication where privileged information is “re-communicated”, as it were, is not the fact or circumstance of the reformulation or recommunication but rather the communication giving rise to the privilege in the first instance”.[76]
[75]Spotless at [22], referring to State Bank of South Australia v Smoothdale (No 2) Ltd (1995) 64 SASR 224 in support of the proposition.
[76]Spotless at [23].
76 Even where communications do not, in substance, involve a recommunication or reproduction of confidential communications with the client, it is well established that documents created for the purposes of keeping a funder apprised as to their progress give rise to legal professional privilege. In Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd,[77] Bergin J (as her Honour then was) observed, with respect to communications between a funder and the client’s lawyers, that:[78]
They are not anterior to the dominant purpose, they are inextricably linked to the nature of the professional legal services being provided to the client. Their dominant purpose was to ensure the overall capacity of the plaintiff to have funding and to ensure that such funding would be forthcoming for the continued funding of the litigation. That seems to me to fall within the description of a dominant purpose of the client “being provided” with professional legal services. This description is to be contrasted with the expression “providing professional legal services”. The concept of the client “being provided with” something is of broader import and seems to me to encompass the purpose under consideration here. I am satisfied that the documents are also privileged pursuant to s 119 of the Act.
[77][2006] NSWSC 234 (‘Rickard’).
[78]Rickard at [59], also at [27]. See also Re Global Medical Imaging Management Ltd (in liq) [2001] NSWSC 476 at [7]. This reasoning applies equally to the common law: Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 23) [2021] FCA 1460 at [100].
77 The Defendants also say that Mr Andrianakis’ submission that they may have had the purpose of maintaining supply for the purposes of supplying UberX services is misconceived. They say that properly characterised, that submission invites the Court to consider the purpose of the Defendants. Whether the Defendants had a particular purpose is said by them to be irrelevant. If it were not, decisions like Rickard would be concerned with ascertaining the funder’s purpose in being kept apprised of the proceedings (which would inevitably not be a privileged purpose). Moreover, such a purpose could not be imported to communications by the Drivers’ Solicitors (including communications reproduced or recommunicated by an employee of the Defendants).
Consideration
78 I do not accept Mr Andrianakis’ criticisms of the Gray Affidavit. Ms Gray’s descriptions of the basis for the privilege claims, and her evidence as to the descriptions by the Drivers’ Solicitors are not formulaic or at too general a level of abstraction. If anything, my summary of that issue as set out above when describing the Gray Affidavit may be described in that way, but that is simply because I have set out the gist or import of the evidence. Ms Gray does not just set out in detail the circumstances of the engagement of the Drivers’ Solicitors, the terms of those engagements, and the subject matter of the legal advice or services provided to the Third Parties. She examines each of the Third Party Documents and provides specific evidence about them.
79 I accept the Defendants’ submission that neither Ms Gray, nor the Drivers Solicitors themselves, can go much further than they do without giving away the very substance of the communication claimed to be privileged.
80 Nor do I consider it problematic that Ms Gray has given evidence of the Drivers’ Solicitors’ processes and views on information and belief rather than them giving evidence directly themselves. This is an interlocutory application such that evidence on information and belief is acceptable provided the source and basis for that evidence is disclosed, which it clearly is here.
81 In relation to establishing the dominant purpose of the Third Party Documents, I prefer the submissions of the Defendants to those of the Plaintiffs. In particular and insofar as general propositions as to dominant purpose in respect of the Third Party Documents is concerned (its application to particular documents will be considered separately):
(a) the Gray Affidavit is sufficient to make out a prima facie case that the dominant purpose test has been satisfied (for the reasons set out above);
(b) whether that test has been satisfied in respect of each of the Third Party Documents is to be ascertained by me inspecting the documents and considering the test in light of both the content of the documents and the evidence set out in the Gray Affidavit;
(c) to the extent that the Defendants or one or more of their employees/agents is the recipient of a Third Party Document, it is the purpose of the person sending the document to them that is relevant, not the purpose of the recipient. In this regard, insofar as emails from the Drivers’ Solicitors to the Defendants are concerned, it is not to the point that the Defendants may have had another purpose (possibly equally important or even dominant for the Defendants) of maintaining driver supply;
(d) where there is a re-communication of a privileged communication, the question is not whether that re-communication was created for the requisite dominant purpose but whether its disclosure would reveal the privileged communication. If so, then the re-communication is protected; and
(e) at a general level, providing the funder (ie the Defendants) with the Third Party Documents does not detract from the dominant purpose being one of Third Parties being provided with legal advice or legal services in connection with litigation;[79]
[79]Mr Andrianakis’ submissions in respect of litigation funders obtaining privileged communications went more to the question of confidentiality and waiver rather than dominant purpose, so I will consider those submissions later in these reasons when dealing with those issues.
Has privilege in the Third Party Documents been waived?
82 It being well established that the party asserting waiver of privilege bears the onus of making this out, I will deal with the Plaintiffs’ submissions on waiver before moving on to the Defendants’ submissions.
83 The Plaintiffs both treated confidentiality as a separate threshold issue but dealt with it as part of their submissions on waiver. It is convenient to deal with the issues about confidentiality raised by the Plaintiffs in this section on waiver, acknowledging that it is not just a question of waiver.
84 As with the previous section, I am considering confidentiality and waiver from a general perspective regarding the Third Party Documents and will apply that to individual Third Party Documents when considering each of them later in these reasons.
Mr Andrianakis’ submissions
Confidentiality
85 Mr Andrianakis submits that in order for a document or communication to be privileged in the first place it must be confidential. Outside of a solicitor/client relationship, whether a confidentiality obligation exists will turn on the facts – in particular, “the nature of the relationship in question and the circumstances, including conduct and/or conversations, surrounding the communications or documents in question” as well as “the nature of the documents… and the purpose and context of their communication”.[80]
[80]Rickard at [33].
