Andrew Vassiliou v Timezone Australia Pty Ltd T/A Timezone

[2019] FWC 1912

[2019] FWC 1912

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Andrew Vassiliou
v
Timezone Australia Pty Ltd T/A Timezone
(U2018/10181)

COMMISSIONER GREGORY MELBOURNE, 22 MARCH 2019

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – jurisdictional objection – whether applicant dismissed within the meaning of the Act – whether forced resignation – no dismissal at initiative of employer – application dismissed.

[1] Mr Andrew Vassiliou was employed by Timezone Australia Pty Ltd T/A Timezone Australia (“Timezone”) on 7 March 2017 and worked as an Amusement Machine Technician. The Letter of Appointment given to him at the time indicated that his primary place of work was at the Forest Hill location, but he could from time to time be required to work at other locations, either on a permanent or a temporary basis.

[2] However, on 18 September 2018 Mr Vassiliou forwarded an email to the Regional Manager Victoria, Ms Renee Woolley, advising that he was resigning from his employment, with effect from 2 October 2018. He also indicated that he was seeking payment of what he described as “outstanding Car Allowance Monies owed to me.” 1 The last shift he worked was on 30 September 2018.

[3] On 3 October Mr Vassiliou lodged an unfair dismissal application, citing s.386(1)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“the Act”). Timezone subsequently filed its response to the application indicating that it raised a jurisdictional objection on the basis that Mr Vassiliou was not dismissed, but resigned from his employment of his own volition. This decision deals with that jurisdictional objection. The Commission also indicated to the parties that if it found in favour of Timezone then the application must be dismissed. However, if it found in favour of Mr Vassiliou then it would provide the opportunity for the parties to lodge further submissions and evidence in regard to the substantive unfair dismissal application.

[4] Mr Vassiliou appeared on his own behalf. Mr Robert Meoli, People and Culture Lead, appeared on behalf of Timezone.

The Issue to be Determined

[5] Section 385 of the Act, “What is an unfair dismissal,” relevantly provides:

“A person has been unfairly dismissed if the FWC is satisfied that:

(a) the person has been dismissed; and

(b) the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable”. 2

[6] Section 386, “Meaning of dismissed,” continues to provide:

“(1) A person has been dismissed if:

(a) the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer’s initiative; or

(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.” 3

[7] Timezone submits Mr Vassiliou resigned from his employment of his own volition when he forwarded the email to the Regional Manager Victoria on 18 September 2018. However, Mr Vassiliou submits he was forced to resign because of the conduct engaged in by Timezone, and therefore he is a person that “has been dismissed.” The Commission is accordingly now required to determine whether Mr Vassiliou was “dismissed.”

The Evidence and Submissions

Mr Andrew Vassiliou

[8] Mr Vassiliou was first employed by Timezone on 7 March 2017. The Letter of Appointment given to him at the time indicated he was appointed to the position of Technical Assistant, and his primary place of work was at Timezone Forest Hill. However, it also indicated that “if the needs of the business change, you may be required work at another reasonable location, either on a permanent or temporary basis.” 4

[9] Mr Vassiliou was subsequently directed to work at a number of different locations. In addition, in August 2017 he was asked to go to various locations in Queensland where he was involved in carrying out repairs and assisting in the training of other technicians. After completing his period of probation in October 2017 he was also complimented on his work performance and provided with a wage increase of almost 25%.

[10] However, in June of last year Mr Vassiliou was told that the Forest Hill location was going to be closing for a period of time, and he was then involved in dismantling equipment to be placed into storage or transported to other locations. It eventually closed on 26 July and Mr Vassiliou was told that he was now required to work at the Northland location in Preston which involved a 70 kilometre round trip from his home each day.

[11] In May and June last year Mr Vassiliou made approaches to the then Regional Manager, Mr Cesar Giron, seeking to be paid a car allowance for all travel from his home to the various locations he was being required to attend at different times. He based this request on the fact that he was being required to carry various tools, machinery, and other spare parts in his vehicle in order to carry out his duties and responsibilities. He then submitted a car allowance invoice in June last year, which was accepted, and his payslip was modified to include payment of this allowance for travel from his home to the Forest Hill location.

[12] On 1 August he submitted a further car allowance claim for the month of July which included travel to his newly allocated location at Northland. On 15 August he sent a follow-up email to Mr Giron requesting payment of this allowance and was told the invoice had been approved and had been passed on to accounts for payment. However, despite several further follow-up requests this amount was not paid.

[13] Mr Vassiliou then decided to make application for a period of annual leave on the basis that this would provide him with some financial relief as he would not be required to travel to his work location during the leave period. He attached a copy of the annual leave application form he submitted at the time, which indicated he was seeking leave from 1 October 2018 until 8 November 2018. The form also indicated that this involved a total number of 27 leave days.

[14] On 18 September he met with the new Regional Manager Victoria, Ms Renee Woolley, who had taken over this role from Mr Giron. Ms Woolley told him that he was not entitled to some of the car allowance claims he had made for the month of July. She also told him that he would not be able to take annual leave at the times requested because of necessary work requirements associated with the opening or reopening of some locations.

[15] Mr Vassiliou then stated, “After seriously considering my options to this situation and not seeing any sort of financial relief in the near future and the continuation of this Financial Burden 70 Klm per day I Had No Alternative and was forced by My employers Harsh and Unfair Conduct to submit my Resignation which I did at 7pm that night from Home.” 5 He sent the following email to Ms Woolley at 7.08 pm on the evening of Tuesday, 18 September 2018:

“Hi Renee, Please accept my Resignation from my position as Technician Timezone it comes complete with the Mandatory 2 Weeks Notice Starting 18/09/18 Finalised 2/10/18 , Also I pose the question if you require me to Work My Notice or Just Pay Me Out? Further more I will require the Companies decision Regarding The outstanding Car Allowance Monies owed to me which include July 18 August 18 And by the end of my Notice period will Include September 18 please have the Companies decision for me by the 21/09/18 where if the decision is not Favourable to me I will Launch an Action for the recovery of Monies

Regards

Andrew” 6

The Applicant’s Submissions

[16] Mr Vassiliou indicated in his submissions that he could no longer continue to afford the costs of travel associated with the round trip of 70 kilometres from his home to the Northland location in Preston. This contrasted with the 28 kilometre return journey when travelling from home to the Forest Hill location. He estimated his travel was costing him approximately $54 per day in terms of the operation of his vehicle. He submits that this situation and Timezone’s failure to agree to pay him a car allowance to cover his travel costs left him with no option but to resign. He also noted that an Australian Taxation Office ruling had indicated that an employee using his/her own vehicle in such circumstances could be entitled to claim a tax deduction for the costs associated with its use, and it followed that Timezone should also be providing him with a car allowance in respect of the use of his vehicle. He estimated he was owed approximately $2,500.00 based on these travel allowance claims. He also made reference to the decision in Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics, 7 and relied on the conclusions of the Full Bench in that matter in support of his submissions.

[17] Mr Vassiliou also indicated in response to a question from the Commission that he had not sought to pursue his concerns about his claimed entitlement to a travel allowance to any other regulatory body because he was concerned about the delays involved in pursuing the claims in that way. He also indicated that he believed he had tried every avenue in order to obtain the payments he considered were due to him. He also denied that Ms Woolley had suggested that his annual leave could be approved if he was prepared to commence the period of leave one week earlier than proposed.

Timezone

Mr Robert Meoli

[18] Mr Meoli is employed by Timezone as the People and Culture Lead. He indicated that Mr Vassiliou resigned of his own accord on 18 September 2018, and there was no conduct or a course of conduct engaged in by Timezone that had compelled Mr Vassiliou or left him with no option but to resign. Mr Meoli also did not believe Mr Vassiliou had an entitlement to be paid a travel allowance for the travel between his home and primary place of work. He also did not believe he was entitled to be paid a tool allowance. He also indicated that it is not always possible to grant employee’s annual leave requests, and each request must be considered in conjunction with the overall requirements of the business and the particular requirements of different individual locations.

Ms Renee Woolley

[19] Ms Woolley was appointed to the position of Regional Manager Victoria at Timezone in August last year. She replaced Mr Giron who moved to take up another role within the organisation.

