| [2022] FWC 1430 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Amy Harlow
v
Finncare Aged Care
(U2022/3601)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT LAKE | BRISBANE, 7 JUNE 2022 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – application made outside of statutory timeframe – application for extension of time dismissed.
Ms Harlow (the Applicant) lodged an application with the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) in relation to the termination of her employment by Finncare Aged Care (the Respondent).
The Applicant began her employment on 9 June 2021. It is uncontentious that the Respondent terminated the Applicant’s employment on 17 February 2022. That application was lodged with the Commission on 25 March 2022.
Representation
The Respondent sought to be represented by a paid agent, Ms Georgia Patterson. Granting permission to be represented under s.596 requires the satisfaction of two elements.[1] The first pre-requisite: the presence of one of the criteria under s.596(2), does not immediately invoke the right to representation and establishing satisfaction “involves an evaluative judgment akin to the exercise of discretion.”[2] Once that first step is satisfied, the second step “involves consideration as to whether in all of the circumstances the discretion should be exercised in favour of the party seeking permission.”[3] I exercised my discretion and granted permission pursuant to s.596(2) to the Respondent, as I was satisfied that the matter would be dealt with more efficiently and effectively, considering the complexity of the matter and the capabilities of the parties.
Was the application lodged within time?
Section 394(2) of the Act requires that an application for unfair dismissal remedy be made within 21 days after a dismissal took effect, or in such further time as the Commission may allow pursuant to s.394(3) of the Act.
The Applicant lodged her application on 25 March 2022. She does not accept that her application was made some 15 days outside of the 21 days required under s.394(2) of the Act.
The Respondent opposes the granting of an extension of time. It is therefore necessary to determine whether a further period should be allowed under s. 394(3) of the Act for the application to be made.
Consideration of whether a further period should be granted
Section 394(3) of the Act sets out the circumstances in which the Commission may allow a further period for a general protections application involving dismissal be made:
“(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b)whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in…
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- Case
- [2022] FWC 1430
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Commission found that the explanation for the delay and the Applicant’s lack of mitigation efforts against an extension of time. The Commission also found that the Applicant became aware of her dismissal on 11 January 2022, and she contested the dismissal generally with the Respondent. However, the absence of prejudice to the Respondent and the neutral factors of the merits of the application and fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a like position did not weigh in favour of an extension of time. The Commission concluded that the Applicant did not satisfy the test of ‘exceptional circumstances’ under s.394(3) of the Act and dismissed the application.
The Commission ordered that the application be dismissed.