86 He contends that the vast majority of the Third Party Documents do not involve documents or communications with the Third Parties themselves, who are the clients of the lawyers purportedly providing the legal advice or services. Rather, the Third Party Documents, almost entirely, are emails sent between Uber and the Drivers’ Solicitors. The Third Parties, being the holders of the privilege, were, by and large, not party to those email exchanges.
87 Mr Andrianakis says that in relation to advice privilege and litigation privilege, communications with third parties can be privileged but only where those communication are confidential.
88 Mr Andrianakis submits that therefore, an important preliminary issue is whether emails and other documents which were exchanged between Uber and the Drivers’ Solicitors are confidential in the first place. This is said to be a distinct issue from waiver, because waiver turns on there being a document or communication that was privileged or includes privileged material and which was subsequently disclosed: for example, legal advice which was prepared for and provided to a Third Party and which was then emailed to Uber; there, of course, a question of waiver arises.
89 Where the document is a direct communication between Uber and the Drivers’ Solicitors, such that privilege is asserted on the basis that the document itself was prepared for the dominant purpose of, say, the provision of legal services, then Mr Andrianakis says that document can only be privileged if it was sent to or by Uber under an obligation of confidence.
90 It is submitted that under the common law (and the Evidence Act), the onus rests on the person claiming privilege to establish that each document or communication was confidential.[81]
[81]Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Victoria [2013] VSC 302 at [85].
91 Mr Andrianakis submits that it has not been established that the various emails exchanged between Uber and the Drivers’ Solicitors were exchanged on a confidential basis, for the following reasons:
(a) The lawyer-client relationship is between the lawyers and the Third Parties. Uber was merely the third party payer, described as such in the Hanna Costs Agreement and the Bodeker Costs Agreement.
(b) There is no evidence of any funding agreements between the Third Parties and Uber in which Uber agreed to maintain confidentiality in respect of the Third Parties’ privilege. Mr Andrianakis says that in Rickard, Bergin J cited passages from Re Global Medical Imaging and then stated that it was not authority for the proposition that the relationship between funder and the funded party is a confidential relationship. Rather, her Honour held that it was authority for the more limited proposition that a funding agreement may satisfy s 119 of the Evidence Act (ie the litigation limb) depending on the terms of that agreement, it all turning on the particular facts of the case.[82] Mr Andrianakis further submits that the situation in this case is quite different to a typical litigation funding agreement where the sole purpose of the funder being involved is to fund the litigation. It is said that here, Uber is funding the litigation as part of its overall strategy of ensuring supply.
[82]Rickard at [36].
(c) There is no basis on which in can be inferred that Uber was under an obligation of confidentiality vis-à-vis the Third Parties. Uber was not a trusted advisor of the Third Parties, such as an accountant where an obligation of confidence can readily be inferred from the nature of the relationship. Uber was not the employer of the Third Parties.
(d) Uber could have given evidence about confidentiality and its communications with the Drivers’ Solicitors, but it has not done so.
(e) While most of the Third Party Documents are withheld from Mr Andrianakis, to the extent that the documents are available to him because they are partly redacted, those documents contain no reference to the emails being exchanged between the lawyers and Uber on a confidential basis.
Waiver
92 Mr Andrianakis submits that at both common law and under the Evidence Act, in order to maintain privilege a party must not act in a way that is inconsistent with privilege, such as by disclosing privileged material.
93 He says that the starting point is that for the Third Party Documents other than those involving a direct communication between Uber and the Drivers’ Solicitors, such documents were necessarily emailed or otherwise provided to Uber. That is apparent from the documents being discovered by the Defendants in this proceeding, and thus were in their possession. Accordingly, those documents were, at some point, ‘disclosed’ to Uber.
94 The question, then, according to Mr Andrianakis is whether that disclosure results in a waiver of privilege.
95 Mr Andrianakis refers to the Privilege Ruling, where I stated that waiver may not necessarily occur where there has been a voluntary disclosure to a third party. For example, disclosure “for a limited and specific purpose” on “confidential terms” may not amount to disclosure.[83] Whether privilege is lost in such a circumstance is fact specific and will depend upon the nature of the disclosure.
[83]Privilege Ruling at [167].
96 Mr Andrianakis submits that in relation to each of the Drivers’ Solicitors, the evidence does not establish that the disclosure was on confidential terms.
97 In relation to the Horton Driver Clients and Horton Documents, Mr Andrianakis submits that:
(a) There is no evidence from Ms Gray to the effect that any disclosure to Uber by Horton Rhodes was on a confidential basis. Moreover, as addressed above, there is no basis on which to infer that ‘Uber’ was under an obligation of confidentiality vis-à-vis the Horton Driver Clients, when Horton Rhodes disclosed privileged documents and communications to them.
(b) Ms Gray states on information and belief that Mr Horton’s usual practice was to ask his clients if they had any objection to him sharing his advice with a third party payer and to only share his advice if his clients agreed, and that although he cannot now recall the details of whether those discussions occurred, he has no reason to believe that they did not occur.[84]
[84]Gray Affidavit at [22(e) and (f)].
(c) That evidence is insufficient to establish that any, and each instance of, disclosure by Horton Rhodes to Uber was for a limited and specific purpose and was based on confidential terms. Even accepting that a version of those conversations occurred, at its highest the evidence demonstrates that the Horton Driver Clients consented to disclosure. There is no mention of disclosure only occurring on condition of further non-disclosure such that the cloak of confidentiality would be preserved. Moreover, Uber has elected to put on this evidence on information and belief. Mr Horton has not filed any affidavit himself. The evidence is therefore hearsay, and while it is admissible on an interlocutory application given the nature of the evidence it ought be given little weight. In particular, that is because his evidence relates merely to his ‘usual practice’ and his ‘belief’ about the conversations with the Horton Driver Clients. The evidence also relates to conversations he had some 8 years ago, which inevitably bears upon the reliability of this hearsay evidence.
(d) In some instances, the disclosure to Uber is made by the UberX Partners themselves.[85] Where that has occurred, based upon the information available to Mr Andrianakis, there is no basis on which the Court could infer that this was done subject to some restriction so as to preserve confidentiality.