[20] After taking on her new role she had cause to question Mr Vassiliou’s reimbursement claims because she believed they appeared to include claims he was not entitled to. This involved, in particular, the invoice dated 18 July as it appeared to include some claims for payments in respect of travel to the Forest Hill location. Ms Woolley said she was in contact with Mr Vassiliou about these matters on four occasions, and also met with him on site on another occasion to discuss his claims, and this all occurred within a relatively short period of time. She was intending through these discussions to have the correct information before any final decision was made about the claimed entitlements.

[21] Ms Woolley said there was no issue about payment of the travel allowance when Mr Vassiliou was travelling to locations other than Forest Hill. She also indicated that there were no performance concerns in regard to Mr Vassiliou’s work performance, and he was a very competent and experienced technician. It was never her intention at any time for Mr Vassiliou to leave his employment at Timezone. However, he had been asked to work from the Northland location in Preston because the centre at Forest Hill was closing for a period of time while renovations took place. He would be required to return to the Forest Hill location when those renovations were completed.

[22] In terms of the annual leave request Ms Woolley indicated that Mr Vassiliou had submitted the relevant form on 13 September indicating that he intended to commence his period of leave on 1 October and to remain on leave until 8 November 2018. However, this coincided with the reopening of the renovated Forest Hill location and Mr Vassiliou was required to be at work at this important time. She also indicated that she had offered to have the period of leave moved forward by one week so that Mr Vassiliou would be present when the Forest Hill venue reopened. These discussions were still ongoing at the time that he resigned.

The Respondent’s Submissions

[23] Timezone submits that Mr Vassiliou initially lodged a kilometre reimbursement form with Mr Giron on 1 August 2018. There was some delay in this claim being processed as Mr Giron was involved in a handover with the newly appointed Victorian Regional Manager, Ms Renee Woolley. Ms Woolley first became aware of these claims on 22 August 2018. She subsequently took issue with the claims in respect of travel to the Forest Hill location, as this was his primary work location, and informed Mr Vassiliou that a transport allowance entitlement only arose in respect of the use of a private vehicle for travel to locations other than the primary place of work. She accordingly informed him that the original claim could therefore not be accepted, and the claim form would need to be changed before it could be considered again. These discussions were ongoing at the time of Mr Vassiliou’s resignation.

[24] Mr Vassiliou also submitted two annual leave requests to Ms Woolley. The first request was lodged on 28 August 2018 and involved a period of two days leave. This was granted without delay. The second request was received on 13 September 2018. Ms Woolley was subsequently involved in discussions with Mr Vassiliou about bringing the period of leave forward by one week so that his leave would be completed prior to the reopening of the Forest Hill venue. This was because it was important for Mr Vassiliou to be at work for the reopening in order to ensure the satisfactory operation of the machines.

Consideration

[25] It is clear at the outset that Mr Vassiliou was frustrated by what he believes is Timezone’s unreasonable failure to agree to pay him a travel allowance in respect of the kilometres travelled from his home to work in his private vehicle. He referred to a ruling from the Australian Taxation Office in support of this claim, which apparently indicates that the costs associated with use of a private vehicle for work purposes can be deductible in some circumstances. This may well be the case, however, it is not necessarily evident as to why Mr Vassiliou believes this also entitles him to claim the payment of a travel allowance from his employer.

[26] Mr Vassiliou also makes reference to the Letter of Appointment given to him at the time he was employed in March 2017. It does not contain any specific reference to a travel allowance, although it does make reference to the Amusement, Events and Recreation Award 2010 (“the Award”) in the definitions referred to at the commencement of the document. Sub clause 15.7 of the Award does refer to a transport allowance entitlement and this again appears to provide the basis of the claims Mr Vassiliou makes. The sub clause states:

“Where an employee agrees to a request from their employer to use the employee’s own motor vehicle for the purpose of travelling on the employer’s business, the employer will pay the employee an allowance of $0.78 per kilometre travelled.” 8

[27] However, this again does not necessarily confirm the existence of a travel allowance entitlement in the manner claimed by Mr Vassiliou. The clause makes clear that the entitlement is based on an employee agreeing to a request from their employer to use their private motor vehicle for the purpose of travelling on the employer’s business. Timezone maintains this entitlement never existed when Mr Vassiliou was travelling to his primary place of work at Forest Hill. However, as indicated previously the Commission is ultimately not required in the context of this application to determine whether or not Mr Vassiliou had an entitlement to payment of a travel allowance. It is instead required to determine whether he was “dismissed” from his employment, as provided for by the Act. As indicated, Mr Vassiliou relies on the provisions contained in s.386(1)(b) in this context.

[28] Mr Vassiliou also made reference to various authorities in his submission in support of his application and it is useful at the outset to have regard to how previous decisions have dealt with the provisions contained in s.386(1)(b).

[29] A Full Bench in Kylie Bruce v Fingal Glen Pty Ltd (in liq) 9 was also dealing with an application where the Applicant contended that she had been forced to resign because of conduct or a course of conduct engaged in by her employer, and therefore had been dismissed. The particular circumstances in that matter involved frequent late payment of wages and superannuation entitlements, and not being paid on time for a period of annual leave. In the course of its decision the Full Bench made reference to the relevant legislative provisions and case law in the following terms (references omitted):

“[11] The Senior Deputy President decided that the Applicant had not been unfairly dismissed because she had not been dismissed (see s.385(a) of the Act). The word ‘dismissed’ is defined in s.386 of the Act:

‘386 Meaning of dismissed

(1) A person has been dismissed if:

(a) the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer’s initiative; or

(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.’

[12] According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008,

‘Clause 386 - Meaning of dismissed

1528. This clause sets out the circumstances in which a person is taken to be dismissed. A person is dismissed if the person’s employment with his or her employer was terminated on the employer’s initiative. This is intended to capture case law relating to the meaning of ‘termination at the initiative of the employer’ (see, e.g., Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 200).

1529. Paragraph 386(1)(b) provides that a person has been dismissed if they resigned from their employment but were forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by their employer. Conduct includes both an act and a failure to act (see the definition in clause 12).

1530. Paragraph 386(1)(b) is intended to reflect the common law concept of constructive dismissal, and allow for a finding that an employee was dismissed in the following situations:

•  where the employee is effectively instructed to resign by the employer in the face of a threatened or impending dismissal; or

•  where the employee quits their job in response to conduct by the employer which gives them no reasonable choice but to resign.”

[13] The test of constructive dismissal in the context of the unlawful termination provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1998 was considered by the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia in Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2) (Mohazab) and subsequently elucidated by Justice Moore in Rheinberger v Huxley Marketing Pty Ltd (Rheinberger). The commonly quoted statement of principle in Mohazab is that:

‘In these proceedings it is unnecessary and undesirable to endeavour to formulate an exhaustive description of what is termination at the initiative of the employer but plainly an important feature is that the act of the employer results directly or consequentially in the termination of the employment and the employment relationship is not voluntarily left by the employee. That is, had the employer not taken the action it did, the employee would have remained in the employment relationship’.

[14] It is important that this passage be read in the context of the judgment as a whole. It is clear that the requirements set out by the Full Court in the passage quoted are necessary, but not sufficient, to establish that employer action constitutes constructive dismissal.

[15] These principles of constructive dismissal have been applied to the unfair dismissal provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 by Full Benches of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in Pawel v Advanced Precast Pty Ltd (Pawel)and ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd v Doumit (ABB Engineering), and we accept the Applicant’s submission that those decisions are relevant to any consideration of s.386(1)(b) of the Act.

[16] In Pawel the Full Bench said that:

‘[13] It is plain that the Full Court in Mohazab considered that an important feature in the question of whether termination is at the initiative of the employer is whether the act of an employer results directly or consequentially in the termination of the employment and that the employment relationship is not voluntarily left by the employee. However, it is to be noted that the Full Court described it as an important feature. It plainly cannot be the only feature. An example will serve to illustrate this point. Suppose an employee wants a pay rise and makes such a request of his or her employer. If the employer declines and the employee, feeling dissatisfied resigns, can the resignation be said to be a termination at the initiative of the employer? We do not think it can and yet it can be said that the act of the employer i.e. refusing the pay rise, has at least consequentially resulted in the termination of the employment. This situation may be contrasted with the position where an employee is told to resign or he or she will be terminated. We think that all of the circumstances and not only the act of the employer must be examined. These in our view, will include the circumstances giving rise to the termination, the seriousness of the issues involved and the respective conduct of the employer and the employee...’

[17] In ABB Engineering, the Full Bench said that:

‘Where it is the immediate action of the employee that causes the employment relationship to cease, it is necessary to ensure that the employer’s conduct, said to have been the principal contributing factor in the resultant termination of employment, is weighed objectively. The employer’s conduct may be shown to be a sufficiently operative factor in the resignation for it to be tantamount to a reason for dismissal. In such circumstances, a resignation may fairly readily be conceived to be a termination at the initiative of the employer. The validity of any associated reason for the termination by resignation is tested. Where the conduct of the employer is ambiguous, and the bearing it has on the decision to resign is based largely on the perceptions and subjective response of the employee made unilaterally, considerable caution should be exercised in treating the resignation as other than voluntary.’

[18] The four authorities cited above were summarised by a Full Bench of the AIRC in O’Meara v Stanley Works Pty Ltd (O’Meara) as follows:

‘[23] In our view the full statement of reasons in Mohazab which we have set out together with the further explanation by Moore J in Rheinberger and the decisions of Full Benches of this Commission in Pawel and ABB Engineering require that there... be some action on the part of the employer which is either intended to bring the employment to an end or has the probable result of bringing the employment relationship to an end. It is not simply a question of whether “the act of the employer [resulted] directly or consequentially in the termination of the employment.” Decisions which adopt the shorter formulation of the reasons for decision should be treated with some caution as they may not give full weight to the decision in Mohazab. In determining whether a termination was at the initiative of the employer an objective analysis of the employer’s conduct is required to determine whether it was of such a nature that resignation was the probable result or that the appellant had no effective or real choice but to resign.’

[19] Subject to the comments below, we accept and adopt this as a summary of the principles applicable in determining whether an employee has been forced to resign because of the conduct of the employer within the meaning of s.386(1)(b) of the Act.” 10

[30] I also note that this decision was cited with approval in the subsequent Full Bench decision in Victorian Association for the Teaching of English Inc v Debra de Laps, 11 which also involved an issue of constructive dismissal.

[31] Based on this review of the relevant authorities I am satisfied that for Mr Vassiliou to establish he has been “dismissed” it must be found to have been the act of his employer that resulted directly or consequentially in the termination of his employment, so that he cannot be said to have left voluntarily. The actions of the parties must also be considered on the basis of an objective analysis. I have sought to apply these principles to the determination of this matter.

[32] I am satisfied, firstly, that Timezone did not act with the intention of bringing the employment relationship with Mr Vassiliou to an end. The evidence of Mr Meoli and Ms Woolley indicates instead that Mr Vassiliou was a valued employee, whose skills and abilities were highly regarded within the organisation. This is emphasised in Mr Vassiliou’s evidence as well. He received a 25% pay rise only six months after first being employed. He was also asked on occasions to travel interstate to assist with repairs and to provide training to other technicians. He was also called upon to carry out repair work at locations other than his primary work location at Forest Hill. The evidence of Mr Meoli also indicates that skilled technicians, like Mr Vassiliou, are in short supply and it was difficult at times to find employees with the skills required.

[33] At the same time I am also satisfied that Timezone’s actions in refusing to accept the totality of Mr Vassiliou’s travel allowance claims and his annual leave requests resulted in the decision by Mr Vassiliou to resign from his employment. As indicated he appears to be both genuinely aggrieved by Timezone’s actions and also of the view that financially he could no longer continue in his employment. However, as the authorities referred to make clear it is not simply a question of whether the actions of the employer resulted directly or consequentially in the ending of the employment. There must instead also be some action on the part of the employer which is either intended to bring the employment relationship to an end, or has the probable result of doing so. The conduct involved must also be weighed objectively.

[34] In considering the circumstances on this basis I am not satisfied, in conclusion, that when viewed objectively it can be said that Timezone intended to bring the employment relationship to an end, or that its actions had the probable result of doing so. There are instead other legitimate explanations for it acting in the way it did. For example, the evidence makes clear that Timezone had a different view to Mr Vassiliou about his entitlement to a travel allowance when using his private vehicle. He claimed it should be paid to him whenever he travelled to work in his private vehicle. However, Timezone was of the view that it was only payable when he travelled to a location other than his primary work location. As indicated previously the Commission is not required in the context of this matter to determine which interpretation is to be preferred. However, I have no reason to doubt that Timezone genuinely believe its interpretation was the correct one. There is also nothing to suggest that it adopted this view with the intention that it would likely result in the end of the employment relationship.

[35] The evidence also indicates that Timezone was in the process of working through this issue with Mr Vassiliou. There was clearly some delay in this process due to the fact that Ms Woolley was newly appointed to the position of Regional Manager in place of Mr Giron who had taken on another role within the organisation. However, Ms Woolley had been in contact with Mr Vassiliou about the issue on several occasions, and had also visited him on site to discuss the issue. This again suggests that Timezone was working to try and get an agreed position in regard to the matter, rather than acting with the deliberate intent of ending the employment relationship. It also appears that Timezone agreed with Mr Vassiliou that he was entitled to the allowance when travelling to locations other than his primary location. It also appears that he would have shortly returned to the Forest Hill location as his primary place of work had he not resigned. This would have removed the concerns that he had about the distance travelled to the Northland location.

[36] Timezone’s response in regard to Mr Vassiliou’s leave request can also be explained on grounds other than its actions representing an attempt to bring about an end to the employment relationship. Mr Vassiliou, firstly, made the leave request at relatively short notice. He was also seeking a significant period of leave amounting to 27 work days in total. It is also noted that the Letter of Appointment given to Mr Vassiliou at the time that he was first employed states at sub clause 2.12.1, when dealing with the entitlement to annual leave that, “Leave is granted with due consideration of the centre’s requirements.” 12 The leave request was also made at a time when Timezone was about to reopen the Forest Hill location and wanted Mr Vassiliou at work at that location at this important point in time, although it is acknowledged that Mr Vassiliou may not have been aware of this at the time he made the leave request. However, Timezone’s refusal to accede to his request in these circumstances can be understood, and can be explained on grounds other than it representing an attempt to bring about an end to the employment relationship.

Conclusion

[37] As indicated already Mr Vassiliou appears to have been a valued employee during the time he was employed by Timezone, and his technical skills and ability were utilised by the business in a number of different areas. However, it is also clear that he was frustrated by its actions in response to his claims for payment of a travel allowance, and his request to take a period of annual leave. In his view these actions in combination left him with no option but to resign from his employment. However, for the reasons indicated already I am not satisfied that when viewed objectively Timezone acted in a manner that was either intended to bring the employment relationship to an end, or had the probable result of doing so.

[38] It follows that Mr Vassiliou is not a person who has been “dismissed” in accordance with either of the grounds set out in s.386(1) of the Act. It is therefore not possible for him to have been unfairly dismissed as provided for by s.385. It follows that his application must also be dismissed.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

A Vassiliou, Applicant.

R Meoli for the Respondent.

Hearing details:

2019.

Melbourne:

January 29.

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

<PR706137>

 1   Email from Andrew Vassiliou to Renee Woolley dated 18 September 2018.

 2   Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 385.

 3   Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 386 (1).

 4   Letter of Appointment from Timezone to Andrew Vassiliou dated 7 March 2017, sub clause 2.13.

 5   Applicant’s Outline of argument: objections filed 18 November 2018, question 5c.

 6   Email from Andrew Vassiliou to Renee Woolley dated 18 September 2018.

 7   Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200.

 8   Amusement, Events and Recreation Award 2010, sub clause 15.7.

 9   [2013] FWCFB 5279.

 10 Ibid, [11] – [19].

 11   [2014] FWCFB 613.

 12   Letter of Appointment from Timezone to Andrew Vassiliou dated 7 March 2017, sub clause 2.12.1.