Andrew Mortimer v Hastie Services Pty Limited T/A Spectrum Fire & Security

[2014] FWC 2537

[2014] FWC 2537

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Andrew Mortimer
v
Hastie Services Pty Limited T/A Spectrum Fire & Security
(U2012/13979)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOOLEY MELBOURNE, 17 APRIL 2014

Application for unfair dismissal - application stayed.

[1] On 9 October 2012, Mr Andrew Mortimer made an application for remedy for unfair dismissal under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). Mr Mortimer’s employment was terminated by Hastie Services Pty Limited T/A Spectrum Fire & Security (Spectrum) on 28 September 2012.

[2] On 1 November 2012, Spectrum filed their response to the application.

[3] The matter was subject of conciliation however, it was not resolved. Directions were issued and the matter was listed for hearing.

[4] On 8 January 2013, the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) received advice that Spectrum was going into liquidation.

[5] On 13 March 2013, Minter Ellison, Spectrum’s legal representative, advised the Commission that the company had been placed into liquidation on 30 January 2013 following the passing of a resolution for the voluntary winding up of the company on 30 January 2013.

[6] Minter Ellison also advised that PPB Advisory were the liquidators and that they rely upon section 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Corporations Act).

[7] On 19 March 2013, the Commission forwarded email correspondence to Mr Mortimer and advised him that creditors had passed a resolution to voluntarily wind up the company and had appointed a liquidator. The email referred Mr Mortimer to s.500(2) of the Corporations Act.

[8] Section 500(2) of the Corporations Act provides as follows:

(2) After the passing of the resolution for voluntary winding up, no action or other civil proceeding is to be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court imposes.

[9] Section 58AA of the Corporations Act provides the following definition in relation to the meaning of “court” and “Court”:

“58AA Meaning of court and Court

(1) Subject to subsection (2), in this Act:

“court” means any court.

“Court” means any of the following courts:

(a) the Federal Court;

(b) the Supreme Court of a State or Territory;

(c) the Family Court of Australia;

(d) a court to which section 41 of the Family Law Act 1975 applies because of a Proclamation made under subsection 41(2) of that Act.

(2) Except where there is a clear expression of a contrary intention (for example, by use of the expression “the Court”), proceedings in relation to a matter under this Act may, subject to Part 9.7, be brought in any court.

Note: The matters dealt with in Part 9.7 include the applicability of limits on the jurisdictional competence of courts.”

[10] Having regard to this provision and of the Full Bench decision of Smith 1, I am satisfied that the Commission is not a “Court” and is therefore unable to grant leave as prescribed in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act.

[11] In Silalahi v CMI Industrial (Forge) 2, the then Commissioner Jones considered relevant authorities and found that an application pursuant to s.394 of the Act falls within the meaning of “civil proceedings” in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act.

[12] As noted earlier, Mr Mortimer’s application pursuant to s.394 of the Act was filed on 9 October 2012 and the passing of the resolution for winding up occurred on 30 January 2013.

[13] Taking into account the provisions set out in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act, I am satisfied that Mr Mortimer’s application cannot proceed any further in the Commission except by leave of the Court.

[14] Therefore, Mr Mortimer’s application under s.394 of the Act is stayed until leave of the Court is granted.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

 1 Smith & Ors v Trollop Silverwood & Beck Pty Ltd (2003) 142 IR 137

 2   [2012] FWA 7275 at [11] - [16]

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