Anderson v Regal Investments Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   ANDERSON & ORS -v- REGAL INVESTMENTS PTY LTD & ORS [2000] WASC 258

CORAM:   MASTER BREDMEYER

HEARD:   16 OCTOBER 2000

DELIVERED          :   27 OCTOBER 2000

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2443 of 1999

BETWEEN:   WARREN PERRY ANDERSON

First Plaintiff

CHERYL ANNE ANDERSON
Second Plaintiff

MADELIENNE NITA ANDERSON
Third Plaintiff

CATHERINE LOUISE ANDERSON
Fourth Plaintiff

DANIEL JAMES ANDERSON
Fifth Plaintiff

SHAUNA ELIZABETH ANDERSON
Sixth Plaintiff

AND

REGAL INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 009 137 651)
First Defendant

OWSTON NOMINEES NO 2 PTY LTD (ACN 001 769 099)
Second Defendant

UMBERTO BRUNO GIANOTTI
Third Defendant

PETER ROLFE SWAIN
Fourth Defendant

(BY ORIGINAL ACTION)

REGAL INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 009 137 651)
Plaintiff

AND

WARREN PERRY ANDERSON
First Defendant

CHERYL ANNE ANDERSON
Second Defendant

(BY COUNTERCLAIM)

Catchwords:

Pleading - Application to strike out - Standing to sue - Rolled up pleas

Legislation:

Trade Practices Act, s 51AA, s 80 and s 87

Result:

Application allowed in part

Representation:

Original Action

Counsel:

First Plaintiff                :     Mr R J Ellicott QC & Mr M R Speakman

Second Plaintiff            :     Mr R J Ellicott QC & Mr M R Speakman

Third Plaintiff               :     Mr R J Ellicott QC & Mr M R Speakman

Fourth Plaintiff             :     Mr R J Ellicott QC & Mr M R Speakman

Fifth Plaintiff                :     Mr R J Ellicott QC & Mr M R Speakman

Sixth Plaintiff               :     Mr R J Ellicott QC & Mr M R Speakman

First Defendant             :     Mr J Gilmour QC & Mr G R Donaldson

Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Third Defendant           :     No appearance

Fourth Defendant          :     No appearance

Solicitors:

First Plaintiff                :     Williams & Hughes

Second Plaintiff            :     Williams & Hughes

Third Plaintiff               :     Williams & Hughes

Fourth Plaintiff             :     Williams & Hughes

Fifth Plaintiff                :     Williams & Hughes

Sixth Plaintiff               :     Williams & Hughes

First Defendant             :     Tottle Christensen

Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Third Defendant           :     No appearance

Fourth Defendant          :     No appearance

Counterclaim

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr J Gilmour QC & Mr G R Donaldson

First Defendant             :     Mr R J Ellicott QC & Mr M R Speakman

Second Defendant         :     Mr R J Ellicott QC & Mr M R Speakman

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Tottle Christensen

First Defendant             :     Williams & Hughes

Second Defendant         :     Williams & Hughes

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40

Hayam v Citibank NA (1987) AC 730

Lidden v Composite Buyers Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 560

Pritchard v Race Cage Pty Ltd (1997) ATPR 41‑554

Ramage v Waclaw (1988) 12 NSWLR 84

The Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447

Case(s) also cited:

Antonovic v Volker (1986) 7 NSWLR 151

Bakewell v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (SA) (1937) 58 CLR 743

Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362

Caratti v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 27 ATR 448

Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1933) 49 CLR 293

Commonwealth…

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Details
Case
[2000] WASC 258
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Anderson v Regal Investments Pty Ltd involved a dispute between the plaintiffs, who were the guarantors of a loan to the defendants, and the defendants, who were the recipients of the loan. The plaintiffs sought to strike out certain parts of the defendants' pleadings on the grounds that they did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. The defendants argued that the pleadings were sufficient and that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the action.

The legal issues before the court were whether the defendants' pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action and whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The court was required to determine whether the pleadings were sufficient to inform the defendants of the case they had to meet and whether the plaintiffs had a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the action to bring the suit.

The court found that the defendants' pleadings were not embarrassing and that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The court noted that the pleadings contained 14 facts that reasonably informed the defendants of the case they had to meet, and that the overlap between the causes of action did not cause any prejudice to the defendants. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue because they had an interest in the subject matter of the action, namely the loan agreement and the guarantees.

The court allowed the application in part and modified the prayers for relief to give effect to its views on standing. The court held that the plaintiffs could proceed with their claims for equitable compensation, an account, and restitution, but that the defendants were not required to plead to them. The court did not hear argument on these claims and noted that they may not be relevant or may have been included for good measure.

In summary, the court found that the defendants' pleadings were sufficient and that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The court allowed the application in part and modified the prayers for relief to reflect its views on standing. The court did not hear argument on certain claims and noted that they may not be relevant.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A good summary of economic duress is found in the judgment of McHugh JA in Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40 at 45:"The rationale of the doctrine of economic duress is that the law will not give effect to an apparent consent which was induced by pressure exercised upon one party by another party when the law regards that pressure as illegitimate: Universie Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 366 at 384 per Lord Diplock. As his Lordship pointed out, the consequence is that the 'consent is treated in law as revocable unless approbated either expressly or by implication after the illegitimate pressure has ceased to operate on his mind' (at 384). In the same case Lord Scarman declared (at 400) that the authorities show that there are two elements in the realm of duress: (a) pressure amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim and (b) the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted. 'There must be pressure', said Lord Scarman 'the practical effect of which is compulsion or the absence of choice'. " It is a shorthand kind of plea. The pleas of unconscionable conduct and economic duress could have been pleaded separately. This would produce two causes of action. Then they could be pleaded separately in the case of the guarantors and of the beneficiaries, giving a total of four causes of action. Then the pleas could be further subdivided into the three documents challenged giving a total of 12 causes of action. I cannot see the point of that. I consider the plea in its present form is not embarrassing. I think the 14 facts pleaded acquaint the first defendant reasonably clearly with the case it has to meet. It admits in its defence three of those 14 facts. In relation to four other facts, the plea is "[Owston] does not know and does not admit". A positive defence is pleaded in relation to two other pleas, viz that Mrs Cheryl Anderson and Ms Madelienne Anderson, the directors of Owston who signed the Loan Agreement, had no sufficient commercial experience to protect the beneficiaries and did not fully understand the effect and commercial implications of the Loan Agreement. The defence is that all the negotiations for the loan were conducted by Mr Anderson and Mr Gianotti, the former directors, who acted as agents for the two ladies. In further support of my view that this plea is not embarrassing, I note that there is some overlap between unconscionable conduct and economic duress. They are not mutually exclusive: see the quotation above from Mason J in Amadio. Moreover, the three documents were signed at the same time and, in broad terms, involved the same parties and the same arguments. I consider that this form of plea will not cause a lengthening of the trial. The application will be allowed in part. The prayers for relief need to be modified to give effect to my views on standing. In each case the prayers for equitable compensation, an account and restitution can stand. I did not hear argument on them. They may not be relevant. They may have been thrown in for good measure. They do no harm. The defendants are not required to plead to them.