Andrew Karl kNÖRR v Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO)

[2015] HCASL 4

ANDREW KARL KNÖRR

v

COMMONWEALTH SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH ORGANISATION (CSIRO) & ORS

[2015] HCASL 4
M73/2014

1. The applicant seeks special leave to appeal from two sets of orders made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Neave and Osborn JJA and Sifris AJA).

2. The first set of orders, made on 12 May 2014, reflected the Court's dismissal of the applicant's application for leave to appeal against orders of a single judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Beach J) made on 12 November 2012.  The latter orders dismissed the applicant's application to file and serve a statement of claim (two previous iterations having been struck out as manifestly defective); refused the joinder of Radial Corporation Limited, a company of which the applicant is the sole director, as a plaintiff; dismissed the proceedings; and ordered the applicant to pay the respondents' costs of the proceedings (the costs of the fifth to ninth respondents being fixed at $20,000 each).

3. The second set of orders, made on 29 July 2014, dismissed two summonses which had been filed by the applicant in respect of costs orders made by Beach J, but which were not dealt with by the Court in its orders of 12 May 2014.  The Court also refused to accede to an application by the applicant that the Court recuse itself on the grounds of apprehended bias and that the Court reopen and set aside its judgment of 12 May 2014.

4. The applicant does not have legal representation. The application therefore falls to be dealt with under r 41.10 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth).

5. The applicant requires an enlargement of time within which to lodge an application for special leave to appeal to this Court in relation to the first set of orders.  We would not grant an enlargement of time because any appeal would enjoy no prospects of success.  Despite running to some 56 pages, the applicant's application fails to identify any question of law or principle which would warrant a grant of special leave to appeal.  Nor does it disclose any reason to doubt the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeal.  We would dismiss the application for special leave to appeal in relation to the second set of orders for the same reasons.

6. Pursuant to r 41.10.5, we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

V.M. Bell
5 March 2015 S.J. Gageler