Anderson v State of NSW; Perri v State of NSW

Anderson and Perri (the applicants) sought leave to appeal against decisions of the District Court of New South Wales that dismissed their claims against the State of New South Wales (the respondent). The applicants alleged they suffered personal injury as a result of child sexual abuse. The core of the dispute concerned the application of limitation periods to their claims, particularly whether the actions of police officers constituted child sexual abuse and whether the claims were discoverable within the relevant timeframes, given the applicants were minors at the time of the alleged abuse. The matter was heard by Gleeson and White JJA and Griffiths AJA of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether there were reasonably arguable errors of law or fact in the District Court's decisions. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the District Court erred in finding that the actions of the police officers did not amount to child sexual abuse, as the alleged conduct lacked a sexual connotation. Furthermore, the court needed to assess whether the District Court correctly applied the principles of discoverability, particularly in relation to whether the applicants, as minors, knew or ought to have known the facts constituting their cause of action, and whether any advice they received was sufficient to induce a reasonably capable person to seek further legal advice.

The Court of Appeal found that the applicants had not demonstrated reasonably arguable errors of law or fact in the District Court's findings. The court reasoned that the definition of child sexual abuse, as applied in the context of the claims, required conduct with a sexual connotation, which was not established by the applicants' allegations against the police officers. Regarding discoverability, the court concluded that the District Court had correctly applied the relevant legal principles, finding that the applicants, or persons capable of making decisions on their behalf, did not know or ought not to have known the necessary facts to bring their claims within the statutory time limits. The advice provided to the applicants was not considered sufficient to trigger the discoverability provisions.

Consequently, leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs.