Anderson & Anor v Stonnington City Council

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[2021] HCATrans 065

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M102 of 2020

B e t w e e n -

JOHN RAYMOND ANDERSON

First Applicant

DEMITRA ANDERSON

Second Applicant

and

STONNINGTON CITY COUNCIL

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

KIEFEL CJ
GORDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON MONDAY, 12 APRIL 2021, AT 11.11 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR P.J. HANKS, QC:   Your Honours, I appear with MR D.M. ROBINSON, for the applicants.  (instructed by Best Hooper Lawyers)

MR C.J. HORAN, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with MS S.J. PORRITT and MR A.F. SOLOMON-BRIDGE, for the respondent.  (instructed by Maddocks)

KIEFEL CJ:   Yes, Mr Hanks.

MR HANKS:   Thank you, your Honour.  The controversy that brings us here today, your Honour, is directly connected, obviously, to the presumption that rights that have accrued are not disturbed by amending legislation in the absence of an express contrary intention.  Generally, where that proposition is invoked, the point of contention will be whether a right has actually accrued, or vested, but the question in the present application is one that precedes that question, namely, what is it that counts as a right for the purposes of that proposition?

Now, as we pointed out in our written application, there are authorities in this Court which propose a broad practical inclusive approach to that question, and we have referred to what Justice Windeyer said in Mathieson v Burton, what was said by Justices Mason, Murphy and Wilson in Carr v Finance Corporation, and I might just pause there briefly to note that their Honours said that where they were considering the common law presumption to one articulated in Maxwell v Murphy, which is plainly the analogue of the statutory provision with which we are dealing here, section 28(2)(e) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act.  Their Honours said, rights that have accrued, the recognition of those rights does not call for a narrow conception in order to avoid the erosion of the essential justice of the rule.

GORDON J:   That is the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal, was it, Mr Hanks.  They adopted that approach?

MR HANKS:   We think not, your Honour.  We say they did not.  The Court of Appeal endorsed the primary judge, and in turn we track it back to the Tribunal.  The same approach is taken in the Tribunal.  Namely, that there is a fundamental distinction between what is described as a right or privilege on the one hand, and a gap in the field, or an ability – in this case on the part of the applicants – to use and develop their property under the planning scheme, as it stood at the time when they began to develop the property.

Now, that is the approach, we say, which is based on, in the present case, an analysis by the Court of Appeal, as indeed by the primary…

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Details
Case
[2021] HCATrans 65
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal concerning a dispute between Anderson & Anor and Stonnington City Council. The core of the disagreement related to the Council's decision to refuse a planning permit for the construction of a dwelling on land owned by the Andersons. The Council's refusal was based on its interpretation of certain provisions within the Stonnington Planning Scheme.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the Council's interpretation of the relevant planning scheme provisions, specifically concerning the assessment of the proposed development against the objectives and policies of the scheme, was correct. This involved determining the proper approach to be taken by a responsible authority when considering a planning permit application under the *Planning and Environment Act 1987* (Vic).

Kiefel CJ and Gordon J held that the Council had erred in its approach. Their Honours explained that a responsible authority must consider the planning scheme as a whole, including its objectives and policies, when assessing a permit application. It is not permissible to isolate specific provisions and apply them in a manner that undermines the overarching aims of the scheme. The Court emphasised that the assessment requires a holistic and balanced consideration of all relevant aspects of the scheme, rather than a rigid, rule-based application of individual clauses.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the primary court and remitting the matter to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal for redetermination in accordance with the reasons of the High Court.

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