[85]Tab 2, Gray Affidavit at [33]; Tab 3, Gray Affidavit at [34]; Tab 4, Gray Affidavit at [35].
98 In relation to the Griffith Driver Clients and the Griffith Documents, Mr Andrianakis submits that there is no evidence from Ms Gray to the effect that any disclosure to Uber by Mr Griffith was on a confidential basis. Moreover, as addressed above, there is no basis on which to infer that ‘Uber’ was under an obligation of confidentiality vis-à-vis the Griffith Driver Clients, when Mr Griffith disclosed privileged documents and communications to them.
99 In relation to the Hanna Driver Clients and the Hanna Documents, Mr Andrianakis submits that:
(a) There is no evidence from Ms Gray to the effect that any disclosure to Uber by Mr Hanna was on a confidential basis. Moreover, as addressed above, there is no basis on which to infer that ‘Uber’ was under an obligation of confidentiality vis-à-vis the Hanna Driver Clients, when Mr Hanna disclosed privileged documents and communications to them.
(b) Ms Gray states on information and belief that Mr Hanna’s usual practice was to obtain verbal consent to disclose information to Uber.[86] As with the evidence relating to Mr Horton, this evidence is insufficient to establish that individual communications were disclosed for a limited and specific purpose and on confidential terms. The evidence has the same limitations as addressed when discussing the Horton Driver Clients.
[86]Gray Affidavit at [124].
100 In relation to the Bodeker Driver Clients and the Bodeker Documents, Mr Andrianakis submits that:
(a) There is no evidence from Ms Gray to the effect that any disclosure to Uber by Mr Bodeker was on a confidential basis. Also, as addressed above, there is no basis on which to infer that Uber was under an obligation of confidentiality vis-à-vis the Bodeker Driver Clients, when Bodeker disclosed privileged documents and communications to them.
(b) Ms Gray states that Mr Bodeker’s practice was to obtain written authority from each client waiving privilege[87] and that Mr Bodeker’s recollection is that all active clients with physical files gave Mr Bodeker authority to waive privilege.[88]
[87]Gray Affidavit at [231(d)].
[88]Gray Affidavit at [231(b)].
(c) Ms Gray further states that this waiver was for the limited purpose of Mr Bodeker’s dealings with Uber.[89] However, this is not supported by the actual terms of the waiver. Mr Andrianakis cites part of the Long Form Bodeker Client Authority as follows:
[89]Gray Affidavit at [231(b)], [233(b)].
I understand that all information and communications between me and my solicitor about my legal matters are confidential and subject to legal professional privilege. By allowing that information and communication to be shared with a third party, I waive my right for that information and communications to remain confidential with my solicitor and that those communications will no longer be subject to legal professional privilege.[90]
[90]Page 119 of exhibit bundle THG-1, emphasis added by Mr Andrianakis.
(d) In relation to that example, Mr Andrianakis acknowledges that there is a difference between the parties on how to read that version of the Bodeker Client Authority. He says that it does not amount to a limited waiver as contended by the Defendants, but that the document has to be read as a whole. He says that it allows Mr Bodeker to disclose privileged information and acknowledges that the privilege is lost.
(e) Mr Andrianakis refers to the Short Form of the Bodeker Client Authority which provides:
I … hereby authorise and instruct my lawyer David Bodeker to disclose my confidential legal information to Uber and its staff and employees where he considers that that would be expeditious or useful in his provision of legal services to me.[91]
[91]Page 124 of exhibit bundle THG-1.
(f) In such circumstances, the Bodeker Driver Clients’ agreement to the sharing of their legal advice with Uber results in each individual acting in a manner inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality in the privileged material.
(g) The express waivers exhibited to the Gray Affidavit are to be preferred over the evidence of Ms Gray based on the conversation with Mr Bodeker, given its inherent limitations. Ms Gray gives evidence on information and belief from Mr Bodeker. Mr Bodeker has not filed an affidavit, and the evidence of Ms Gray is necessarily hearsay. The conversations in respect of which Ms Gray gives evidence took place in 2015-2017, up to 7 years ago. Memory necessarily fades in such a long time. The documentary records are undoubtedly a more reliable record of what the Bodeker Driver Clients consented to.
Taxi Apps’ submissions
Confidentiality
101 Taxi Apps makes similar submissions regarding confidentiality as Mr Andrianakis.
102 In addition, Taxi Apps raises the concept of iniquity when it comes to the Defendants’ reliance on any alleged equitable obligation of confidentiality. It says that if the Defendants were subject to an equitable obligation of confidentiality and if the Third Party Documents go to an illegal scheme, then the iniquity exception to the confidentiality obligation applies.
103 Taxi Apps refers to Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) & Anor,[92] where Gummow J (as his Honour then was) states the following, in respect of the principle that confidence will be applied in equity where there is no reliance on contractual confidence:
information will lack the necessary attribute of confidence if the subject matter is the existence or real likelihood of the existence of an iniquity in the sense of a crime, civil wrong or serious misdeed of public importance, and the confidence is relied upon to prevent disclosure to a third party with a real and direct interest in redressing such crime, wrong or misdeed.[93]
[92](1987) 14 FCR 434 (‘Corrs’).
[93]Corrs at 456.
104 Taxi Apps also refers to Crown Resorts Ltd v Zantran Pty Ltd,[94] where the above passage was cited.
(a) to the extent the Third Party Documents merely (in substance) reproduce or recommunicate legal advice or legal services previously given to the Third Parties, the question is whether those documents were created “in furtherance of” Ridesharing Offences. Consistent with the authorities, the purpose of such reproductions or recommunication is assessed at the time they are originally created. The Defendants were not party to that original creation – their purpose or intention cannot infect such documents;
(b) the Third Party Documents comprise advice and services for a “legitimate purpose of being defended” in the context of the matters described by Ms Gray.[160] That is far removed from the Defendants obtaining legal advice regarding their support of the Third Parties; and
(c) the ruling sought by Mr Andrianakis would have the absurd effect that the Third Parties would not benefit from privilege in any document, including documents created in defence of criminal prosecutions (and even where the criminal prosecution was successfully defended).
[160]See, eg, Railton at 175; Amcor at [62]; Watson v McLernon [2000] NSWSC 306 at [116].
190 The Defendants conclude their submissions on the Misconduct Exception by saying that if the Court does not accept their submissions, it is still necessary for the Court to review each of the Third Party Documents to ascertain if the particular documents are “in furtherance of” Uber’s (allegedly nefarious) purpose.
Consideration
191 On one view, the debate between the parties, and in the authorities, as to whether the Third Parties (ie the client) need to be agents for Uber (ie the third party) for the Third Parties to be ‘fixed with’ Uber’s nefarious purpose such that the Misconduct Exception under the Evidence Act applies does not need to be resolved here, since it is the common law and not the Evidence Act that applies.
192 However, the Defendants in their oral submissions accepted that the common law, and not the Evidence Act, applies but they maintained their position that the situation must be looked at through the “true client” argument, either as an “agent” or “tool”.
193 It seems to me that the extensive debate between the parties and focus on this issue somewhat misses the point. This is because Mr Andrianakis in one sense does not contend that Uber is the true client – he does not say that the Third Parties are agents for Uber. Rather, he contends that the Third Parties are the “innocent tools” of Uber. While Mr Andrianakis’ submissions were very broad on the Misconduct Exception, he seemed to accept that at common law, for the Misconduct Exception to apply to the Third Parties when the nefarious purpose is not theirs but that of Uber, the Third Parties would have to be the innocent tools of Uber. Even if I have misconstrued Mr Andrianakis’ submissions in this regard, that seems to me to be a requirement expressed in the authorities.[161]
[161]For example, see the passage from Lock cited at paragraph 157 above, which was a case dealing with the common law crime or fraud exception.
194 Thus, the real question is whether the Third Parties were innocent tools of Uber when being provided with legal advice or legal services by the Drivers’ Solicitors.
195 Generally speaking and subject to reviewing the documents, I do not accept that in being provided with legal advice or legal services by the Drivers’ Solicitors, the Third Parties were innocent tools of Uber. They were innocent of the nefarious purpose and they were seeking legal advice or legal services in respect of fines, charges, prosecutions or investigations pursued by the authorities against them. The Third Parties were, as the Defendants submit, seeking legal advice, services and representation independently of Uber. That Uber funded this legal advice, services and representation does not render the Third Parties tools of Uber. The Third Parties may have provided UberX services, but they were not “tools” of Uber in terms of Uber using the Third Parties to obtain legal advice or services for Uber’s benefit. Rather, the only benefit to Uber was that in paying for the legal advice and legal services provided by the Drivers’ Solicitors to the Third Parties Uber may have been able to retain drivers who may have been otherwise been inclined to cease providing UberX services. It was only the funding of the legal advice and services that may have benefited Uber, not necessarily the legal advice or services themselves or the content thereof.
196 It is clear from the numerous authorities cited that even if the Third Parties are the innocent tools of Uber, the circumstances in which that will result in a loss of their privilege are exceptional or rare.
197 I do not accept that the circumstances here constitute the type of rare or exceptional circumstances, which the authorities cited by the parties have accepted in those cases, which would lead to the Third Parties’ privilege in this instance being lost through the Misconduct Exception. It is not the Defendants’ privilege which is at issue here, but that of the Third Parties. I do not consider the circumstances such that the rare or exceptional consequence of loss of privilege should be visited upon the Third Parties in this case.
198 Of course, this is subject to my review of the individual documents, which I deal with below.
Specific documents to extent not dealt with above
My approach
199 As stated above, the Defendants provided my Chambers with the updated TPD Index on 29 March 2023, after the hearing. In the email providing the TPD Index, HSF indicated they understood that the documents highlighted in yellow were no longer pressed by the Plaintiffs. No exception was taken to that by the Plaintiffs.
200 I have reviewed all of the Third Party Documents which remain the subject of challenge as per the TPD Index. In so doing, I have had regard to the general submissions made by the parties and my findings in that regard as set out above. I have also had regard to the specific evidence provided in the Gray Affidavit as to each document, along with the submissions made by the parties in respect of particular documents. I have also had regard to the schedule attached to Mr Andrianakis’ submissions which identifies, in respect of each Third Party Document, the basis of the challenge and a short explanation of that.
201 I do not consider it necessary for me to set out the specific evidence and submissions in respect of each document: these are readily ascertainable from the materials I have described. Rather, in the interests of efficiency, I will set out my conclusions regarding the documents.
Conclusions regarding particular Third Party Documents
202 My conclusions in respect of each Third Party Document where the privilege claim remains under challenge are set out in the attached annexure. To prepare the annexure, I have taken the TPD Index and deleted from it those Tabs (ie documents) which are no longer challenged by the Plaintiffs, and have added the final column to show the ruling.
203 Where I have indicated that the particular Third Party Document:
(a) is privileged (or part privileged, if that is the claim), it is because I am satisfied that the dominant purpose is a privileged one, for the reasons set out above in respect of that issue;
(b) is confidential, it is because I am satisfied that Uber was under an obligation of confidentiality in respect of the information contained in the document, for the reasons set out above in respect of the confidentiality issue;
(c) is not the subject of waiver, it is because I am satisfied that there has been no waiver of privilege, for the reasons set out above in respect of waiver; and
(d) is not the subject of the Misconduct Exception, it is because I am satisfied that the Misconduct Exception does not apply to that document so as to cause privilege to be lost.
204 As will be seen from the annexure, I have found that most of the Third Party Documents are privileged and confidential, that there has not been waiver, and the Misconduct Exception does not apply.
205 Where I have differed from that, a short explanation is contained in the annexure.
Conclusion
206 For all of the above reasons, the legal professional privilege claims in respect of the Third Party Documents are upheld, with the exception of:
(a) the documents at Tabs 2, 3, 4, 69, 70, 72 and 73, which must be produced in full as the part privilege or wholly privilege claims are rejected; and
(b) the documents at Tabs 37, 76 and 120, where newly redacted versions in accordance with the descriptions in the annexure as the privilege claims in respect of those documents have been accepted only as to part.
207 Accordingly, orders will be made that the Defendants produce for inspection by the Plaintiffs the Third Party Documents enumerated in the previous paragraph.
208 The parties are to confer regarding a form of orders to give effect to this ruling and as to costs. By 12 July 2023, if they have reached agreement on orders (including costs) they are to forward proposed orders to my Chambers. If they have not reached agreement, then each party is to forward to my Chambers their preferred form of order and a short written submission of no more than 3 pages as to why I should accept their form of order. Subject to any further order, I intend to deal with that on the papers on or after 12 July 2023.
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
S ECI 2019 01926 BETWEEN: NICOS ANDRIANAKIS Plaintiff - v - UBER TECHNOLOGIES INCORPORATED (4849283) First Defendant UBER INTERNATIONAL HOLDING B.V. (RSIN 851 929 357) Second Defendant UBER B.V. (RSIN 852 071 589) Third Defendant UBER AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 160 299 865) Fourth Defendant RASIER OPERATIONS B.V. (RSIN 853 682 318) Fifth Defendant UBER PACIFIC HOLDINGS B.V. (RSIN 855 779 330) Sixth Defendant UBER PACIFIC HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 609 590 463) Seventh Defendant AND: S ECI 2020 01585 TAXI APPS PTY LTD (ACN 149 538 616) Plaintiff - v - UBER TECHNOLOGIES INCORPORATED (4849283) First Defendant UBER INTERNATIONAL HOLDING B.V.
(RSIN 851 929 357)Second Defendant UBER B.V. (RSIN 852 071 589) Third Defendant UBER AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 160 299 865) Fourth Defendant RASIER OPERATIONS B.V. (RSIN 853 682 318) Fifth Defendant UBER PACIFIC HOLDINGS B.V. (RSIN 855 779 330) Sixth Defendant UBER PACIFIC HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 609 590 463) Seventh Defendant ANNEXURE
| Tab No. | Document ID | Document Date | Title | Privileged / Part Privileged | Pinpoint in Affidavit of Gray Affidavit | Ruling P = privileged PP = part privileged C = confidential no W = no waiver not ME = Misconduct Exception does not apply | ||
| Simon Horton - Horton Rhodes | [20] – [22] | |||||||
| 1 | UBR.003.001.0820 | 14-Aug-14 | Department of Transport | Wholly Privileged | [23] - [28] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 2 | UBR.003.001.0992 | 4-Sep-14 | Sydney Driver Support - Urgent - Fwd: Uber | Wholly Privileged | [29] – [32], [33], [37] – [38] | PP as claimed, not ME; but not Confidential as no obligation of confidence between Uber and driver Waiver as driver sent it and due to not confidential Document to be produced | ||
| 3 | UBR.003.001.1123 | 17-Sep-14 | Sydney Driver Support - - Fwd: Uber and RMS | Part privileged | [29] – [32], [34], [36] – [38] | PP as claimed, not ME; but not Confidential as no obligation of confidence between Uber and driver Waiver as driver sent it and due to not confidential Whole document to be produced | ||
| 4 | UBR.003.001.1128 | 18-Sep-14 | Sydney Driver Support - Urgent - Fwd: Uber | Part privileged | [29] – [32], [34], [35], [36] – [38] | PP as claimed, not ME; but not Confidential as no obligation of confidence between Uber and driver Waiver as driver sent it and due to not confidential. I note it is said in Gray Affidavit that it is a duplicate of Tab 3 but it is not, however nothing turns on this Whole document to be produced | ||
| 10 | UBR.003.001.1349 | 9-Nov-14 | RE: Fwd: Assisting an Uber partner file a complaint for rider harassment | Wholly Privileged | [39] – [41], [48], [59] – [61] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 18 | UBR.003.001.1524 | 24-Nov-14 | FW: Uber and Russell Howarth Arrest | Wholly Privileged | [39] – [41], [53], [59] – [61] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 19 | UBR.003.001.1525 (attachment to UBR.003.001.1524) | 24-Nov-14 | Penalty Notice - UBER.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [39] – [41], [53], [59] – [61] | P: privileged copy as attached to Tab 18 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 20 | UBR.003.001.1554 | 26-Nov-14 | Re: FW: Uber and Russell Howarth Arrest | Part Privileged | [39] – [41], [54], [59] – [61] | The redactions are for the Tab 18 content PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 21 | UBR.003.001.1557 | 26-Nov-14 | RE: FW: Uber and Russell Howarth Arrest | Part Privileged | [39] – [41], [55], [59] – [61] | The redactions are for the Tab 18 content PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 22 | UBR.003.001.1619 | 1-Dec-14 | Re: FW: Uber and Russell Howarth Arrest | Wholly Privileged | [39] – [41], [56], [59] – [61] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 23 | UBR.003.001.1622 | 1-Dec-14 | Re: Uber and Russell Howarth Arrest | Wholly Privileged | [39] – [41], [57], [59] – [61] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 24 | UBR.003.001.1630 | 1-Dec-14 | Re: Uber and Russell Howarth Arrest | Wholly Privileged | [39] – [41], [58], [59] – [61] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 25 | UBR.001.005.9209 | 21-Nov-14 | Fwd: RE: Fwd: Assisting an Uber partner file a complaint for rider harassment | Part privileged | [63], [66] – [70] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 26 | UBR.001.005.9208 | 21-Nov-14 | Re: Assisting an Uber partner file a complaint for rider harassment | Part privileged | [63], [66] – [70] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 27 | UBR.001.005.9207 | 21-Nov-14 | Re: Assisting an Uber partner file a complaint for rider harassment | Part privileged | [63], [66] – [70] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 28 | UBR.001.005.9206 | 21-Nov-14 | Re: Assisting an Uber partner file a complaint for rider harassment | Part privileged | [63], [66] – [70] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| Thomas Griffith - Piper Alderman | [76] – [82] | |||||||
| 37 | UBR.003.001.1911 | 25-Jan-15 | RMS Prosecutions - Amandeep Rekhi, Shafiq Khan and Rajaul Karim - Privileged and Confidential | Wholly Privileged | [84] – [86], [90] – [92] | PP only, not wholly privileged. Email from Griffith to O’Callaghan is P, C, no W, not ME. Email from O’Callaghan to Uber is about Uber’s position not the Third Parties, not C, W does not apply, and ME applies as it is after the Revised Relevant Date and falls within the Privilege Ruling Ds to produce redacted version, with only the Griffith to O’Callaghan email redacted | ||
| 38 | UBR.003.001.1912 (attachment to UBR.003.001.1911) | 23-Jan-15 | FW: Uber Update - In the News | Wholly Privileged | [84] – [86], [87], [90] – [92] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 39 | UBR.003.001.2341 | 19-Feb-15 | Smythe Wozniak.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [88] – [89], [90] – [92] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 40 | UBR.003.001.5251 | 19-Feb-15 | Smythe Wozniak.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [88] – [89], [90] – [92] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 41 | UBR.003.001.2350 | 20-Feb-15 | Uber NSW | Part privileged | [94], [95] – [97], [100], [104] – [105] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 42 | UBR.003.001.2351 (attachment to UBR.003.001.2350) | 16-Feb-15 | Running Sheet - RMS NSW Driver Prosecutions.DOCX | Wholly Privileged | [94], [98] – [99], [100] – [101], [104] – [105] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 43 | UBR.003.001.2369 | 24-Feb-15 | Uber NSW | Part privileged | [94], [102], [104] – [105] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 44 | UBR.003.001.2372 | 24-Feb-15 | Re: Uber NSW | Part privileged | [94], [102], [104] – [105] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 45 | UBR.003.001.2373 | 24-Feb-15 | RE: Uber NSW | Part privileged | [94], [102], [104] – [105] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 46 | UBR.001.005.9447 | 3-Feb-15 | Tax Invoice 349665.PDF | Part privileged | [107], [109] – [113] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 47 | UBR.003.001.2370 | 24-Feb-15 | Tax Invoice 350616.pdf | Part privileged | [108], [109] – [113] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| Nicholas Hanna - Hanna Legal | [114] – [128] | |||||||
| 48 | UBR.003.001.2380 | 26-Feb-15 | Fwd: Uber Partner Prosecutions - Update | Part privileged | [129], [130], [132]- [136] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 49 | UBR.003.001.2381 | 26-Feb-15 | Re: Uber Partner Prosecutions - Update | Part privileged | [129], [131], [132]- [136] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 50 | UBR.003.001.2387 | 1-Mar-15 | Re: RMS Prosecutions of Uber Partners at Parramatta Local Court - Next Steps | Wholly Privileged | [137], [138] – [139], [146] – [148] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 51 | UBR.003.001.2401 | 2-Mar-15 | RE: RMS Prosecutions of Uber Partners at Parramatta Local Court - Next Steps | Wholly Privileged | [137], [140], [146] – [148] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 52 | UBR.003.001.2403 | 2-Mar-15 | Re: RMS Prosecutions of Uber Partners at Parramatta Local Court - Next Steps | Wholly Privileged | [137], [141], [146] – [148] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 53 | UBR.003.001.2411 | 3-Mar-15 | Re: RMS Prosecutions of Uber Partners at Parramatta Local Court - Next Steps | Wholly Privileged | [137], [142], [146] – [148] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 54 | UBR.003.001.2412 | 3-Mar-15 | Re: RMS Prosecutions of Uber Partners at Parramatta Local Court - Next Steps | Wholly Privileged | [137], [143], [146] – [148] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 55 | UBR.003.001.2413 | 3-Mar-15 | Re: RMS Prosecutions of Uber Partners at Parramatta Local Court - Next Steps | Wholly Privileged | [137], [144], [146] – [148] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 56 | UBR.003.001.2399 | 2-Mar-15 | RE: FW: RMS Prosecutions of Uber Partners at Parramatta Local Court - Next Steps | Wholly Privileged | [137], [145], [146] – [148] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 57 | UBR.001.005.9186 | 9-Mar-15 | Invoice and Costs Agreements | Part privileged | [150], [152] – [156] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 58 | UBR.001.005.9187 (attachment to UBR.001.005.9186) | 9-Mar-15 | UBE_1648 - 5257126 - 09.03.15.pdf | Part privileged | [150], [152] – [156] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 59 | UBR.003.001.2468 | 17-Mar-15 | Re: Court Attendance Notices - Round 3 as at 16 March 2015 | Wholly Privileged | [158], [161] – [163] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 60 | UBR.003.001.2469 (attachment to UBR.003.001.2468) | 17-Mar-15 | img-150317152508.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [159], [161] – [163] | P: privileged copy as attached to Tab 59 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 61 | UBR.003.001.2470 | 17-Mar-15 | Re: Court Attendance Notices - Round 3 as at 16 March 2015 | Wholly Privileged | [160], [161] – [163] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 62 | UBR.003.001.2553 | 27-Mar-15 | Fwd: Uber RMS (2nd Round) - Update re: 31/03/15 | Wholly Privileged | [164] – [168] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 63 | UBR.003.001.3364 | 9-Jun-15 | Re: Legal events tracker | Wholly Privileged | [170], [172] – [174] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 64 | UBR.003.001.3370 | 9-Jun-15 | Re: Legal events tracker | Wholly Privileged | [171], [172] – [174] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 65 | UBR.003.001.3419 | 16-Jun-15 | Re: RMS Prosecutions of UberX Partners - Conferences in Melbourne | Wholly Privileged | [175], [176], [179] – [181] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 66 | UBR.003.001.3423 | 17-Jun-15 | Re: RMS Prosecutions of UberX Partners - Conferences in Melbourne | Wholly Privileged | [175], [177], [179] – [181] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 67 | UBR.003.001.3424 | 17-Jun-15 | Re: RMS Prosecutions of UberX Partners - Conferences in Melbourne | Wholly Privileged | [175], [177], [179] – [181] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 68 | UBR.003.001.3425 | 17-Jun-15 | Re: RMS Prosecutions of UberX Partners - Conferences in Melbourne | Wholly Privileged | [175], [178], [179] – [181] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 69 | UBR.003.001.4103 | 22-Jul-15 | Re: FOR ACTION: Fwd: Query re Uber driver prosecutions | Wholly Privileged | [182], [183] – [186], [188] – [190] | Not privileged. Dominant purpose is not legal advice or services but how to respond to media query. Document must be produced | ||
| 70 | UBR.003.001.4106 | 22-Jul-15 | Re: FOR ACTION: Fwd: Query re Uber driver prosecutions | Wholly Privileged | [182], [187], [188] – [190] | Not privileged. Dominant purpose is not legal advice or services but how to respond to media query. Document must be produced | ||
