| [2020] FWC 706 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.365—General protections
Andrew Jurss
v
Southern Cross Ceramics Pty Ltd
(C2019/7336)
DEPUTY PRESIDENT BOYCE | SYDNEY, 14 FEBRUARY 2020 |
Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal — application filed 136 days out of time — no exceptional circumstances within the meaning of s.366 of the Fair Work Act 2009 — application dismissed.
Introduction
[1] On 30 November 2019, Mr Andrew Jurss (Applicant) lodged an application with the Fair Work Commission (Commission) pursuant to s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)(Act). The Applicant did so by filing a Form F8 with the Commission. The Applicant claimed that his employment with Southern Cross Ceramics Pty Ltd (Respondent) was terminated contrary to Part 3-1 of the Act (by the Respondent) on 26 June 2019.
[2] A general protections application involving a dismissal must be made within 21 days after a dismissal took effect, or in such further time as the Commission may allow. 1 The 21 day period prescribed in s.366(1)(a) does not include the day on which the dismissal took effect.
[3] The Applicant acknowledges that he lodged his application 136 days outside of the statutory time limit. To be within time, the Applicant should have lodged his Application on or before 17 July 2019.
Matters to be taken into account
[4] The matters that I need to take into account in order to be satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances are provided for by s.366(2) of the Act, which reads:
“366 Time for application
…
(2) The FWC may allow a further period if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(c) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(d) the merits of the application; and
(e) fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position”.
[5] The test of “exceptional circumstances” establishes a “high hurdle” for an applicant. 2 A decision whether to extend time under s.366(2) involves the exercise of a discretion.3
[6] Section 366(2) makes clear that each of the matters set out therein need to be taken into account in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances. The meaning of “exceptional circumstances” in s.366(1) was considered by a Full Bench of the (then) Fair Work Australia in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd 4 (Nulty)as follows:
“[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors…
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- Case
- [2020] FWC 706
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the application, filed beyond the stipulated time limit, could still be entertained due to the presence of exceptional circumstances warranting an extension. The court was required to determine whether the delay in filing was justified under the exceptional circumstances provision of the Fair Work Act. This involved an assessment of the reasons provided by Jurss for the delay and whether these reasons were sufficient to warrant an exception to the general rule of timeliness in such applications.
The court examined the grounds provided by Jurss for the delay and found them insufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances as defined by section 366 of the Fair Work Act. It was determined that the delay was not attributable to any circumstances beyond Jurss' control, and therefore, no exception applied. Consequently, the application was dismissed on the grounds that it was not filed within the legally permissible timeframe, and no exceptional circumstances were present to warrant an extension. The court upheld the importance of adhering to statutory timelines in such matters, emphasizing that the Act's provisions are designed to ensure timely resolution of disputes to maintain fairness and efficiency in the workplace.