AMF15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AMF15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR (No.2) [2016] FCCA 2743
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Review of former Refugee Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a protection visa – applicant relevantly claiming a fear of harm in Iran as a Christian convert – applicant not believed – whether the Tribunal applied a test of religious faith inconsistently with s.116 of the Constitution or customary international law considered – whether the Tribunal otherwise erred in testing the veracity of the applicant’s claims considered – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, s.116

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 91R

Cases cited:

ABX15 v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCA 855

Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1

Minister for Immigration v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362

Minister for Immigration v SZOCT (2010) 119 ALD 90

Plaintiff 178A/2016 v Minister for Immigration [2016] HCA Trans 219
SZLSP v Minister for Immigration [2012] FCA 451
SZWAR v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2382

Wang v Minister for Immigration (2000) 105 FCR 548

Applicant: AMF15
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 1048 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Driver
Hearing date: 25 October 2016
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 21 November 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Williams
Solicitors for the Applicant: Russell C Byrnes, Solicitor
Solicitors for the Respondents: Mr A Markus of Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The application as amended on 12 October 2016 is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1048 of 2015

AMF15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and background

  1. This is one of a series of cases in which applicants have raised issues relating to s.116 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution (Constitution) concerning the testing of religious faith.  The legal representation in each of these cases has been the same and the arguments raised are essentially the same.  The arguments have been rejected in this Court, on appeal in the Federal Court and in the original jurisdiction of the High Court.  The arguments are raised again in this case but, in light of the entirely unfavourable authority arising from previous cases, the issues are only raised so as to protect the applicant’s rights on appeal.  Different arguments are also raised based upon more traditional administrative law grounds.

  2. On 14 May 2015, a Judge of this Court made orders dismissing the application with costs under rule 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (Federal Circuit Court Rules). Those orders were subsequently set aside by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia on 20 May 2016[1], and the application was remitted to this Court to be heard and determined according to law.

  3. Following remittal, the applicant was given leave to file and serve an amended application, further…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 2743
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Judge Driver of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, Family Law Division. The applicant, AMF15, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and another party, concerning the applicant's claim to be a genuine convert to Christianity. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the Tribunal, in assessing the applicant's genuineness, had fallen into jurisdictional error by applying an impermissible premise regarding the expected knowledge of a Christian convert.

The primary legal issue before the court was to determine whether the Tribunal's assessment of the applicant's knowledge of Christian tenets and the Bible demonstrated an erroneous a priori assumption that all believers must possess specific knowledge, or whether it represented a legitimate exploration of the applicant's genuine adherence to the religion. This involved distinguishing between a flawed premise that dictates a minimum standard of knowledge for all adherents and a lawful assessment of an individual applicant's knowledge in the context of their claimed conversion.

Judge Driver accepted the Minister's submission that the Tribunal's language did not support the conclusion that it operated from a premise that all believers must possess certain specific knowledge. The court reasoned that the Tribunal's written reasons typically reflect a concluded view after considering all evidence, and a finding that an applicant's lack of knowledge is a reason for rejection does not necessarily imply an initial, preconceived standard. The court noted that the applicant's inability to articulate his reasons for conversion, his lack of familiarity with the Bible, and his general lack of credibility provided a lawful foundation for the Tribunal's finding that he was not a genuine convert. The court found that the Tribunal's assessment was made in the particular context explained in its decision, and it did not operate from the premise that all believers must have certain specific knowledge.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The relevant principles enunciated by the Full Federal Court were summarised by Bromberg J in SZLSP v Minister for Immigration[23]. At [26] his Honour cited passages from the judgment of Kenny J in Minister for Immigration v SZLSP at [37]-[40], including as follows. I accept that a Tribunal which relies on the premise that “every believer or follower of [a religion] must have certain knowledge or provide certain answers concerning aspects of that religion” may well fail to engage with the question whether the particular applicant before it is in fact a follower of the religion, and so fall into jurisdictional error. There is, however, a difference between: (a) operating from the premise that all believers will have certain specific knowledge; and (b) concluding, after exploring the matter and without any preconception as to what knowledge all believers will demonstrate, that a particular applicant’s lack of knowledge indicates that he is not a genuine adherent of a religion. Further, it must be remembered that the Tribunal’s written reasons typically represent a Tribunal’s concluded view after considering all the evidence. If a Tribunal ultimately finds that an applicant’s lack of particular knowledge is a reason to reject his claim, this finding does not necessarily mean that the Tribunal approached the matter from the outset on the a priori basis that the applicant was required to demonstrate that knowledge. Absent an explicit statement in the Tribunal’s reasons that an applicant must meet a particular standard of knowledge to establish that he is a follower of his claimed religion, it may not always be possible to distinguish a potentially illegitimate a priori approach from a legitimate exploration of an applicant’s knowledge. As the analysis in WALT and SBCC demonstrates, the Tribunal’s reliance on other factors besides its evaluation of an applicant’s knowledge will typically be a strong indicator that the Tribunal has conducted a legitimate exploration rather than made a determination by reference to a preconceived minimum standard of knowledge … . [emphasis added][23] [2012] FCA 451 The Minister submits and I accept that, in the present case, the language used by the Tribunal does not support a conclusion that the Tribunal’s exploration of the applicant’s familiarity with or knowledge of the Bible and basic tenets of Christianity amounts to “operating from the premise that all believers will have certain specific knowledge”, and the finding ultimately made by the Tribunal was made in the particular context explained at [76] of the Tribunal’s decision, referred to below. In light of what is stated there by the Tribunal, it is clear that it did not operate “from the premise that all believers will have certain specific knowledge”. In the present case the applicant’s inability to articulate his reasons for embracing Christianity, coupled with his lack of familiarity with the Bible and his general lack of credibility, provide not only an adequate, but ample and lawful foundation for the finding that the applicant is not a genuine convert to Christianity.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established