Ames v The Queen - [2013] HCATrans 214

[2013] HCATrans 214

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A7 of 2013

B e t w e e n -
DANIEL TROY AMES
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

FRENCH CJ
KIEFEL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM PERTH BY VIDEO LINK TO ADELAIDE

ON WEDNESDAY, 11 SEPTEMBER 2013, AT 10.33 AM

MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR B.J. DOYLE, for the applicant. (instructed by Patsouris & Associates).

MR M.G. HINTON, QC, Solicitor‑General for the State of South Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS H.H.L. DUONG, for the respondent. (instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA).

FRENCH CJ: Thank you.

MR WALKER: Your Honour, at the outset there is an application by us for an extension of time for the application for special leave which I understand my learned friend does not oppose.

MR HINTON: That is correct.

FRENCH CJ: Thank you. Time will be extended. Yes, Mr Walker?

MR WALKER: If it please the Court. Your Honours, at the foot of page 35 to the top of page 36 of the application book, it is revealed in the remarks on sentencing by the learned trial judge just what had not been done when his Honour made findings for the purposes of conviction. For the purposes of conviction, as was conceded by the respondent in the Court of Criminal Appeal and it is clear from a reading of the conviction reasons, no finding of any kind was made about the state of mind, let alone about how it matched one of the requisite forms of intention necessary to support a conviction of murder. That is a conviction of murder as opposed perhaps to one of the ways in which a conviction for manslaughter would have been proper or perhaps supporting an acquittal completely.

FRENCH CJ: There is no suggestion, of course, having regard to what his Honour said at page 11 that he was unconscious of the requirement.

MR WALKER: Quite so. I will come back to that, to the way in which what is said in the dot points at page 11 in paragraph 43 in just one moment but there is certainly no suggestion that it was not explicitly known. I have to both deal with that and turn it to some advantage, as I will in a moment. At pages 35 and 36, one knows in the remarks on sentencing that there was a position taken which involved, noticing that there were some matters that could not be taken beyond speculation, that there was a step taken in relation to the state of mind for the purpose of sentencing.

It being taken at that stage, of course, had this significance; that the silence of the prisoner was held against him in the way in which the sentencing…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Ames v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Ames v The Queen [2013] HCATrans 214
Case: [2013] HCATrans 214
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Ames v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Ames, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of certain evidence during his trial.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of the applicant's prior convictions and prior bad character. This involved determining whether the prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed its probative value, and whether its admission was otherwise unfair to the applicant.

The High Court reasoned that the admission of evidence of prior convictions and bad character, particularly when it suggested a propensity to commit the offence charged, could be highly prejudicial. The Court applied the principle that such evidence is generally inadmissible unless it has a specific probative value beyond merely showing a tendency to commit the crime. In this instance, the Court found that the evidence had not been properly admitted, as its prejudicial effect was substantial and its probative value was not sufficiently established to justify its admission.

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders