Andara Homes Pty Limited v Nicholas Palm and Ling Jiang
[2014] ACTSC 141
•18 June 2014
ANDARA HOMES PTY LIMITED v NICHOLAS PALM AND LING JIANG
[2014] ACTSC 141 (18 June 2014)
REAL PROPERTY – Caveats – Extension of caveat – Lapsing of caveat – Subsequent caveats
PROCEDURE – Costs – Party and party costs – Lump sum assessment by the court – principles
Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT), ss 104, 107
Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), Part 1 of the Dictionary
Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), rr 1720(3)(c), 2802, 2806, s 4.1 of Sch 4
Real Property Regulations 1993 (NSW)
Andara Homes Pty Limited v Tai [2014] ACTSC 37
Australasian Performing Rights Association Ltd v Marlin [1999] FCA 1006
Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] 2 Qd R 298
Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119
Bellissimo v JCL Investments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1260
Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation (No 2) [2008] FCA 1375
Cleary v Smith (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Higgins J, 28 May 1994)
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Individual Homes Pty Ltd (1994) 119 ACTR 1
Cwalinski v Cwalinski [1958] Tas SR 56
Danthanarayana v GR8 Constructions Pty Ltd (2012) 201 FCR 347
Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No 3) [2006] FCA 916 European Bank Ltd v Evans (2010) 240 CLR 432
Financial Integrity Group Pty Ltd v Farmer (No 3) [2014] ACTSC 75
Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd v Vimwise Civil Engineering Pty Ltd (2005) 12 BPR 23,355
In re Jones (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 560
In re Lyons (1864) 1 WW & A’B (L) 119
Keen v Telstra Corporation Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 930
Leary v Leary [1987] 1 All ER 261
Mijo Developments Pty Ltd v Royal Agnes Waters Pty Ltd (2007) 1 LT(A)R 187
Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583
Naidoo v Williamson (2008) 37 WAR 516
Sony Entertainment (Australia) Ltd v Smith (2005) 215 ALR 788
Summerfield v Summerfield [2007] Fam CA 804
Taddeo v Catalano (1975) 11 SASR 492
Vandyke v Vandyke (1976) 12 ALR 621
No. SC 148 of 2014
Judge: Refshauge J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 18 June 2014
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SC 148 of 2014
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
BETWEEN:ANDARA HOMES PTY LIMITED
Applicant
AND:NICHOLAS PALM AND LING JIANG
Respondents
ORDER
Judge: Refshauge J
Date: 18 June 2014
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The costs payable by the applicant, Andara Homes Pty Limited, by order dated 14 May 2014 be assessed and set under rule 1720(3)(c) of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) in the sum of $16,500.
On or about 6 August 2012, the respondents, Nicholas Palm and Ling Jiang (now Ling Palm), and whom I will call Mr and Mrs Palm, entered into a building contract with the applicant, Andara Homes Pty Limited, whom I will call Andara Homes.
The contract was for the construction of a home on land at Ngunnawal, the Crown Lease of which Mr and Mrs Palm had purchased.
The contract contained in clause 31 a provision said to impose a charge on the land sufficient to support Andara Homes lodging a caveat on the land. See Andara Homes Pty Limited v Tai [2014] ACTSC 37.
Andara Homes did lodge a caveat on the land on 31 January 2014, but, in circumstances not entirely clear to me, that caveat lapsed or was removed. There was, however, no challenge by Andara Homes to the respondent’s assertion that it had been removed by the Registrar-General under s 107(2) of the Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT).
On 1 April 2014, Andara Homes lodged a further caveat on the land. The Registrar-General gave notice that the caveat would lapse unless extended by an order of this Court and, on Andara Homes by its director giving the usual undertaking as to damages, I made an order on 17 April 2014, temporarily extending the caveat for a short period to permit Mr and Mrs Palm to appear and be heard.
Mr and Mrs Palm did appear subsequently and opposed the continuation of any order extending the caveat. Ultimately, on 28 April 2014, I declined to extend the caveat any further.
For reasons that appear below, I permitted Andara Homes to amend its Originating Application to apply, should it wish to do so, for leave to lodge a further caveat, as could be done under s 107C of the Land Titles Act.
On 14 May 2014, however, no such amended application having been filed, I dismissed the application and entered judgment for the respondents with costs.
The respondents sought damages. I made orders in respect of them as I shall briefly describe below.
The respondents also sought an order that I fix the costs under r 1720(3)(c) of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT). It is this matter with which these reasons are primarily concerned.
The caveat
It is desirable, however, that I set out briefly the circumstances under which these proceedings were conducted.
The caveat, the subject of the application by Andara Homes for its extension so as to prevent its lapsing, was said to be supported by the following caveatable interest:
An equitable interest subject to rights in relation to the sale of the land and the expected profits and opportunities in the same.
As noted above (at [4]-[5]), however, it was the second caveat that Andara Homes had lodged on the title to this property. That brought into play s 170C of the Land Titles Act which provides:
107C Successive caveats
(1) Where a caveat has been removed by the registrar-general in accordance with section 107 (2), the registrar-general shall not enter on the register any subsequent caveat affecting the same land or interest by the same person, or for the same purpose, except by order of the court.
(2) Where a subsequent caveat of the kind referred to in subsection (1) has been entered on the register, other than by order of the court, the registrar-general may—
(a) give notice to the caveator that the caveat will be removed; and
(b) not less than 14 days after the date of service of the notice, remove the caveat from the register, unless the court otherwise orders.
It was under s 107C(2) of the Land Titles Act that the Registrar-General had given notice to Andara Homes and which prompted it to apply to the court for an order extending the caveat.
Mr and Mrs Palm, however, opposed the application on the ground that there was no caveatable interest properly expressed in the caveat. It is clear law that a caveat which does not express a caveatable interest in adequate terms is defective in form and should be removed. See Vandyke v Vandyke (1976) 12 ALR 621 at 638-9.
In Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd v Vimwise Civil Engineering Pty Ltd (2005) 12 BPR 23,355 at 23,3579; [29]-[31], Campbell J said
[29]A claim to be entitled to an ‘equitable interest’ in land is a claim which could relate to a multiplicity of types of interest, from an equitable easement, to the benefit of an option to purchase, to a right to have an agreement for lease specifically performed to the benefit of a restrictive covenant under a common building scheme. As well, it could relate to an equitable mortgage or charge.
[30]I would not regard the identification of the interest claimed by a caveator as being nothing more than an ‘equitable interest’ as specifying the interest to which a caveator claims to be entitled. One of the functions of a caveat is to notify someone who searches the register of what interest the caveator claims. A claim to an ‘equitable interest’ does not do that.
[31]S Lindsay, Caveats against dealings in Australia and New Zealand, Federation Press, Leichhardt, 1995, p 149 says that ‘it is insufficient to claim an interest pursuant to an agreement dated “X” without specifying the nature of the interest’. The same author, at p 157, refers to it being a ‘fundamental requirement’ that a caveator ‘fully and properly describe its interest, which requires disclosure of both the nature of the claim and the grounds for making it’. I agree with those statements of the law.
See also Bellissimo v JCL Investments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1260 at [7].
There is, Mr R Thomas, Counsel for Andara Homes, pointed out, a difference between the legislative provisions in New South Wales and this Territory where, in the latter jurisdiction prescribed particulars of the estate or interest are required to be included. A schedule to Real Property Regulations 1993 (NSW) requires that “particulars of the nature of the estate or interest for land claimed by the caveator” and “the facts upon which the claim is founded, including (if appropriate) a statement of the manner in which the estate or interest claimed is derived from the registered proprietor of the estate or interest” are required to be stated in the caveat as well as the nature and date of any written agreement or instrument. In this Territory, s 104(6) of the Land Titles Act simply requires “a sufficient description to identify the land and the interests therein claimed by the caveator”.
Nevertheless, there are a number of decisions which do hold that, quite apart from the particular express statutory provision of New South Wales, the mere description of “an equitable interest” is insufficient. In Cwalinski v Cwalinski [1958] Tas SR 56 at 57, Burbury CJ so held on a statute very similar to the relevant terms of the Land Titles Act. See also In re Lyons (1864) 1 WW & A’B (L) 119, In re Jones (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 560.
Thus, it seemed to me that a bare assertion of “an equitable interest” was insufficient a description of the interest in the land claimed by Andara Homes.
Mr Thomas submitted that there was a constructive trust created by the construction of part of the home on the land and the purchase and delivery to the land of goods by Andara Homes.
He relied on Danthanarayana v GR8 Constructions Pty Ltd (2012) 201 FCR 347. That decision, however, merely recognised that cl 31 of the Standard Home Building Contract of the Master Builders Association of the ACT created a charge on the land to secure payment of all moneys owing to a builder. In that case, Foster J held (at 357-8; [51]-[52]) that the charge did not cease to be effective after the building contract had been terminated, as, controversially, had occurred here.
It appears that this was the basis of the first caveat, however, and Andara Homes seemed to be trying to distinguish the two interests expressed in the two caveats.
Instead, Mr Thomas relied on the principles established in Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583 at 620 where Deane J said of the principles underlying the mention of a constructive trust
Those circumstances can be more precisely defined by saying that the principle operates in a case where the substratum of a joint relationship or endeavour is removed without attributable blame and where the benefit of money or other property contributed by one party on the basis and for the purposes of the relationship or endeavour would otherwise be enjoyed by the other party in circumstances in which it was not specifically intended or specially provided that that other party should so enjoy it. The content of the principle is that, in such a case, equity will not permit that other party to assert or retain the benefit of the relevant property to the extent that it would be unconscionable for him so to do.
Should a constructive trust be created here, as meeting this description, then there is no doubt that it would provide a caveatable interest. See Taddeo v Catalano (1975) 11 SASR 492 at 494-5.
In any event, an interest in land, which is the term used in s 104(6) of the Land Titles Act, is defined very widely in Part 1 of the Dictionary to the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) as follows:
interest, in relation to land or other property, means –
(a)a legal or equitable estate in the land or other property; or
(b)a right, power or privilege over, or in relation to, the land or other property.
It is an extraordinarily wide definition. It may be that the width of the definition is not co-extensive with the width of a caveatable interest. I do not need to explore that question; it must await another day. In Mijo Developments Pty Ltd v Royal Agnes Waters Pty Ltd (2007) 1 LT(A)R 187 at 194; [48], Hammerschlag J held that a constructive trust was at least a right in respect of the land and a sufficient caveatable interest.
The problem here, however, is that I could not see any basis for finding that there was a constructive trust on the facts here. There was a charge on the land to protect unpaid moneys due. This is a strong indication that there was no trust imposed on the property. Further, it has to be said that, at all times, it was specifically intended that Mr and Mrs Palm would enjoy the benefit of the work and property supplied by Andara Homes. This was, of course, a provisional view.
I gave Andara Homes the opportunity to show that a constructive trust had been created, contrary to my initial opinion. It did not do so. It was in this context that I dismissed the application and entered judgment for Mr and Mrs Palm.
Damages
As noted above (at [5]), I required as a condition of the extension of the caveat that I did grant, an undertaking as to damages and, because of the risk that Andara Homes would not be able to meet any damages, a deposit of $2,000 as security for the undertaking. This is a not uncommon requirement where the mere undertaking may be insufficient or of little value.
Regrettably, the Registry accepted a company cheque for that sum and it was dishonoured on presentation.
Nevertheless, on the entry of judgment, Mr and Mrs Palm sought damages. The principles applicable to such payments have been authoritatively determined by the High Court in European Bank Ltd v Evans (2010) 240 CLR 432.
The Court held (at 442; [29]) that the appropriate inquiry as to such damages is to be found by asking and answering the following questions:
· What is the loss that is now alleged?
· Did that loss flow directly from the order made upon the undertaking?
· Could loss of this kind that was sustained (not necessarily the actual loss) have been foreseen at the time of the order?
I have discussed this issue further in Financial Integrity Group Pty Ltd v Farmer (No 3) [2014] ACTSC 75 at [91]-[94]. I adopted the same approach.
Effectively, Mr and Mrs Palm sought payment of three sums:
(a) $561.15 being interest charged on the loan from the Commonwealth Bank for the purchase of the land.
(b) $530.76 being outstanding payments from the new builder.
(c) $1,200 being rent payable on the premises they presently occupy.
These sums were said to represent the amounts due or payable during the period of the extension of the caveat, namely from 1 to 28 April 2014.
With no opposition from Andara Homes, I accepted the second amount claimed, $530.76. It was interest payable on amounts claimed by the new builder which could not be paid because the Bank would not advance further moneys while the caveat remained in place.
I did not consider that the interest payable to the Bank, the first amount, was a damage since it did not accrue because the caveat was lodged and the loan period was not extended because of the caveat. It did not seem to me that this was a loss stemming directly from the extension of the caveat; indeed, it did not seem to me to be a loss at all.
As to the rent, I deferred a decision on that for there is no certainty at the present that the construction of the premises will not be completed on time such that there is no extra rent payable because of delays occasioned by the extension of the caveat. I gave Mr and Mrs Palm leave to approach me should this damage actually eventuate.
Regrettably, the dishonour of the cheque meant that the damages I have found cannot be paid to Mr and Mrs Palm out of any funds in Court.
Costs
Application was also made for payment of costs in a sum assessed by the Court. This is possible under r 1720(3)(c) of the Court Procedures Rules which permits a court to make an order that the person liable to pay the costs, in this case Andara Homes, pay the person entitled to the costs “an amount of costs decided by the court”.
Initially, I ordered that the parties confer with a view to coming to some agreement as to costs. I indicated that, if no agreement could be reached, that I would consider whether to make an order of the kind sought. I was recently informed that no agreement had been reached and so I will proceed to determine the application. I gave Andara Homes an opportunity to make any submissions it wished to make in writing.
The Court, of course, has a wide discretion as to decisions about costs. As Steytler P, with whom Pullin JA and Murray AJA agreed, said in Naidoo v Williamson (2008) 37 WAR 516 at 526; [39]
The only fetters are those provided elsewhere in the Supreme Court Act and the Rules, or in any other Act (none of which is presently applicable) and, of course, the fact that the discretion must be exercised judicially.
It must be recognised that, when a court assesses the costs, it will not have the detailed knowledge that the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar have of the amounts regularly allowed and the detail of the assessment of costs. Indeed, as Jacobson J said in Sony Entertainment (Australia) Ltd v Smith (2005) 215 ALR 788 at 813; [197], “the exercise of the rule contemplates a much broader brush than would be applied on taxation”. Indeed, there should not be an inquiry on the nature of a taxation of costs: Leary v Leary [1987] 1 All ER 261 at 264.
The purpose of the rule permitting such a procedure is to avoid the expense, delay and aggravation involved in protracted litigation arising out of an assessment of costs (called, until the making of the Court Procedures Rules, the “taxation of costs”). See Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 120.
There is clearly a strong case for assessing a fixed sum where the party required to pay the costs is unlikely to be able to do so due to his, her or its financial position and when a formal assessment will add to the financial burden of the party entitled to the costs without a likelihood of recovering the extra costs spent. See Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No 3) [2006] FCA 916 at [29], Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation (No 2) [2008] FCA 1375 at [42].
The conduct of the litigation by the party liable for the costs may also be a very relevant factor in determining whether the court should assess the costs. Where that party has caused trouble and expense in the proceedings, delayed or failed to comply with court orders, or otherwise failed to ensure an expeditious and efficient disposal of the litigation, this may well indicate a protracted process of assessment that would be unfair or unreasonable to impose on the party entitled to the costs. See Sony Entertainment (Australia) Pty Ltd v Smith at 812; [192], Summerfield v Summerfield [2007] Fam CA 804 at [109]. There was no obvious issue of that kind here, though Andara Homes did not prepare evidentiary material that should have been adduced.
The likelihood that the party liable for the costs will not attend the formal assessment of costs is also a relevant factor when deciding whether to fix a lump sum. See Sony Entertainment (Australia) Pty Ltd v Smith at 812; [193]. While Andara Homes has delayed in these proceedings, a relevant matter, I have no reason to believe it would not appear at the formal assessment.
In Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] 2 Qd R 298 at 306-7; [32] the Court adopted from the submissions of the respondent the reasons why a court would make such an order and the circumstances of its making with appropriate reference to authorities as follows:
(a) the purpose of making a gross sum order is to save the parties the time, trouble, delay and expense and aggravation in protracted litigation arising out of taxation: Leary v Leary [1987] 1 WLR 72, 76 (Leary) and Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 (Beach Petroleum);
(b) the specification of a gross sum order is not the result of a process of taxation or assessment of costs: Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738, 743, [22] (Harrison);
(c) the power to make a gross sum order should be exercised only when the Court considers that it can do so fairly between the parties, and that includes sufficient evidence in arriving at an appropriate sum on the materials available: Wentworth v Wentworth (Court of Appeal (NSW), 21 February 1996, unreported) per Clarke JA and referred to in Harrison at [22];
(d) the gross sum can only be fixed broadly having regard to the information before the Court: Beach Petroleum at 124 and Harrison at [22];
(e) expert evidence analysing the bills of costs and/or giving an opinion about the likely outcome of the taxation has been utilised by the Court in making the gross sum order: Beach Petroleum at 121;
(f)the Court should be confident in fixing the amount of the gross fee that the approach taken to estimate costs is logical, fair and reasonable: Beach Petroleum at 123;
(g) the power to order gross sum amounts is appropriate to be used in complex cases: Beach Petroleum at 120;
(h) the Court must be astute to prevent prejudice to the party ordered to pay the costs by overestimating the costs, but must also be astute not to cause an injustice to the successful party by an arbitrary “failsafe” discount on the cost estimates submitted to the Court: Beach Petroleum at 124;
(i) the power to order a gross sum may appropriately be exercised where the assessment of costs would be protracted and expensive, and in particular if it appears that the party obliged to pay the costs would not be able to meet a liability of the order likely to result from the assessment: Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc [2000] FCA 628 at [25] and Harrison at [21].
I would add that, in addition, a simple matter may make it “entirely appropriate to save the parties the difficulties and inconvenience, and added expense of a taxation” as noted by Burchett J in Australasian Performing Rights Association Ltd v Marlin [1999] FCA 1006 at [4]. See also Keen v Telstra Corporation Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 930 at [6]-[7].
The overriding obligation of the Court is to act judicially. As Purchas LJ described the obligation in Leary v Leary [1987] 1 All ER 261 at 265
It is easy to envisage cases where a judge could be said to have acted unjudicially: eg by clutching a figure out of the air without having any indication as to the estimated costs; receiving such an estimate without the details being made available to the other side; or refusing a request to hear submissions on such a schedule if the party against whom the order is to be made makes on reasonable grounds, an application to be heard.
Should an order be made in this case?
There are a number of factors that tell in favour of the court exercising its jurisdiction to assess the costs as a lump sum.
The matter was relatively simple, though some of the legal argument was complex.
Andara Homes has, by its conduct, raised the real possibility that it will not be able to pay any costs assessed. This is the result of the fact that its cheque in payment of the filing fees in this matter delivered on 17 April 2014 was dishonoured on presentation which I noted to the parties on 14 May 2014. As noted earlier (at [31]), the cheque it used to pay into court the amount on account of damages was also dishonoured on presentation.
Mr and Mrs Palm have also provided with their application detailed and reasoned material in support of the amount they claim. This material was in the form of an affidavit of their solicitor, Steven John Gavagna, affirmed on 14 May 2014 which I have read.
Andara Homes, however, opposed the application.
At present, however, Andara Homes appears to be unrepresented. Its lawyers have failed to seek leave to withdraw in accordance with r 2806 of the Court Procedures Rules or encourage Andara Homes to act for itself and proceed under r 2802. That strictly leaves them as solicitors on the record with the obligations and duties, including to the Court, that this entails.
Nevertheless, I permitted, though with some limitations, a director of Andara Homes, Mr Simon Anderson, to represent the company as was done in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Individual Homes Pty Ltd (1994) 119 ACTR 1 at 3.
He sought that I defer my decision as he said he was trying to secure legal representation. After fourteen days, I directed that he have a further four days within to make any submissions.
I did receive a submission in which Mr Anderson submitted that the costs should be assessed by an “external party”. The grounds were based on criticisms he made of the solicitors for Mr and Mrs Palm so that, he said, the costs would not be justified.
The Court is, of course, an “external party” and can perfectly well assess the costs in a fair and unbiased manner, though I accept that a judge may not have the same detailed knowledge as the Registrar or Deputy Registrar would bring as the officers charged ordinarily to undertake the task.
The allegations about the solicitor for Mr and Mrs Palm appears to be based on a complaint that Mr Anderson has made about him. It is, of course, not possible to assess that complaint or form any view about it at all, but it is, in any event, quite irrelevant to the question of costs, for they must be assessed on the evidence adduced which is detailed and provides enough information to properly assess it.
In my view, it is appropriate that the Court proceed as requested and I will determine the amount of the costs to be paid by Andara Homes.
The amount to be ordered
Mr and Mrs Palm have sought an amount of $17,267.83.
Attached to the affidavit of Mr Gavagna filed in support of their claim was an itemised solicitor-client account and counsel’s fee note.
Mr Gavagna also deposed that he has experience of over fifty matters involving costs negotiations and assessments and about fifteen matters which have proceeded to assessment (taxation). He has also appeared before the Registrar or Deputy Registrar in respect of such assessments.
He set out the charges made for the various members of his staff engaged in the proceedings, the hours they worked and the total charged on that basis. Counsel’s fees in the sum of $7,276.50 were also charged.
The total amount of the costs and disbursements was $23,018.33. He estimated an additional $1650 for the final appearance before me.
The itemised account annexed to his affidavit set out the amounts claimed with an indication of the work done, which permits me to have a good opportunity to evaluate the necessity and propriety of the work done and the amounts claimed. Nevertheless, I should not proceed as if I were taxing the account.
Mr Gavagna estimated that the party and party costs would be allowed in the sum of $17,267.83.
Counsel submitted that a test on that figure was to compare the scale costs with those charged. Thus, the scale charge allowable for the holder of an unrestricted practising certificate or a solicitor who has held a practising certificate for two or more years experience was $360.50 per hour while Mr Gavagna charged $495 an hour. This was thirty percent above the scale.
The costs of a senior associate were charged at $412.50 per hour which was fifteen per cent above the scale. There were other varying discounts for other staff.
Applying these discounts to the fees charged, though, of course, not for counsel’s fees or for disbursements, counsel estimated that the total on this basis would be $17,360 and used that as a check on Mr Gavagna’s estimate.
I have also briefly reviewed the itemised list. A number of items were included but, quite properly, not charged for as they would not be recoverable on a party and party assessment of costs.
It seemed to me also that a number of items for which the scale provided a specific sum were charged on a time basis. Some of the items thus charged were less than the scale fee though some exceeded it. Further, while Mr Gavagna had not charged for items that would be regarded as solicitor-client items, I could identify a number of other items that I considered would not be payable on a party and party basis.
I acknowledge that s 4.1 of Sch 4 of the Court Procedures Rules permits an additional sum to be allowed to provide for the solicitor’s care and conduct of a proceeding. This takes account of matters such as the complexity of the proceedings, the difficulty or novelty of the issues, the amount involved, the importance of the matter to the party, the skill and labour used, including specialised knowledge as well as other matters. This has conventionally been allowed at one-third of the amount claimed: Cleary v Smith (Unreported, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Higgins J, 28 May 1994) 1-2.
In the circumstances, I am prepared to allow the costs on a party and party basis in the sum of $16,500. I will make orders to that effect.
I certify that the preceding seventy-seven (77) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour, Justice Refshauge.
Associate:
Date: 18 June 2014
Counsel for the plaintiff: Mr R Thomas
Solicitor for the plaintiff: Elringtons
Counsel for the respondents: Mr G Blank
Solicitor for the respondents: Goodman Law
Date of hearing: 28 April 2014
Date of judgment: 18 June 2014
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