Amos v Brisbane City Council

[2006] HCATrans 224

[2006] HCATrans 224

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B108 of 2005

B e t w e e n -

EDWARD AMOS

Applicant

and

BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

Publication of reasons and pronouncement of orders

GUMMOW J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 10 MAY 2006, AT 9.27 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

GUMMOW J:   The applicant was unsuccessful in a claim brought in the Magistrates Court of Queensland against the respondent in respect of personal injuries, and costs were awarded against him by the magistrate on 1 June 2005. The applicant contended that the magistrate had no power to award costs against him, by reason of s 56 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Q). That section is expressed by sub-s (1) to apply “if a court awards $50,000 or less in damages”, and sub-s (2) makes provision for certain principles which must be applied with respect to costs orders “[i]f the Court awards $30,000 or less in damages”.

The applicant’s case is that s 56 required that the magistrate make no order as to costs, because the nil damages he obtained was less than $30,000, so mandating that the principles in s 56(2) be applied which do not provide that a court may award costs. That contention was rejected at first instance by the magistrate, on appeal to the District Court of Queensland (Griffin DCJ) on 25 July 2005, and on further appeal to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland on 25 November 2005. In the Court of Appeal, Muir J (with whom Jerrard and Keane JJA agreed) held that the words of s 56 were unambiguous and “incapable of accommodating an order dismissing proceedings” of the kind made in this case. Muir J also rejected the proposition that s 56 provides a complete code governing the award of costs in personal injuries matters to the exclusion of the court’s long‑standing and statutorily conferred powers to award costs in situations (such as the applicant’s case) to which s 56 is silent.

We have considered the applicant’s written case and the decisions of the Magistrates Court, the District Court and the Court of Appeal. In the light of the clear terms of s 56, the decision of those Courts was correct and the construction sought to be advanced by the applicant is untenable. There are insufficient prospects of success to warrant a grant of special leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal. Special leave is refused.

Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application for special leave.  I publish the disposition signed by Heydon J and myself.

AT 9.29 AM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED