AMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1477

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: AMG17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1746
File number: NSD 1371 of 2017
Judge: O'CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment: 22 November 2017
Date of publication of reasons: 7 December 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where proposed grounds of appeal directed entirely to merits of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision – decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant grant of leave – application dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5J(1)(a), 36(2)(a) and (aa)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r 44.121(a)

Cases cited:

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

Décor Corporation Proprietary Limited v Dard Industries Inconvenience (1991) 33 FCR 397

Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 172

Date of hearing: 22 November 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 11
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S A Given
Solicitor for the First Respondent:  HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1371 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AMG17
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 NOVEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)

O’CALLAGHAN J:

  1. The applicant in this proceeding seeks leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) in AMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1746. The primary judge dismissed the proceeding pursuant to r 44.121(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). Accordingly, the order is interlocutory, and pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the applicant requires leave to bring any appeal against the decision of the primary judge. A grant of leave to appeal will be made where it is established that the decision of the primary judge is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on appeal and where substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision of the primary judge to be wrong: see Décor Corporation Proprietary Limited v Dard Industries Inconvenience (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-9.

    TRIBUNAL’S DECISION

  2. The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia.  He lodged an application for…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1477
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AMG17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an applicant seeking leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The decision dismissed an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The applicant sought to challenge the AAT's conclusion that they did not have a well-founded fear of persecution and were not a refugee, as well as the AAT's decision that Australia had no protection obligations towards them under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The AAT also rejected the applicant's claim for complementary protection. The primary judge had identified three legal issues from the applicant's grounds of appeal, namely whether the AAT's conclusions or decisions were reasonable, whether there was procedural unfairness, and whether there was a problem with interpretation. The primary judge dismissed the application on the basis that the AAT was not required to have evidence to rebut the applicant's claims, but rather needed to reach a positive state of satisfaction that the applicant was owed protection obligations.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on three grounds. The first ground argued that the AAT did not identify the potential harm taken by the Malaysian government correctly. The second ground alleged that the AAT doubted all the supporting documents provided by the applicant, which caused confusion. The third ground claimed that the AAT reviewed the applicant's case incorrectly and hid the serious question of persecution the applicant would face if returned to Malaysia. However, the applicant did not file any written submissions to support their application for leave to appeal. At the hearing, the applicant made statements that did not assist their case. The court held that none of the grounds contended for could possibly succeed if leave were granted because each one was based on the misconceived notion that the court had jurisdiction to engage in merits review of the AAT's decision. The court does not have such jurisdiction and the proposed grounds did not seek to impugn the primary judge's decision.

The Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The court held that the proposed grounds for appeal did not seek to impugn the primary judge's decision and were not based on any jurisdictional error made by the primary judge. The court also held that the proposed grounds were misconceived and could not possibly succeed if leave were granted. The court further held that the proposed grounds were directed entirely to the merits of the AAT's decision, which the court could not review. The court held that the decision of the primary judge was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal found that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution and is not a refugee. The Tribunal was therefore satisfied that the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. For the same reasons, the Tribunal also rejected the applicant’s claim under the complementary protection provisions in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION The proceedings in the FCCA began with a show cause application filed on 6 February 2017. Pursuant to r 44.13(1) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) at the hearing of the application for an order to show cause before the primary judge, the applicant was confined to the grounds contained in his application. The grounds contained in his application are set out in [7] of the primary judge’s reasons. It is not necessary to rehearse those grounds in these reasons. In order to assist the applicant, the primary judge distilled three legal issues from the grounds contended for in the show cause application, namely:(1)whether the conclusions or decision of the Tribunal were/was reasonable;(2)whether procedural unfairness before the Tribunal was involved in some way; and/or(3)whether there was a problem with interpretation at the hearing. The third ground identified by the primary judge is not relied on by the applicant on this application, so it is not necessary here to rehearse the basis upon which the primary judge rejected the submissions made about that ground by the applicant. The primary judge rejected the other two grounds as to unreasonableness or unfairness as having no basis. The primary judge held, contrary to the assertions contained in the grounds, that the Tribunal was not required to have evidence to rebut the applicant’s claims. Rather, it was required to reach a positive state of satisfaction that the applicant was owed protection obligations.THE APPEAL In this Court, the applicant seeks leave to appeal on three grounds. Those grounds, which include, understandably enough, grammatical errors, are as follows:1.AAT did not identify the potential harm taken by Malaysia Government correctly.2.AAT has doubted all the supporting documents provided by me which confused a lot.3.AAT reviewed my case incorrectly. The tribunal hided the serious question of the persecution I will face if return Malaysia. The applicant did not file or rely on any written submissions. At the hearing in this Court, the applicant was asked if he wished to make any submission in support of his application for leave to appeal. In response, he said, “If I am asked to sign my name, I just sign my name. I made a mistake at my first step. I can only continue with what I’m doing”. In my view, those statements do not assist the applicant. In my view, none of the grounds contended for can possibly succeed if leave were to be granted, because each one of them is founded on the misconceived notion that this Court has any jurisdiction to engage in merits review of the Tribunal’s decision. The Court does not have that jurisdiction: see by way of example only Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-7; and see also Gupta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 172 at [62] per Gilmour and Mortimer JJ, Logan J agreeing at [102]. Further, as counsel for the first respondent submitted, the proposed grounds do not seek to impugn the decision of the primary judge in any event.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established