Anderson v Densley

This case involved an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland concerning a claim for commission by a real estate agent, Mark Densley (the respondent), against his principal, William Charles Anderson (the appellant). Densley sought commission on the sale of grazing properties, plant, and livestock. The dispute centred on whether Densley's engagement or appointment as a commission agent was sufficiently evidenced in writing as required by section 23 (1) (b) of The Auctioneers and Commission Agents Acts 1922 to 1951 (Q.).

The legal issues before the High Court were twofold: first, whether the amendment to section 23 (1) (b) of the Act in 1936, which substituted "act as commission agent" for "act as agent," required an express written appointment as a commission agent or remuneration by commission; and second, whether the first contract of sale, which described the respondent as agent for the vendor, constituted sufficient written evidence of his engagement or appointment as a commission agent in respect of the subsequent, ultimately completed, sale of the properties with plant and livestock.

The Court held that the amendment to section 23 (1) (b) did not alter the established principle that connected writings evidencing an oral contract of agency were sufficient. This principle, established in cases like *Canniffe v. Howie*, meant that an express mention of "commission agent" or remuneration by commission was not necessary if the writing demonstrated the creation of the principal-agent relationship for the transaction. However, the Court found that the first contract of sale, while acknowledging the respondent as agent for the sale of the land, did not constitute evidence of his engagement or appointment as a commission agent for the broader transaction involving the sale of the grazing properties together with plant and livestock. The Court concluded that the first contract and a related second contract were not sufficiently connected to evidence the agency for the final, completed sale. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the judgment for the respondent was set aside, and judgment was entered for the appellant.