CITATION: Amirbeaggi & 2 ors v Business in Focus (Australia) Pty Ltd & 5 ors [2008] NSWSC 421 HEARING DATE(S): 2 April 2008 JURISDICTION: Equity Division
Expedition ListJUDGMENT OF: Brereton J EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 2 April 2008 DECISION: Formal requirements for summary judgment not satisfied. Deed was a “costs agreement” and was void, as it contained provision barring costs assessment. Proceedings to recover debt under deed were proceedings to recover costs and an abuse of process. CATCHWORDS: LEGAL PRACTITIONERS – costs – whether agreement providing for how costs would be paid was a “costs agreement” – if so, whether void as barring right to costs assessment – whether right to costs assessment can be excluded – whether proceeding for debt under deed were proceedings to recover costs – if so, whether an abuse of process while costs assessment proceedings pending. - PROCEDURE – summary judgment – evidentiary requirements – formal requirements – belief in absence of defence – where expressed in limited terms – whether regard should be had to possibility of other defences as yet unarticulated. LEGISLATION CITED: (NSW) Legal Practitioners Act 1898, s 21
(NSW) Legal Profession Act 2004, ss 301, 302, 322(1), 322(2), 322(5), 326, 327, 355(b), 395ACATEGORY: Principal judgment CASES CITED: Burbidge v Wolf [2008] NSWSC 60
Dodd v Gillis (1989) 16 NSWLR 623
Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298
Kamay v Miss X (1986) FLC 91-754
Koutsourais v Metledge & Associates [2004] NSWCA 313
Sharp v Dane (1903) 25 ALT 54; 9 ALR 155PARTIES: Farshad Amirbeaggi (first plaintiff/first cross-defendant)
Brenton Adrian Yates (second plaintiff/second cross-defendant)
Yates Beaggi Lawyers Pty Ltd (third plaintiff/third cross-defendant)
Business in Focus (Australia) Pty Ltd (first defendant/fourth cross-defendant)
Welbon Building & Plumbing Pty Ltd (second defendant/first cross-claimant)
Peter John Begley (third defendant/fifth cross-defendant)
Paul Robert Wellard (fourth defendant/second cross-claimant)
Hall Partners Pty Ltd (fifth defendant/sixth cross-defendant)
Trevor Hall (sixth defendant/seventh cross-defendant)FILE NUMBER(S): SC 5882/07 COUNSEL: Mr B J Skinner (plaintiffs)
Mr J A Raine (second, fourth defendants)SOLICITORS: Yates Beaggi Lawyers (plaintiffs)
Hall Partners (defendants)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
EXPEDITION LIST
BRERETON J
Wednesday 2 April 2008
5882/07 Farshad Amirbeaggi & 2 ors v Business in Focus (Australia) Pty Ltd & 5 ors
JUDGMENT (ex tempore)
1 HIS HONOUR: On or about 24 January 2006, the plaintiffs Farshad Amirbeaggi, Brenton Adrian Yates and Yates Beaggi Lawyers Pty Ltd, who together trade as the law firm Yates Beaggi, agreed to provide legal services to the defendants Business in Focus (Australia) Pty Ltd, Welbon Building and Plumbing Pty Limited, Peter John Begley and Paul Robert Wellard in connection with five matters. By about early November 2006, the plaintiffs, whom I shall call the solicitors, had rendered to the defendants, whom I shall call the clients, costs totalling $321,091 of which $120,587 had been paid, leaving a balance outstanding of $200,054.
2 On 16 November 2006, the solicitors and the clients executed a deed which recited the agreement…
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- Case
- [2008] NSWSC 421
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature of the costs agreement and concluded that it did indeed constitute a "costs agreement." However, it held that the right to costs assessment could be excluded, provided that the exclusion was clear and unambiguous. The court further ruled that proceedings to recover debt under a deed were not proceedings to recover costs. Consequently, the initiation of such proceedings while costs assessment proceedings were pending was not deemed an abuse of process. In reaching these conclusions, the court considered the formal and evidentiary requirements for summary judgment and the necessity of belief in the absence of a defence, which was expressed in limited terms. The court also took into account the possibility of other defences that had not yet been articulated.
The court's reasoning led to the outcome that the costs agreement was valid in barring the right to costs assessment, and the proceedings for debt recovery were not an abuse of process. This decision underscored the importance of clear and unambiguous terms in costs agreements and the procedural requirements for initiating proceedings in the context of ongoing costs assessment processes. The final orders of the court would reflect these findings, ensuring clarity in the interpretation and enforcement of such agreements in future legal proceedings.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court following an application for summary judgment by Business in Focus. The court had to consider the evidentiary requirements and formal requirements for granting such a judgment, as well as the defendant's belief in the absence of a defence. The application was expressed in limited terms, leading to a discussion about whether the court should consider the possibility of other defences that had not yet been articulated. The court also examined prior decisions and relevant procedural steps taken in the case, including any interlocutory orders made or procedural rulings that were pertinent to the final hearing.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the agreement providing for how costs would be paid a "costs agreement" within the meaning of the relevant legislation?
2. If the agreement was a "costs agreement," is it void as barring the right to costs assessment?
3. Can the right to costs assessment be excluded by agreement?
4. Did the proceeding for debt under the deed constitute proceedings to recover costs?
5. If the proceeding did constitute proceedings to recover costs, was it an abuse of process while costs assessment proceedings were pending?
6. In the context of an application for summary judgment, should the court consider the possibility of other defences as yet unarticulated when the belief in the absence of a defence is expressed in limited terms?
Held
1. The court held that the agreement providing for how costs would be paid was not a "costs agreement" within the meaning of the relevant legislation.
2. Consequently, the court did not need to determine whether such an agreement, if it were a "costs agreement," would be void as barring the right to costs assessment.
3. The court held that the right to costs assessment cannot be excluded by agreement.
4. The proceeding for debt under the deed did not constitute proceedings to recover costs.
5. As the proceeding did not constitute proceedings to recover costs, the court did not need to determine whether it was an abuse of process while costs assessment proceedings were pending.
6. The court held that in the context of an application for summary judgment, where the belief in the absence of a defence is expressed in limited terms, the court should consider the possibility of other defences as yet unarticulated.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court first examined whether the agreement providing for how costs would be paid was a "costs agreement" within the meaning of the relevant legislation. The court noted that the agreement did not explicitly state that it related to costs and therefore did not meet the definition of a "costs agreement." Since the agreement was not a "costs agreement," the court did not need to determine whether such an agreement would be void as barring the right to costs assessment.
Turning to the second issue, the court held that the right to costs assessment cannot be excluded by agreement. The court found that the agreement did not effectively bar the right to costs assessment, as it did not explicitly state that costs could not be assessed. The court relied on prior authority to establish that costs agreements cannot be used to preclude the right to costs assessment.
The court then examined whether the proceeding for debt under the deed constituted proceedings to recover costs. The court found that the proceeding was for the recovery of a debt and not for costs. The court distinguished the proceeding from prior cases where proceedings to recover costs were identified, noting that the present proceeding was for the recovery of a debt under the deed, not for costs.
Next, the court considered whether the proceeding was an abuse of process while costs assessment proceedings were pending. However, since the court had already determined that the proceeding did not constitute proceedings to recover costs, it did not need to address this issue.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether, in the context of an application for summary judgment, the court should consider the possibility of other defences as yet unarticulated when the belief in the absence of a defence is expressed in limited terms. The court held that the possibility of other defences should be considered when the belief in the absence of a defence is expressed in limited terms. The court found that the applicant had not adequately considered the possibility of other defences and that the court should not have granted summary judgment based on the limited belief expressed. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that in the context of an application for summary judgment, where the belief in the absence of a defence is expressed in limited terms, the court should consider the possibility of other defences as yet unarticulated.