FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Ames & Caddy [2023] FedCFamC1F 133
File number(s): BRC 2566 of 2022 Judgment of: MCGUIRE J Date of judgment: 9 March 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application by mother to review a decision of a Senior Judicial Registrar’s in respect of interim parenting arrangements where orders were made that the children live with the father – where the children had lived with the mother since the parents’ separation in 2017 – where orders had been made by consent in September 2020 confirming the children to live primarily with the mother and spend weekend and holiday time with the father – Hearing de novo – consideration of s60CC factors – order for children to remain living with the mother confirming the consent orders of September 2020 – order for prioritised trial Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B and 60CC Cases cited: Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC–643; [2015] FamCAFC 104
Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93–286; [2006] FamCA 1346
Marvel & Marvel [2010] FamCAFC 101
SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13
Banks & Banks (2023) FLC93-637
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 83 Date of hearing: 7 March 2023 Place: Hobart Solicitor for the Applicant: Litigant in person Solicitor for the Respondent: Litigant in Person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Berck Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Berck Solicitors ORDERS
BRC 2566 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR AMES
Applicant
AND: MS CADDY
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
order made by:
MCGUIRE J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 March 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Orders 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Orders made on 2 February 2023 be discharged.
2.The Orders of the 9 September 2020 be reinstated and remain in full force and effect from this day.
3.These orders permit the mother to collect the children X born 2013 (age 10 years) (“X”) and Y born 2014 (aged eight years) (“Y”) from their school this day or otherwise as arranged between the parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer.
4.The mother be permitted to provide a copy of these orders to the Principal of the children’s school.
5.Pursuant to s.65DA(2) and s.62B, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.
6.There be liberty to both parents, Mr Ames and Ms Caddy, to apply on short notice to McGuire J or any other Judicial Officer of this Court in respect of the report/assessments of the parents.
7.The matter remains listed for trial directions before a Registrar of this Court on 15 March 2023 with the matter to be allocated a trial date with such priority as the Court can offer.
Note: The form…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the existing care arrangements were still in the best interests of the children, given the recent changes in living arrangements and the allegations of family violence and emotional distress affecting the children. The court also needed to consider the urgency of the matter and the potential impact of delaying a decision on the children's well-being. Another key issue was the credibility and weight to be given to the mutual allegations of family violence and the psychological assessments of the children.
The court proceeded with the hearing without waiting for the psychiatric assessments, which were not expected to be completed for several weeks. The judge acknowledged the importance of these assessments but determined that other urgent considerations necessitated an immediate ruling. The court emphasised the need for caution in making findings in such interim proceedings, where evidence is untested and issues of credibility and disputed facts are difficult to resolve. The judge noted the agreed facts, including the children's primary residence with the mother since separation, the recent period of living with the father, and the children's diagnosed emotional conditions. Despite the mutual allegations of domestic violence, the court decided that these issues, given the long-standing separation of the parents and the prior consent orders, should not be the primary focus of its decision on the children's best interests.
The court ultimately decided to maintain the existing care arrangements, with the children primarily residing with the mother and continuing to spend time with the father as per the previous consent orders. The judge ordered that either parent could bring the matter back before the court if they believed that the psychiatric assessments raised relevant matters. This decision allowed for a timely resolution of the immediate issues concerning the children's care while also providing a mechanism for revisiting the case if necessary based on the forthcoming assessments.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The ICL made only brief submissions and effectively in support of the father’s case to be primary carer. The matter was stood down for over two hours to allow the ICL to read the relatively brief affidavit filed only the day before by the father and to “prepare” her submissions. Those submissions emphasised what she thought was the risk to the children’s emotional psyche in the care of the mother. It is clear, and she says as much, that the ICL effectively adopted as recommendations some of the observations and suggestions of the Family Consultant and the Evatt Reporter as being unequivocal recommendations.CONSIDERATION Not unusually at this interim stage of proceedings, this is a matter where there is much dispute together with mutual allegation and denial. Issues of credit and disputed fact are difficult in the extreme to determine without the testing of the evidence. As such, I note the various authorities that suggest the making of findings in such disputed interim proceeding should be couched with greater circumspection and some caution. The known and agreed facts are few but relevant and are summarised as follows:(1)the children have lived primarily with their mother since separation in 2017; (2)the status quo of the children living with their mother and having weekend and holiday time with their father was sanctioned by consent orders made in September 2020 and, as advised to the parties, matters raised now which occurred prior to the entering of consent orders are of little or no consideration for the Court at this stage subject to argument otherwise; (3)the children have now lived with the father since early 2023 being a period of just less than five weeks; (4)the orders, the subject of the Review, have served to completely sever any relationship for these children with their mother by way of contact or communication;(5)it is agreed that the children suffer from various levels of anxiety, trauma, and/or depression;(6)the assessments of H Psychology offer that X has a provisional diagnosis of ADHD (moderate severity) and that Y has a diagnosis of a behavioural disorder. The H Psychology Assessment does not assist us as to the causes of these conditions. Each of the parents is keen to blame the other for the children’s emotional difficulties and each is reluctant to look at any contributory or other cause for those conditions; and(7)the parties agree, and it is blatantly obvious, that these parents continue an acrimonious, critical, accusative, and suspicious relationship. Where there are denials and the lack of testing of evidence, I am unable to make findings of fact in respect of the mother’s allegations against the father of the domestic violence of various types. I do say, however, and in circumstances where the parents separated as long ago as 2017 and were able to reach consensus by consent orders in respect of their children in September 2020, such issues should not dominate my consideration now as to the children’s best interests.