Amanda Gibson v Darley Piper Australia

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[2011] FWA 6148


FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy

Amanda Gibson
v
Darley Piper Australia
(U2009/14994)

COMMISSIONER RAFFAELLI

SYDNEY, 12 SEPTEMBER 2011

Termination f employment - application to withdraw Notice of Discontinuance - application refused.

[1] On 7 January 2010 Ms Amanda Gibson (the Applicant) filed an application under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Fair Work Act) for an unfair dismissal remedy. The Applicant indicated that her employment had been terminated by Darley Australia Pty Ltd (the Respondent) on 2 September 2009.

[2] The application was the subject of conciliation by telephone before a Fair Work Australia conciliator on 11 February 2010.

[3] On 12 February 2010, the Applicant signed a notice of discontinuance (NOD) in respect of her application. (The document on file suggests that the NOD was signed on 11 February 2010. However, in her evidence in proceedings before me, the Applicant said that she signed the NOD on the day after the conciliation).

[4] On 13 July 2011, the Applicant applied to set aside the NOD.

[5] One of the grounds raised in the motion filed on 13 July 2011 was an alleged failure by the Respondent to comply with the obligation under section 530 of the Fair Work Act. In proceedings on 22 August 2011, I indicated that the operation of section 530 was irrelevant to the application to set aside the NOD. It does not seem to have been pursued.

[6] It should be noted that the Applicant’s original application of 7 January 2010 was not filed in time. Time has yet to be extended. However, proceedings before me on 2 September 2011 concerned the Applicant’s application to have the NOD set aside.

[7] The Applicant was represented by Mr D. McGrane. The Applicant gave evidence.

[8] The Applicant’s evidence was that in the conciliation proceedings of 11 February 2010, the conciliator had focused on the fact that the application had been made out of time. The conciliator said that an extension of time for filing the application would not be granted. The conciliator suggested that the Applicant discontinue the matter.

[9] The Applicant said that she accepted the conciliator’s suggestion to discontinue because she was told that there would be no extension of time given. Indeed, it was her evidence that the conciliator had said that the extension of time question could not be heard (Paragraph [192] of transcript).

[10] Although during the conciliation the question of the Respondent’s pursuit of costs was raised, it was not a matter which she considered before agreeing to sign the NOD.

[11] Mr McGrane put that the conciliator was incorrect in her view. The Applicant had acted upon that advice when signing the NOD. Given the circumstances, the Applicant should be allowed to have the NOD set aside.

[12] Mr McGrane also explained that the failure by the Applicant to move to set aside the NOD signed on 12 February 2010 until 13 July 2011…

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Details
Case
[2011] FWA 6148
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Amanda Gibson initiated proceedings against Darley Piper Australia concerning the termination of her employment. Gibson sought to discontinue the proceedings, however, Darley Piper opposed the application on the grounds that it would be unjust to allow the discontinuance. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether Gibson's application to withdraw her notice of discontinuance should be granted.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the application to withdraw the notice of discontinuance should be allowed. This involved a consideration of the circumstances under which a party may seek to discontinue proceedings and the factors that the court must weigh in deciding whether such an application should be granted. The court was also required to examine the potential prejudice to the respondent if the application were to be allowed and whether there were any other compelling reasons to permit the withdrawal of the notice of discontinuance.

In assessing the matter, the court noted that the application to withdraw the notice of discontinuance was made shortly before the scheduled hearing and that Darley Piper had already incurred significant costs in preparing for the hearing. The court found that allowing the withdrawal would cause substantial prejudice to Darley Piper and that there were no exceptional circumstances that would warrant permitting the discontinuance. Consequently, the court refused Gibson's application to withdraw the notice of discontinuance.

The court's decision was based on the balance of convenience and the principle that discontinuance should not be allowed if it would unjustly prejudice the respondent. The court concluded that the application should be refused as it would result in significant prejudice to Darley Piper without any corresponding benefit to Gibson. The court emphasised that parties must carefully consider the implications of discontinuing proceedings and that the court would not readily permit such applications if they would cause undue prejudice to the respondent.

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