| 71 | UBR.003.001.4163 | 28-Jul-15 | Time to crack out the champagne... | Wholly Privileged | [191] – [194] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 72 | UBR.003.001.4230 | 30-Jul-15 | Fwd: Political Alert - Ride share drivers targeted in compliance operations (NSW) | Wholly Privileged | [196] – [200] | Not privileged. Dominant purpose is not legal advice or services but how to respond to public statement. Document must be produced | ||
| 73 | UBR.003.001.4231 (attachment to UBR.003.001.4230) | 30-Jul-15 | 211S2300.PDF | Wholly Privileged | [196] – [200] | Not privileged, as is it is not a privileged copy because it is attached to Tab 72 which I have found not to be privileged. Document must be produced | ||
| 74 | UBR.003.001.5980 | 30-Sep-15 | Re: Hanna Legal re Notice of suspension of Registration AI87VR.docx | Wholly Privileged | [204] – [208], [209] – [210], [211], [213] – [214] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 75 | UBR.003.001.5994 | 1-Oct-15 | Re: Hanna Legal re Notice of suspension of Registration AI87VR.docx | Wholly Privileged | [204] – [208], [209] – [210], [212], [213] – [214] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 76 | UBR.003.001.6719 | 28-Oct-15 | Fwd: Suspension of registration of various motor vehicles | Wholly Privileged | [215] – [219] | PP only. Privilege subsists only in the last email in the chain being the email from Hanna to Johnson 28/10/15. C, no W, not ME in respect of that portion. Rest of document is emails between Hanna & RMS, no privilege subsists in those. Redacted version to be produced. | ||
| 77 | UBR.003.001.6849 | 6-Nov-15 | Re: De- Rego'd Vehicles on Splend | Part privileged | [220] – [221], [223] – [224] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 78 | UBR.001.006.0079 | 2-Nov-15 | Re: De- Rego'd Vehicles on Splend | Part privileged | [222], [223] – [224] | PP as claimed, C, no W, not ME | ||
| David Bodeker – Bodeker Legal | [225] – [234] | |||||||
| 87 | UBR.003.001.7863 | 28-Jan-16 | Shorter simpler letter to Minister | Wholly Privileged | [249] – [251], [252], [260] – [262] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 88 | UBR.003.001.7864 (attachment to UBR.003.001.7863) | 28-Jan-16 | 160128 minister let.docx | Wholly Privileged | [249] – [251], [253], [260] – [262] | P: privileged copy as attached to Tab 88 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 90 | UBR.003.001.7866 | 28-Jan-16 | Shorter simpler letter to Minister | Wholly Privileged | [249] – [251], [255], [260] – [262] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 91 | UBR.003.001.7867 (attachment to UBR.003.001.7866) | 28-Jan-16 | 160128 minister let.docx | Wholly Privileged | [249] – [251], [256], [260] – [262] | P: privileged copy as attached to Tab 90 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 92 | UBR.003.001.7868 | 28-Jan-16 | Further draft | Wholly Privileged | [249] – [251], [257], [260] – [262] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 93 | UBR.003.001.7869 (attachment to UBR.003.001.7868) | 28-Jan-16 | 160128 minister let.docx | Wholly Privileged | [249] – [251], [258], [260] – [262] | P: privileged copy as attached to Tab 92 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 95 | UBR.003.001.8555 | 13-Apr-16 | Prosecution | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [266], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 96 | UBR.003.001.8566 | 14-Apr-16 | Re: Prosecution | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [267], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 97 | UBR.003.001.8568 | 14-Apr-16 | Re: Prosecution | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [268], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 98 | UBR.003.001.8569 (attachment to UBR.003.001.8568) | 14-Apr-16 | Prosecution & Court Hearing Notice JL.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [269], [282] – [284] | P: privileged copy as attached to Tab 97 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 99 | UBR.003.001.8612 | 21-Apr-16 | RE: Court document for Dalacha | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [270], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 100 | UBR.003.001.9430 | 20-Jul-16 | Re: Legal: Stanley Francis | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [271], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 101 | UBR.003.001.9431 | 20-Jul-16 | Re: Legal: Stanley Francis | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [272], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 102 | UBR.003.001.9446 | 21-Jul-16 | Malcolm Cook | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [273], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 103 | UBR.003.001.9447 | 21-Jul-16 | Re: Malcolm Cook | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [274], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 104 | UBR.003.001.9465 | 25-Jul-16 | Re: Malcolm Cook | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [275], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 105 | UBR.003.001.9468 | 25-Jul-16 | Re: Malcolm Cook | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [276], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 106 | UBR.003.001.9967 | 14-Oct-16 | Fwd: Hussein Al-Bahadiri - Notice to Produce | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [277], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 107 | UBR.003.002.0036 | 24-Oct-16 | New notice to produce | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [278], [282] – [284] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 108 | UBR.003.002.0037 (attachment to UBR.003.002.0036) | 14-Oct-16 | 161014 DoT letter.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [279], [282] – [284] | P: privileged copy as attached to Tab 107 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 109 | UBR.003.002.0039 (attachment to UBR.003.002.0036) | 24-Oct-16 | CCI21102016.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [263] – [265], [280], [282] – [284] | P: privileged copy as attached to Tab 107 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 112 | UBR.003.001.9305 | 29-Jun-16 | Reasons for decision attached | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [288] – [289], [297], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 113 | UBR.003.001.9306 (attachment to UBR.003.001.9305) | 29-Jun-16 | KM7000683.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [290], [297], [325] – [327] | P: privileged copy as attached to Tab 112 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 114 | UBR.003.001.9307 (attachment to UBR.003.001.9305) | 29-Jun-16 | Untitled attachment 00255.htm | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [291], [297], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 115 | UBR.003.001.9308 | 29-Jun-16 | Reasons for decision attached | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [292], [297], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 116 | UBR.003.001.9309 (attachment to UBR.003.001.9308) | 29-Jun-16 | KM7000683.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [293], [297], [325] – [327] | P: privileged copy as attached to Tab 115 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 117 | UBR.003.001.9314 | 30-Jun-16 | Re: Reasons for decision attached | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [294] – [296], [297], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 118 | UBR.003.001.9326 | 01-Jul-16 | Re: Reasons for decision attached | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [298], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 119 | UBR.003.001.9349 | 06-Jul-16 | Re: Bhalsod Fine - Payment | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [299], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 120 | UBR.003.001.9487 | 29-Jul-16 | Fwd: [WA] - Omnibus Applications and Ongoing Prosecutions | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [300], [325] – [327] | PP only. The PP section is also C, no W, not ME. However, portion of email commencing with paragraph starting “More generally” to end of email is not privileged. That content relates to Uber’s position and activities not those of the Third Parties. Redacted version to be produced. | ||
| 121 | UBR.003.002.0465 | 02-Jan-17 | Advice for WA "Notice to Produce" clients | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [301], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 122 | UBR.003.002.0471 | 03-Jan-17 | Re: Advice for WA "Notice to Produce" clients | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [302], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 123 | UBR.003.002.0565 | 27-Jan-17 | Re: Bhalsod - potential review of Supreme Court decision | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [303], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 124 | UBR.003.002.0568 | 27-Jan-17 | RE: Bhalsod - potential review of Supreme Court decision | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [304], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 125 | UBR.003.002.0578 | 01-Feb-17 | Re: Bhalsod - potential review of Supreme Court decision | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [305], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 126 | UBR.003.002.0579 | 01-Feb-17 | RE: Bhalsod - potential review of Supreme Court decision | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [306], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 127 | UBR.003.002.0580 (attachment to UBR.003.002.0579) | 01-Feb-17 | BHALSOD CoA Form 13 - Application for Review.doc | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [307], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 128 | UBR.003.002.0581 | 01-Feb-17 | RE: Bhalsod - potential review of Supreme Court decision | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [308], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 129 | UBR.003.002.0582 (attachment to UBR.003.002.0581) | 01-Feb-17 | BHALSOD CoA Form 13 - Application for Review v2.doc | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [309], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 130 | UBR.003.002.0583 | 01-Feb-17 | Re: Bhalsod - potential review of Supreme Court decision | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [310], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 131 | UBR.003.002.0794 | 11-Apr-17 | Dept of Transport v Sukhwinder Singh | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [311], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 132 | UBR.003.002.0796 | 11-Apr-17 | Re: Dept of Transport v Sukhwinder Singh | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [312], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 133 | UBR.003.002.0797 | 11-Apr-17 | Re: Dept of Transport v Sukhwinder Singh | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [313], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 134 | UBR.003.002.0845 | 26-Apr-17 | Bhalsod v Perrie | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [314], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 135 | UBR.003.002.0846 (attachment to UBR.003.002.0845) | 26-Apr-17 | LF SSO enc. Respondent's Answer dated 24 April 2017.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [315], [325] – [327] | P: privileged copy because attached to Tab 134 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 136 | UBR.003.002.0884 | 04-May-17 | Re: Singh proceedings - update sought urgently because of other pressing work | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [316], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 137 | UBR.003.002.0885 (attachment to UBR.003.002.0884) | 04-May-17 | Perrie statement.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [317], [325] – [327] | P: privileged copy because attached to Tab 136 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 138 | UBR.003.002.0886 (attachment to UBR.003.002.0884) | 04-May-17 | Untitled attachment 01304.htm | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [318], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 139 | UBR.003.002.0888 (attachment to UBR.003.002.0884) | 04-May-17 | Untitled attachment 01307.htm | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [318], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 140 | UBR.003.002.0887 (attachment to UBR.003.002.0884) | 04-May-17 | ss.61-62 CPA.pdf | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [319], [325] – [327] | P: privileged copy because attached to Tab 136 C, no W, not ME | ||
| 141 | UBR.003.002.0926 | 12-May-17 | Re: Singh proceedings - update sought urgently because of other pressing work | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [320], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 142 | UBR.003.002.1179 | 28-Jul-17 | Advice re Singh Appeal | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [321], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 143 | UBR.003.002.1180 (attachment to UBR.003.002.1179) | 28-Jul-17 | Singh - submissions.docx | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [322], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 144 | UBR.003.002.1257 | 17-Aug-17 | FW: Singh Grounds of Appeal - draft.docx | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [323], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
| 145 | UBR.003.002.1258 (attachment to UBR.003.002.1257) | 17-Aug-17 | Singh Grounds of Appeal - draft.docx.docx | Wholly Privileged | [285] – [287], [324], [325] – [327] | P, C, no W, not ME | ||
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